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A. Members of the Trial Defense Team. 3 The core members of a capital defense
team include two attorneys, an investigator, and a mitigation specialist. See ABA
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, Guideline 4.1.A.1. Accordingly, Mr. Hall requests the depositions
of the following individuals:
1. Lead counsel - Rob Chastain.

Mr. Chastain has refused Mr. Hall's

attempts to speak confidentially about his representation, indicating that he
would only discuss the case in the presence of a State's representative. 4
2. Co-counsel - Deborah Krista!.
Kristal. Like Mr. Chastain, Ms. Kristal has also
refused

Mr.

Hall's

attempts

to

speak

confidentially

about

her

representation. In fact, Ms. Kristal has indicated that she views the State's
representative, Jan Bennetts, as her attorney in these post-conviction
proceedings. 5
3. Investigator - Gary Starkey.
4. Mitigation specialist - Bruce and James Whitman.
In addition, Mr. Hall moves this Court to issue subpoenas decus tecum for each of
the above depositions, to include the following: 1) documentation identifying the cases
that the individual trial team member worked on during the course of their representation;

2) all e-mail correspondence between the individual trial team member and other team
Mr. Hall reserves the right to request discovery including the depositions of members of
his original trial team, including Amil Myshin and D.C. Carr. However, without the full
cooperation of trial counsel (Rob Chastain and Deborah Kristal), it is impossible to
determined to what extent, if any, original trial counsel influenced the course of successor
counsels'representation.

3

4

Undersigned counsel is willing to provide an affidavit if the State disputes this claim.

5

See supra, fn. 4.

MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
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members including their agents, such as expert witnesses; and 3) all email
correspondence between the individual trial team member and the Ada County
Prosecutor's Office and its agents.

II.
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
A. Documents in the Possession of the Ada County Coroner's Office. 6

The

requested documents are relevant to, and are necessary to provide full factual
support for, Mr. Hall's claims for post-conviction relief, e.g., Claim M
("Deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel by failing to adequately
investigate guilt-phase issues - failure to challenge the pathology"). See Amended
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed April 7, 2009 (herein "Amended
Petition"), p.61.
1. All bench notes from the Cheryl Hanlon autopsy, sexual assault kit and
any other procedures performed or observed by Dr. Glenn Groben or any
other Ada County Coroner personnel.
2. Any peer review, formal or informal, whether internal or external to the
Ada County Coroner's Office, as well as any documentation related
thereto, of Dr. Groben's opinions based on his examination and autopsy in
the underlying criminal case, or confirmation that no peer review was
conducted.
3. Any notes, reports, or dictations of findings made by Dr. Groben at or near
the body recovery scene.
4. Copies of any diagrams prepared at the time of the physical examination
and autopsy.

See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (holding that the prosecutor must actively
search its files and the files of related agencies expected to have possession of evidence
favorable to the defense).
6
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5. Any complaints filed against Dr. Groben and/or the Ada County Coroner
with any agency or professional association regarding his/its professional
performance, qualifications or veracity.
6. Scanned, accessible, high-resolution files of all photos of Ms. Hanlon's
body, including any reenactment photographs.
7. A copy of the forensic pathology procedural manual currently in effect as
well as in effect in March 2003 for the Ada County Coroner's Office.
8. All notes, reports and recordings made by or at the direction of the
Coroner's Office or its agents regarding the death of Amanda Stroud.
9. Documentation of all correspondence between Dr. Groben or his agents
and other non-lay or expert witnesses or potential witnesses or their
agents.
10. A copy of Dr. Groben's billing records or invoices for the instant case.
11. Any notes, reports, or results of tests in the Cheryl Hanlon case regarding
the following:
a. Reconstruction of ligatures
b. Fingernail clippings
c. Blood sample (tube)
12. Death Certificate of Ms. Hanlon from Ada County Coroner's office,
signed by Glen Groben.
13. Ms. Hanlon's Record of Death from Ada County Coroner.
B. Documents in the Possession of the Ada County Prosecutor's Office.

The

requested documents are relevant to, and are necessary to provide full factual
support for, Mr. Hall's claims for post-conviction relief; the particular claims are
noted below following the specific requests.
1. Color copies of any illustrative exhibits utilized during the State's guilt
phase case (including opening statements and closing arguments). See e.g.,
Amended Petition, Claim N ("The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct
During Guilt Phase Closing Arguments"); Claim 0 ("Deprivation Of The
Effective Assistance Of Counsel Due To Trial Counsels' Failure To
Object To Prosecutorial Misconduct During Guilt Phase Closing
Arguments").

MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
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Object To Prosecutorial Misconduct During Guilt Phase Closing
Arguments").
Arguments") .
2. Color copies of any illustrative exhibits utilized during the State's
sentencing phase case (including opening statements and closing
arguments). See e.g., Amended Petition, Claim R ("The Prosecutor
Committed Misconduct During Sentencing-Phase Opening Statements By
Improperly Appealing To The Emotion, Passion, Or Prejudice Of The
Jury"); Claim S ("Deprivation Of The Effective Assistance Of Counsel By
Failing To Object To Prosecutorial Misconduct During Sentencing-Phase
Opening Statements").
3. Color copies of all PowerPoint slides and other documents shown to the
jury. See supra, Request Nos. 1-2.
4. Copies of all e-mails between the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's
office and the Ada County Public Defender's office regarding the Hanlon
case, including but not limited to, stipulations regarding evidence,
instructions, motions, and prospective jurors, as well as any plea
negotiations. See Amended Petition, Claim E ("Deprivation Of The
Effective Assistance Of Counsel During Jury Selection"); Claim L
("Deprivation Of The Effective Assistance Of Counsel Due To Trial
Counsels' Failure To Object To Giving A Special Jury Instruction
Regarding Amanda Stroud"); Claim P ("Deprivation Of The Effective
Assistance Of Counsel Due To Trial Counsels' Failure To Request
Adequate Jury Instructions And Supplemental Instructions Regarding
Felony Murder"); Claim KK ("Deprivation Of The Effective Assistance
Of Counsel For Failing To Request Sentencing Phase Jury Instructions").
5. All documented communications, or summaries of communications, by
the prosecutor's office with all expert witnesses, whether or not called at
trial, including but not limited to the Ada County Coroner's Office. This
request also includes any tests or results of examinations of the shoe prints
found at the scene with shoes allegedly worn by Erick Hall at the time of
Ms. Hanlon's death.
6. All documented communications, or summaries of communications, by
the prosecutor's office with the media, including but not limited to press
releases. See Amended Petition, Claim D ("Deprivation Of The Effective
Assistance Of Counsel Due To Trial Counsels' Failure To Object To
Impaneling A Jury From Gooding County In Lieu Of Changing Venue").
7. Gary Starkey's
Starkey'S dates of employment and the names of the homicide and
rape cases he worked on while employed by the Ada County Prosecutor's
office. See Amended Petition, Claim A ("Deprivation Of The Effective

MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
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Assistance Of Counsel Due To A Complete Breakdown In The AttorneyClient Relationship").
C. Documents in the Possession of the Ada County Prosecutor's Office Relating to
Particular Witnesses.
1. Jeff Carlson. See e.g., Amended Petition, Claim M.4 ("Deprivation Of The

Effective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To Adequately Investigate
Guilt-Phase Issues - Failure To Adequately Investigate And/Or Examine
The State's Guilt-Phase Witnesses")
a. All written statements and summaries of statements made by Jeff
Carlson regarding the nature and scope of the argument he had
2003IMarch 1, 2003, and
with Cheryl Hanlon on February 28 2003/March
statements and summaries of statements made by any other
individuals, regarding that argument.
2. Amanda Stroud. See e.g., Amended Petition, Claim L ("Deprivation Of
The Effective Assistance Of Counsel Due To Trial Counsels' Failure To
Object To Giving A Special Jury Instruction Regarding Amanda Stroud").
a. All written statements and summaries of statements made by or
attributed to Ms. Stroud, regardless of medium, in the presence of
the prosecuting attorney or investigator.
b. All written statements and summaries of statements made by or
attributed to Ms. Stroud, regardless of medium, in the presence of a
law enforcement officer.
c. All audio or video recordings, wrItmgs, or other mediums of
communications made by Ms. Stroud and obtained by the
prosecutor or law enforcement (Mr. Hall is currently is in
possession of the transcript of the 03110/03 interview by Detectives
Morgan and Smith, transcriber unknown, but does not have
possession of the corresponding audio or video recording.)
d. All law enforcement and prosecution investigative reports, notes,
and files regarding the Amanda Stroud homicide investigation.
e. March 9, 2003 recordings from Ada County Jail referenced in
Affidavit for Search Warrant indicating Amanda Stroud called
Kathy Stroud from Ada County Jail.

MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
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f. All recorded conversations between Erick Hall and Amanda Stroud
from the Ada County Jail as referenced in the Affidavit for Search
Warrant, not notarized, signed on notary signature line by Judge
Minder on April 17, 2003.
g. Any documentation in which Amanda Stroud indicates that she
had engaged in consensual autoerotic asphyxiation with Erick Hall,
or any other documentation indicating that Mr. Hall expressed any
interest in asphyxiation during consensual sexual relations.
h. Any documentation in which Amanda Stroud indicates that Erick
Hall ever "blacked out" or experienced a mood change during
sexual relations or when touched on the neck.
3. Kathy Stroud. Ms. Stroud reported her suspicions that Erick Hall was
involved in the Cheryl Hanlon homicide to law enforcement based on
hearsay information apparently conveyed by her daughter, Amanda
Stroud. See e.g., Amended Petition, Claim L ("Deprivation Of The
Effective Assistance Of Counsel Due To Trial Counsels' Failure To
Object To Giving A Special Jury Instruction Regarding Amanda Stroud").
a. All written statements and summaries of statements made by or
attributed to Ms. Stroud, regardless of medium, in the presence of
the prosecuting attorney or investigator.
b. All written statements and summaries of statements made by or
attributed to Ms. Stroud, regardless of medium, in the presence of a
law enforcement officer.
c. Photographs provided by Kathy Stroud to investigator Doug
Traubel on March 5, 2007 showing brown shoes allegedly taken
between November 11,2002 and January 1,2003.
4. Norma Jean Oliver.
a. All written statements and summaries of statements made by or
attributed to Ms. Oliver, regardless of medium, in the presence of
the prosecuting attorney or investigator, limited to such statements
made following Mr. Hall's arrest for the Hanlon and Henneman
murders.
b. All written statements and summaries of statements made by or
attributed to Ms. Oliver, regardless of medium, in the presence of a
law enforcement officer, limited to such statements made
following Mr. Hall's arrest for the Hanlon and Henneman murders.

MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
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5. Dr. Pablo Stuart. See e.g., Claim AA.4 ("Deprivation Of The Effective
Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To Adequately Investigate And Present
Mitigating Evidence - Trial Counsel Failed To Adequately Investigate,
Prepare And Present Evidence Through Expert Witness Testimony")
a. Copy of the video tape deposition of Dr. Pablo Stuart.
D. Documents in Possession of Law Enforcement Agencies.
1. Field notes and logbooks. Because police reports do not contain all
information contained in original field notes and logbooks, Mr. Hall
requests all field notes and logbooks generated by any law enforcement
officer in the course of the investigation of the Henneman and Hanlon
homicides.
2. Unredacted Handwritten Notes. s8 Mr. Hall specifically requests unredacted
handwritten notes from the following officers:
a. Brett Quilter;
b. Dave Smith; and
c. Mark Vucinich.
3. Correspondence. All correspondence or summaries of correspondence
between law enforcement and other state and federal agencies regarding
the Hanlon case homicide investigation.
4. FBI I-Drives. Copies of all reports, communications or files contained on
any I-Drive of any FBI field office involved in the Henneman or Hanlon
investigation, including, but not limited to the Salt Lake City and Boise
field offices.
5. Task Force Lead Assignments.
6. Miscellaneous Investigative Reports and Other Documentation. Any and
all FBI reports containing "profiling" of the perpetrator in the Lynn
Henneman and Cheryl Hanlon murders.
7. Prior Offenses.
a. Copy of all police reports and notes regarding Ada County Case
No. M0303573, the Failing to Register as a Sex Offender case filed
against Mr. Hall.

8

Redacted versions of these notes were obtained in discovery by trial counsel.
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b. Police reports regarding Ada County Case No. H9600534, the
escape case filed against Mr. Hall.
8. Media Contact. All documented communications, or summaries of
communications, by law enforcement with the media, including but not
limited to press releases.
9. Specific Reports, Documents, and Recordings.
a. A copy of the report of officer Delgadillo regarding the arrest of
Kenneth Tittle referenced in officer Vucinich's report.
b. A copy of the crime scene video, with audio, initially made by
Craig Nixon referenced in Tr., Vol. IX, p. 4668.
c. A copy of the Idaho Power security camera footage of alleged
appearance of Erick Hall and Ms. Hanlon.
d. A copy of the transcript and any recordings of interview of Jason
Vanderesch conducted by Greg Morgan and Mark Ayotte.
e. A copy of the relevant portion of the 'Crime Lab Activity'
electronic database referencing the underlying case.
f.

A copy of the photo lineup shown to Daryl Lady on March 10,
2003 at 6:05pm.

g. A copy of attachment to lead sheet #50 (the notes indicate that a
crime stoppers memo was attached; however, nothing is attached
to the copy in discovery though a paperclip was photocopied on
page.)
h. Copies of the Violent Criminal Apprehension Program, a 15 page
document referenced in Dave Smiths testimony, and the five
similar incidents resulting from that search. (Tr., Vol. XI, pp.6123
- 6124.)
10. Documentation regarding DNA evidence.
a. All documentation relating to entry of Mr. Hall's DNA profile into
the Idaho CODIS database, or any local or state database.
b. All documentation relating to entry of Mr. Hall's DNA profile into
the national NDIS database, or any national database.

MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
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11. Rewards. All documentation and information regarding reward money
offered for assistance in the Henneman and Hanlon homicide
investigations including claims made on such reward.
12. Documentation Regarding Sex Offender Registration. Documentation
from the Idaho sex offender registry involving registration, or attempts at
registration, by Erick Hall
13. Miscellaneous Documents and Reports. Copies of any and all written
questions by jury to the court, any bailiff, or other court personnel.
14. IMSI, Ada County Jail, Garden City Jail and Other Prison and Jail
Records.
a. Copies of the Ada County Jail Visitation logs regarding trial
counsel or investigator visits to Mr. Hall. See Amended Petition,
Claim A ("Deprivation Of The Effective Assistance Of Counsel
Due To A Complete Breakdown In The Attorney-Client
Relationship").
b. Copies of the Safety Practices Manual. Any and all manuals,
informal or formal policies, memoranda or guidelines regarding
safety practices for female correctional officers or other female
employees or volunteers and inmates classified as or believed to be
sexually violent toward women.
15. Documents Requiring Subpoenas
a. Copies of all Washington DSHS Division of Child Support records
McCrackenlHall in Case
pertaining to Frank McCracken and Jean McCracken/Hall
No. 70253. Court Order to specify that need for records outweighs
need for privacy. See Amended Petition, Claim AA ("Deprivation
Of The Effective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To Adequately
Investigate And Present Mitigating Evidence").
DATED this 17th day August,

2009'~llv~uLt 0.
0 .~
2009'~llv~ult
MARK J. ACKLEY
Lea Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit

0,
o.
NICOLE OWENS
Co-Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit

MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 17th day of August, 2009, served a
true and correct copy of the forgoing MOTION FOR DISCOVERY as indicated
below:
JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

Statehouse Mail
U.S.
Mail
-Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery
---->--

'I.
'!.

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

Administrative Assistant

MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
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Neville082809

Session: Neville082809
Session Date: 2009/08/28
Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Reporter: Wolf, Sue

Division: DC
Session Time:

Courtroom:

CR501

08:30

Clerk(s)
Ellis, Janet
State Attorneys:
Public Defender(s)
Prob.

Officer(s):

Court interpreter(s)

Case ID:

0002
Case Number: CVOC08-3085
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK
Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO
Co-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney:
State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
Public Defender:

2009/08/28
11:03:50 - Operator
Recording:
11:03:50 - New case
, STATE OF IDAHO
11:04:22 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Time set for status conference.
11:05:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court notes Answer filed and received draft of proposed stip
and proposed
11:05:35 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
order to implement the stipulation for scheduling.
11:06:07 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
Mr. Ackleley stated stip signed this morning.
Tenders to Co
urt
11:08:40 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court notes couple of changes to stipulation, Counsel ha
ve now signed and
11:08:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
initialed.
11:09:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court entered proposed order which tracks with stipulation.
11:10:13 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
Mr. Ackley advised Court that SAPO's office schedule opened
a little.
But
11:10:59 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL

001074
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<
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believe with State's calendar the scheduling order will work
11:12:32 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
Ms.Bennetts responded regarding schedule.
Working hard to g
et discovery
11:13:07 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
completed.
11:13:26 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
Mr. Ackley advised Court on Hall I, schedule.
State has bri
ef due Sept 18th
11:14:01 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
and SAPO's brief due mid october.
Supreme Court docket fill
ed until end of
11:14:32 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
year, so hearing may not be until February next year.
11:14:52 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
Ms. Bennetts responded re: petition re: sealed hearing, may
need some access
VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
11:15:36 - State Attorney: VARlE,
to that record.
Believe there was 2 or 3 hearings that may
need to have
11:15:56 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
unsealed.
11:17:02 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
Believe can work out stipulation on that.
Applies to waivor
of attorney
11:17:43 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
client privilege.
11:18:03 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court responded
11:18:25 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
Believe that Court will probably rule that atty/client waivo
r.
Do not
11:19:02 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
believe State need to file another motion.
11:19:10 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
Believe can stip to some things and try to get discovery
co
mpleted by end of
11:19:33 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
year.
11:19:36 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court has October 30th available.
Would like to see in
advance what
11:21:15 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
stipulations counsel have resolved.
Would like to know what
is contested.
11:22:04 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court will request any stipulations and any matters cont
ested be
11:22:52 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
submitted to Court by October 16th.
11:24:09 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Counsel can submit by email.
11:24:27 - Operator
Stop recording:
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

-------------)
----------------------------)

PETITIONERIRESPONDENT'S
STIPULATION FOR AMENDMENT
OF SCHEDULING ORDER

(CAPITAL CASE)

COMES NOW, Petitioner ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorney Mark
Ackley at the State Appellate Public Defender's office (hereinafter "SAPD"), and Respondent,
STATE OF IDAHO, in and for the County of Ada, by and through its attorney Jan Bennetts at
the Ada County Prosecutor's Office, and hereby submit this stipulation regarding the scheduling
of post-conviction proceedings in the above-captioned case.
Petitioner and Respondent agree to the following modifications of the Scheduling Order
issued on February 2,2009:
(1)

Petitioner filed his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on April 7,2009;

(2)

Respondent filed an Answer to the Amended Petition on August 5, 2009;

(3)

Petitioner and Respondent filed their motions for discovery by August 15,2009;

STIPULATION FOR AMENDMENT OF SCHEDULING ORDER

1

001076

1

(4)

Petitioner and Respondent shall file their responses to motions for discovery no
later than October 9, 2009;

(5)

Petitioner and Respondent shall file their replies to the responses to motions for
discovery within fourteen (14) days thereafter, said replies being due no later than
October 23, 2009;

(6)

The parties shall be prepared for a hearing on the motions for discovery within
seven (7) days thereafter, said hearing being held on or about October 30, 2009,
depending on the Court's docket;

(7)

The parties shall complete discovery and any Court-ordered depositions no later
than April 26, 2010;

(8)

Petitioner shall file his Final Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
(hereinafter "Final Amended Petition") within sixty (60) days of the completion
of discovery or the receipt of all transcripts from any Court-ordered depositions,
whichever occurs later;

(9)

Respondent shall file an Answer to the Final Amended Petition within

one

hundred twenty (120) days after the filing of the final Amended Petition;
(10)

Petitioner and Respondent shall file all dispositive motions within sixty (60) days
after the filing of Respondent's Answer;

(11)

Petitioner and Respondent shall file all responses to dispositive motions within
sixty (60) days after the filing of the dispositive motions;

Based on the foregoing, the parties ask this Honorable Court to grant a scheduling order
implementing the above procedures, as reflected in the proposed Scheduling Order filed
herewith.

STIPULATION FOR AMENDMENT OF SCHEDULING ORDER
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this2'8 l-1day of

A\A~\As+1YJ~ b

Qcbbd
Ocbbd

,2009.

om

~~
J~~

J
. Bennetts
Deputy Ada County Prosecutor

STIPULAnON FOR AMENDMENT OF SCHEDULING ORDER
STIPULAnON
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NO.____~~~____- - - NU

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
LS.B. # 4843

---,-.
f"Vl--:-/1-,.r,F1LEi'F.o~---/J FILED
. I'"'Vl

A.M.! \ :~ f}!:

P.M.

'----2882009
200S
AUG 2

MARK J. ACKLEY, LS.B. # 6330
NICOLE OWENS, LS.B. # 7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

By
~

D~~NAVARRO
C1e. f1(
J. D~.~
NAVo\~~O ClE.erk
_A12 ,(~J -L! 0~~
_A1'"L,(~
.

OEPUlY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

------------.)
--------------------------)

Case No. CVPC08-03085
AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER
FOR POST-CONVICTION
PROCEEDINGS

(CAPITAL CASE)

THIS COURT HAVING considered the party's respective positions during a hearing
held on August 28, 2009, and this Court being otherwise fully informed, hereby incorporates its
findings from said hearing and enters the below scheduling order for the above-captioned postconviction proceedings.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
(1)

Petitioner filed his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on April 7, 2009;

(2)

Respondent filed an Answer to the Amended Petition on August 5, 2009;

(3)

Petitioner and Respondent filed their motions for discovery by August 15,2009;

(4)

Petitioner and Respondent shall file their responses to motions for discovery no
later than October 9,2009;

POST-CONVICTION
AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER FOR POST
-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
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(5)

Petitioner and Respondent shall file their replies to the responses to motions for
discovery within fourteen (14) days thereafter, said replies being due no later than
October 23, 2009;

(6)

The parties shall be prepared for a hearing on the motions for discovery within
seven (7) days thereafter, said hearing being held on or about October 30, 2009,
depending on the Court's docket;

(7)

The parties shall complete discovery and any Court-ordered depositions no later
than April 26, 2010;

(8)

Petitioner shall file his Final Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
(hereinafter "Final Amended Petition") within sixty (60) days of the completion
of discovery or the receipt of all transcripts from any Court-ordered depositions,
whichever occurs later;

(9)

Respondent shall file an Answer to the Final Amended Petition within

one

hundred twenty (120) days after the filing of the final Amended Petition;
(10)

Petitioner and Respondent shall file all dispositive motions within sixty (60) days
after the filing of Respondent's Answer;

(11)

Petitioner and Respondent shall file all responses to dispositive motions within
sixty (60) days after the filing ofthe dispositive motions;

IT IS SO ORDERED this

2..<4~ay of August, 2009.

THOMAS F. NEVILLE
District Judge

AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER FOR POST
-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
POST-CONVICTION
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~~
__ ~
~~

~AI

t'>AI

P~ary,,2009,
2009, served a true and
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this _#'_11 day of p~
correct copy of the attached NOTICE OF HEARING FOR ENTRY OF SCHEDULING ORDER
by the method indicated below:

JAN M. BENNETTS
DOUGLAS R. VARIE
V ARIE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

MARK 1. ACKLEY
NICOLE OWENS
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
BOISE, ID 83703

X

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
~Facsimile
~Facsimile

~ Hand Delivery

J. DAVID NAVARRO
CLERK OF THE COURT

AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER FOR POST-CONVICTION
POST -CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
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:712I{(2 . .u~::~~~.~.
~~:~~~.~. ___
SEP 222009
J. OAVIO NAVARRO. Clerk
ByL.AMES
DepUTY

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Jan M. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 4606
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
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)

Case No. CV-PC-08-03085
STATE'S OBJECTION TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION
FOR DISCOVERY
(HALL II)

-------------)
---------------------------)

COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the
County of Ada, State of Idaho, in the above entitled matter, and enters the State's
Objection to the Petitioner's Motion for Discovery which was filed on or about August
17, 2009.

The State hereby incorporates by reference the State's Memorandum in

Support of the State's Objection to the Petitioner's Motion for Discovery filed with this
STATE'S OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II),
Page 1
001082

...

Objection. The State objects to the Petitioner's Discovery Request on the basis that the
"fishing expedition" as
discovery requests in the Petitioner's Motion are a precluded "fishing
described in Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397 (Ct. App. 1999). The State requests that
the Court exercise its discretion and not order discovery until the Petitioner shows that
each item of discovery is necessary to protect the petitioner's substantial rights.
Aechliman, supra; State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803 (Ct. App. 2003).

t7//$tt day of September, 2009.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this t7//s.t

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

-1f..
~ day of September 2009, a true and

correct copy of the foregoing State's Objection to Petitioner's Motion for Discovery was
served on Mark J. Ackley, Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders, 3647 Lake

Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho 83703 in the manner noted below:

~By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first
class.
o By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
IJ

By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for
pickup at the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.

IJ

By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at th

csimile number: _ _ __
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-PC-08-03085
CV-PC-08-03085
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF THE STATE'S
OBJECTION TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION
FOR DISCOVERY
(HALL II)

-------------)
----------------------------)
COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and provides the State's Memorandum in Support of the
State's Objection to the Petitioner's Motion for Discovery in the above-entitled case.
The Petitioner filed his Motion for Discovery on August 17, 2009, requesting
depositions, a number of various documents and other evidence.
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I. LAW
Idaho Criminal Rule 57 (b) states as follows:
Filing and processing. The petition for post-conviction relief shall
be filed by the clerk of the court as a separate civil case and be
processed under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure except as
otherwise ordered by the trial court; provided the provisions for
discovery in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure shall not apply to the
proceedings unless and only to the extent ordered by the trial court.
Discovery in post-conviction cases has been limited in a number of opinions
including the following. In Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397 (Ct. App. 1999), the
Idaho Court of Appeals was considering a post-conviction motion following a seconddegree murder conviction against the defendant, Aeschliman. The defendant in that case
filed a motion for leave to engage in civil discovery, which the district court initially
denied without prejudice. The district court advised the defendant that he could renew his
discovery motion if he specified "particular areas of discovery required and how those
areas were relevant to the application." Id. at 400.

The defendant failed to satisfy the

court's requirements and ultimately the district court denied his discovery request and
granted the State's motion for summary disposition. Id.
The defendant in Aeschliman argued that the denial of his motion for discovery
under Idaho Criminal Rule 57(b) violated the equal protection clause of the United States
and Idaho Constitutions and procedural due process as well. The Court of Appeals held
that the defendant, as an incarcerated individual, was not a member of a suspect class. It
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further held that the granting or denial of discovery did not involve a fundamental
constitutional right. The Court held that the discovery rule involved was not obviously
discriminatory and "lacking in a discernable relationship to a governmental purpose." Id.
at 401.
The Court noted that in an ordinary civil case, "Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(1) limits the scope of discovery to matters that are relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action [and that] from a practical standpoint, the parties self-limit
discovery because of a desire to limit costs." Id. (internal quotations & ellipses omitted).
Additionally, opposing parties can seek protective orders to protect themselves from
oppressive or burdensome discovery. However, in a post-conviction setting there is no
"self-limiting" limitation on discovery because "there is little if any financial disincentive
from engaging in unlimited discovery." Id.

The obvious reason is that the criminal

defendant is usually indigent and is either pro se or has counsel appointed for him.
"Thus, unbridled discovery costs the applicant nothing and sanctions for discovery abuses
are, for the most part, impractical." Id. That is why Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57(b)
"limits discovery so that the prosecution will not be inundated with discovery requests
from applicants who are either unaware of the proper methods and subject areas of
discovery or are simply onfishing expeditions." Id. (emphasis added).
The Court went on to hold that denial of discovery was appropriate unless shown
to be necessary to protect the applicant's substantial rights. The Court stated:
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In order to be granted discovery, a post-conviction applicant must
identify the type of information that he or she may obtain through
discovery that could affect the disposition of his or her application
for post-conviction relief.
Id. at 402.

It is the State's position that the Petitioner's multiple requests for discovery are
nothing more than a fishing expedition and are unwarranted. The Petitioner has made no
showing regarding how his multiple discovery requests would affect the disposition of his
Petition.
The Idaho Supreme Court made a similar finding in Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286
(2000). In Fields, the Court upheld the denial of a discovery request in a successive
petition for post-conviction relief. The Idaho Supreme Court reiterated that "[t]here is no
requirement that the district court order discovery, unless discovery is necessary to protect
an applicant's substantial rights." Id. at 291. In upholding the district court's decision
not to grant the petitioner additional discovery, the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
[t]he information Fields sought was unlikely to be contained in the
prosecutor's files. Furthermore, the potential evidence would be
generated more probably through the continuing efforts of Fields and
his representatives. The district court's denial of the discovery
request does not prevent further investigation on Fields' behalf, and
more importantly, does not deny Fields any substantial rights.
Id.

In Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602 (2001), the Idaho Supreme Court again
considered a discovery question in a post-conviction setting. The Court noted that the
"decision to authorize discovery during post-conviction relief is a matter left to the sound
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S
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discretion of the district court." Id. at 605. In Raudebaugh, the district court reserved
ruling on the petitioner's discovery motion until he filed his second amended petition so
that the court could see if the petition alleged prejudice. "After the second amended
petition was filed, the district court determined that the petition and affidavits failed to
provide evidence that trial counsel's performance was prejudicial. The petition makes
conclusory statements about what an expert and an investigator might have testified at
trial but does not point to specific facts." Id.
The Supreme Court upheld the district court's denial of discovery and the district
court's conclusion that Raudebaugh had failed to provide evidence of prejudice sufficient
to defeat summary dismissal. In Raudebaugh, the petitioner was seeking release of the
knife that was used as a murder weapon for examination by his own expert.
The Idaho Supreme Court stated the following:
Raudebaugh argues that once the district court found that trial
counsel's conduct was deficient, discovery should have been
authorized in the post-conviction action to permit scientific
examination or testing without requiring that the post-conviction
applicant also show any probability that the independent examination
will yield exculpatory evidence. The Court of Appeals accepted
Raudebaugh's position. However, this Court rejects that position in
this case.
Granting discovery is left to the discretion of the trial court. The test
is whether the district court abused its discretion by summarily
dismissing the petition without ruling specifically on the discovery
request. The district court intended for Raudebaugh to make a
showing of prejudice in the second amended petition and concluded
that Raudebaugh failed to provide evidence of prejudice sufficient to
defeat summary dismissal. The district court's conclusion is based
on the fact that Raudebaugh' s allegations only argue what the
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II), Page 5

OBJECTION

TO
001089

experts might have testified to had trial counsel employed them.
Raudebaugh's allegations are speculative. There is no showing that
the state's testing was flawed or that there is new technology that
would make current testing more reliable. The district court did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing the case without authorizing the
requested discovery.
Id.

In State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803 (Ct. App. 2003), the Idaho Court of Appeals
considered a motion for discovery in a post-conviction setting. In upholding the district
court's denial of the petitioner's motion for discovery, the Court quoted Aeschliman,
supra, and stated the following:

Discovery during post-conviction relief proceedings is a matter put
to the sound discretion of the district court. Unless necessary to
protect an applicants substantial rights, the district court is not
required to order discovery. In order to be granted discovery, a postconviction applicant must identify the specific subject matter where
discovery is requested and why discovery as to those matters is
necessary to his or her application.
Id. at 810 (internal citations omitted).

The Court found that the petitioner in LePage identified specific areas of discovery
requested but failed to show why those specific areas were necessary to his petition for
post-conviction relief. The Court concluded that the district court had not abused its
discretion. Id. at 810-11.
The petitioner in LePage later renewed his motion for discovery and alleged
specific evidence and why he thought that evidence was pertinent to his case. The district
court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals upheld the denial, finding that the
petitioner had not shown that the evidence he requested was "necessary." Accordingly,
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S
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the Court concluded that the petitioner had failed to show that there was an abuse of
discretion in the denial of his renewed motion for discovery. Id. at 811.
II. ARGUMENT

In the cases cited above, it becomes clear that the decision to grant discovery is
discretionary with this Court and should only be granted where it is necessary to protect
the substantial rights of the Petitioner. The Petitioner must not only make a specific
request for discovery, but he must also show how the requested evidence is necessary or
pertinent to his application for post-conviction relief.
In the present case, the Petitioner has made some specific requests and many
general requests for discovery. However, he has failed to demonstrate how those requests
are necessary to support his filed Petition for post-conviction relief. If he is unable to
make a specific connection between his requests for discovery and his Petition as well as
how and why the requested discovery is necessary to protect his substantial rights, his
motion for discovery should be denied.
III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, because the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate how his requests for
discovery are necessary to protect his substantial rights, his requests for discovery should
be denied.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

~ I~day

of September 2009.

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Janii::~
Janl.i!~

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

;;2 0)- day of September 2009,

a true and

correct copy of the foregoing State's Memorandum in Support of State's Objection to
Petitioner's Motion for Discovery was served on Mark J. Ackley, Deputy State Appellate
Public Defenders, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho 83703 in the manner noted

below:
.~y

depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, first

class.
o By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for
pickup at the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
o By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _ _ __
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.

STATE
STA TE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - ))
---------------------------

Case No. CV PC 080 3085
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
AND PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR
A PROTECTIVE ORDER

(Capital Case)

COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his counsel at the
State Appellate Public Defender (hereinafter "SAPD"), and responds to the Respondent's
Motion for Discovery (hereinafter "State's Motion"). While the State's Motion is generally
divided into two parts; this response is divided into three. Part I involves the State's requests
for discovery from trial counsels' files. Part II involves the State's requests for discovery
from the SAPD's files. Part III involves Mr. Hall's request for a protective order.
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RESPONSE

1.
THE STATE'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY OF
TRIAL COUNSELS' FILES
Discovery in post-conviction proceedings is generally a matter of a district court's

Cj Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 21 P.3d 924 (2001) (setting forth the
discretion. Cf
standards for consideration of a non-capital petitioner's request for post-conviction
discovery). In this case, the State makes extraordinarily broad and non-specific requests for
discovery. State's Motion, p.1 (requesting the "the production of the entirety of trial
counsel's files"); p.3 (requesting "any materials, documents or other evidence not
specifically set forth above that relates to trial counsel's representation, defense, preparation
and trial of the Petitioner in this case."). The State requests discovery otherwise protected
from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. In this case,
Mr. Hall has not explicitly consented to the disclosure of such privileged information.
Accordingly, this Court must first conclude that by raising claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, Mr. Hall has impliedly waived the protections of these privileges.
Numerous federal courts have addressed the doctrine of implied waiver. See, e.g.,

Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003); Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156
(11 th Cir. 2001). As explained by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
The doctrine of implied waiver allocates control of the privilege between the
judicial system and the party holding the privilege. The court imposing the
waiver does not order disclosure of the materials categorically; rather, the
court directs the party holding the privilege to produce the privileged
materials if it wishes to go forward with its claims implicating them.
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Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 720. Under the doctrine, the State does not gain unlimited access to

privileged communications; any waiver is limited to only those communications relevant
to the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 721-22. Accordingly, the
scope of the waiver will necessarily vary from case to case depending on the claims raised,
and "in many instances will require careful evaluation by the district court." Johnson v.
F.3d 1156, 1179 (11 th Cir. 2001).
Alabama, 256 F3d
The discovery requested by the State is currently protected from disclosure under
both the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. Mr. Hall asks this Court to
analyze the respective waivers and requested information separately, and to adopt the
analysis set forth in Salt Lake Legal Defender Association v. Uno, 932 P.2d 589 (Utah 1997).
In Uno, the Utah Supreme Court ordered the trial court presiding over post-conviction
proceedings to vacate its order requiring trial counsel to produce for the State all their files
relating to their representation of the defendant at trial where the defendant had alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the pending proceedings. The court reasoned that:
It is not the client seeking access to the files-it is the client's adversary, the

State. Furthermore, at issue is the performance of counsel during preparation
and trial, not solely counsel's internal processes in compiling the file. Finally,
ineffective assistance of counsel is in significant part a question of behavior
observable from the record and ascertainable from counsel's testimony. The
contents of counsel's files mayor may not have a bearing on the specific
case .
claims of ineffectiveness made in this case.
. . . A good defense lawyer in a capital case should be privy to a vast amount
of information about the defendant and the crime, much of which will find its
way into the files. A discovery policy that creates a significant likelihood that
such files will be opened in subsequent proceedings to the State, and thus to
the prosecution, would dramatically impair the trial preparation process.
There is simply no way to protect against improper use of information
damaging to the client that might be available in the files.
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ld. at 590-91 (emphasis added).l
The same policies and protections that the Utah Supreme Court considered apply to
this case. Drawing in part upon the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26, the Uno court
set forth a three-step process designed to "ensure that the State has access to information,
necessary and otherwise unobtainable, relevant to [Mr. Hall's] claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel [and] at the same time, it should preserve to the maximum extent
possible the integrity of attorney work product necessary in criminal cases and protect
criminal defendants from prejudicial disclosures not relevant to ineffectiveness claims." Id. at
591. First, Mr. Hall's current counsel will prepare and disclose to the State an index of all
the documents in trial counsels' files. Id. Second, after reviewing the index, the State must
demonstrate-for each document sought-that it has (a) "substantial need" for the document,
(b) that it cannot without "substantial hardship" obtain the substantial equivalent of the
information contained in the specific document by other means, (c) that the specific
document is at issue via a specific claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and (d) that the
document is edited to prevent the disclosure of any information not related to the
ineffectiveness claims. Uno, 932 P.2d at 591. Third, the Court should then conduct an in
camera review of each document to which the State is able to demonstrate its preliminary
entitlement to ensure that it does not contain extraneous information that should not be
revealed to the State. Id.

In Part III below, Mr. Hall requests the entry of a protective order limiting the temporal
scope of the implied waiver to these post-conviction proceedings. A protective order would
"protect against the improper use of information" at any retrial or resentencing. Mr. Hall will
not object to the disclosure of all relevant work product if the Court limits the scope of the
waiver to these proceedings or if the State agrees to such a limitation.
I
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Thus, should this Court order Mr. Hall to disclose trial counsels' files, the Court
should order a similar procedure as set forth by the Utah Supreme Court, in this case drawing
upon the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to LR.C.P., Rule 26, the State must show
a "substantial need [for trial counsel's] materials in the preparation of the [State's] case and
that the [State] is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means." I.R.c.P. 26(b)(3). Undue hardship is sufficiently shown where
the party seeking discovery is, with due diligence, unable to obtain evidence of some of the
material facts, events, conditions and circumstances of the case which the discovery will
probably reveal, and that on account of such showing such party is unable to adequately
prepare the case for trial. Sanders v. Ayrhart, 89 Idaho 302, 311-12, 404 P.2d 589, 594
(1965).
II.
THE STATE'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY OF
THE SAPD'S FILES
The State seeks "any written statements; any audio and/or video recordings; any notes
authored by anyone working as an agent of the petitioner's appellate counsel; and/or any
email communications between any of these people and appellate counselor appellate
counsel's agents." State's Motion, p.l. This request extends to "any witness ... or any other
person" who the petitioner's appellate counselor agent has interviewed regardless of whether
pp.l-2. In short, the State
that person will testify in these proceedings. State's Motion, pp.1-2.
requests information prepared by post-conviction counsel in anticipation of the litigation
associated with these post-conviction proceedings. The Court should deny the State's motion
in its entirety.
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The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide the scope of pennissible discovery from
an adverse party, stating in relevant part as follows:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it
relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or
defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the infonnation sought
will be inadmissible at the trial if the infonnation sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
I.R.C.P., Rule 26(b)(1)
26(b)(l) (emphasis added).
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may
obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable
under subdivision (b)(l) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's
representative . . . only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and
that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such
materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation, including communications between the attorney and client, whether
written or oral. ...

I.R.C.P., Rule 26(b)(3) (emphasis added).
Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, expected to testify,
(b)(1) of this rule
otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1)
and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be
obtained by interrogatory and/or deposition ....
A party may not discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who
has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation
of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called
as a witness at trial, except as provided in Rule 35(b) or except upon a
showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the
party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by
other means.
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I.R.C.P., Rule 26(b)(4) (emphasis added).
The requested information includes information created by the SAPD during these
post-conviction proceedings in anticipation of litigation, protected by the attorney-client
privilege and the work-product doctrine. Accordingly, the information is not discoverable.
I.R.C.P., Rule 26(b)(1)
26(b)(l) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged .
.") (emphasis added). Further, the requested information is not even relevant to the subject
. . .")
matter of these proceedings.

The primary issue in these post-conviction proceedings

involves whether trial counsel rendered effective assistance of counsel; post-conviction
counsels' representation is not at issue.

I.R.C.P., Rule 26(b)(I) ("Parties may obtain

discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
...") (emphasis added). Accordingly, the State's request
involved in the pending action . ...")

constitutes the epitome of a "fishing expedition," an abuse of discovery well beyond the like
of which the State accuses Mr. Hall of conducting in his motion for discovery. See State's
Objection to Petitioner's Motion for Discovery, p.2, filed 9/21109;
9/21/09; State's Memorandum in
Support of State's Objection to Petitioner's Motion for Discovery, p.4,
pA, filed 9/21/09. 2
By casting a wide net, the State has caught hold of some potentially discoverable
information which is not privileged. For instance, the names and addresses of witnesses
expected to be called at trial are discoverable, and not the work product of an attorney.
Wiseman v. Schaffir,
Schaffor, 115 Idaho 537, 539, 768 P.2d 800, 802 (Ct. App. 1989). However, at

The State's request for the discovery of the SAPD's files is much more extreme than
anything requested in discovery by Mr. Hall. Notably, Mr. Hall has not requested any
information about the communications or interviews that the State has conducted during
these post-conviction proceedings, including but not limited to any conversations with trial
counsel. Indeed, trial counsel has refused to discuss their representation with the SAPD
absent the presence of the State, and Deb Kristal has gone so far as to say that the State's
counsel represents her in these proceedings.

2
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this point, the Court has not granted Mr. Hall an evidentiary hearing, so it remains to be
determined whether any witnesses will be called at a trial on the petition.

Therefore,

disclosure of otherwise discoverable information is premature until this Court determines that
any of Mr. Hall's claims survive summary judgment.
The State will not suffer any prejudice by waiting until a determination of whether an
evidentiary hearing will take place before obtaining any discoverable information because,
unlike an ordinary civil litigant, Mr. Hall has attached to his amended petition and will attach
to his final petition "[a]ffidavits, records, or other evidence" supporting his allegations. I.C.
§§19-4903.
19-4903. This statutory requirement provides the State adequate notice of Mr. Hall's claims
and evidence in support thereof, thereby lessening the need for discovery that may justify
disclosure in a typical civil case. Cf State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560-61, 199 P.3d 123,
135-36 (2008) ("An application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an
ordinary civil action ... [it] must contain much more than a short and plain statement of the
claim that would suffice for a complaint . . . [it] must present or be accompanied by
allegations .... ") (citations omitted).
admissible evidence supporting its allegations....")
In conclusion, the State has not satisfied any of the requirements to obtain discovery
from files prepared by the SAPO in anticipation of litigation or trial. Indeed, the State has
not even attempted to make a showing that they have a substantial need for the requested
information that cannot be met through the exercise of due diligence without undue hardship.
As stated by the United States Supreme Court,
Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted
inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney. . . . Were
such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is
now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts,
heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp
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practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the
preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be
demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would
be poorly served.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509-11. Accordingly, the State's motion for the SAPD's

files should be denied.
III.

MR. HALL'S REQUEST FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER
To the extent the Court finds a waiver the attorney-client privilege and/or the work
product doctrine requiring the disclosure of trial counsels' files, Mr. Hall requests the entry
of a protective order, limiting the waiver to these post-conviction proceedings. In Bittaker v.
Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the

waiver should be limited to the instant proceedings, consistent with a habeas petitioner's
interest in "obtaining a fair adjudication of his petition and securing a retrial untainted by
constitutional errors." Id. at 722. As stated by the court,
If [Mr. Hall] succeeds on any of [his] claims, it will mean that his trial was
constitutionally defective. Extending the waiver to cover [Mr. Hall's] retrial
would immediately and perversely skew the second trial in the prosecution's
favor by handing to the state all the information in petitioner's first counsel's
casefile. If a prisoner is successful in persuading a federal court to grant the
writ, the court should aim to restore him to the position he would have
occupied, had the first trial been constitutionally error-free. Giving the
prosecution the advantage of obtaining the defense casefile-and possibly even
forcing the first lawyer to testify against the client during the second trialwould assuredly not put the parties back at the same starting gate.
Id. at 722-23. Accordingly, drawing upon the protective order in Bittaker, Mr. Hall proposes

the following:
All information received by the State pursuant to Mr. Hall's waiver of the
attorney-client and work-product privileges for the purpose of pursuing his
post-conviction claims, as pronounced in this Court's orders finding such
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waivers, shall be deemed to be confidential to the extent such information is
not available through other non-privileged sources. This protective order
covers information obtained through interviews and depositions of trial
counsel, as well as trial counsels' agents. The information received through
these confidential sources may be used only by the State of Idaho for purposes
of any proceedings incident to litigating the claims presented in Mr. Hall's
petition for post-conviction relief pending before this Court. Disclosure of the
contents of the communications, the documents, and the documents
themselves may not be made to any other persons or agencies, including any
other law enforcement or prosecutorial personnel or agencies, without an
order from this Court. This order shall continue in effect after the conclusion
of these post-conviction proceedings and specifically shall apply in the event
of a retrial of all or any portion of Mr. Hall's criminal case, except that either
party maintains the right to request modification or vacation of this order upon
entry of final judgment in this matter.
See id at 717 n.2.

Absent the entry of such an order, Mr. Hall will be prejudiced.

Specifically, he will have to choose between pursuing his due process right to meaningful
post-conviction proceedings (in which he would raise all potentially meritorious challenges
to his underlying judgment of conviction and sentence), and protecting his privileges, as well
as his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights in the event of a retrial of any portion of the
underlying criminal case. See generally, Bittaker, supra.

CONCLUSION
The State's request for discovery associated with trial counsels' representation is well
taken, but is nevertheless non-specific and overbroad. Accordingly, Mr. Hall requests the
Court to enter an order limiting the waiver of the attorney-client privilege to the scope of the
claims raised in his petition. Mr. Hall further asserts that the State should make a greater
showing of need and hardship before accessing trial counsels' files.

Finally, Mr. Hall

requests this Court to enter a protective order limiting any waiver of the attorney-client
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privilege and the work product doctrine to these post-conviction proceedings. Without the
entry of a protective order, Mr. Hall objects to the State's discovery request.
The State's request for discovery for the SAPD's files is not well taken.

Post-

conviction counsels' representation of Mr. Hall is not the subject matter of these proceedings.
The State's motion seeks to undermine the attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine while completely eviscerating the discovery provisions in Rule 26. Accordingly,
Mr. Hall objects to the State's discovery request.
For all these reasons, Mr. Hall respectfully requests that this Court grant in part, and
deny in part, the State's motion for discovery, subject to Mr. Hall's request for a protective
order.

DATED this 9th day October, 2009.

MARKJ.A LEY
Lead Counsel, Capital

ation Unit

u~uteO

NICOLfuwENS......
Co-Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
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)
)
)
)
)
)
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Case No. CV PC 080 3085
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO THE
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF THE STATE'S
OBJECTION TO THE MOTION
FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II)

(Capital Case)

COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his counsel at the
State Appellate Public Defender (hereinafter, "SAPD"), and replies to the State's
Memorandum In Support Of The State's Objection To Petitioner's Motion For Discovery
(Hall II) (hereinafter "State's Memorandum"). Mr. Hall hereby incorporates by reference his
Motion for Discovery filed on August 17, 2009. This reply is divided into two parts. Part I
addresses the law governing post-conviction discovery. Part II specifically identifies how the
requested evidence is necessary for meaningful post-conviction proceedings.
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1.

Law Governing Post-Conviction Discovery
a.

post-conviction discovery
post-conviction

Post-conviction counsel has an absolute duty to conduct a thorough investigation
independent of infonnation provided by their client, trial counsel, and the prosecution. ABA
Guidelines for the Appointment and Perfonnance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (2003)
(herein "ABA Guidelines"), Guideline 1O.15.1(E)(4)
lO.15.1(E)(4) (stating that post-conviction counsel
have an obligation to "continue an aggressive investigation of all aspects of the case.").) The
commentary to the ABA Guidelines specifically notes that, "[w]here necessary, counsel
should pursue [efforts to secure infonnation in the possession of the prosecution or law
enforcement authorities] through fonnal and infonnal discovery." Commentary to ABA
Guidelines, Guideline 10.7.
Generally, a district court has discretion whether to authorize discovery in postconviction proceedings as provided by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 1.C.R 57(b).
However, discovery becomes mandatory when a petitioner shows it is "necessary to protect
[his] substantial rights." Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 605, 21 P.3d 924, 927 (2001).
Because the "significance of any item of evidence can seldom be predicted accurately until
the entire record is complete," this Court should resolve discovery disputes in favor of
requiring disclosure. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976) (noting the
"imprecise standard" for defining favorable evidence as set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373
) The ABA Guidelines have been endorsed by the Supreme Court in Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (relying on the 1989 ABA Guidelines in finding trial counsel
ineffective in failing to "discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence") (emphasis
in original).
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(1963)).
u.s. 83 (1963».

In addition, due to the heightened protections afforded by the Due Process

Clause and the Eighth Amendment to capital defendants generally, this Court should exercise
its discretion liberally in favor of disclosure when discovery is not otherwise mandatory. See
e.g., Payne v. Bell, 89 F. Supp. 2d 967, 971 (W.D. Tenn. 2000) (recognizing that "more

liberal discovery is appropriate in capital cases where the stakes for petitioner are so high.")
(1978).
(relying on Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,604 (1978».
Further, to the extent that Mr. Hall's trial counsel could have obtained the requested
discovery at trial, either through I.C.R. 16 or based upon Mr. Hall's constitutional right to
present a defense including his rights to compulsory process,2 confrontation,3 and due
process,4 such discovery must be provided in these post-conviction proceedings. Mr. Hall
asserts disclosure of the discovery requested in his motion, whether such disclosure is
mandatory or not, is necessary to ensure meaningful post-conviction proceedings, and thus is

2 The Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process guarantees the right to compel witnesses to
appear in court with requested documents. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 54-58
(1987) (plurality); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
3 The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause guarantees the right to demonstrate that a
witness is biased or that the witness's testimony is exaggerated or otherwise unbelievable.
Fowler v. Sacramento County Sheriff's Dept., 421 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005).
4 The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees the right to the production of
exculpatory evidence. Brady, 373 U.S. 83. The State's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence
under Brady and its progeny extends to all stages of the judicial process, including postconviction proceedings. Imbler, 424 U.S. 409; Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746 (9th Cir.
1992); Bowen, 799 F.2d 593; High v. Head, 209 F.3d 1257, 1264-66 (1Ith Cir. 2000)
(relying on a prosecutor's continuous duty to disclose Brady material does not relieve habeas
counsel of their duty to raise all claims in original habeas proceedings where claims could
have been identified by pursuing discovery).
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mandated by due process. Cf State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862,864, 828 P.2d 891, 893 (1992)
(recognizing that the absence of meaningful capital post-conviction proceedings may violate
state and federal due process); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 P.2d 789, 793
(Ct. App. 1999) ("failing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful
opportunity to have his or her claims presented may be violative of due process"). In short,
without the requested discovery, Mr. Hall will be denied a full and fair opportunity to
develop claims of trial error.
b.

depositions

Unless otherwise ordered, the scope of discovery includes any non-privileged matter
that is either admissible or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. I.R.C.P. 26(b)(1). A petitioner may employ any method of discovery available
under the civil rules including, but not limited to, depositions, production of documents,
written interrogatories, and requests for admission. I.R.C.P. 26(a).

The Uniform Post-

Conviction Procedures Act specifically recognizes these methods of post-conviction
discovery by authorizing summary disposition "when it appears from the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with

any affidavits" that there is no genuine issue of material fact. I.C. § 19-4906(c). (Emphasis
added).
Depositions are necessary to provide additional evidentiary support for Mr. Hall's
claims. To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Hall must first show that
his trial counsels' performance was deficient, and second, that such deficient performance
U.s. 668, 687 (1984).
prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

To prove
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deficient performance, Mr. Hall "must show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. This means Mr. Hall must "reconstruct the
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct" for an objective evaluation of counsels'
performance at that time. Id. at 689. Mr. Hall "must overcome the presumption that, under
the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'"
strategy.'" Id.
Accordingly, depositions should be granted to afford Mr. Hall a full and fair opportunity to
meet his burden of proof. See Coleman v. Zant, 708 F.2d 541, 548 (lIth Cir. 1983) (relying
in part on the denial of depositions at the state post-conviction level in finding that federal
habeas petitioner had been denied a full and fair opportunity to develop facts to support his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim); see generally Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1009
(9th Cir. 1997) ("Denial of an opportunity for discovery is an abuse of discretion when the
discovery is necessary to fully develop the facts of a claim.") (citation omitted).5
Mr. Hall has requested the depositions of Rob Chastain, Deborah Kristal, Gary
Starkey, and Bruce and James Whitman. Mr. Starkey was an investigator and the Whitmans
were mitigation specialists; each were an integral part of Mr. Hall's representation during the
underlying criminal proceedings. See ABA Guidelines, (Guideline 4.1 ("The Defense Team
and Supporting Services,,).)6 A complete understanding of the scope of their investigations is
u.S.
necessary to assess trial counsels' performance. See e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

5 Both Coleman v. Zant, supra, and Jones v. Wood, supra, addressed the rules governing
discovery in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
6 The ABA Guidelines provide that the core defense team consist of two lawyers, a
mitigation specialist, and an investigator. ABA Guidelines, Guideline 4.1 and commentary.
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668, 690-691 (1984) ("counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary."); Wiggins v. Smith,
539 U.S. 510, 522-23 (2003) (noting that when assessing trial counsel's choices, courts
should first focus on whether the investigation is itself reasonable).

To rebut any

presumption that trial counsels' decisions were reasonable, Mr. Hall must conduct
of their investigators.
depositions oftheir
Depositions are the only pre-evidentiary hearing mechanism for fully and fairly
developing Mr. Hall's claims. Unlike affidavits or other discovery methods, depositions
provide both parties a full opportunity to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's
challenged conduct. As noted by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York,
[D]epositions are preferable if a searching interrogation of the other
party is desired. At a deposition the examining party has great flexibility and
can frame the questions on the basis of answers to previous questions.
Moreover, the party being examined does not have the opportunity to study
the questions in advance and to consult with counsel before answering, as is
the case if interrogatories are used. Attempts at evasion, which might be
stymied by a persistent oral examination, cannot easily be countered by
interrogatories. The flexibility and the potency of oral depositions is in large
part lacking in written interrogatories.
Madanes v. Madanes, 199 F.R.D. 135, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citation omitted); see also

Cir.l995) (holding that it is proper under
Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir.1995)
most circumstances to disregard an affidavit when the affidavit is contradicted by the
witness's prior deposition testimony). Mr. Hall should be given the opportunity to take
depositions in this case.
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II.

Discovery Is Mandatory In Mr. Hall's Case

When a petitioner shows discovery is "necessary to protect [his] substantial rights,"
discovery is no longer discretionary but instead becomes mandatory. Raudebaugh v. State,
135 Idaho 602, 605, 21 P.3d 924, 927 (2001). Even if a petitioner cannot make a showing
that discovery is necessary to protect his substantial rights, the case law still gives the district
court discretion to order discovery. Aeschliman, at 402, 973 P.2d at 754 ("Unless necessary
to protect an applicant's substantial rights, the district court is not required to order
discovery."). Once a petitioner shows discovery is necessary to protect his substantial rights,
then the Court loses discretion and discovery is mandatory. Accordingly, even if Mr. Hall
cannot show discovery is necessary to protect his substantial rights, he requests this Court
grant discovery, generally exercising its discretion liberally in large part because this is a
capital case.
Based on an examination of trial counsels' files and the record and transcript, as well
as current counsels' unsuccessful attempts to obtain requested materials through alternate
means of investigation, it is clear that certain information is in the State's possession, or in
State agents' possession, which is necessary for an adequate investigation but which cannot
be accessed without resort to discovery7.

Mr. Hall enumerated each item of discovery

necessary to complete his post-conviction investigation in his Motion for Discovery, and
where possible demonstrated the relevance of each request to a claim raised in his Amended

7 The SAPD has attempted to obtain all documents in the possession of trial counsel on
multiple occasions. The SAPD has also attempted to interview trial counsel. Trial counsel
has refused to turn over the entirety of their files and has refused to discuss their
representation with post-conviction counsel absent the presence of the State's representative.
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Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

Thus, the discovery is necessary for meaningful

consideration of Mr. Hall's claims.
Moreover, those items not previously tied to a claim in the Motion for Discovery can
be connected to his Amended Petition as follows:
•

Request B(5) in the Motion for Discovery is necessary because it is relevant to
Mr. Hall's Amended Petition Claim M ("Deprivation Of The Effective
Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To Adequately Investigate Guilt-Phase
Issues.").

•

Requests D(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(1O) and (11) in the Motion for Discovery are
necessary because they are relevant to Mr. Hall's Amended Petition Claim M
("Deprivation Of The Effective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Adequately Investigate Guilt-Phase Issues.").

•

Request D(8) in the Motion for Discovery is necessary because it is relevant
to Mr. Hall's Amended Petition Claim D ("Deprivation Of The Effective
Assistance Of Counsel Due To Trial Counsels' Failure To Object To
Impaneling A Jury From Gooding County In Lieu Of Changing Venue.").

Each one of Mr. Hall's discovery requests is necessary to protect his substantial rights
because they are relevant to claims raised in his Amended Petition.
Thus, because Mr. Hall has demonstrated how his requests for discovery are
relevant to claims in his petition, discovery is necessary to protect his substantial rights and
this Court must grant his requests. Additionally, to the extent Mr. Hall's trial counsel could
have obtained the requested discovery at trial through I.C.R. 16, this Court should grant the
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discovery request now.

Granting discovery

IS

necessary to ensure meaningful post-

conviction proceedings.

DATED this 9th day October, 2009.

MARKJ.A LEY
Lead Counse , Capit

:\kU1U

NiCoLE
co
NICOLE OWENS
Co-Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit
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COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney and makes
specific responses to the Petitioner's discovery requests. In addition, the State
replies to the Petitioner's response to the State's motion for discovery request and
replies to the Petitioner's request for protective order.
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I. STATE'S SPECIFIC RESPONSES TO PETITIONER'S DISCOVERY
REQUESTS
The State has already provided the legal framework within which the
Petitioner's requests for discovery should be analyzed in the State's Memorandum
in Support of the State's Objection to the Petitioner's Motion for Discovery filed
on or about September 22, 2009. The State hereby incorporates by reference the
law and analysis set forth in the State's Memorandum in Support of the State's
Objection to the Petitioner's Motion for Discovery.
In the Petitioner's Reply to the State's Memorandum in Support of the
State's Objection to Petitioner's Motion for Discovery filed on October 9, 2009,
the Petitioner states that even if he cannot show that discovery is necessary to
protect his substantial rights, this Court should liberally grant his requests. (See p.
7.) The State objects to that standard being applied. The legal standard has been

set forth and should be followed. It is unfair to the State to permit the Petitioner to
go on a fishing expedition with his discovery requests.
The Petitioner also relies on the ABA Guidelines in support of his position.
However, the Petitioner's reliance on these guidelines is misplaced. As explained
in State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 782 (1997), the Idaho Supreme Court has
declined the invitation to adopt these guidelines. Further, the United Supreme
Court has expressly recognized that such guidelines are just that, merely guides.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1988).

The State has attempted to follow the outline format in the Petitioner's
Motion for Discovery filed on August 17,2009, in making the responses below.
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I. DEPOSITIONS

A. Defense Team

1. & 2. The State agrees that the Petitioner may depose trial counsel Rob
Chastain and Deborah Kristal as requested.
3. & 4.

The State understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn these

requests at this time but that they may raise them at a later date.
It appears that the Petitioner has not formally requested to depose prior

counsel Amil Myshin and D.C. Carr. Accordingly, the State will not address that
issue until it is raised.
The Petitioner further seeks 1)
I) documentation identifying the cases that the
individual trial team member worked on during the course of their representation;
2) all email correspondence between the trial team member and other team

members,

including

agents,

such as

expert witnesses;

and,

3)

email

correspondence between individual trial team members and the Prosecutor's
Office and agents.
With regard to request numbered 1), the State objects to requiring trial
counsel to provide documentation regarding the cases they worked on during the
course of their representation.

Certainly the Petitioner's counsel may inquire

during depositions regarding their workloads, but the State objects to requiring
trial counsel to provide documentation. Further, it is unclear what documentation
is sought. It would seem to the State that documentation regarding trial counsels'
clients is privileged information that is not accessible to the Petitioner, the State
and the Court.
The two additional requests numbered 2) and 3), refer to email correspondence
in trial counsel's possession. The State understands that trial counsel provided
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email correspondence to counsel for the Petitioner quite some time ago. The State
understood this because Ms. Kristal copied the undersigned on an email to counsel
for the Petitioner that indicates these emailswereprovidedbackinJune2008.To
be clear, the State did not receive the emails themselves that are the subject of this
request.

Rather, Ms. Kristal copied the State on an email to the Petitioner's

counsel that indicated these emails had been provided to Petitioner's counsel. The
State is not comfortable talking with trial counsel about any details in this case
until this Court has ruled on the State's Motion for Attorney-Client Privilege
Waiver. The State can certainly facilitate the production of these emails after
there is a formal waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.
Additionally, the Petitioner in his Reply to the State's Memorandum in Support
of the State's Objection to Petitioner's Motion for Discovery filed on October 9,
2009, the Petitioner indicates that trial counsel have refused to tum over the
entirety of their files. (See page 7 n.7.) The State would note that Petitioner's
counsel had indicated that he has some 20,000 pages of documents. The State
does not know what is missing from the Petitioner's files, but can certainly work
with trial counsel and the Petitioner to facilitate the production of missing
documents as soon as the Petitioner's counsel identifies what items are missing
and the Court orders waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine.

II.

PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

A. Coroner's Office
Petitioner's Requests numbered 5. & 8.

The State understands that the

Petitioner has withdrawn these requests.
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Petitioner's Requests numbered 7.

The State understands that the Petitioner

has withdrawn this request at this time but may raise it at a later date.
Petitioner's request number 1. The State will contact Dr. Groben to determine
if he has any bench notes regarding this case and will provide those to counsel for
the Petitioner if they exist.
Petitioner's requests numbered 2. through 4.,6.,9., through and including 13.
The State provided the autopsy report, photographs of the autopsy, the
coroner's investigative report, and other items related to the autopsy. All of the
State's discovery items that were disclosed in this case are outlined in the State's
discovery response, discovery letters, and the approximately 35 addendums
submitted to trial counsel in this case. In addition, the State provided a discovery
log that also outlines the State's discovery. The State understands that items can
get misplaced in the transition from trial counsel's office to the Petitioner's
counsel's office.

If the Petitioner is missing items that have previously been

provided as outlined in the State's discovery responses to trial counsel and can
inform the State of what items it is missing, the State can copy those specific items
again, but the State needs counsel for the Petitioner to identify what items they are
mIssmg.
The State would further note as it relates to item number 3. (notes, reports, or
dictations of findings made by Dr. Groben at or near the body recovery scene), the
State provided to trial counsel the actual video of the body recovery with Dr.
Groben and the investigators.
Additionally, Dr. Groben's report outlines what he did in this case. The State
objects to the requests for items that are in addition to what has already been
provided. The Petitioner fails to state a basis for his requests other than general
reference to failure to investigate guilt-phase issues.

This statement is an

insufficient basis to support his request for discovery. This request is a fishing
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expedition, especially in light of the fact that the Petitioner has the State's
discovery that was already provided to trial counsel related to the autopsy.

B. Ada County Prosecutor's Office
Petitioner requests a number of documents from the Ada County
Prosecutor's Office, numbered 1. through and including 7. The State objects to
the documents as follows.
The State objects to Petitioner's requests number 1. and number 2., trial
exhibits, because these exhibits are in the Court's possession. The exhibits were
referred to by exhibit number during the trial. Petitioner's counsel may view those
exhibits through the Court.
The State agrees to request number 3., PowerPoint slides.
The State objects to request number 4., copies of emails. Again, as noted
above, the State had understood that trial counsel had provided these emails to the
Petitioner through the State Appellate Public Defender's Office. In any event, the
State objects to providing its emails. Nor does the Petitioner cite any authority
that authorizes their release to him.
The State objects to request number 5., the State's communications or
summaries with experts. This request invades the State's work product and the
State is not required to provide these to defense counsel. The Petitioner cites no
authority whatsoever to support his request for the State's work product. Nor has
the Petitioner demonstrated a basis for this requested information. The Petitioner
requests examinations of the shoe prints found at the scene. The State has already
provided that information through discovery to trial counsel. Again, if items are
missing as identified by the Petitioner's counsel, the State can re-copy those items.
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Petitioner's request number 6., regarding the State's communications with
the media. The State understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn this request at
this time but may raise it at a later date.
Petitioner's request number 7., regarding Gary Starkey.

The State

understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn this request.

C. Documents

In

Possession of Prosecutor's Office Regarding

Witnesses

l.a. Jeff Carlson. The State objects to this request for summaries. First, it is
the State's work product even if such notes or summaries exist. The Petitioner has
failed to demonstrate a basis for this requested information. Nor has the Petitioner
cited any authority that permits him to receive the State's work product. Second,
Mr. Carlson's statements to law enforcement were already provided through the
State's discovery response to trial counsel. If counsel for the Petitioner identifies
what items are missing, the State can re-copy those.
2. Amanda Stroud. The State notes at the outset that Amanda Stroud passed
away prior to the trial in this case. Accordingly, neither side could call her as a
witness. Nor could either side use her hearsay statements. The Petitioner has
failed to demonstrate a basis for these requests.
a. Prosecutor Summaries. The State objects to this request for summaries.
First, it is the State's work product even if such notes or summaries exist. Second,
the documentation of her statements to law enforcement were already provided
through the State's discovery response to trial counsel.
b. & c. Amanda Stroud statements. There appears to be an overlap in
requests as outlined in subsection b. and subsection c.

In any event, this
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infonnation has already been provided through the State's discovery response to
trial counsel, including police reports documenting interviews with Amanda
Stroud, audio and video recordings and transcripts. The State can provide these
materials again if the Petitioner's counsel is missing something and infonns the
State what is missing based upon the State's detailed discovery responses in this
case.
d. Investigative Reports Regarding Amanda Stroud's Death. The State
understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn this request.
e. Jail Recordings. The State does not find a reference to a recording in the
Search Warrant Affidavit, but rather that Kathy Stroud indicated to law
enforcement that Amanda had called her from the jail. The State does not have a
recording of this conversation. Nor does it appear that the Affidavit references a
recording, but merely that a call or calls were made from Amanda at the jail to
Kathy Stroud. The State has made an inquiry about the jail system used in 2003
and it appears as though a different system was used back in 2003 than is now
used. Although the State did not make inquiry about this specific case, even if
recordings had existed at one time, they would not exist now based upon the
State's inquiry.

In any event, the Petitioner has failed to establish the basis for

this request.
f.

Jail Recordings.

Similarly, the State does not find a reference to a

recording of conversations between Amanda Stroud and the Petitioner from the
jail in the Search Warrant Affidavit.

Rather, this Affidavit was prepared in

support of the Search Warrant that authorized law enforcement to open a letter that
the Petitioner had written to Amanda Stroud from the jail.
g. & h. Sexual Relations & Black Out.

The State objects and refers its

response to subsection b. & c. above. The State has already provided discovery
regarding Amanda Stroud. In addition, the Petitioner does not provide any basis
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for this request given that Amanda could not be called as a witness by either party
in this case. Nor could any hearsay statements that she made prior to her death be
used by either party at trial.

3. Kathy Stroud.
a. Prosecutor Summaries. The State objects to this request for summaries.
First, it is the State's work product even if such notes or summaries exist. Second,
the documentation of her statements to law enforcement were already provided
through the State's discovery response to trial counsel.
b.

Law Enforcement Statements & Summaries.

This information has

already been provided through the State's discovery response to trial counsel. The
State can provide any missing materials again if the Petitioner's counsel will
identify what they are missing from what the State has already provided.
c. Photographs. The requested photographs have already been provided
through the State's discovery response to trial counsel. The State can provide
these materials again.

4. Norma Jean Oliver. The State understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn
this request.

5. Dr. Pablo Stuart. The Petitioner requests a copy of Dr. Pablo Stuart's taped
deposition. This was a deposition prepared at trial counsel's request. Although
this was trial counsel's evidence, the State does have a copy and can provide a
copy to the Petitioner.
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D. Documents in Possession of Law Enforcement

1. Field notes and logbooks. The State has already provided what information
it has through discovery to trial counsel. The State is uncertain what else the
Petitioner is seeking than what the State has already provided.

This blanket

request is merely a fishing expedition.

2. Unredacted Handwritten Notes.
a. Brett Quilter. The State understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn
this request.
b. & c. Dave Smith & Mark Vucinich. The State has already provided the
handwritten notes of Dave Smith and Mark Vucinich to trial counsel through the
State's discovery response. The State can provide these documents again.

3. Correspondence. The State understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn
this request.

4. FBI I-Drives. The State understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn this
request.

5. Taskforce Lead Assignments. The State understands that the Petitioner has
withdrawn this request at this time but may raise it at a later date.

6. Miscellaneous Investigative Reports and Other Documentation. The State
understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn this request.
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7. Prior Offenses.
a. Case No. M0303573: The Petitioner seeks police reports from this case
number. However, this case number is the "M" case number from the Henneman
murder case. This "M" number was bound over to case number H0300518, which
is the Henneman case number. The Petitioner refers to the case in this request as a
Failure to Register as a Sex Offender. It is possible the Petitioner is seeking case
number H0300423, which is a Failure to Register as a Sex Offender case. Even if
the Petitioner is seeking police reports from H0300423, he has failed to
demonstrate a basis for this requested information. In fact, this H0300423 Failure
to Register case was dismissed on August 15, 2003. The State fails to see how this
is relevant to the Petitioner's Amended Petition and objects to this request.
b. Case No. H9600534: The Petitioner seeks police reports from this case
number. However, this case number is not the Petitioner's case. It is a Controlled
Substance charge for an offender named "Quinn Jorgensen." The Petitioner has
failed to demonstrate a basis for this requested information. The State fails to see
how this is relevant to the Petitioner's Amended Petition and objects to this
request.
8. Media Contact. The State understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn
this request at this time but may raise it at a later date.

9. Specific Reports, Documents & Recordings.
a. Arrest Report. The State does not have this report and objects to this
request. The Petitioner has failed to provide any basis for this request.
b. Crime Scene Video. The State already provided a copy of this video to
trial counsel, but can provide another copy to the Petitioner's counsel.
c. Idaho Power Video. There is no Idaho Power video.
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d. Transcript & Recordings Jason Vanderesch. The State already provided
these to trial counsel, but can provide another copy to the Petitioner's counsel if
Petitioner's counsel will identify what they are missing.
e. Crime Lab Activity. The State does not understand what the Petitioner is
requesting.

Again, if pages are missing, the State can re-copy missing pages.

f. Photo Line up. The State has previously provided the line-ups to trial
counsel. If the Petitioner can point to a particular item number as listed in the
State's discovery response that was not received, the State can re-copy it.
g. Lead Sheets. The State provided to trial counsel the Lead Sheets in its
possession, consisting of 278 pages. These sheets are numbered with prosecutor
page numbers. The State can re-copy any missing pages if the Petitioner's counsel
will provide the missing page numbers to the State. The Petitioner refers to Lead
Sheet #50 and the Petitioner indicates that a crime stoppers "memo" is missing.
The State does not see the word "memo" on Lead Sheet #50. Again, the page
numbers are in order, so the Petitioner can determine if pages are missing.
h.

Violent Crime Apprehension Program.

This request relates to

Henneman case. The State objects to this request. In reviewing the portion of the
transcript cited by the Petitioner, Detective Smith testified that he used a
nationwide program to determine if another jurisdiction had a case with a similar
M.O. as the Henneman case. He received back five, "but the DNA did not
M.a.

match." (Trial Transcript, at 6123-24.) The Petitioner has failed to establish how
this information is relevant to any of his claims.
10. DNA.

a. & b. CODIS & NDIS. The State objects to this request. This is a fishing
expedition and is so broad ("all documentation") that the State does not know
what the Petitioner is seeking. Nor does he relate this request to any claim in his
Amended Petition whatsoever. The State has provided all DNA testing results as
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was outlined in the discovery responses, addendums, and discovery letters
provided to trial counsel. The State does not have any additional documents in its
possession than have already been provided.
11. Rewards. The State understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn this
request.
12. Documentation Regarding Sex Offender Registration.

The State

objects to this request. The Petitioner fails to state a basis for this request.
13. Miscellaneous Documents and Reports. The Petitioner requests copies
of questions from the jury to the Court, bailiff or other court personnel. These are
documents in the record. Counsel for Petitioner can obtain these documents from
the record in this case.
14. IMSI, Ada County Jail, Garden City Jail and Other Prison and Jail
Records. The State understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn this request at
this time but may raise it at a later date.
15. Documents Requiring Subpoenas.

The Petitioner seeks Washington

records. The State does not have these records in its possession and objects to
providing them.

II. STATE'S REPLY TO PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO STATE'S
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY & STATE'S REPLY TO MOTION FOR
PROTECTION ORDER
A. State's Reply Regarding Trial Counsel Files
The State filed a Motion for Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver on March 11,

2008, based upon the filing of the Petition. The State also filed an accompanying
Motion for Production of Documents when it filed its Motion for Attorney-Client
Privilege Waiver that included a request for documents, materials and items that
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would be included in the work product doctrine. The State has since filed its
Motion for Discovery as noted above.
The Petitioner proposes that he only be required to turn over an index of the
documents in trial counsel's files.

Then, he proposes that the State would be

required to demonstrate not only a "substantial need" for each document, but that
the State cannot, without "substantial hardship," obtain the substantial equivalent
of the documents in another way. The Petitioner then proposes that the State
establish that the requested documents relate to specific claims.

Those items

would then somehow be edited. Then, finally, he proposes that the Court would
be required to view each document en camera and determine whether the
document contains extraneous information. The State objects to this process.
The Petitioner, by filing an Amended Petition, has waived his AttorneyClient Privilege. See I.R.E. 502(d)(3). Moreover, the Amended Petition is not
limited to one or two narrow issues. Rather, the Amended Petition is nearly 200
pages in length and covers all aspects of representation. The Petitioner cannot
now claim that the privilege prevents the State from having all of the discovery in
the Petitioner's possession that relates to all aspects of trial counsel's
representation. Not only will all of the discovery relate to one or more issues
given that the Amended Petition leaves absolutely nothing out in terms of trial
counsel's representation, but trial counsel is entitled to review all of the documents
they had in preparation for trial in this case.
Moreover, the State understands from the Petitioner's counsel that there are
approximately 20,000 pages of documents in their possession relating to trial
counsel's representation.

It would be an extraordinary and unnecessary

undertaking were the State required not only to document its need for each page,
but to document that it could not get the discovery another way without substantial
hardship. Similarly, it would be an extraordinary and unnecessary undertaking for
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the Court to then reVIew each of the 20,000 pages of discovery and then
apparently redact certain items before the State is entitled to review them. Not
only is this unfair to the State, but it is unfair to trial counsel who will understand
the significance of each document and who should be entitled to review ALL
documents without redactions. Accordingly, the State is requesting that all of trial
counsel's documents be provided to the State in their entirety without redactions,
deletions or exceptions.
In support of his position, the Petitioner relies primarily upon Bittaker v.

Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003) and Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n v.
Uno, 932 P.2d 589 (Utah 1997).

Uno discusses the procedures in Utah for

disclosing work product. The process involves the procedure outlined above that
the Petitioner has requested the Court to follow in this case.
However, Uno was decided by the Supreme Court of Utah and is, therefore,
clearly not controlling. More importantly, this Court should not consider Uno as
persuasive authority because it is substantially distinguishable. The Uno case was
decided based on the existence of a local rule. See Uno, 932 P.2d at 589-91.
Idaho does not have the same rule, which forms the basis for Utah's procedure in
this regard.

Accordingly, Uno and the procedure outlined in Uno should not

dictate the Court's ruling as it pertains to the State's request for discovery.
A number of other jurisdictions have rejected similar claims as those made
in Uno. See State v. Taylor, 393 S.E. 2d 801, 805 (N.C. 1990) ("By alleging in his
amended motion for appropriate relief that his court-appointed attorney . . .
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial and direct appeal of
these cases, the defendant waived the benefits of both the attorney-client privilege
and the work product privilege, but only with respect to matters relevant to his
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel."); Reed v. State, 640 So.2d 1094
(Fla.1994) (When appellant filed a motion for post-conviction relief claiming
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ineffective assistance of counsel, he waived attorney-client privilege and work
product protections. The state was entitled to the trial attorney's entire file, unless
the defendant moved to exclude particular items that contained matters unrelated
to the crimes for which defendant was convicted.); Waldrip v. Head, 532 S.E. 2d
380, 387 (Ga. 2000) ("[W]e hold that a habeas petitioner who asserts a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel makes a limited waiver of the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine and the state is entitled only to counsel's
documents and files relevant to the specific allegations of ineffectiveness.").
The reasoning of this line of cases requiring production of work product
materials is compelling: "The passage of time often dims the recollection of a
defendant's original trial counsel with respect to client conversations and trial
strategies. At the least, it is only fair that the State should have a right to refresh
counsel's recollection concerning these matters by reference to the attorney's
files." Reed, 640 So.2d at 1097.
In addition to the persuasive cases from several state jurisdictions, the
Ninth Circuit has also ruled on the work product issue. In Alvarez v. Woodford, 81
Fed. Appx. 119, 120 (9 th Cir. 2003), 2003 WL 22682463 (9 th Cir. 2003), the Court
ruled that "the same concerns that dictate waiver of the attorney-client privilege by
a habeas petitioner raising an ineffectiveness claim also dictate the waiver of the
work product protection."

In another case, the Ninth Circuit ruled that "the

making of a claim of ineffective assistance necessarily implies a relatively broad
waiver of attorney-client privilege." Duncan v. Us. District Court for the Central
District of California, 78 F.3d 592 (9 th Cir. 1996), 1996 WL 88084 3 (9 th Cir.
1996). The State understands that the Duncan case is an Unpublished Opinion and
hereby notifies Court and counsel that it is an Unpublished Opinion. Nonetheless,
the Duncan case is instructive.
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The Duncan case dealt with document requests without differentiating
between attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. The petitioner in
Duncan claimed error at nearly every stage of the proceedings, as is the situation

in this case. The Duncan Court noted that, "[
"[d]efending
d]efending against these claims will
require the State to introduce evidence regarding a variety of surrounding
circumstances. These circumstances will include what Duncan told his attorney,
what strategies the attorney considered and rejected and what witnesses were
available or unavailable to the defense."

[d. at *3.

The Court in Duncan

concluded that the district court's order compelling disclosure to the State of
contested documents was appropriate.
In a somewhat different situation, the Supreme Court of the United States
has concluded that, "[t]he privilege derived from the work-product doctrine is not
absolute. Like other qualified privileges, it may be waived."

u.s. v. Nobles, 422

U.S. 225, 239 (1975) (Supreme Court concluded that calling an investigator to
testify waived work product protections regarding that investigator's report.).
The more applicable and persuasive authority indicates that by filing
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, particularly where such claims encompass
nearly every element of the representation, the Petitioner has waived attorneyclient privilege and the protections of the work product doctrine. In the absence of
trial counsel's files, the depositions will be litigation by ambush. Questions will
either reference material possessed only by Petitioner's counselor depend on
those materials for an answer. If the depositions were held without disclosure of
the files first, they would be slow, cumbersome and likely repeated after trial
counsel had an opportunity to review their files with the State. Moreover, the State
has a right to be prepared for its role in the depositions and the proceedings that
follow.
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Further, there is really no functional difference in this context between the
work product privilege and the attorney-client privilege, which is waived by the
filing of claims of ineffectiveness against trial counsel. The logical extension of
the work product argument is that trial counsel could tell the State what the
defendant told them, but could not show the State notes documenting those
communications because the notes are work product.

The policy behind the

waiver is to allow trial counsel to defend themselves against the claims, but also to
ensure that the trial court is fully informed of all relevant information necessary to
rule on the claims. It is the State's duty to see that the Court gets that information.
The State cannot carry out this important function without access to the
documentation. The Petitioner was aware of the requirement of waiver when he
filed his claims.

B. State's Reply Regarding SAPD Files
The State has agreed not to litigate the State's Motion for Discovery
relating to the SAPD files until it becomes relevant. The State understands that its
request for discovery relating to the SAPD files may be premature given that we
have not yet reached the point in these post-conviction proceedings where
evidence gathered by the SAPD has become relevant. The State also recognizes
that it has cast a broad net in its request because the State does not know what
discovery exists.
However, the State is not formally withdrawing its request for discovery.
Rather, the State is willing to request that this Court hold off ruling on the State's
request until such a time when the SAPD files may become relevant.

For

example, should the SAPD seek to introduce evidence or rely on evidence that it
has obtained during the course of representing the Petitioner, the State would be
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entitled to renew its Motion and seek a copy of such evidence based upon the
State's previously filed Motion.

III. STATE'S REPLY TO PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR A
PROTECTIVE ORDER
The Petitioner requests a protective order to limit the waiver to these postconviction proceedings.
Bittaker addresses whether materials provided by the petitioner in regard to

ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a habeas proceeding can later be used in
the event of a re-trial in state court. The Ninth Circuit concluded that it was not an
abuse of discretion for the federal district court to preclude "use of the privileged
materials for any purpose other than litigating the federal habeas petition, and
.... "
barring the Attorney General from turning them over to any persons or offices ...."
Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 2003).

The Eleventh Circuit has ruled, to the contrary, that once the attorney-client
privilege has been waived it cannot be reasserted in future proceedings.

See

United States v. Suarez, 820 F.2d 1158 (11 th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 987

(1987).

In Suarez, the Court there noted that "the privilege is not a favored

evidentiary concept in the law since it serves to obscure the truth, and it should be
construed as narrowly as is consistent with its purpose."

Id. at 1160.

The

reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit on this issue is more sound than that of the Ninth
Circuit.

The tactical decision to waive the privilege during post-conviction

proceedings should not be without weight.
Further, the issue of admissibility of trial counsel's files at a retrial is not
ripe for determination. That question cannot be fairly determined until all the
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relevant facts are at issue. There are many circumstances that may influence the
decision of this Court in ruling on the admissibility of the information, such as
whether: the Petitioner waives the privilege by some other mechanism; the
information becomes available from an additional source; or the Petitioner takes
the stand and perjures himself, which opens the door to use of the previously
privileged material. To rule now that the information can never by used at future
proceedings invites the Petitioner to testify falsely at future proceedings, without
being subject to proper cross-examination.
Whether trial counsel's discovery is admissible in later proceedings should
be decided at that time when the relevant facts are fully developed. Accordingly,
the State asks the court to forego an order regarding future admissibility of the
information previously the subject of the attorney-client privilege.

IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State's seeks an order denying the
Petitioner's discovery requests consistent with the objections outlined above.
Based upon the foregoing, the State seeks an order granting the State's
discovery request and requiring the Petitioner to provide the State with the entirety
of trial counsels files and other discovery as outlined in the State's Motion for
Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver, the State's Motion for Production of Documents
and the State's Motion for Discovery.
Based upon the foregoing, the State agrees not to litigate the State's Motion
for Discovery relating to the SAPD files until it becomes relevant.
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Finally, based upon the foregoing, the State requests that this Court forego
ruling on future admissibility until the facts are fully developed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~~ day of October 2009.

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

~~
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

·20 p. day of October 2009, a true and
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
thisZOp..
correct copy of the foregoing State's Memorandum in Support of State's Objection
to Petitioner's Motion for Discovery was served on Mark J. Ackley, Deputy State
Appellate Public Defenders, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho 83703 in the
manner noted below:
¥-J3y depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid,
first class.
o By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.

individual( s) that said copies were available
o By informing the office of said individual(s)
for pickup at the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
o

attorney( s) at the facsimile number:
By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s)
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REPLY TO STATE'S SPECIFIC
RESPONSES TO PETITIONER'S
DISCOVERY REQUESTS
(HALL II)

(Capital Case)

COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his counsel at the State
Appellate Public Defender (hereinafter "SAPD"), and replies, in part, to the State's Specific
Responses to Petitioner's Discovery Requests and Reply to Petitioner's Response to State's
Motion for Discovery and State's Reply to Motion for Protection Order filed on October 20,
2009. Mr. Hall has contacted the State and the State does not object to Mr. Hall filing this reply.
Purpose of this Reply
The general purpose of this reply is to facilitate discovery proceedings. The specific
purposes of this reply is five-fold: 1) to reply to the State's additional response to Mr. Hall's
motion for discovery; 2) to withdraw additional discovery requests; 3) to provide additional
information requested by the State; 4) to attach relevant portions of the Court's discovery order
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of Idaho, Ada County Case No. SPOT0500155
SPOT0500 155 (herein "Hall
entered in Erick Virgil Hall v. State ofIdaho,
I"); and 5) to renew a single discovery request to which Mr. Hall had indicated an intent to
withdraw.
First, Mr. Hall replies to the additional response filed by the State on October 20, 2009.
In its response, the State raised objections to discovery based on grounds that had not previously
been asserted, including but not limited to, the State's reliance on the work product doctrine. As
noted herein, the State's additional response to Mr. Hall's motion for discovery was not
anticipated under the Court's Scheduling Order. Nevertheless, Mr. Hall does not object to the
State's additional response so long as the Court is willing to consider Mr. Hall's additional
reply.
Second, Mr. Hall withdraws discovery requests in addition to those reflected in an email
provided to the Court on October 19, 2009. Specifically, Mr. Hall withdraws the following
requests:
•

II(A)(6)("Scanned, accessible, high-resolution files of all photos of Ms. Hanlon's
body, including any reenactment photographs.");

•

II(B)(l)("Color copies of any illustrative exhibits utilized during the State's guilt
.... ");
phase case ....");

•

II(B)(2)("Color copies of any illustrative exhibits utilized during the State's
.... ");
sentencing phase case ....");

•

II(C)(2)(e)("March 9, 2003 recordings from Ada County Jail referenced in
Affidavit for Search Warrant indicating Amanda Stroud called Kathy Stroud from
Ada County Jail.");

•

II(C)(2)(f)("All recorded conversations between Erick Hall and Amanda Stroud
from the Ada County Jail as referenced in the Affidavit for Search Warrant, not
notarized, signed on notary signature line by Judge Minder on April 17, 2003.");

•

II(D)(7)("Prior Offenses.");

• II(D)(l2)("Documentation regarding Sex Offender Registration."); and
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•

II(D)(l5)(a)("Copies
II(D)(l5)(a)("Copies of all Washington DSHS Division of Child Support
records.").

In addition, for reasons noted herein, Mr. Hall conditionally withdraws the following
request:
•

II(D)(lO)(a)("All documentation relating to entry of Mr. Hall's DNA profile into
CaDIS database, or any local or state database.").
the Idaho CODIS

Third, Mr. Hall provides additional information to the State to assist the State in
disclosing requested materials. For example, where possible, Mr. Hall has provided specific
page numbers corresponding with discovery materials previously disclosed by the State where
such page numbers include reference to specific materials that have not been located by Mr. Hall
in reviewing trial counsels' files.
Fourth, Mr. Hall attaches relevant portions of the Court's discovery order in Hall 1.
I.
Because this case overlaps in some regard with Hall I, and because this Court endeavored to
make consistent rulings in the two underlying criminal cases, Mr. Hall references and attaches
relevant portions of the Court's discovery order and the State's response thereto from the Hall I
post-conviction case to ensure consistent rulings in the two post-conviction cases.
Finally, Mr. Hall renews a discovery request.

Specifically, as noted

the

III

aforementioned October 19, 2009 email.Mr. Hall previously informed the Court and the State
that he would agree to withdraw discovery request II(D)(ll)("Rewards.").
II(D)(lI)("Rewards."). For reasons noted
herein, Mr. Hall renews that discovery request and attaches additional support for that request.
Relevant Background
The State filed its motion for discovery on August 7, 2009 and Mr. Hall filed his motion
for discovery on August 17,2009. On September 21,2009 the State filed the State's Objection
to Petitioner's Motion for Discovery. On October 9, 2009, Mr. Hall filed both his Reply to the
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State's Memorandum in Support of the State's Objection to the Motion for Discovery and his
Response to Respondent's Motion for Discovery and Petitioner's Request for Protective Order.
On October 20,2009, the State filed its Specific Reponses to Petitioner's Discovery request and
Reply to Petitioner's Reponses to State's Motion for Discovery and State's Reply to Motion for
Protection Order.

Although Mr. Hall previously filed a reply to the State's Objection to

Petitioner's Motion for Discovery, this reply is necessary as the State has filed a second response
to Mr. Hall's discovery request. I
SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR DISCOVERY
1.

DEPOSITIONS
A. Members of the Trial Defense Team.
1. The State has agreed to the deposition of trial counsel Rob Chastain.
2. The State has agreed to the deposition of trial counsel Deborah Krista!.
Kristal.
3. Mr. Hall has agreed not to litigate this request at this time on the assumption the
Court will consider a renewed request for the deposition of trial counsels'
investigator, Gary Starkey, following the depositions of trial counsel.
4. Mr. Hall has agreed not to litigate this request at this time on the assumption the
Court will consider a renewed request for the deposition of trial counsels'
mitigation specialists, Bruce and James Whitman, following the depositions of
trial counsel.

Mr. Hall does not object to the State's additional response so long as the Court is willing to
consider this additional reply. Mr. Hall has contacted the State and the State does not object to
Mr. Hall filing this reply.
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Mr. Hall also moved this Court to issue subpoenas decus tecum for, inter alia,
documentation identifying the cases that the individual trial team member worked on during the
course of their representation. The State objects to this request. In addition, Mr. Hall requested
all e-mail correspondence between the individual trial team members and other team members
including their agents, and all email correspondence between the trial team and Ada County
Prosecutor's Office and its agents. The State does not specifically object to this request.
In support of his requests, Mr. Hall relies in part on the ABA Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (rev. ed. 2003)
(herein "ABA Guidelines"), to support this request. The ABA Guidelines provide in relevant
part that trial counsel has a duty to facilitate the work of successor counsel. This duty requires
full cooperation with successor counsel, including providing all "the client's files, as well as
information regarding all aspects of the representation, to successor counsel . . . ."
." ABA
Guidelines, Guideline 10. 13(B). As noted in Mr. Hall's motion for discovery, trial counsel has
refused to fully cooperate with Mr. Hall's post-conviction counsel. Mr. Hall requests this Court
to order no more than trial counsel is already obligated to provide.

II.
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
A. Documents in the Possession of the Ada County Coroner's Office.

1. Bench notes. The State has agreed to contact Dr. Groben and provide any bench
notes he has relating to this case.
2. Peer review. The State objects to providing more to post-conviction counsel than
was provided to trial counsel. The basis for the State's objection is not valid. To
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meaningfully assess trial counsels' perfonnance, it is necessary to detennine
whether trial counsel conducted a reasonable investigation. See Wiggins v. Smith,
539 U.S. 510, 522-23 (2003) (noting that when assessing trial counsel's choices,
courts should first focus on whether the investigation is itself reasonable);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-691 (1984) ("[C]ounsel has a duty to

make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes
particular investigations unnecessary."); see also ABA Guidelines, Commentary
to Guideline 10.7 ("Where necessary, counsel should pursue [efforts to secure
infonnation in the possession of the prosecution or law enforcement authorities]
through fonnal and infonnal discovery.") Indeed, "[pJeer
"[pJeer review is the chief way
of satisfying" the requirement that an expert's opinion is based on scientifically
valid principles. Metabolift
Metabolije Intern., Inc. v. Wornick,
Warnick, 264 F.3d 832, 841 (9th Cir.
2001); see also Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 837-38,

153 P.3d 1180, 1183-84 (2007) ("Relevant considerations in detennining whether
the basis of an expert's opinion is scientifically valid include 'whether the theory
can be tested and whether it has been subjected to peer-review and publication. "')
Thus, trial counsels' failure to request discoverable materials is relevant to Mr.
Hall's claim that trial counsel failed to adequately challenge Dr. Groben's
pathology findings. See Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed April
7, 2009 (herein "Amended Petition"), p.61 (Claim M ("Deprivation of the
effective assistance of counsel by failing to adequately investigate guilt-phase
issues - failure to challenge the pathology")).
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3. Notes by Groben at body recovery scene. The State objects to providing more to
post-conviction counsel than was provided to trial counsel during the underlying
criminal proceedings. For the same reasons as noted above, this objection is not
valid. The State also objects on the basis it provided trial counsel with a copy of
the video of the body recovery. This objection is non-responsive. Mr. Hall has
requested copies of "any notes, reports, or dictations of findings made by Dr.
Groben at or near the body recovery scene." This information would not be part
of a video tape but would be the kind of information relied on by Dr. Groben
when forming his opinions. See I.R.E. 703 (providing for disclosure of the basis
of expert opinions); I.R.E. 705 (providing for the disclosure of facts or data
underlying expert opinions).
4. Autopsy diagrams.

The State objects to providing more to post-conviction

counsel than was provided to trial counsel. As noted, this objection is not a valid
reason to deny post-conviction discovery.

The requested materials include

matters that Dr. Groben would have relied upon when forming his opinions and
are thus discoverable. See I.R.E. 703 & 705.
5. Complaints against Dr. Groben. Mr. Hall withdraws this request.
6. Photos of Ms. Hanlon's body. In light of the State's willingness to cooperate with
specific request for missing photographs, Mr. Hall withdraws this request
assuming the Court will consider a renewed request following the completion of
his independent investigation should Mr. Hall determine it is necessary.
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7. Forensic pathology procedural manual. Mr. Hall withdraws this request assuming
the Court will consider a renewed request following the completion of his
independent investigation should Mr. Hall determine it is necessary.
8. Notes etc. regarding death of Amanda Stroud. Mr. Hall withdraws this request.
9. - 13. Correspondence between Dr. Groben and witnesses; a copy of Dr. Groben's
billing records; notes regarding tests; Death Certificate of Ms. Hanlon; and
Record of Death. The State objects to these requests. In these requests Mr. Hall
specifically identifies matters Dr. Groben would have relied on in forming his
opinion. See LR.E. 703 & 705.
B. Documents in the Possession of the Ada County Prosecutor's Office.
1. Illustrative exhibits used in guilt phase case. Mr. Hall withdraws this request.
2. Illustrative exhibits used in sentencing phase. Mr. Hall withdraws this request.
3. PowerPoint. The State has agreed to provide Mr. Hall with copies of PowerPoint
slides it used throughout both phases of the trial.
4. - 5.

E-mails between prosecutors and public defenders; Communications by

prosecutor with expert witnesses. The State objects to providing copies of all emails and all documented communications by the prosecutor's office with all
expert witnesses based on work product. However, these communications are
discoverable under controlling and persuasive precedent from the United States
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Idaho Supreme Court.
In Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1994), the Supreme Court held that the
prosecution violated its obligations under Brady by failing to disclose prosecutor
notes of an interview with a key witness which contained favorable information
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not otherwise disclosed through police reports. Id at 448-449.

Similarly, in

Service Deli, Inc., 151 F.3d 938 the Ninth Circuit held that a government
attorney's handwritten notes from an interview with a key witness constituted
Brady material that should have been disclosed because the government
attorney's notes included exculpatory information. Id at 942. Finally, in Sivak v.

State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636 (2000), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed a
capital petitioner's Brady claim following remand by the federal district court and
dismissal by the state district court. Notably, in federal habeas proceedings, the
federal district court ordered the state to open its notes and files, over the
prosecutor's work-product objection. Id. at 644, 8 P.3d at 639. The discovery
revealed for the first time letters by the prosecutor containing exculpatory
information.Id at 643-645, 8 P.3d at 638-640. On the appeal from the denial of
information.ld
the petitioner's Brady claim, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that, "[t]he letters
clearly should have been disclosed to the defense, even without a specific
request." Id Therefore, a prosecutor's communications with its experts are not
only discoverable, but some instances, constitute Brady material.
6. Prosecutor's communication with media.

Mr. Hall withdraws this request

assuming the Court will consider a renewed request following the completion of
his independent investigation should Mr. Hall determine it is necessary.
7. Gary Starkey dates of employment. Mr. Hall withdraws this request assuming the
Court will consider a renewed request following the completion of his
independent investigation should he determine it is necessary.
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C. Documents in the Possession of the Ada County Prosecutor's Office Relating to

Particular Witnesses.
I. Jeff Carlson statements and summaries of statements. The State objects to this
1.
request on the basis of work product.

The State's assertion that witness

statements are "the State's work product" is incorrect. Specifically, according to
the criminal rules of discovery, the prosecutor must furnish to the defense any
statements made by prospective state witnesses to the prosecuting attorney or the
prosecuting attorney's agents. 1.C.R. 16(b)(6). Thus, statements, or summaries of
statements, prepared by the prosecuting attorney is not work product, and even if
it is, then it is nevertheless subject to discovery.

Indeed, the criminal rules

narrowly define "work product" so that it does not extend to the materials
requested by Mr. Hall. See 1.C.R.
1. C.R. 16(f)(l)
16(f)(1) (limiting work product to materials
containing "opinions, theories or conclusions of the prosecuting attorney or
members of the prosecuting attorney's legal staff."). In addition, as noted above,
according to the United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Idaho
Supreme Court, the prosecutor's own notes are subject to disclosure under Brady.
Therefore, it is essential that the witness statements be disclosed in this case.
2. Amanda Stroud. The State objects to this request based on the fact Amanda
Stroud's hearsay statements could not be used at trial. Hearsay objections are not
26(b)(1) ("It is
appropriate when responding to discovery requests. See LR.C.P. 26(b)(l)
not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the
trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence."). Further, 1.R.E. 702 provides that experts, in
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forming opinions, may rely on facts or data that would otherwise be inadmissible.
Thus, statements attributed to Amanda Stroud could have been shown to trial
counsels' experts to help them in forming their opinion and could have been used
during sentencing.
a. Prosecutor summaries of statements by Amanda Stroud to Prosecutor. The
State objects to this request on the basis of work product.

However, as

detailed above, the States work product argument fails. See I.C.R. 16(b)(6) &
I.C.R. 16(f)(1).
b. - c. Amanda Stroud recorded statements. The State has agreed to provide
these materials if Mr. Hall informs the State what is missing from trial
counsel's files. Accordingly, Mr. Hall requests the following:
1.

Audio:

Cited in the supplemental report of Detective Greg Morgan.

(Attachment 1.) ("On Sunday, 3-9-03 at approximately 1430 hours, I
began an interview of Amanda Stroud at the Ada County Jail.

This

interview was tape recorded on a concealed micro cassette (later review
revealed poor tape quality) Stroud stated.....")
stated ..... ")
11.

Audio:

Cited in the supplemental report of Detective Greg Morgan

3/01103
3/01/03 interview with Kathy and Amanda Stroud. (Attachment 2.) ("Det.

Ayotte and I then drove [redacted] and met with Kathy and Amanda at
their residence at approximately 1400 hours. We attempted to interview
Amanda on the front porch of their residence but due to her brothers and
stepfather who were working on a car with a radio playing loudly, we
asked that they accompany us to [redacted] Police Dept. At approximately
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1520 hrs., we began a second interview which was also taped.")
(Emphasis added.)
d. Amanda Stroud homicide investigation. Mr. Hall withdraws this request.
e. - f. Jail Recordings. The State has inquired of the jail if such recordings were
made whether the recordings exist now and was informed they would not
exist. Based on the State's response, Mr. Hall withdraws this request.
g. - h. Amanda Stroud experiences with Mr. Hall. The State objects to this
request based on the fact Amanda Stroud's hearsay statements could not be
used at trial. This is not a valid discovery objection for the same reasons as
noted above. See I.C.R.P. 26(b)(1).
3. Kathy Stroud.
a. Prosecutor Summaries. The State objects to this request on the basis of work
product.

However, for the same reasons as note above, the State's work

product argument fails. See I.C.R. 16(b)(6) & I.C.R. 16(t)(1).
b. - c.

Statements and photographs.

The State has agreed to provide this

information if Mr. Hall informs them what he is missing.
4. Norma Jean Oliver. Mr. Hall withdraws this request.

5. Video deposition. The State has agreed to provide Mr. Hall a copy of the video
tape deposition of Dr. Pablo Stuart.
D. Documents in Possession of Law Enforcement.
1. Field notes and logbooks. The State objects to this request on the grounds it is not
specific enough. Mr. Hall hereby limits his request at this time to the field notes
of Detective Greg Morgan, Detective Mark Ayotte, Officer Dave Smith, and
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Detective Chip Morgan. Mr. Hall made a similar request in Hall I which this
Court granted in limited part. (Attachment 3, p.l6.) ("The prosecuting attorney
shall check relevant police files for notes not contained in reports regarding the
Henneman murder investigation.")
Field notes are used to memorialize what occurred in the field.

The

practice of law enforcement officers is that they memorialize most, but not all, of
their notes taken in the field.

It is established that field notes often contain

information not memorialized in police reports and sometimes contain
exculpatory information, not disclosed to the prosecutor. See e.g., Illinois Public
Act 93-065 (requiring disclosure offield notes to prosecutors in all capital cases);
see also United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir.l976) (holding that

under the Jencks Act, an officer's original interview notes with the suspect or
potential witness must be preserved or produced); Oregon State Bar, Indigent
Defense Task Force Report: Principles and Standards for Counsel in Criminal,
Delinquency, Dependency, and Civil Commitment Cases, Standard 2.6 - 7a

(counsel should request and secure "law enforcement notes (field notes)").
2. Unredacted Handwritten Notes.

Mr. Hall withdraws request a. and the State

agrees to provide request b. and c.
3. - 6. Correspondence; FBI I-Drives; and Task Force Lead Assignments. Mr. Hall
withdraws these requests.
7. Prior Offenses. Mr. Hall withdraws these requests.
8. Media contact. Mr. Hall withdraws this request.
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9. Specific Reports, Documents & Recordings.
a. Arrest Report. The State objects to this request.
b. Crime scene video. The State has agreed to provide a copy of this video.
c. Idaho Power Video. The State, in its Response, indicates "there is no Idaho
Power video." However, this video is described in reports by both Detective
Morgan and Detective Ayotte. (Attachments 4,5.) As Detective Ayotte stated
in his report:
Det Morgan and 1... went to the Idaho Power building where we
met with the security officer. We were allowed to view the
security system digital recording files for the day in question.
We noted at appx 0245 hrs. (the clock on the system is appx one
hour off) two subjects walking onto the field of view of the
SIE onto
system. They appeared to cut across 13 th St. walking S/E
or near the Idaho Power property.
The shot is a distance shot and does not show clear detail, it
however appears the subjects are male and female. One is taller
then [sic] the other. And they appear to be walking arm in arm
or very close together.
The security officer indicated they store the files for more than a
month, and agreed to maintain the files until we could attempt
to recover a copy. Det. Chip Morgan was assigned this task.
(Attachment 5.) (Emphasis added.) Thus, the State's response there is no
Idaho Power video is inaccurate.
The evidence in this video, as described by Detectives Morgan and
Ayotte, directly contradicts the theory advanced by the State at trial.
Specifically, the State elicited testimony from Daryl Lady he saw Mr. Hall
with Ms. Hanlon on fifteenth and Idaho in the early morning of March 1,
I, 2003
and that Mr. Hall told Ms. Hanlon "Come on. Let's Go." (Tr., 10/4/07,
p.4362, Ls.5-7; p.4367, Ls.4-13.) The State, in its closing argument, used this
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testimony to argue Mr. Hall had formulated a deliberate intention to kill Ms.
10118/07, p.5618, Ln.5 - p.5619, Ln.l8.) However, Detective
Hanlon. (Tr., 10/18/07,
Ayotte describes the individuals in the Idaho Power video as "walking arm in
arm or very close together" after the time Daryl Lady describes seeing Mr.

Hall and Ms. Hanlon. (Attachment 5.) Detective Morgan also describes in his
report how the individuals in the Idaho Power video "appear to be walking
together ... " (Attachment 4.) This evidence could have been used to
close together..."
demonstrate that Ms. Hanlon was willingly walking with Mr. Hall.
d. Jason Vanderesch interview. The State does not object to this request. Mr.
Hall is missing disc two and request the State provide him with a complete
copy.
e. Crime Lab Activity. The State does not object to this request. Instead the
State requests clarification.

Accordingly, Mr. Hall has attached the

documents where the 'Crime Lab Activity' electronic database is referenced.
(Attachment 6.) It appears from these documents to be a database created by
the State regarding chain of custody for various items associated with Boise
Police Crime Lab Activity.
f.

Photo lineup. The State does not object to this request but instead directs Mr.
Hall to provide an "item number as listed in the State's discovery response."
Accordingly, Mr. Hall has reviewed the State's discovery response. He is
unable to clearly identify the photo lineup shown to Daryl Lady on March 10,
2003.

Prosecutor item number 22 and 80 both reference photo lineups
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however, Mr. Hall

IS

unsure if these are the lineups he

IS

requesting.

(Attachment 7.)
g. Attachment to lead sheet #50. The State does not object to this request but
asks for clarification. A copy of lead sheet #50 is attached as Attachment 8.
The notes on lead sheet #50 state "see attached crimestoppers"; however,
nothing is attached to the copy in discovery. A paperclip was photocopied on
the page. Mr. Hall would like a copy of the "attached crimestoppers."
h. Violent Criminal Apprehension Program. The State objects to this request.
10. DNA.
a. - b.

CODIS and NDIS.
CaDIS

The State objects to these requests.

Mr. Hall

conditionally withdraws this request based on the fact that the Court granted,
in part, a similar request in the Hall I post-conviction case, and the State
previously responded to the Court's order. (Attachment 3, p.l9.) (The
prosecuting attorney shall determine whether Petitioner's DNA was submitted
to or entered into the Idaho CaDIS
CODIS or state-wide database in the 1990s, as
maintained by the Idaho State Police.") This request is withdrawn on the
condition and the assumption that the State's previous response fully complied
with the Court's order. The State's previous response is attached hereto for
the State's review. (Attachment 9.)
11. Rewards.

Mr. Hall previously indicated to the State he would withdraw this

request. However, Mr. Hall subsequently learned that a testifYing witness, Kathy
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Stroud, may have made a claim on the reward offered in the underlying case. 2
Mr. Hall requests all documentation relating to Kathy Stroud requesting a reward
for information provided in the Hanlon case. In fact, Mr. Hall made a similar
request in the Hall I case which the Court granted in part. (Attachment 3, p.l9.)
The State's response was limited to reward money paid in Hall I Henneman and
not Hall II Hanlon. Accordingly, Mr. Hall request information regarding any
reward money offered for assistance in the Hall II Hanlon case including claims
made on such reward.
12. Sex Offender Registration. Mr. Hall withdraws this request.
13. Jury questions. The State does not object to Mr. Hall obtaining this information
from the Court record. However, this information is not currently part of the
official record.
14. Jail and prison records. Mr. Hall withdraws this request assuming the Court will
consider a renewed request following the completion of his independent
investigation should Mr. Hall determine it is necessary.
15. Washington records. Mr. Hall withdraws this request.

Alternatively, it is possible that Detective Smith made a claim for the reward on behalf of Ms.
Stroud. In any event, based on information provided to Mr. Hall's counsel following discussions
with the State, Mr. Hall respectfully gives the Court and the State notice that he will pursue this
request with the assumption that the State objects unless otherwise noted at the upcoming
hearing.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 28 th day of October, 2009, served a true and correct
copy of the forgoing REPLY TO STATE'S SPECIFIC RESPONSES TO PETITIONER'S
DISCOVERY REQUESTS (HALL II) as indicated below:
JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702
ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery
Statehouse Mail
~U.S.Mail
~U.S.Mail
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_ _ Hand Delivery
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Administrative Assistant
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DEPARTMEfltADA COUNTY SHERIFF'SA':PARTMENT
SHERIFFSA':PARTMENT
ISE POLICE DEPARTM~ADA
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT
•
.JOPiC:

~ ~:.E"H~;":)~~'~]'~1~:i~:?~~tf:~6*~J.i§:

•.. •.•

fitltr~;,~~f:%~\;l~lL;
~t;:;'~~J~~~il?l~~.
Occurred

3-1-03

12. Division

Occurred
9. Time occurred

0300-1030

Co. Prosecutor

CID
cm

He stated after they crossed ill front ofhhn he had proceeded towards home and he had not seen
them again.
On Saturday, 3-8-03, I met with Det. Smith at Cill. I was assigned Lead 78 which stated the
had been contacted by her daughter, Amanda Stroud. She had
caller, Kathy Stroud of
reported that her daughter was a transient and was with a man named Eric Hall. She stated her
daughter had called her on Sunday, 3-2-03, and told her that Eric was really "freaked out" about
something he was involved in and had been hiding out ever since. Her daughter had asked her to
check out the Saturday and Sunday papers for something that might have happened. The caller
5'9"11 to 5'10'\ 180-190 lbs.,
stated Hall had beaten her daughter in the past. She described Hall as 5'9
dark hair, olive complexion, blue eyes with a tattoo of the Grim Reaper on his foreann. She
stated he commonly wore a dark colored sweat shirt and that he and her daughter usually ate at
the barbeque in Julia Davis Park on Sunday afternoons.
I called Stroud and asked her if she had additional infonnation. She stated that her daughter had
called her from a payphone and appeared to be scared about something Eric had been involved
in. She stated she wouldn't tell her where they were staying at. She stated she didn't take the
paper and didn't watch the news but had called a friend who had told her about the murder. She
stated she knew that Eric had beaten her daughter several times in the past.
I sent an e-mail to patrol which contained a brief synopsis of the lead and descriptions of the
Stroud and Hall. I attached photographs of them to the e-mail. I had found that both Stroud and
Hall were currently wanted on outstanding warrants. I learned that Hall had Failed to Register as
a Registered Sex Offender and was currently wanted for that and some misdemeanor warrants.
From the CRT, I learned that he had been arrested and found guilty ofarape by force in 1991. I
learned that the case was a Garden City arrest and the report would not be immediately available
since their records department was closed on weekends.
At approximately 2330 hrs., that night I was contacted by Sgt. Randy Roper, who stated his
officers had Stroud under observation and was requesting direction. I stated I would like to have
them both located if possible. He contacted me shortly afterwards and stated both Stroud and
Hall had been located and had been arrested.
On Sunday, 3-9-03 at approximately 1430 hrs., I began an interview of Amanda Stroud at the
Ada Co. Jail. This interview was tape recorded on a concealed micro cassette (later review
revealed poor tape quality). Stroud stated that she and Hall had been living together on the streets
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

12. Division

Date Occurred

3-1-03

0300-1030

Co. Prosecutor
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band out of his pocket and had eventually given it to Amanda but she had later lost it. Amanda
had told her mother that she had also seen an unusual ring that separated into three rings that
were interconnected that the suspect nad in his possession.
Det. Ayotte and I then drove
and met with Kathy and Amanda at their residence at
hIs. We attempted to interview Amanda on the front porch of their residence
approximately 1400 bIs.
but due to her brothers and stepfather who were working on a car with a radio playing loudly, we
asked that they accompany us to
Police Dept. At approximately 1520 hrs., we began a "
second interview which was also taped. Present during the interview was Det. Ayotte, Amanda
and Kathy Stroud and 1.
Amanda Stroud was confronted ahout her knowledge and the withholding of information, She
stated that she was in love with Eric and was pregnant with his child. She agreed to be
completely truthful with us. She stated everything she had told us in earlier interviews was
truthful but stated that on the afternoon of 3-1-03, after they had woke up, Eric had pulled a
ber that he
his pocket and looked at the time. She stated he told her
silver metal woman's watch from Iris
had pulled the band from the watch. She stated he had later given her
ber the watch and she had lost
it but recalled that it had a phosphoIous dial that would light up after a flashlight had been shone
on it.

She stated she had also seen the suspect in possession of a silver ring. She stated the ring when
not worn separated into three .rings that were interconnected. She stated she had last seen it .on 31-03 when he had been playing with it. She stated she didn't know what had happened to it.
Det. Ayotte showed the witness a photograph of the victim that had been obtained from Rhoda
Shennan. She stated she had seen her before and recalled that the victim had given ber
her a couple
th
of bucks one time in the 6 and Main area.
Amanda then drew a sketch ofthe
of the ring which appeared to be consistent with infonnation given
by Jeff Carlson and her friends. Carlson stated that the victim never took it off because her finger·
had swollen to the point she could not get it off her finger. We asked her what kind of boots the
suspect had been wearing on 3-1-03. She stated they were Lugz brand and had. been given to him
by her mother, when she and the suspect had been living with her. Kathy Stroud stated she
recalled the boots and stated she had purchased them as a gift for a former boyfriend and when
they had broken up, he had left them at the house. Kathy stated she was going to throw them
away but Eric had told her that they fit him and she had given them to him.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL ~~STRICT
~~STRICT OlEo:')
OlEo,,) .)2'
.):2 :
t)FA])A
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY tlFADA
P.M··-"I4~_~_ __

1 6 2007
FEB 16
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

J.D~AVARRO,~
Case No. SPOT0500lSVil.M.;J
SPOT05001SVil.M.;J tI
DEPUTY

ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY

(Capital Case)

-------------~)
--------------------------~)
Petitioner's Motion for Discovery, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Discovery,
and Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Discovery having been filed, hearing
having been held on January 10-12 and January 16, 2007, and the Court otherwise being fully
informed, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows':

I.

Witnesses, Prospective Witnesses, and Other Persons of Interest.
A.

Lisa Manora Lewis.
1.

Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents" is DENIED.

2.

Petitioner's request for "All statements and summaries of statements to
law enforcement, including Scott Birch, either made by or attributed to
Ms. Lewis, regardless of medium, and all reports and notes made by law
enforcement about Ms. Lewis, including those made by Scott Birch" is
GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney shall disclose
said statements, summaries, reports, and notes that either he possesses or
Deputy Attorney General Birch possesses or has access to.

3.

Petitioner's request for "All statements and summaries of statements to,
and reports or notes by, SRO Mike Barker" is GRANTED IN LIMITED
PART.
The prosecuting attorney shall disclose said statements,
summaries, reports, and notes that either he possesses or SRO Mike
Barker possesses or has access to.

For ease of reference, the Court uses the same numbering system used by Petitioner in his
Motion for Discovery.
I
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B.

C.

Peggy Jean Colbert Hill.

1.

Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents" is DENIED.

2.

Petitioner's request for "All statements and summaries of statements to
law enforcement, including to Scott Birch, either made by or attributed to
Ms. Hill, regardless of medium, and reports and notes made by law
enforcement about Ms. Hill, including those made by Scott Birch" is
GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney shall disclose
said statements, summaries, reports, and notes that either he possesses or
Deputy Attorney General Birch possesses or has access to.

3.

Petitioner's request for "All statements and summaries of statements to,
and reports or notes by, SRO Mike Barker" is GRANTED IN LIMITED
The prosecuting attorney shall disclose said statements,
PART.
summaries, reports, and notes that either he possesses or SRO Mike
Barker possesses or has access to.

Patrick Bernard Hoffert.

1.

Petitioner's request for "All reports and investigative notes regarding the
death of Patrick Bernard Hoffert, including but not limited to:
a. Law enforcement reports and notes related to Mr. Hoffert's suicide at
408 E. 51 st St.
S1. #6, Garden City, Idaho, on September 25,2000.
b. Law enforcement reports and notes related to Garden City PD Incident
No. 01-2000-03006, whether generated by Garden City or other law
enforcement agencies"
is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney shall
inquire of the Garden City Police Department and disclose any existing
requested items.

2.

Petitioner's request for "Copies of all audio and video-taped interviews
conducted in connection with Mr. Hoffert's death, including but not
limited to the interviews of Verdell Jean StinnlRugger and Deirdre
Muncy" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney
shall inquire of the Garden City Police Department and disclose any
existing requested items.

3.

Petitioner's request for "Any writings attributed to Mr. Hoffert on the day
of his suicide, including but not limited to property collected by Garden
City Police Department. .. from the suicide investigation, including
'notebook wi notes from Hoffert,' property no. 12448" is GRANTED IN
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LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney shall inquire of the Garden
City Police Department and disclose any existing requested items.

D.

4.

Petitioner's request for "Results of any forensic testing conducted upon
the 1989 black Toyota, VIN JT4RN13P4K0005180, property no. 12455"
IS GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney shall
inquire of the Garden City Police Department and disclose any existing
requested items.

5.

Petitioner's request for "Coroner/ pathology notes and reports regarding
the death of Mr. Hoffert" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The
prosecuting attorney shall inquire of the Ada County Coroner's Office and
disclose any existing requested items. The Court further ORDERS that
said discovery includes any reports, notes or other documents forwarded
to the Ada County Coroner's Office by the Garden City Police
Department, including, but not limited to the "notebook" purportedly
containing writings by Mr. Hoffert.

6.

Petitioner's request for "Any DNA or other forensic profile developed on
Mr. Hoffert" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting
attorney shall inquire of the Garden City Police Department to determine
whether such a profile/profiles were developed and, if so, shall disclose
such profile(s).

7.

Petitioner's request for "Detective Allen's supplemental report on the
suicide scene" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting
attorney shall inquire of the Garden City Police Department and disclose
any existing requested items.

Chris Hall.
Petitioner's request for discovery regarding Chris Hall is WITHDRAWN without
prejudice to renew the request upon further investigation.

E.

Christian Johnson.
1.

Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents" is DENIED.

2.

Petitioner's request for "Any and all incentives to testify against Erick
Hall explicitly or implicitly offered to, or requested by, this witness" is
DENIED.

3.

Petitioner's request for "All statements and summaries of statements to
law enforcement either made by or attributed to Mr. Johnson, regardless of
medium, and all reports and notes made by law enforcement about Mr.
Johnson" is DENIED.

ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY
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G.

4.

Petitioner's request for "A complete NCIC criminal record check,
including juvenile criminal records" is GRANTED IN PART. The
prosecuting attorney shall run and disclose a NCIC criminal records
Petitioner's request for juvenile criminal records is
check.
WN without prejudice to renew the request upon further
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRA
investigation.

5.

Petitioner's request for "Documentation or summaries of all off-record
and/or ex parte conversations regarding Mr. Johnson's criminal history or
ongoing criminal proceedings" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to
renew the request upon further investigation.

6.

Petitioner's request for "Documents or summaries of plea negotiations
related to the case for which Mr. Johnson made an appearance on or about
10/13/04" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request upon
further investigation.

7.

Petitioner's request for "Any search warrant from any search and seizure
of Mr. Johnson" is GRANTED.

8.

Petitioner's request for "All reports and notes from Idaho Department of
Corrections and Idaho Department of Probation and Parole ... " is
WITHDRA
WN without prejudice to renew the request upon further
WITHDRAWN
investigation.

Miriam Colon.
1.

Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents" is DENIED.

2.

Petitioner's request for "All statements and summaries of statements to
law enforcement either made by or attributed to Ms. Colon, regardless of
medium, and all reports and notes made by law enforcement about Ms.
Colon" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney
shall inquire of the Detective Dave Smith and disclose any existing notes
made by law enforcement which were not reflected in reports disclosed to
trial counsel.

3.

Petitioner's request for "A complete NCIC criminal record check,
including juvenile criminal records" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice
to renew the request upon further investigation.

Norma Jean Oliver.
1.

Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents" is GRANTED
IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney shall disclose any notes
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not previously provided regarding Ms. Oliver's mental health history from
his files in both the 2004 murder case and the 1991 rape case. The
remainder of Petitioner's request is DENIED.
2.

Petitioner's request for "All statements and summaries of statements to
law enforcement either made by or attributed to Ms. Oliver, regardless of
medium, and all reports and notes made by law enforcement about Ms.
Oliver" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney
shall inquire of the Garden City Police Department and disclose any
existing requested items specific to the 1991 rape case.

3.

Petitioner's request for "Any incentives to testify against Erick Hall
explicitly or implicitly offered to, or requested by, Ms. Oliver" is
DENIED.

4.

Petitioner's request for the "Transcript of hearing to release 1992
10/28/03" is GRANTED,
Presentence Investigation Report held on 10128/03"
provided that Petitioner shall provide the Court with further identifying
information, including the name of the judge presiding at said hearing.

5.

Petitioner's request for "A complete NCIC criminal record check,
including juvenile criminal records" is DENIED IN LARGE PART.
However, the prosecuting attorney shall inquire of Ada County and
Payette County juvenile courts to determine what records, if any, exist.

6.

Petitioner's request for "All documentation and recordings relating to Ms.
Oliver's arrest as a runaway on or about 12/04/91, including any
statements made to the arresting officers, jailor juvenile authorities, and
any dispatch or other recordings, including the entire juvenile criminal file
stemming from that arrest" is GRANTED IN PART. The prosecuting
attorney shall inquire of Ada and Payette County law enforcement
agencies as to the existence of police reports, recordings, and written
statements and provide existing police reports, recordings and written
statements to Petitioner. The remainder of Petitioner's requests are
DENIED.

7.

Petitioner's request for "Information regarding Ms. Oliver's mental health,
competency, or veracity, regardless of whether documentation exists,
known by the prosecution in the underlying criminal case" is DENIED.

8.

Petitioner's request for "Information regarding the investigation of the
reported rape of Ms. Oliver, and subsequent charging, arrest, plea
negotiations and plea entry [of] Petitioner in State v. Hall, Case No.
M9108836" is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as follows:
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a. Petitioner's request for "A complete transcript of the proceedings
including a transcript of the grand jury proceedings" is GRANTED.
Petitioner has already received a copy of said transcript.
b. Petitioner's request for "A 'contact sheet' of all photos taken of Ms.
ART. The
Oliver after the alleged rape" is GRANTED IN LIMITED P
PART.
prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the extent he has possession of
the requested discovery.
c. Petitioner's request for "Color copies of all photos taken of Ms. Oliver
after the alleged rape and not submitted as an exhibit in Petitioner's
current case" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting
attorney shall disclose to the extent he has possession of the requested
discovery.
d. Petitioner's request for "The name of the person with whom Ms.
Oliver stayed at the Sands Motel on or about 12/04/91, after the
alleged rape and prior to her arrest as a runaway, and any
documentation of communication with that person" is DENIED.
e. Petitioner's request for "Any notes, memoranda or other documents
memorializing oral communications made during plea negotiations
held by the Ada County Prosecutor's office" is DENIED.
f.

Petitioner's request for "All files created by or held by the Ada County
Public Defender's office related to State v. Hall, Case No. M9108836,
including documentation pertaining to plea negotiations" is
WITHDRA WN without prejudice to renew the request upon further
WITHDRAWN
investigation.

g. Petitioner's request for "All reports and notes, photographs, audio and
video recordings, including, but not limited to:
1.

Tape-recorded statement made to the Garden City Police
Department (hereinafter "GCPD") by Erick Hall on or
about 12/04/91.

11.

Tape-recorded statement made to GCPD by Norma Jean
Oliver on or about 12/04/91"

is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART to the extent that the prosecuting
attorney can obtain the requested discovery by inquiring of the Garden
City Police Department.
h. Regarding Petitioner's request for "Admission from the Ada County
Prosecutor that state discovery page numbers 120-138
120-13 8 were disclosed
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in discovery to defense counsel, as stated in the State's 'Infonnal
Discovery Letter' dated 01116/04, confmnation that the prosecutor's
office hand-writes discovery page numbers on the lower right comer
of each page turned over in discovery, and copies of said discovery
pages with such discovery page numbers clearly visible," the Court
WITHHOLDS RULING,

i.

Petitioner's request for "All reports, notes and other documents made
by Dr. Lawrence Vickman, St.
S1. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center,
regarding the examination and treatment of Ms. Nonna Jean Oliver in
or around December 1991" is GRANTED CONDITIONALLY.
Petitioner shall detennine whether St.
S1. Alphonsus and/or Dr. Vickman
require a court order.

J.

Petitioner's request for "Results of DNA or other forensic testing
conducted on vaginal and anal swabs and articles of clothing
belonging to Ms. Oliver" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The
prosecuting attorney shall search the 1991 rape case file for results of
testing conducted on the anal swabs and disclose existing results.

k. Petitioner's request for "Infonnation regarding Ms. Oliver's mental
health, competency, or veracity, regardless of whether documentation
exists, known by the prosecution in the underlying criminal case as
well as Case No. M9108836" is DENIED.
1.

Petitioner's request for "All mental health, psychological and/or
psychiatric records, including all reports, notes and other documents,
held or created by Intennountain Hospital, Dr. Lamar Heyrend,
counselor Margaret Farmer, and Bonnie Pitman for Ms. Oliver," is
GRANTED CONDITIONALLY. Petitioner shall detennine whether
Intennountain Hospital, Dr. Lamar Heyrend, counselor Margaret
andlor Bonnie Pitman require a court order. The requested
Farmer, and/or
discovery materials shall be reviewed by the Court in camera to
detennine relevance to mental health conditions as they existed at the
time of Petitioner's sentencing.

m. With regard to Petitioner's request for "Social Security Income
records, including all application materials, ofNonna Jean Oliver," the
Court WITHHOLDS RULING until Petitioner provides the Court with
further infonnation.
H.

Detective Daniel Hess.

Petitioner's request for discovery regarding Detective Hess is WITHDRAWN
without prejudice to renew the request upon further investigation.
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1.

Jay Rosenthal.
Petitioner's request for discovery regarding Mr. Rosenthal is WITHDRAWN
without prejudice to renew the request upon further investigation.

J.

April Sebastian. Petitioner made numerous discovery requests with resepect to
Ms. Sebastian, in particular as related to Ada County Case No. H0400228.
Petitioner clarified that Ada County Case No. H0400335 was not relevant, and
withdrew any requests insofar as they related to that case number. With respect to
the remaining claims, the Court rules as follows:
1.

Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents" is DENIED.

2.

Petitioner's request for "Any incentives to testify against Erick Hall
explicitly or implicitly offered to, or requested by, this witness" is
DENIED.

3.

Petitioner's request for "Copy of the Presentence Investigation Report for
H04003351M0401584" is WITHDRAWN.
Case No. H0400335IM0401584"

4.

Petitioner's request for "Copy of the Presentence Investigation Report,
including 'Addendum to Presentence Investigation Report' and any
document purporting to make 'rider' recommendations in Case No.
H0400228" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The Court will obtain
the PSI, conduct an in-camera review for relevant information, and release
a redacted version of the PSI and any addenda to Petitioner's counsel. The
Court FURTHER ORDERS that Petitioner's counsel may share
information contained in the redacted PSI with Petitioner; however,
counsel may not make copies for Petitioner without express permission
from the Court.

5.

Petitioner's request for "All statements and summaries of statements to
law enforcement either made by or attributed to April Sebastian,
regardless of medium, and all reports and notes made by law enforcement
about Ms. Sebastian, from March 1, 2003 to present" is DENIED.

6.

Petitioner's request for "A complete NCIC criminal record check,
including juvenile criminal records" is DENIED.

7.

Petitioner's request for "All reports and notes from Idaho Department of
Corrections and Idaho Department of Probation and Parole" including, but
not limited to, the documents specified in the Motion for discovery, is
DENIED.
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(

Michelle Deeo.

1.

Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents" is DENIED.

2.

Petitioner's request for "Documentation of initial contact between
Michelle Deen and the prosecuting attorney's office" is DENIED.

3.

Petitioner's request for "Any and all incentives to testify against Erick
Hall explicitly or implicitly offered to, or requested by, this witness" is
DENIED.

4.

Petitioner's request for "All statements and summaries of statements to
law enforcement either made by or attributed to Ms. Deen, regardless of
medium, and all reports and notes made by law enforcement about Ms.
Deen, from March 2003 to present" is DENIED.

5.

Petitioner's request for "A complete NCIC criminal record check,
including juvenile criminal records" is DENIED.

6.

Petitioner's request for "All police reports, notes and recordings regarding
theft, breaking and entering, burglary or similar crimes stemming from
incidents reported by Erick Hall and/or Janet Hock against Michelle Deen
and/or Tommy Workman and to which law enforcement responded in or
around July 2001" is DENIED.

7.

Petitioner's request for "Documents related to Ada County Case No.
H0200584," including
a.

"Copy of the Presentence Investigation Report, including any
probation revocation report, reports or recommendations from the
Jurisdictional Review Committee or any other addenda" is
DENIED.

8.

Petitioner's request for "Documents related to Ada County Case No.
H0301398," as specified in the Motion for Discovery, is WITHDRAWN
without prejudice to renew the request upon further investigation and upon
submission to the court of further identifying information.

9.

Petitioner's request for "All reports and notes from the Idaho Department
of Corrections and Idaho Department of Probation and Parole" including,
but not limited to the documents specified in the Motion for Discovery is
DENIED.
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M.

Evelyn Dunaway.
1.

Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents" is DENIED
without prejudice to renew the request upon providing further factual
basis.

2.

Petitioner's request for "Any incentives to testify against Erick Hall
explicitly or implicitly offered to or requested by this witness" is
DENIED.

3.

Petitioner's request for "All statements and summaries of statements to
law enforcement either made by or attributed to Ms. Dunaway, regardless
of medium, and all reports and notes made by law enforcement about Ms.
Dunaway, from March 2003 to present" is DENIED.

4.

Petitioner's request for "A complete NCIC criminal record check,
including juvenile criminal records" is WITHDRAWN
WITHDRA WN without prejudice
to renew the request upon further investigation.

5.

Petitioner's request for "All police reports, notes, recordings and witness
statements regarding a domestic dispute or incident between Evelyn
Dunaway and Erick Hall to which law enforcement responded in or
around March 2002" is DENIED without prejudice to renew the request
upon further investigation.

6.

Petitioner's request for "All reports and notes from Idaho Department of
Corrections and Idaho Department of Probation and Parole" including, but
not limited to, the documents specified in the Motion for Discovery, is
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRA WN without prejudice to renew the request upon further
investigation.

Rebecca McCusker.
Petitioner's request for discovery related to Rebecca McCusker, as specified in
the Motion for discovery, is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the
request upon further investigation.

N.

Dr. Glenn Groben and the Ada County Coroner's Office.
1.

Petitioner's request for "All bench notes from the Lynn Henneman
autopsy, sexual assault kit and any other procedures performed or
observed by Dr. Groben or any other Ada County Coroner personnel" is
GRANTED, based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to provide the
requested discovery.
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2.

Petitioner's request for "Any peer review, formal or informal, whether
internal or external to the Ada County Coroner's Office, as well as any
documentation related thereto, of the autopsy performed on Ms.
Henneman, or confIrmation that no peer review was conducted" is
GRANTED IN LIMITED PART, based on the prosecuting attorney's
agreement to provide the requested discovery insofar as the infonnation is
contained in a report. Reports prepared by Mr. Erwin Sonenberg and Ms.
Hoffman shall be included, if such reports exist.

3.

Petitioner's request for "Any notes, reports, or dictations of findings made
by Dr. Graben" in the locations specified in the Motion for Discovery,
namely "At or near the body recovery scene," and "At or near the alleged
crime scene near the Main St. Bridge" is GRANTED, based on the
prosecuting attorney's agreement to provide the requested discovery.

4.

Petitioner's request for "Ada County Coroner's Office procedures for
body removal and preservation" is DENIED.

5.

Petitioner's request for "Copies of the full body x-rays taken of Lynn
Henneman, and full disclosure of where, when and by whom the x-rays
were taken" is GRANTED, based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement
to provide the requested discovery.

6.

Petitioner's request for "Any toxicology test results from Idaho labs; and
if none exist, then an explanation why testing was conducted by a Texas
laboratory, and a complete copy of the Texas report" is GRANTED, based
on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to provide the requested
discovery.

7.

Petitioner's request for "A list of all cases, regardless of jurisdiction, in
which Dr. Groben conducted autopsies wherein broad ligature
strangulation, drowning, or blunt force trauma was the cause, suspected
cause, or explicitly excluded cause of death, including specific
identification of those "other cases exactly like this" referenced by Dr.
Groben in his trial testimony" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to
renew the request upon further investigation.

8.

Petitioner's request for "A list of all cases in which Dr. Graben testified
wherein broad ligature strangulation, drowning, or blunt force trauma was
the cause, suspected cause, or explicitly excluded cause of death" is
DENIED.

9.

Petitioner's request for "Reports and notes from all autopsies referenced in
preceding request no. 7" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the
request upon further investigation.
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10.

andlor
Petitioner's request for "Any complaints filed against Dr. Groben and/or
the Ada County Coroner with any agency or professional association
regarding his/its professional performance, qualifications or veracity" is
DENIED.

11.

Petitioner's request for "Scanned, accessible, high-resolution files of all
photos of Ms. Henneman's body, including reenactment photographs" is
GRANTED, based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to provide the
requested discovery.

12.

Petitioner's request for "Microscopic slides and reports, notes, or other
documentation of "residual intact red blood cells" for the seven identified
scalp injuries, and specific identification of the number of sections taken
from each individual laceration and the results at each identified section"
is GRANTED IN PART. The prosecuting attorney shall provide the
requested reports, notes and other documentation. The Court FURTHER
ORDERS that counsel for Petitioner and the prosecuting attorney shall
confer further to establish a mutually agreeable chain of custody procedure
for the microscopic slides.

13.

Petitioner's request for "Sex crimes kit protocol" is GRANTED, based on
the prosecuting attorney's agreement to inquire of the Ada County
Coroner's Office and provide such procedures if they exist.

14.

Petitioner's request for "Any notes, reports, or results of tests in the
Henneman case regarding the following:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

Reconstruction of ligatures
Depth of the scalp wounds
Fingernail clippings
Pubic hair combings
Head hair
Blood sample (tube)
The amount of force to break the humerous
Any subcutaneous examination of the left and right wrists and left
and right ankles as well as any other possible ligature sites
(Petitioner is in possession of Dr. Groben's report at page 3 which
describes a subcutaneous examination of Ms. Henneman's right
wrist and left arm only)"

is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney shall
provide the requested discovery if said discovery is contained in notes
which were not otherwise provided for in reports provided to trial counsel.
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15.

Petitioner's request for "List of videos that Dr. Groben watched that,
according to his testimony, demonstrated the length of time it takes a
choking victim to be rendered unconscious" is WITHDRAWN without
prejudice to renew the request upon further investigation.

16.

Petitioner's request for "Forensic pathology procedural manual currently
in effect as well as in effect in October 2000 for the Ada County Coroner's
Office" is DENIED.

17.

Petitioner's request for "All materials presented, including PowerPoint
slides, used for the presentation given by Dr. Groben on the Henneman
homicide at the northwest pathologist meeting held in September or
October 2004" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request
upon further investigation.

18.

Petitioner's request for "All notes, reports and recordings made by or at
the direction of the Coroner's Office or its agents regarding the death of
Amanda Stroud" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request
upon further investigation.

19.

Petitioner's request for "All notes, reports and recordings made by or at
the direction of the Coroner's Office or its agents regarding the death of
Kay Lynn Jackson" is DENIED.

20.

Petitioner's request for "Documentation of all correspondence between
Dr. Groben or Erwin Sonnenberg or their agents and other non-lay or
expert witnesses or potential witnesses or their agents" is GRANTED IN
LIMITED PART. Based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement, he shall
provide notes as stated above with respect to request number I.N.14. The
remainder of Petitioner's request is DENIED.

2l.
21.

Petitioner's request for "Dr. Groben's curriculum vita" is GRANTED,
based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to provide the requested
discovery.

22.

Petitioner's request for "Dr. Groben's billing records or invoices for the
instant case" is DENIED based upon the prosecuting attorney's assertion
that no such billing records exist.

23.

Petitioner's request for "Any applications by the Ada County Coroner's
office for accreditation with the National Association of Medical
Examiners ("NAME"), or any other accrediting association, and any
responses thereto" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. Based on the
prosecuting attorney's agreement, he shall inquire as to whether the
Coroner's Office was or was not accredited by NAME during the
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Henneman autopsy through the time of trial and sentencing and disclose
that information. The remainder of Petitioner's request is DENIED.
O.

P.

Q.

Dr. Michael Estess.
1.

Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents" is DENIED.

2.

Petitioner's request for "Dr. Estess's files" is DENIED.

3.

Petitioner's request for "Any reports or summaries of oral
communications made by Dr. Estess to the State in the instant case" is
DENIED.

4.

Petitioner's request for "Documentation of all correspondence between
Dr. Estess or his agents and other non-lay or expert witnesses or potential
witnesses or their agents" is DENIED.

5.

Petitioner's request for "Dr. Estess' curriculum vita" is DENIED.

6.

Petitioner's request for "Dr. Estess' billing records or invoices for the
instant case" is DENIED.

Dr. Robert Engle.
1.

Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents" is DENIED.

2.

Petitioner's request for "Dr. Engle's files" is DENIED.

3.

Petitioner's request for "Any reports or summaries of oral
communications made by Dr. Estess to the State in the instant case" is
DENIED.

4.

Petitioner's request for "Documentation of all correspondence between
Dr. Engle or his agents and other non-lay or expert witnesses or potential
witnesses or their agents" is DENIED.

5.

Petitioner's request for "Dr. Engle's billing records or invoices for the
instant case" is DENIED.

Other Non-Lay or Expert Witnesses.
1.

Petitioner's requests for "All correspondence between non-lay or expert
witnesses or their agents," as specified in Petitioner's Motion for
Discovery and during the hearing on that Motion is DENIED.
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R.

Jean McCracken.

1.

S.

Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents,"
documents," as narrowed at
the hearing on the Motion for Discovery, is DENIED.

Amanda Stroud.
WN
Petitioner's request for discovery regarding Amanda Stroud is WITHDRA
WITHDRAWN
without prejudice to renew the request upon further investigation.

T.

Kathy Stroud.
WN
Petitioner's request for discovery regarding Kathy Stroud is WITHDRA
WITHDRAWN
without prejudice to renew the request upon further investigation.

II.

Prosecuting Attorney's Office
A.

Miscellaneous documentation.
1.

Petitioner's request for "Color copies of any illustrative exhibits utilized
during the State's opening statement" is GRANTED, limited to the one (1)
color portrait of Ms. Henneman shown during opening argument.

2.

Petitioner's request for "A copy of the motion requesting an order
impaneling the grand jury, and a copy of the order as required under ICR
6.1 (b) and I.
1. C. § 19-1307" is GRANTED.

3.

Petitioner's request for "A copy of any committee minutes on the drafting
ofthe death penalty jury instructions" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice
to renew the request upon further investigation.

4.

Petitioner's request for "Color copies of all PowerPoint slides and other
documents shown to the jury, including, but not limited to the "scale"
diagram roughly drawn and referenced in Mr. Hall's petition for postconviction relief' is GRANTED.

5.

With respect to Petitioner's request for "Access to the original video
and/or audio tapes made during police custodial interrogation of
Petitioner," as clarified at the hearing to include those recordings made on
3/13/03, 3/29/03, and 4/1/03, the Court ORDERS the prosecuting attorney
to determine the location of said recordings. The parties shall determine
the best method of enhancing said recordings, after which the Court shall
enter an Order accordingly.

6.

Petitioner's request for "Disclosure and access to any other audio and/or
video recordings involving Petitioner while in police custody and not
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previously disclosed during the ooderlying
Wlderlying criminal proceedings" is
DENIED, based on the prosecuting attorney's assertion that no additional
recordings exist.
7.

B.

C.

Discovery Materials.
1.

With respect to Petitioner's request for "Documentation denoted by
asterisk (*) as identified in comments section of attached Appendix B,"
the Court WITHHOLDS RULING pending an attempt of the parties to
satisfy the request.

2.

th, th
th 12th
th
th
th
Petitioner's request for "State's 1st, 3 rd , 6th
and 15th
Addenda
, 8 , 10 ,, 12
th
th
to Discovery Responses, and confirmation that the State's 16 Addenda to
Discovery Response was the last discovery response sent to defense
counsel" is GRANTED.

Electronic Mail.
1.

III.

Petitioner's request for "All documented communications, or summaries
of communications, by the prosecutor's office with the media, including
but not limited to press releases" is DENIED.

COWlty
Petitioner's request for "Copies of all e-mails between the Ada Coooty
Prosecuting Attorney's office and the Ada County Public Defender's
office regarding the Henneman case, the Hanlon case, or Erick Hall" is
DENIED, said request having been previously denied.

Law Enforcement Agencies
A.

Field notes and logbooks.
Petitioner's request for "field notes and logbooks generated by any law
enforcement officer" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting
attorney shall check relevant police files for notes not contained in reports
regarding the Henneman murder investigation.

B.

Correspondence.
Petitioner's request for "correspondence or summaries of corresponsence between
law enforcement and other state and federal agencies regarding the Henneman
murder investigation," is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request
upon review of the discovery addenda provided under Section II.B.2, above.
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C.

Specific reports.
With respect to Petitioner's request for specific reports, the Court WITHHOLDS
RULING pending review of the discovery addenda provided under Section ILB.2,
above.

D.

FBI I-drives.
Petitioner's request for "Copies of all reports, communications or files contained
on any I-Drive of any FBI field office involved in the Henneman or Hanlon
investigation, including, but not limited to the Salt Lake City and Boise field
offices" is DENIED, based on the prosecuting attorney's assertion that no
evidence was recovered by the FBI and there was no report from the FBI to local
law enforcement agencies.

E.

Task force lead assignments.
Petitioner's request for task force "lead assignments" is GRANTED IN LIMITED
PART. Petitioner may, upon appointment, inspect the 3-ring binders containing
the lead sheets with follow up reports and/or notes in the possession of Detective
Dave Smith and located at the Clinton Street Detective's Annex of the Boise
Police Department. Petitioner may examine the information contained in said
binders and copy those pages Petitioner wishes to retain, at Petitioner's expense.

F.

Miscellaneous reports and other documentation.
1.

Petitioner's request for "Police reports regarding all unsolved rapes,
attempted rapes, murders and attempted murders that took place in Ada
County from January 1995 to date" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to
renew the request upon further investigation.

2.

Petitioner's request for "Police reports regarding any and all attempted
abductions taking place in or around the Greenbelt, from January 1995 to
date, including, but not limited to the following unsolved homicides," as
limited at the hearing and in subsection (a) of the Motion for Discovery to
"law enforcement reports and notes regarding the murder of Kay Lynn
Jackson" is DENIED.

3.

Petitioner's request for "Police reports regarding any and all attempted
robberies involving beating on or around the head and taking place in Ada
County from January 1995 to date" is DENIED.

4.

Petitioner's request for "Any and all FBI reports containing 'profiling' of
the perpetrator in the Lynn Henneman and Cheryl Hanlon murders" is
DENIED.
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5.

Petitioner's request for "Any and all reports or documentation regarding
the special light sources used, and where, when and by whom used" is
WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request upon review of
pending discovery, specifically, police reports.

6.

Petitioner's request for "Police reports regarding Petitioner's escape
history" is GRANTED, based on the agreement of the parties.

7.

Petitioner's request for "Copy of all police reports and notes regarding
Ada County Case No. M0303573, the Failing to Register as a Sex
Offender case filed against Petitioner" is GRANTED, based on the
agreement of the parties.

8.

Petitioner's request for "The name of the officer(s) who searched the Main
Street Bridge area" is WITHDRAWN
WITHDRA WN without prejudice to renew the
request upon review of pending discovery.

9.

Petitioner's request for "All documented communications, or summaries
of communications, by law enforcement with the media, including but not
limited to press releases" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew
the request upon review of pending discovery.

10.

Petitioner's request for "Any reports identifying transients' involvement in
small fires reported at East Jr. High" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice
to renew the request upon review of pending discovery.

11.
II.

Petitioner's request for "Documentation regarding the search for
bloodstains located at or near the Chart House parking lot and near the
Main Street Bridge" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the
request upon review of pending discovery.

12.

Petitioner's request for "Records for Lynn Henneman's cellular telephone
use from October 1, 2000 until service was terminated" is GRANTED.
The prosecuting attorney shall conduct another review of his files for such
documents and disclose such documents found.

13.

Petitioner's request for "Any results from informal or formal testing
conducted for time and distance to walk relevant areas of the Greenbelt,
whether such testing was conducted by law enforcement personnel or
others" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request upon
review of pending discovery.

14.

Petitioner's request for "Any and all reports, notes and statements related
to searches conducted along the Boise River between the DoubleTree
Motel and the Capital Street Bridge, including searches of the Main Street
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bridge area on October 9, 2000" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to
renew the request upon review of pending discovery.
15.

F.

Petitioner's request for "Any and all reports, notes and statements related
to searches conducted by the FBI Salt Lake City-based 'Evidence
Recovery Team' along the Boise River near the Main St. bridge area on or
about 10/10100,
10/10/00, including documents relating to use of alternative light
sources" is DENIED for those reasons given with respect to request III.D,
above.

Documentation regarding DNA evidence.
1.

Petitioner's request for "Legible, readable, and unredacted miscellaneous
documentation and other requested information identified in Appendix A
and attached thereto" is DENIED, based on the prosecuting attorney's
assertion that he provided his color copies to trial counsel and retained
only a black and white copy.

2.

Petitioner's request for "All documentation relating to entry of Petitioner's
CODIS database, or any local or state
DNA profile into the Idaho CaDIS
database" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney
shall determine whether Petitioner's DNA was submitted to or entered into
CODIS or state-wide database in the 1990s, as maintained by
the Idaho CaDIS
the Idaho State Police.

3.

Petitioner's request for "All documentation relating to entry of Petitioner's
DNA profile into the national NDIS database, or any national database" is
DENIED without prejudice to renew the request based upon the results of
request IILF.2,
III.F.2, above.

4.

Petitioner's request for "Copies of any reports and summaries of
communications or conversations bc:tween Cellmark, Idaho State Police
andlor the Ada County prosecutor's
Forensics Laboratory, police agencies and/or
office regarding the existence and/or
andlor DNA profile for another perpetrator
in the Henneman and/or
andlor Hanlon homicide cases," as limited at the hearing
to the Henneman case, is DENIED.

5.

Petitioner's request for "Results of all comparisons made of Erick Virgil
Hall's DNA profile against any local, state, or national DNA database,
including the Idaho CaDIS
CODIS and national NDIS databases" is DENIED
without prejudice
prejUdice to renew the request based upon the results of request
IILF.2, above.

6.

Petitioner's request for "All DNA profile information developed or other
forensic testing conducted in connection with the murder of Kay Lynn
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Jackson and information related to DNA or other forensic exclusions in
that case" is DENIED.
7.

G.

Petitioner's request for "All DNA profile information developed or other
forensic testing conducted in connection with the death of Amanda Stroud
and information related to DNA or other forensic exclusions in that case"
is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request based upon
further investigation.

All Documentation and Information Regarding Reward Money Offered For
Assistance In The Henneman and Hanlon Homicide Investigations Including
Claims Made On Such Reward.
Petitioner's request for documentation and information is GRANTED IN
LIMITED PART, based upon the prosecuting attorney's assertion that only one
claim was made on the reward money, that the claim was made by the Boise
Police Department on behalf of another person, and that a private company
administering the reward money did not payout any reward money. The
prosecuting attorney shall provide the name of the person who made claim on the
reward money or the name of the person upon whose behalf the claim was made
by the Boise Police Department, and disclose the basis upon which the claim was
made.

H.

Documentation Regarding Sex Offender Registration.
1.

V.

Petitioner's request for "Documentation from the Idaho sex offender
registry involving registration, or attempts at registration, by Erick Hall" is
GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney agreed to and
shall provide the relevant police reports. The remainder of Petitioner's
request is DENIED.

Miscellaneous Documents and Reports.
A.

Miscellaneous
1.

Petitioner's request for "Legible copy of all receipts from the Table Rock
Brewhouse associated with food and alcohol ordered and purchased by
Lynn Henneman on 09/24/00" is DENIED. Petitioner has access to the
receipts admitted as trial exhibits.

2.

Petitioner's request for "Transcripts of all grand jury proceedings held in
connection with State v. Erick Virgil Hall, Ada County No. H03006l4
H0300614
(Hanlon)" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request based
upon further investigation.
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(

3.

Petitioner's request for "Register of Actions for State v. Erick Virgil Hall,
Ada County Case Nos. H03006141M0302868 (Hanlon)" is
WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request based upon further
investigation.

4.

Petitioner's request for "Copies of all exhibits presented to Grand Jury No.
03-35 (Lynn Henneman)" is GRANTED, to the extent that the prosecuting
attorney possesses said exhibits.

5.

Petitioner's request for "Copies of any and all written questions by jury to
the court, any bailiff, or other court personnel" is GRANTED. Madame
Clerk shall examine the Court's file and make copies of all notes from
jurors.

IMSI, Ada County Jail, Garden City Jail and Other Prison and Jail Records
A.

Inmate Classification Manuals.
Petitioner's request for Idaho Department of Correction's inmate classification
manuals is DENIED. However, Petitioner may seek a Court order if moc will
not cooperate with Petitioner's investigation.

B.

Safety Practices Manual.
Petitioner's request for "manuals, informal or formal policies, memoranda or
guidelines regarding safety practices for female correctional officers or other
female employees or volunteers and inmates classified as or believed to be
sexually violent toward women" is DENIED. However, Petitioner may seek a
Court order if IDOC has the requested information but will not cooperate with
Petitioner's investigation.

VII.

Depositions and Related Documentation Requiring Subpoenas
A.

All members of the defense team and their agents.
Trial counsel Amil Myshin and D.C. Carr have been deposed. Petitioner's
request for the depositions of Glen Elam, Roseanne Dapsauski, and Rolf
Kehne are DENIED.
1.
I.

Petitioner's request for subpoena duces tecums for
"Documentation identifying the cases each trial team member
worked on from April 1,
I, 2003 through January 18, 2005" was
previously and is DENIED.

ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY

21

001180

(
2.

B.

Petitioner's request for "All e-mail correspondence between trial
team members and the prosecutor's office" was previously and is
DENIED.

Dr. Michael Estess
Petitioner's request to depose Dr. Michael Estess is WITHDRAWN
without prejudice to renew the request upon further investigation.

VIII. Documents Requiring Subpoenas
A.

IX.

Miscellaneous
1.

Petitioner's request for "All files created by or held by the Ada County
Public Defender's office related to State v. Erick Virgil Hall, Case No.
M03021581H0300423 (failure to register)" is WITHDRAWN without
M0302158IH0300423
prejudice to renew the request upon further investigation.

2.

Petitioner's request for "An identification of the names of all cases that
each trial counsel handled while representing Petitioner including the case
names and dates that any of the cases went to trial, including an
identification of cases involving serious felony offenses of arson,
homicide (all degrees), rape, sodomy, kidnapping, burglary and robbery"
was previously and is DENIED.

3.

Petitioner's request for "All Washington DSHS Division of Child Support
records pertaining to Frank McCracken and Jean McCrackenlHall in Case
No. 70253" is GRANTED. Petitioner shall submit an order to the Court
which specifies that the need for records outweighs the need for privacy.

Preservation of Physical Evidence.
Petitioner's requests that "all physical evidence collected in the underlying criminal
investigation be preserved in order to avoid the destruction of potentially exculpatory
materials" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART, to the extent that the prosecuting attorney
has control over physical evidence, and based upon the prosecuting attorney's assertion
that law enforcement agencies and other public agencies would not destroy physical
evidence in a murder case.
X.

Access to Hanlon Court Documents.
Petitioner's request for access to the "Hanlon court filelrecord" is WITHDRAWN
without prejudice to renew the request upon further investigation.

PETITIONER'S "APPENDIX A": The parties agree to further confer regarding documents
contained in Petitioner's Appendix A to the Motion for Discovery to determine whether
agreement can be reached.
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PETITIONER'S "APPENDIX B": The parties agree to further confer regarding documents
contained in Petitioner's Appendix B to the Motion for Discovery to determine whether
agreement can be reached.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

I~ ~day of ~

,2007.

Thomas F. Neville
District Judge:
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CERTIFICATE
CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE

~

G

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of
J/\I'l
J,,1'l .... , 2007, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER REGA~COVERY
REGA~COVERY by method
indicated below to:

MARK ACKLEY
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
BOISE ID 83703
ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W FRONT STEET 3RD FLOOR
BOISE ID 83702

Dep
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SHERIFF'. EPARTMENT
)ISE POLICE DEPARTM./A~A COU.N)"V SHERIFF',SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT
...'

3-1-03

0300-1030

Co. Prosecutor

cro

case,

Det. Ayotte and I, from a previous
knew that Idaho Power has video surveillance cameras
situated on their building. One camera is positioned on the intersection of 13 th and Idaho. We met
with the security officer who played the digital system for us. At approximately 0245 brs., two
people were observed crossing the street from the intersection of 13th walking south on 13 th to
the area of 13 th and Main. The people appear to be walking close together and one appeared to be
~er detail could not be
taller than the other. The camera is located on top of the building and ~er
seen.
Det. Ayotte and I were assigned several leads that we worked to their logical conclusion. (See
lead sheets for further detail)~
.
wasLead
One lead of note was
Lead 77, from caller Scott Hill. Mr. Hill was a co-worker of the victim's
and had checked with
". He stated he had worked an event at th
his employees and had learned they had punched out at 0236 hrs. He stated he had left a few
minutes after that and had walked across the street to the parking garage, south of the Center on
the Grove. He stated he had parked his car on the 5th floor and found that the elevator wasn't
working and had to walk up the stairs to his car. He stated he had pulled out onto 13 th going north
boUnd and had a green.light
green. light to .enter the intersection. He stated as he was starting to proceed
through, a group of three people walked in front of his car and he had to wait for them to cross
the street before proceeding through the intersection. He stated he observed that
person
closest to him was Cheryl Hanlon, who he recognized. He stated she was arm. in arm with a
person that appeared to be clean cut, approximately 5 19" or 5110" wearing a blue jacket. He stated
be didn't get a very good look at him becaUse he was concentrating on the victim. He stated he .
had considered honking his hom but decided against it since he was tired and knew that the .
victim would probably engage him in conversation. He stated he decided against it since he ~so
knew that the victim was not with her boyfriend that he· had met on other occasions. He estimated
the time as being very close to 0300 hrs., based on leaving after his employees had clocked out
and having to walk to the top ofthe
of the parking garage. He stated neither the victim nor her
companions had looked at him.

the

He stated be believed the person she was walking with had feathered hair parted in the middle.
and described it as an 80l s type haircut called the "mullef'. He stated he bad not ~y seen him
very well. He stated the.third person ~ on a bicycle and appeared to be a street peIson.
pelson. He
stated he bad a baseball cap on and had obviously dirty unkempt hair. He stated he was tall and
seemed to be to big for the bicycle he was riding.

Oftic:er'

Serial I Datcliuue
RqJoniuc Oftic:er I Serial'

Approving I Serial'
Serial I DatdI""uDc
s~ Approving'

DeL Greg Morgan 322 3-14-03

Sgt. Tony Wallace 296 3-14-03
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BOISE POLICE DEPARa. _lENT/ADA COUNTY SHERIL

S DEPARTMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

03/01/03

She could tell that Jeff was mad. She didn't hear all of what was said but believed they were
arguing about leaving~·
leaving~'
When they left, .she
she can't say. why but believes they were going for diimer.
From 2230 hrs until 0100 Det. Iverson and I then went to all the bars along State St. asking
them to post the flyer that had been·developed. In some of the bars people indicated the victim
looked familiar but none could
cOuld say she had been in last night.

I

· We went off duty about 0100 hrs. 03/02103.

03/02103 1000 hrs. I returned to duty. I attended a briefing to update all officers assigned to the
investigation. Leads that had been developed were assigned.
.

-.
I

.

that the victim was seen at about 0245 hrs..
hrs.· Attempting to
to enter Elliott's
One lead developed was thatthe
bar on Idaho. A composite of the subject with the victim and flyer was developed.
1200 hrs.· Det Smith received a phone call from a subject in the front lobby ofthe
of the law
· enforcement building on Banister. I was informed the subject was talking with Pet. Smith about .
.
the homicide and 1. was directed to respond to Barrister and detain the subject. '

subj~ct who Was still. on the phone in the lobby·talking with Det. '.
I re~nded and located the sUbj~ct
Smith. I contacted.the subject who was identified as Derrick Bilow and requested that he come'
come·
to cm
CID with me. He agreed to do so and I ti:~rted him uncuff~ in the front seat of my
vehilce•.
unmarked police vehilce•.
CID we had no conversation other then the fact I was taking him
During the trip from Barrister to. cm
· to talk with Det. Smith, ·and he pointing out his car parked in the front lot at Banister. .
After this subject was turned over to Det. Smith I went about handling the leads that were
.
'
assigned to me.
Det Morgan and I checked the victim's work place then went to the Idaho Power building where .
we met with the ~urity officer. We
allowed to view the security system digital recording
files for the day in question. .

were

!

\

~ Offi<:cr I Serial I DatdT"1IIlC
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BOISE POLICE DEPAh . ..1ENT/ADA
..lENT/ADA COUNTY SHER1.

'S DEPARTMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

,

FILE

03/01/03

"

We noted at appx 0245 brs. (the'
(the'clock
clock on the system is appx one hour oft) two subjects walking
onto the field ofview
of view ofth~
ofth~ sYstem..
sYstem., They appeared to cut across 13th St walking SIE onto or
near the Idaho Power property.
.'
.,
The shot is a distance shot and does not show clear detail, it however appears the subjects are
male and female..One
female. 'One is taller then the other. And they appear to be walking arm in arm
arm. or very
"
, '
"
'
' .
"'
close together. .
officer indicated they store the files for more then a month, and agreed to maintain
The security officerindicated
the files until we couid attempt to recover a copy. Det. Chip Morgan was assigned this task.

a

brs. I received call from Phil the victim's brother. He indicated that he had been
Appx 1725 hrs.
talking with his mother and wanted to pass on some o f . t they had talked about He didn't
of the information but wanted to pass it along.
know the value ofthe
l

~.
~'

Phil indicated that his mother believed that the victim may have had some issues with Bill the
..
roommate, but she was not sure what they were or why.
, 'roommate,
They believed the victim is street smart, and would not have walked away with someone she
didn't know or f~l comfortable with. Had she been with someope other then Jeff it would have
frigh~ed of
been someone she was pot frigh~ed
1735 hrs. I talked directly with Joyce by
bY phone. She wanted to know if the victim's PIU bad
.been
'been recovered and where it is; She also indicated she had taiked with Jeff today:. .,
.'
She indicated that slie knew Cheryl always kept her ID and money in her pocket when she went
out.
this
She indicated the family would hold a memorial service in Washington on Wednesday of
oftbis
week.
.,

.
'

1825 Det Morgan and I met with Jeff at his residence OJ
'. He was shown the composite
of the subject thai was believ~
it ,didn't,.
ofthe
believ~ to have been with the victim at 0245 brs. He indicated it.didn't
look like anyone he knew.
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t<cpoItiaa
Officer I Serial
tCmortinJrOffic::cr'
Serial'I Datdl'"1IIle
Datdl"1IIlC

£T. MAYOTi'B
BPJ>.OO2a.ADP
BPJ>..OO2a.ADP 1994

348

. .'

., .'

"
...
".
.

0001188
t,O ::18'

Fonow-up, , Pink - Crime Analysis
, ~.
DISTRIBUTION:' Original- Records, Yenow - Follow-up,'
Analysis·~.

....,.,

ATTACHMENT 6

001189

~

Cl"ime Lab Activity
306409

2003

Date:

Activity:

I

I

I

~

I

ComparisonTech:
ComparlsonTech: C~

Primary LabTech: IL-~_ - '

C')
c')

r.:.."

001190

o
o

t::,.~

Results:

I 03/0212003 I'IRec'd
'IMoreHlts & route copy to Det. Anderson.
IRec'd photos via cf card frm Carner IIMoreHlts

I
I
I
I

II 03/0212003 I'IRec'd
IRec'd photos via cf card frm Holst - 'IMoreHlts & route copy to Det. Anderson.

I

Del. Anderson..
Anderson ..
1I 03/0412003 I IRec'd photos via cf card frm Carner IIMoreHlts & route copy to Det.

II 03/0412003 II
1IRec'd Proc. req. from D. Smith - VHllltem(S) 3, 4, 5, & 6.
Checkbook cover.
II 0310612003
03/0612003 II
1IRec'd Proc. req. from G.Morgan •- V I
Ilcheckbook

(S) WARD, JEFFREY ROBERT

I

I·

II

03/1112003 1IRec'd photos via cf card frm Carner IIMoreHlts only

II 03/13/2003

IIRec'd (2) disks from Hilliard
HIlliard - VH

II 03/1412003

IIRec'd Proc. req. from Det.
(S) M. HALL; Item #7, oral swab from Hall; Item #8, oral swab from Carlson.
Del. D. Smith 'I(S)

II 07/1012003

1IIProcesslng
IProcessing completed SH

II 0711 0/2003

IIProcesslng
'IProcesslng completed SH

I
I

IIMoreHlts only

I

I'I,Holst's
Holst's request - Insufficient ridge detail developed. Evidence actually processed In
March but didn't wrap up until this date. No real reason.

I'1IMOrgan's
Morgan's request - Negative.

Evidence actually processed In March but didn't wrap up /
until this date. No real reason.

II 01/23/2004 II
(2)each disks copied (6 total)and routed to Jan Bennetts on 1123/04-BK
1IPhoto reqlHllliard
req/Hllllard for J.BennettsAC
J.BenneltsAC I'1(2)eaCh

II 1210112005 I1IIInformation SH

I
I
I

III~eturned
Returned Items #6 (water bottle) and #11 (match book I think, hard to read) to Property.
property./
Just cleaning out office.

IIRcv'd evidence from state Lab JD I'I~et.
I, 0111712006 II
Det. L Anderson submitted shoe track photos to Slate
State Lab.
lab. Photo's were actually

J ~ ~~t~-lo'tr'~
~~t~-Io'tr'~

•
retained ,~
@ State lab for their files, Just ~cv'd
rcv'd enveloped w/chaln
wlchaln which contained
conlalned the"",\.
the"" ' ..Jo.
.Jo ~
f...,

II 0412512006

Illnfo only JD

r

-

,~

I1 Perer Jan Bennets/ACpq would like me to find out what Property stili has on file & fax It toto/
Tracy SmlthlACPO. Old 4126/06.

II 04125/2006
0412512006

IIEvldence
info only JD
'IEvldence Info

I'Itcated
Located the following Items In
in case file (all S&S): Smith's #1- Eric Hall's oral swabs,
#3E & 3G- Swabs from (V) thighs, 3A- reference blood stain
slain for (V).

SKH~2.
SKH~2-

Jeffery

1

Cn~~cbrcJ)d.~~
~s ~~~.:\:~~g.U~~
~~~.:\:~~g.U~~ Cn~~cbrcJ)d.~~
~\

:r: ...

~
",l)~/
"'l)~'

I cJ\

SERI sticker (M711606 with handwritten '2'). Evidence was placed Into the secured 1...1
SERf

"',
.....
The evidence JD
I 11/15/2006 II-E-vld-e-n-ce-fro-m-JD-s-10-126I-0-6-e-n-try--"""
'IEvldence from JOs 10126106 entry- 'I(he
JO placed Into the 'out' area In secured Crime Lab
lab refrigerator was
transported to ACSO Property this date to be cold stored-BK

I

II 01/0312007

h
--. ...

JI1~ICtim'S
victim's thighs (this envelope was 5&5 by SERI - lab# M20030595)
M20030595.) and marked with a

11/1312006 IIContlnued -

II''I~ called Megan Cleman with Lab Corp. She stated she would send a transport kit for the

IILab
'ILab Corp Information - BK

"'-

IIEvldence
'IEvldence disposition - BK

llper
'Irer request by Jan Bennetts, Det.
Oet. Smith's Item #1 (four oral swabs) were sent via
FedEx to SERI - tracking number 8431 67545675.

I 01/0412007

IIEvldence disposition - BK

Ilper
'I;er request by Jan Bennetts, the SAK was sent to Lab Corp via FedEx·
FedEx - tracking
number 8569 3418 6955.

II 01/0512007

lilab
'Ilab Corp Information - BK

II 01/2412007

Illnfo
'iinro only JD
JO

I J.

""

~

_r::~\_O'l~~
~\O'l~ -c::>

'IRcv'd
processing reqlJ _Be_n_n_ett_s_-B-,~
Bennetts-B~ Itn
the SAK b9
be senftoLBbcorp
sent to Lab Corp (SERlsupposed
(SERI supposed to have done
don~aM::l
II_Rev'
_d..,:.p_ro_ce_s_sl_ng:;...-re..,:.qI_J
Jan Bennetts requested theSAK
~
request~",
that, but returned It to us Instead) for serology from fingernails, and defense request
.~'
~ ~~

II 0110412007

.

I

~\fh\t'o.~~~.~\C)
~\f'r \t"oo ~ ~~. ~~

ttL\

SAK to be sent to them.

II 0110312007

~

:-'-

o

_

j. ~ S~~
~~~~~Sf.~
\0,.. ~

~~'M'"0'
~~\rl'0'

III'I: received a call from Julie with Lab Corp. Julie advised they Just received our package
this date.

I'Ifet.
Det. Smith, myself, B.Klnney,
B.K1nney, Jan BennetlslACPO,
BenneUsiACPO, & Doug VarieiACPO met at

~CI
~~

Property to go through evidence to establish chain of custody. Det
Oet Morgan responded \

II 0112412007 II'IRCv'd
Rcv'd CF from B Klnney-BK
K1nney-BK

'IJan 5: 8737 through 8741.

I

I 0210712007

Ilvla DHL.
OHL. Det.Smlth
Oet.Smlth Item#1-Er/c
Item#1-Erlc hall oral swabs.

I

I'ITOOk
Took Det.Smlth
Oet.Smlth Item #1 & 3E·
3E- and 3G to ACSO-Property this date for cold storage. JD
JO

I

&,

IIRcv'd
IIRCv'd evidence from SRI JD
JO

I 02/0712007
0'210712007 I
I IEvidence Info only JD
JO

... " ' . .

""

,L

...

-""""-

~~
..~+l2
'co~
~",~+l2
"cC\~
....~Jov~~~~·
~ Jov~~~~· ~"
...

~~.~~ ~- ~-tS

JO I
II 0212012007 IIIIRcv'd evidence from LabCorp JD
SAK (S&S In box BK used) & a White
II~AK
white sealed envelope. Had to open envelope to verify

n~_""ak'S ~., So~
,...JL.~\IIf~S'.~""'~~

•
...
,,~
ltem#3F-lnner thigh swabs. & ~1,
., ,,~,~..
contents. It contained (2) yellOV:'
yell~ envelopes said to contain ltem#3F-/nner
• L \ ,11 __ Jro9v?n
AoN.ll>- V
~-------.~~v~~,·~
I 0212012007 IIEvldence Info cont. JD
JO
U
Opened box containing SAK to view chain of custody (Had to cut thru eeals
seals on brown
fIN' ~
..t..l: ~~.
II~pened
~cP.M~.
box In order to view SAK InSide.)
inside.)
~ ~ .- --_ . 0

__

I

I

JO
II 0312812007 III IEvidence Info JD

l--f-III~eet
Meet wI D.VarieiACPO
O.VarieiACPO & checked out the following Items from Property: belt, left shoe,
shoe,. ~W(.

JO
II 0312812007 III IEvidence Info cont. JD

White undershirt, white sweatshirt, blk wallet w/contents,
wlcontents,
II rom
from tree, blue coat, women's While

plastiC for court
cOUrl....--...J
tree branch, clgg butts (#1A & 3A). All were re-packaged In clear plastic
_
Item be checked out of Property for court. Re-packaged 416 & placed In Locker#3.

-

-

-

-

--

-

-

-

-

- - ------_

..

--- - -

--

---

4k I

~r-..t>\~.

Q~("o.l>\~•

• _. _,

I\"" ~.
I\....
~~ NM ~
~.~~NM~

-Dc.w~.

--

_L

l"\._.

I 0411612007 III-R-ele-a-s-ed-a-II-e-vl-de-n-ce-~-o-r
co-urt-JD---'I
to Sean O'Connor/ACPO this date. He will fill out a Property log[
-.·1 .
IReleased all evidence for court
JO 'Ito
lOs[ ~L.··
~1>CL04~
---

!''(..\\ V2,')

c\- \ c.ten
c.t",c,~~i.'(.\\ijJ
i\
&,~ .'",jiijIlIIIIIP"f
~\~.
~.. (1~ wl ~
~ ~'~"(1~wl~

II 04/0512007 II IIRcv'd evidence from ACSO-Propert III~KH-16SKH-16- various paperslltems found In back pack. ACPO D.Varle
addU II
O.Varle requested this addtl

-

~ ~-'ro~

Oef t-shlrt,
t-ahlrt, d-jeans,
Sierra Jeans, Black panties, black leggings, backpack, Nlke cap, Der
d-Jeans, d- LW(""~~~
~~

~________

--

001191

II

C\l

\n ~~
t~ lo~ (1..'Iowt*·~t~lo~(I..'l.wt*
~)
~)

-

_~c

ATTACHMENT 7

001192

11.

Boise City Police Department Narrative
Supplement Report DR# 306-409 by Officer
Nicholls and Officer Nixon consisting of one
(1 age,.

19

t)09473
009473
001193

15.

Boise City Police Department Supplement
Report DR# 306-409 by Detective Dave Smith
consisting of nine (9 a es,

24-32

vVL.L.,h)lCLHE,

of State's page number 83,
Duplicate ofState's

001194
t)09474

51.

Boise City Police Department Property Invoice
and all items listed therein, DR# 306-409 by
Detective M. Ayotte and Detective Greg
Morgan with one 1 age,

107

009475
001195

53.

Idaho State Police, Forensic Services Evidence
Submission Form by Detective Dave Smith
consistin of one 1) a e,

108

001196
009476

01\./

\.

71.

Written Statement by Evelyn Dunaway
Reference DR# 208-655 consisting of two (2)

147-148

89.

Garden City Police Department Incident Detail
Report DR# 03-00849 by Officer Strange
consisting of four (4) pages,

193-196

t)09477
001197

Sketch of Suspect dated March 7,2003,
consisting of one (1) page,

t)09478
001198
..

~

127.

Garden City Police Department Property
Invoice and all items listed therein, for Boise
CityDR# 035109 by Detective Stambaugh
with three (3) pages,

297-299

009479
"
001199
'\

133.

Idaho State Police Forensic Services,
Criminalistic Analysis Report, Affidavit, and
Shoe Print Analysis by Donna Meade
. . of
offoUT
consistin
four 4 a es,

310-313

143.

Fax Cover Sheet from Investigator Chris Rose,
Idaho Correctional Center, dated August 15,
2003, consisting of one (1) page,
2003

334

001200
1)09480
.:Jr

151.

Certified Judgment of Convictions and related
documents, which may include fingerprint
cards, for Case No. M0202709, consisting of
ofjudgment provided,
six (6) pages, -copies ofjudgment
other materials/documents available for
ins ection.

585

153.

Certified Judgment of Convictions and related
documents, which may include fingerprint
cards, for Case No. M0207995, consisting of
ofjudgment provided,
six (6) pages, -copies ofjudgment
available for
other materials/documents availablefor
inspection.

587

t)09481
001201

$'

155.

Certified Judgment of Convictions and related
documents, which may include fmgerprint
cards, for Case No. M9102901, consisting of
seven (7) pages, -copies ofjudgment
ofjudgment provided,
other materials/documents available for
inspection.

589

157.

Certified Judgment of Convictions and related
documents, which may include fingerprint
cards, for Case No. HCR18094, consisting of
ofjudgment
twenty-one (21) pages, -copies ofjudgment
provided, other materials/documents available
or inspection.

591

159.

Certified Judgment of Convictions and related
documents, which may include fingerprint
cards, for Case No. H9400534, consisting of
ofjudgment provided,
five (5) pages, -copies ofjudgment
other materials/documents available for
ins ection.

593

163.

Boise City Police Department News Release
"Homicide Victim Identified" consisting of two
(2) pages,

600-601

001202
t)09482

165.

Boise City Police Department News Release
"Homicide Investigation Continues: Detectives
Examine Tire Tracks" consisting of two (2)

605-606

Photograph Disc DR# 306-409, (2 of2), photos
of Erick Hall's personal items,

l)09483
001203

001204
t)G9484

197.

Idaho State Police Forensic Services Evidence
Receipt and Property Report signed by Jane
Davenport, dated 03/20103,
03/20/03, consisting of one

897

1

201.

Idaho State Police Forensic Services Evidence
Receipt and Property Report signed by Mickey
Hall, dated 03/17/03, consisting of one (1)

901

203.

Idaho State Police Forensic Services Evidence
Receipt and Property Report signed by Jane
Davenport, dated 03/24/03, consisting of one

903

1

205.

Idaho State Police Forensic Services Evidence
Receipt and Property Report signed by Mickey
Hall, dated 06/20/03, consisting of one (1)
page,

905

009485
001205

/~

,

-

.

207.

Idaho State Police Forensic Services,
Criminalistic Analysis Report, Shoeprint or
Tire track Analysis by Donna Meade consisting
of five 5) a es,

908-912

213.

Idaho State Police Forensic Services Evidence
Receipt and Property Report signed by Mickey
Hall, dated 03/03/03, consisting of one (1)
pa e,

922

Duplicate of State's page numbers 612-614.

001206
t)09486

231.

Idaho State Police Forensic Services
Forensic Biology Report by Cynthia R.
Hall, including hand written notes,
consistin
V~A"'U",>U.u,,,- of six (6) pa es,

1015-1020

235.

Idaho State Police Forensic Services
Forensic Biology Report DNA by DNA
analyst, Cynthia Hall, including
handwritten notes, worksheets, and other
materials, consisting of twenty-two (22)
a es,

1027-1048

t)09487
001207

237.

Videotape of security surveillance at
th
Jackson's Food Stores on 8 Street and
Fort, dated February 28, 2003, through
March 1, 2003, consisting of one (1) ta e,

label J

Letter from Jan M. Bennetts to LabCorp
requesting statistical estimates for the
major profile calculations consisting of one
(1) pa e,

1054

,""V.u.CHLl

241.

009488
001208

267.

Statistical Estimates from LabCorp by A.
Dwayne Winston and Meghan E.
Clement, dated October 14, 2004,

6th
Addendum
1180-1181

1)09489 . ~
001209

$

~,

271.

Photo copies of chain of custody
documents for property invoices logged in
under DR# 306-409, consisting of sixty six
(66) pages

9th
Addendum
1185-1249

Boise Police Department Property Invoice,
DR# 306-409 fronts and backs including
bar code supplements, consisting of twenty
seven (27) pages

Addendum
1251-1277

File notes from LabCorp on resubmitted
evidence for testing, consisting of fifty-one
(51) pages

13
Addendum
1279-1328

Updated NCIC for Zachary Bingham (aka

15
Addendum
1332-1341

Spider), consisting often (10) pages

11

tJ09490
001210

283.

Corrected transcript of interview with
defendant, (this transcript was provided to
the public defenders and should have been
forwarded)

285.

Interview of Norma Jean Oliver, consisting
of two (2) compact discs (side A&B) (Ms.
Oliver may also have mental health
treatment at Intermo,untain Hospital in
Boise. However, the State does not possess
of those records.)
any ofthose

009491
001211

287.

Updated discovery log for State v. Erick

1399-1418

Hall, H0300624, consisting of twenty (20)
pages

289.

Register of Actions for April Sebastian

1433-1436

HCR17972 and H0400228, consisting of
four (4) pages

()09492
001212

\~

ATTACHMENT 8

001213
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CRIMINAL
CRnrrNAL

INVESl':rGA~ION
INVES~IGA~ION

LEAD ~

\

CASE ClF'FICm
ClPFICJm
.
~----------~-----

ASSIQIm
ASSIG!Im

DIVISION
DIVISION

I2ADI

5<::>

-=~--=~--

INVESfi~(S)--yy\O
_V'....;..
INVESfi~(S) YY\ 0 Y"j_O""'
j c:......V"\.

_

(Return ~eted
~etei .feeD to Case Offjcer.1
-'

.(

i l s1
SYNOPSIS OF LEAD: [.Incl..(S),
[.IDcl..(S), time rebid., sour;ce, receiver, &: &ta
&tails]

..5R
..5R'l'l-

e.-T+~'n.1l-d...
c.-T+~'n.Il-d...

C<:
Y)'l1L- S~,..f~~:::l....::~~'
V:V)'lIL-S~f~~'

_
.'

1

c.*»1ogy, &
SYNOPSIS OF INVESTIGATOR'S ACTIONS/FINDINGS: CIi:Jcl.
Clilcl. specific ro, du
duc.*»logy,
Srgi1e"Euta.l/CaIt:inaat:i.a: Rerod::s
Re{OLts wr.itt:en.]
wr.itten.. ]
all pert:i.Dent deb; 1s. Attach all a;?Pies of. SrJrole"Euta.l/CaIt:i.naat:i.a

l
DAB: ~
~~
CaIp"""..-.:'~~eted~~____ Invest::1~
Invest::1~ .
.
~_______ CrJrpleted
Yellcw: Case Officer; pj,nk:. ASsigned Inv..
Inv .. ]
[Copies: White &: Yellow:

-.
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001215
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•

<

,I

Q.
11-

RECEIVED
MAR 10
1 0 2007
STATEA~~
~J~l~~~

PUBLlC E)c;;,FENOEF

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Roger Bourne
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State BarNo. 2127
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)

Case No. SPOT0500155

)

STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE
DISCOVERY ORDER

)

)

Respondent,

)
)

-------------)
----------------------------)
COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of
Ada, State ofIdaho, and makes the State's response to the Court's Order Regarding Discovery in
the above-entitled case. The State will use the numbering system that has been followed in the
original motion for discovery and now used in the Court's Order.
I(A)(2) Statements Made by Lisa Lewis to Scott Birch.
Scott Birch advises that he has no report or notes concerning any contact with Lisa
Lewis.
I(A)(3) Notes and Reports Made by SRO Mike Barker Concerning Lisa Lewis.
STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL), Page 1

001216

I'

,-

Officer Barker advises that he has no notes or reports of any contact with Lisa
Lewis.
I(B)(2) Statements Made by Peggy Jean Hill to Scott Birch.
Scott Birch advises that he has no notes or reports concerning any contact with
Peggy Jean Hill.
I(B)(3) Statements Made by Peggy Jean Hill to SRO Mike Barker.
Officer Barker confirms that he has no notes or reports of any contact with Peggy
Jean Hill.
I(C) Notes and Police Reports Concerning the Death of Patrick Hoffert.
The Garden City Police Department has informed the undersigned that the only
report they have in their file concerning the death of Patrick Hoffert is a report
written by Detective Stephen Bartlett. There are no other notes or audio or video
taped interviews. There is no "notebook with notes from Patrick Hoffert." There is
no report of any forensic testing done on a black Toyota vehicle. Garden City has
no pathology notes or reports concerning the death. Garden City has no DNA or
other forensic profile developed on Mr. Hoffert. There is no supplemental report
from Detective Allen on the suicide scene.
I(C)(4) Coroner's file on Patrick Hoffert.
The undersigned has reviewed the coroner's file and has found that it contains the
coroner's report concerning the cause of death, certificate of death, a gross anatomic
description, a toxicological laboratory report, and the police report of Detective
Stephen Bartlett. Attached to Detective Bartlett's report are four handwritten pages,
apparently written by Patrick Hoffert. Copies of those four handwritten pages are
provided with this discovery response. There are also other miscellaneous papers in
the file, but nothing relevant to the petition for post conviction relief.
I(E)(4) An NCIC check on Christian Johnson.
We have run an NCIC check on Christian Johnson and it lists the following felony
convictions.

STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL), Page 2

001217

1. Burglary, Ada County, May 1988 - the defendant was sentenced to a period of
retained jurisdiction on a five year tenn.
2. Burglary, Ada County, November 1987 - the sentence was suspended and the
defendant was put on probation. The State is uncertain if this was a withheld
judgment.

1(E)(7) Information on the Execution of a Search Warrant at Christian Johnson's
Residence.
It does not appear from the police report of Detective Anderson that a search

warrant was executed on the Denver Street residence where Christian Johnson was
staying.

100(2)
1(F)(2) Notes Made by Law Enforcement Not Previously Disclosed, but Contained in
the Police File.
The State has again reviewed the law enforcement file and has found that one page
ofnotes
of notes that may not have been provided in discovery.

I(G)(l) Notes in the Erick Hall Rape File Relating to Norma Jean Oliver's Mental
Health History.
There are no notes in the prosecutor's file relating to Ms. Oliver's mental health
history.

I(G)(2) Statements or Summaries of Statements Attributed to Ms. Oliver Contained
in the Garden City Police File.
The Garden City Police Department has infonned the undersigned that the only
item they still have related to the 1991 rape case is the report of Detective Dan
Hess.

I(G)(3)
No incentives were given or offered to Ms. Oliver for her testimony.

I(G)(5) Juvenile Records in Ada and Payette Counties.
The undersigned has detennined that there was no Ada County prosecution of Ms.
Oliver in connection with her December 1991 runaway. An inquiry has been
made of Payette County and the undersigned has been infonned that no records
were immediately available to the clerk of the court in Payette. The clerk advised

STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL), Page 3

001218

the undersigned that if any records could be found, the clerk would call. No call
was received.

I(G)(6) Police Reports Related to Ms. Oliver's December 4,1991, Runaway Charge.
The State has located a Boise Police report under DR #127-536, which details Ms.
Oliver's arrest for runaway on December 2, 1991, and DR #127-686, which
details her arrest for runaway on December 3, 1991. Those reports are provided
with this discovery response. A check with the Ada County Sheriffs Office
property division shows that no audiotapes or evidence of any kind were booked
into property as a result of those two arrests.
I (G)(8)(b)

There is no "contact sheet" of photos taken of Ms. Oliver as part of the 1991 rape
investigation.

I(G)(8)(c) Color Copies of All Photos Taken of Ms. Oliver.
Color copies of all photos taken of Ms. Oliver were provided to trial counsel
during the original case and are again being provided with this discovery
response.

I(G)(8)(g)
The Garden City Police Department has informed the undersigned that it has no
notes, photographs, or audio or video recordings contained in the file of the
investigation of the 1991 rape case.

I(G)(8)G) DNA Results from the 1991 Rape Case.
There is no indication that any DNA analysis was done in the 1991 rape case.

I(N)(I) Bench Notes from the Coroner's File on the Lynn Henneman Autopsy.
The undersigned has reviewed the coroner's file and has determined that there are
some notes in the file that may not have been disclosed. The notes were probably
by Deputy Coroner Michelle Hoffinan.

I(N)(2) Peer Review of Coroner's Findings.
The undersigned is informed by the coroner's office that no formal peer review was
conducted and no report exists of any peer review.

STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL), Page 4
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I(N)(3) Notes Relating to "Body Recovery."
The undersigned has reviewed the coroner's file and found that some of the notes
referred to above appear to relate to the recovery ofLynn Henneman's body.

I(N)(5) Full Body X-Rays.
I<N)(5)
The coroner's office advises the undersigned that they do not have full body x-rays
ofLynn Henneman's body.

I(N)(6) Toxicology Test Results.
No other report exists in the coroner's file relative to toxicology results other than
what was provided in the original discovery.

The Texas Laboratory is the

laboratory used by the coroner's office.

I(N)(ll)
I(N)(U) Photographs of Lynn Henneman's Body.
Digital photographs of Lynn Henneman's body have been previously provided to
the State Appellate Public Defender, who claim that they are unable to open the
CD's. The Prosecuting Attorney is willing to assist them in opening the CD's or
provide them with additional ones if the CD is defective.

I(N)(12) Microscopic Slides.
The State is willing to work with the State Appellate Public Defender to establish a
procedure for the transfer of microscopic slides to an expert for review when the
necessary information is provided to the State.

I(N)(13) Sex Crimes Kit Protocol.
The coroner's office advised that they use the sex crimes kit protocol that is
provided in the sex crimes kit itself. The coroner's office does not have a separate
protocol.

I(N)(14) Notes Regarding Certain Tests Conducted by the Coroner.
All reports and results of tests have been previously provided in discovery. A
review ofthe coroner's file did not show any additional notes or reports.

I(N)(21) Dr. Groben's Curriculum Vitae.
A copy of that vitae is provided with this discovery.

I(N)(23) Coroner's Office Accreditation.
The Ada County Coroner's Office is not accredited by the National Association of
Medical Examiners.
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II(A)(4) PowerPoint Slides.
A copy of the PowerPoint slide program used during closing argument is provided
with this discovery.

II(A)(5) Access to the Original Video/Audiotapes.
The undersigned has located the original recordings of the defendant's three
interviews.

II(B)(2) Addendum to State's Discovery Response.
Copies of the State's First, Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ten, Twelfth and Fifteenth
Addendums are provided with this discovery response. The State confirms that the
Sixteenth Addendum was the last discovery response sent to defense counsel.

III(A) Field Notes and Log Books.
The undersigned has reviewed the Boise Police file and has found one page of notes
that the State is unable to say was previously provided in discovery.
llI(E)
III(E) Task Force Lead Assignments.

The Prosecuting Attorney and the Boise Police Department has granted access to the
three ring binders containing the Lead Sheets for review by the State Appellate
Public Defender. To the undersigned's understanding, that review has taken place.

III(F}(6} Police Reports Regarding the Defendant's Escape.
The police reports from the Prosecuting Attorney's file detailing the defendant's
escape from prison are provided with this discovery response.

III(F)(7) Police Reports Regarding the Defendant's Failing to Register as a Sex
Offender Charge.
Copies of the police reports detailing the defendant's charge as failing to register as
a sex offender are provided with this discovery response.

III(F)(12} Lynn Henneman's Cellular Telephone Records.
The Prosecuting Attorney has reviewed his file and determined that no cellular
telephone records are in the file and there is no indication that any cellular
telephone records were produced as part of the original investigation.
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III(F)(2) Documentation Regarding DNA Evidence, Petitioner's DNA Profile.
The Prosecuting Attorney has conferred with the Idaho State Forensic Laboratory.
They have advised that the petitioner's DNA profile was not entered into the
statewide database in the 1990's.
III(G)
III (G) Reward Money.
The Prosecuting Attorney has spoken to the agency who administered the reward
fund. That person has confirmed that no reward money was paid in connection
with the Henneman case. Boise City Detective Dave Smith requested of the
reward administrator that reward money be paid to Kathy Stroud, Amanda
Stroud's mother, for the information she originally provided concerning the
possibility that Erick Hall was involved in the Hanlon murder.

The reward

administrator denied that claim and no other claim was made.
III(H) Documentation of Defendant's Sex Offender Registry.
The undersigned has complied by providing copies of police reports and other
documentation from the defendant's failure to register as a sex offender file.
V(A)(4) Copies of Grand Jury Exhibits.
It appears to the undersigned that the Grand Jury exhibits were provided to the

trial jury. No separate Grand Jury exhibits exist in the prosecution file.
IX Preservation of Physical evidence.
The Prosecuting Attorney has sent letters to each law enforcement agency
involved in the Lynn Henneman case requesting that any evidence in their control
continue to be maintained.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this

JS1liday of March 2007.

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor

me
; rosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
delivered to the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho
83703 through the United States Mail, this

J!Z.

day of March 2007.
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Reporter: Wolf, Sue

Division: DC
Courtroom: CR501
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Ellis, Janet
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Case ID: 0001
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V ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
State Attorney: VARIE,
Public Defender:
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00:00:0009:25:22 - Operator
Recording:
00:00:00 09:25 :22 - New case
,STATE OF IDAHO
00:00:1909:25:41 - General:
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Time stamp
00:00:35 09:25:57 - Other: Owens, Nicole
counsel for petitioner as well
00:00:59 09:26:21 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Time set for further post conviction proceedings. State's Motion waiving
00:01:21 09:26:43 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
atty/client privilege/ Pet's Mot for Prot Order/ Respondent's State's Motion
00:01 :5509:27:17 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
for Discovery/ And Petitioner's Motion for Discovery.
00:02:2309:27:45 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENl'{ETTS/DOUG
VARIE,
Ms. Bennetts argued State's Motion waiving Atty/Client privilege.
00:03:2409:28:46 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
VARIE,
Request Court order waivor re: Rob Chastain and Deborah Kristal.
00:05:1609:30:38 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Ms. Owens stated no objection to reviewing trial counsel's file. Re:
00:06:1809:31:40 - Other: Owens, Nicole
atty/client doctrine, propose waived as far as claims waived in
00:07:3009:32:52 - Other: Owens, Nicole
amended petition, any documents withheld, would document and can come to the
00:08:2309:33:45 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Court for in camera
V ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
00:08:2809:33:50 - State Attorney: VARIE,
MS.Bennetts
argued
to the claims entitled to documents, index
if
relevent
Ms.Bennetts
ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
00:09:05 09:34:27 - State Attorney: V
VARIE,
would not give enough information. In regards to Utah case, have outlined
ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
00:09:35 09:34:57 - State Attorney: V
VARIE,
objection to that procedure. That case not controlling to this Court.
00:10:2809:35:50 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
VARIE,
BENNETTS/DOUG
Procedure outlined is very cumbersome. Don't see how State can get documents
00: 11 :08 09:36:30 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
VARIE,
in another way. If Court has to review in camera,
00: 12:07 09:37:29 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court reviewed Pet's prot order as related to this motion.
00:12:4309:38:05 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Ms. Owens proposed that theCourt adopt the Uno procedure, but have backed
00:13:11 09:38:34 - Other: Owens, Nicole
away from that. The Court in Hall I didn't find complete waivor, but did as
2

001225

00:13:3909:39:02 - Other: Owens, Nicole
far as all claims stated. Do not want to waive things that are not in the
00:13:5809:39:20 - Other: Owens, Nicole
amended petition
00:14:11 09:39:33 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
VARIE,
Ms. Bennetts stated would not know how if withheld documents are not part of
ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
00:14:4009:40:03 - State Attorney: V
VARIE,
BENNETTS/DOUG
the claims without seeing them
00:14:4609:40:08 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court responded. The Amended Petition is in excess of 180 pages. Bulk
00: 17:2909:42:51 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
of petition is breach of duty or ineffective assistance of counsel.
00:18:3309:43:55 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Waiving atty client privilege is especially important. Court will find
00:19:0309:44:25 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
petitoner waived privilege. Limited to these post conviction proceedings.
00:19:5709:45:19 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court goes next to Pet's request for protective order.
00:21 :03 09:46:25 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark
Mr. Ackley responded.
00:22:2609:47:48 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark
May be something that believe should not be disclosed and need to provide
00:22:5609:48:18 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark
mcamera
00:23:01 09:48:23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court states if it relates to any or all breaches of duty, needs to be
00:23:3609:48:58 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
disclosed.
00:23:5309:49:15 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark
00:24:0409:49:26 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court stated hypothetical question, and don't normally rule on
00:24:41 09:50:03 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
hypothetical. Mr. Ackley would have certain duties in following this Court's
00:24:5609:50:19 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
orders. Going next to Mot for Prot Order
00:25:1609:50:38 - Other: Owens, Nicole
3
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Ms. Owens will hold back on prot order at this point. Have an agreement on
00:26:0409:51 :26 - Other: Owens, Nicole
this issue until such time as it may become more relevent.
V ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
00:26:21 09:51 :43 - State Attorney: VARIE,
Ms. Bennetts concurred. A little premature. Facts not fully developed.
ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
00:27:23 09:52:46 - State Attorney: V
VARIE,
Operating without knowing what is fully there
00:29:44 09:55:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court will ask State to provide order granting Mot to waive atty/c1ient
00:30:2309:55:45 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
privilege and also memoralize the Pet's Mot for Prot Order to be deferred
00:30:50 09:56: 13 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
event.
until such time it becomes reI
reIevent.
00:31 :58 09:57:20 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
VARIE,
Ms. Bennetts concurred
00:32:0509:57:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court goes to State's Mot for Discovery.
00:32:2909:57:52 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
Ms. Bennett's going back to sealed records from the Court on some hearings,
VARIE,
00:33:01 09:58:23 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
on whether State can have access to those as well.
00:33:5209:59:15 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark
Mr. Ackley stated in light of Court's ruling, would go to claims raised.
00:34:31 09:59:52 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark
Should be unsealed.
00:34:37 09:59:59 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court has granted Mot to waive atty/client privielege including the
00:35:02 10:00:23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
proceedings sealed by the Court.
00:35:22 10:00:44 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark
Order unsealing those proceedings would be appropriate
00:35:39 10:01 :01 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court would look for order on that as well.
00:35:59 10:01:21 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
VARIE,
Ms. Bennetts goes to Rspondent's Mot for Discovery, have agreed not to
00:36:1910:01:41 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
VARIE,
litigate SAPD files as part of this at this time, premature, request Court
4
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00:36:39 10:02:00 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
VARIE,
defer ruling on that. Do have argument on trial counsel's files. Want to
VARIE,
00:37:10 10:02:32 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BEJ'JNETTSIDOUG
review everything to be able to respond effectively
00:38:01 10:03:23 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Agree state should have access to trial counsel's files.
00:38:15 10:03:37 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court grants respondent's Mot for Discovery in part in so far as it reaches
00:39:07 10:04:29 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
trial counsels files. Defer re: SAPD files. Request order from Ms.
00:39:33 10:04:55 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Bennetts.
00:39:35 10:04:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Going next to Pet's Mot for Discovery first to request for depositions
00:40:45 10:06:07 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
State agrees to deposition of Rob Chastain and will grant that request.
00:41 :28 10:06:50 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Co-Counsel deposition of Deborah Kristal also agreed to and will grant that.
00:41 :45 10:07:07 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Going next to investigator Gary Starkey, Pet. has withdrawn that request but
00:42:03 10:07:25 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
may want to renew that later.
00:42:20 10:07:41 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court considers all motions timely made.
00:43:38 10:09:00 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark
Mr. Ackley responded, have scheduling order in this case so have timliness
00:44: 16 10:09:38 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark
Issues.
00:44:19 10:09:41 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court will consider any motion brought where the issue ofjustice
of justice takes us.
00:45:29 10:10:50 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
Ms. Bennetts requested denied without prejudice.
00:45:5810:11:19 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court just does not want to be in position where counsel states will withdraw
00:46:24 10:11:46 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
it now if Court will consider later. Do not want to be in bargening position
00:46:42 10:12:04 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark
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Mr Ackley responded.
BENNETTSIDOUG
00:47:51 10:13:13 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
Ms. Bennetts responded, requested Court just deny without prejudice. Really
00:48:14 10:13:36 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
BENNETTSIDOUG
VARIE,
need depo of Rob Chastain and Deborah Kristal first before decide if need
JANBENNETTS/DOUG
00:48:4110:14:03 - State Attorney: VARIE, JANBENNETTSIDOUG
further depositions. Counsel will be required in furture to make record on
00:48:5910:14:21- State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
why further depositions would be necessary
00:49:1410:14:35 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court's general sense now, with numerous ineffective assistance of
00:50:12 10:15:34 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
counsel claims, depositions of trial counsel is necessary. Court agrees no
00:51:5910:17:21 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
record at this point to depose the investigators. The Court will deny
00:53:29 10:18:50 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
without prejudice to depose investigator Gary Starkey, going to mitigation
00:53:57 10:19:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
specialists
00:54:02 10:19:23 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark
Mr. Ackley responded.
00:55:06 10:20:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court re: Bruce & James Whitman
00:55:42 10:21:04 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark
Same argument
00:55:4810:21:09 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
Request Court deny without prejudice until further record established
00:56:0410:21:25 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court will deny for same reasons re: Bruce & James Whitman. Will be asking
00:56:32 10:21 :54 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
at end of this counsel who prevails orders on these matters.
00:57:43 10:23:04 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Ms. Owens argued trial counsel should disclose their caseloads, request
00:58:26 10:23:48 - Other: Owens, Nicole
subpoena to provide that information.
VARIE,
00:58:44 10:24:05 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
BENNETTSIDOUG
Ms. Bennetts objects, can inquire during deposition. Should not have to
6
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V ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
00:59:07 10:24:29 - State Attorney: VARIE,
document every case they worked on.
01 :00:28 10:25:49 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court notes ABA guidelines not binding on this Court. Very broad and not
01 :01 :44 10:27:05 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
practical. Court will deny request for subpoena. Going to email
01:03:45 10:29:07 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
correspondence between trial counsel and experts
01:04:00 10:29:22 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Understand State does not object to this request.
V ARIE, JAN BEN1'lETTSIDOUG
01:04:5710:30:19 - State Attorney: VARIE,
Ms. Bennetts concurred
01:05:0410:30:26 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court will grant request for email correspondence
01:06:45 10:32:07 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
Ms. Bennetts responded, will provide any emails
01:07:10 10:32:31 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court will grant request for email correspondence between individual team
01:07:43 10:33:04 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
members and trial counsel
01:07:57 10:33:20 - Operator
Stop recording: (On Recess)
01 :07:57 10:46:24 - Operator
Recording:
01 :07:57 10:46:24 - Record
,STATE OF IDAHO
01:08:16 10:46:44 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court goes next to prod. of documents, coroner's office, bench notes,
01 :09:00 10:47:28 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
State has agreed to contact and inquire
01:09:1710:47:45 - State Attorney: V
VARIE,
ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
Ms. Bennetts stated if don't exhibit will note, but don't want to provide
01:09:43 10:48:11 - State Attorney: V
VARIE,
ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
something that does not exhist
01:09:55 10:48:23 - Other: Owens, Nicole
concurs
01:09:58 10:48:26 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
7
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Court will grant, if they exhist. Peer review, fonnal or infonnal from
01:10:2410:48:52 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Coroner's office or confinnation no peer review conducted
BENNETTSIDOUG
01:10:4010:49:08 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
Same as last will make the inquiry.
01 :11 :3410:50:02 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court will grant if they exhist
01:11:56 10:50:24 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Groben made at or near the
Next items are notes and dictations made by Dr. Graben
01:12:19 10:50:47 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
body at the scene
01:12:2610:50:55 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BEJ\fl"-rETTSIDOUG
BEJ\Il"-rETTS/DOUG
Concern is what may already be providing.
V ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
01: 12:45 10:51: 13 - State Attorney: VARIE,
Crime scene video is about as close as can get to bench notes, it is
VARIE,
BENNETTS/DOUG
13:16
16 10:51 :44 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
01: 13:
documented on the video, not sure what in addition to that they are asking
01:13:33 10:52:01 - State Attorney: VARIE,
V ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
for.
01:13:38 10:52:06 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Inquiring if anything further than what was done on the video.
01:14:05 10:52:33 - State Attorney: VARIE,
V ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
Grant in limited part, will inquire if anything exhists
01:14:23 10:52:51 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Curt will grant is such materials exhist and if separate and distinct from
01:14:53 10:53:21 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
bench notes.
01:15:0910:53:37 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Copies of diagrams at time of physical examination and autopsy
BENNETTS/DOUG
01:15:3210:54:00 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
Same thing, autopsy report and photos were all provided. Will look if there
01:16:0010:54:29 - State Attorney: V
VARIE,
ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
will provide
01:16:06 10:54:34 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court grants in limited part, to the extent they exhist and if not already
01:16:31 10:54:59 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
provided

8
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01 :16:34 10:55:02 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Complaints against Dr. Groben withdrawn,
01:16:53 10:55:21 - Other: Owens, Nicole
concurs
01:16:58 10:55:26 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
forensic pathologic manual that was in exhistence
01:18:24 10:56:52 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Withdrawn without prejudice
01:18:33 10:57:01 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
All notes recordings made at direction or by coroner's office on Amanda
01 :18:59 10:57:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Stroud
01:19:03 10:57:31 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Withdrawn
01:19:07 10:57:35 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
documentation of Dr. Groben and all agents
01:20:02 10:58:30 - Other: Owens, Nicole
any correspondence or emai1s
emails Dr. Groben would have with any witnesses.
01 :20:39 10:59:07 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BEJ'JNETTSIDOUG
BEJ'JNETTS/DOUG
object, broad, do not know if it even exhists. If copy in his file
01:21:5411:00:22 - Other: Owens, Nicole
If State will check to see if anything in the file, that would be agreeable.
BENNETTS/DOUG
01:22:1411:00:42 - State Attorney: VARIE,
V ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
To extent he has actual docment in a file. Not agreeing to go beyond a file.
01 :23:26 11 :01 :54 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Will limit to that
01 :23:33 11 :02:01 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Parties have agreed to see if Dr. Groben has anything in his file.
01:24:5611:03:24 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Copy of Dr. Groben's billing records or invoices
01:25:12 11:03:40 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Ms.Owens responded
01 :25:37 11 :04:05 - State Attorney: VARIE,
V ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
BENNETTSIDOUG
Dr. Groben stated Dr. Groben employee of Ada County so would not be invoices
01 :26:02 11 :04:30 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
BENNETTSIDOUG
or billings.
01 :26: 17 11 :04:45 - Other: Owens, Nicole
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If doesn't have billing records, but if State would agree to check
ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
01 :26:54 11 :05:22 - State Attorney: V
VARIE,
Ms. Bennetts responded
01:27:03 11:05:31 - Other: Owens, Nicole
will withdraw based on no records exhist
01:27:15 11:05:42 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court will note withdrawn
01 :27:26 11 :05:54 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
any notes or reports or tests from Cheryl Hanlon case
01:28:04 11:06:32 - Other: Owens, Nicole
believe may fall under same category, if testing exhists and not already
01 :28:25 11 :06:53 - Other: Owens, Nicole
provided
V ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
01 :28:29 11 :06:57 - State Attorney: VARIE,
Ms. Bennetts stated don't believe Dr. Groben did independant testing. Other
01 :29:27 11 :07:55 - State Attorney: VARIE,
VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
testing sent out to labs, but will look in Dr. Groben's file
01:29:43 11:08:11 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court will have record reflect there is an agreement.
01:30:45 11:09:13 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
Ms. Bennetts responded
01 :31 :06 11 :09:34 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Got a separate death certificate as well as record of death
01:31:52 11:10:20 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court inquried if there is a difference
01:32:04 11:10:32 - State Attorney: V
VARIE,
ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
Ms. Bennetts stated will look for that.
01:33:0311:11:31-Judge:Neville, ThomasF.
Court going next to documents in prosecutor's office, illust. exhibits
01 :33:28 11: 11 :56 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
withdrawn and power point exhibits also withdrawn.
01:33:5011:12:18 - Other: Owens, Nicole
State has agreed to provide copy of powerpoint slides
01:34:21 11:12:49 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Going next to copies of emailsre:pleanegotiations.stipulations re: jurors
01:34:4911:13:17 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
etc.
10
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BENNETTSIDOUG
01:34:52 11:13:20 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
State objects
01:35:0011:13:28 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Ms. Owens responded re: may be in trial counsel's files, but if State has
01:35:3711:14:04 - Other: Owens, Nicole
copy and not in trial counsel, request copy.
01:35:49 11 :14:17 - State Attorney: VARIE,
V ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
Ms. Bennetts request Court deny until they view their files
01:37:5811:16:26 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.

01:39:3911:18:07 - Other: Owens, Nicole
BEJ\lNETTSIDOUG
01 :39:43 11:18:11 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BEJ\JNETTSIDOUG
Ms. Bennetts responded
01:40:28 11 :18:55 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
Ms. Bennetts requested Ms. Owens look to see what they have first and ifit
01:40:4611:19:14 - State Attorney: VARIE, JANBENNETTSIDOUG
JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
looks like something missing can try to see if have anything. Request Court
01:41:03 11:19:30 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
VARIE,
BENNETTS/DOUG
deny without prejudice
01:41:08 11:19:36 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court will deny without prejudice. Emai1s
Emails of significance
01:42:13 11:20:40 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Will have Ms. Bennetts look for obvious files aware of and then once
11 :21 :23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
01 :42:55 11:21
have had review of trial counsel
01:43:15 11:21:43 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
file.
01:43:46 11:22:14 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court re: expert witnesses, shoe prints
01:44:13 11:22:41 - Other: Owens, Nicole
State objects due to it being work product.
01:46:1411:24:41 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.

01 :46: 16 11 :24:44 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark
Mr. Ackley responded,
01:47:4411:26:11 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
11
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If have communications, why do need summaries
01:47:5611:26:24 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark
Mr. Ackley stated if have recorded statement, don't need summary.
01:48:48 11:27:15 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
VARIE,
Ms. Bennetts
01:48:57 11:27:24 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Request going beyond brady material
ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
01 :49:06 11 :27:33 - State Attorney: V
VARIE,
Ms. Bennetts objects. Can refer counsel back to prosecutor page names that
01 :50:53 11 :29:21 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
refer to some of this.
01 :52:55 11 :31 :23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court re: portion by agreement to be provided. The rest of it with all
01 :53:29 11 :31 :57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
expert witnesses. Court will deny the balance. Going to next to all
01 :55:00 11 :33:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
documented media and press releases
01:55:13 11:33:40 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Withdraw without prejudice
01 :55:20 11 :33:47 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Going to Gary Starkey's date of employment and what rape and homicide cases
01 :55:39 11 :34:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
worked on while in prosecutor's office
01:55:4811:34:17 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Withdrawn
01:55:5411:34:21 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Documents relating to particular witnesses in prosecutor's office.
01:57:13 11:35:40 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Re: argument of Jeff Carlson
ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
01 :59:22 11:37:49 - State Attorney: V
VARIE,
Ms. Bennetts objected
01 :59:31 11 :37:58 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
In exercise of discretion, the Court will deny. 2 C-A, Amanda Stroud written
02:01 :27 11 :39:54 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
statements.
02:01:38 11:40:05 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Ms. Owens stated same argument
12
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V ARIE, JAN BEJ\ll\fETTS/DOUG
BEJ\ll\fETTSIDOUG
02:01 :48 11 :40: 15 - State Attorney: VARIE,
Ms. Bennetts concurs, same argument
02:01 :59 11 :40:26 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Summaries are the work product of prosecutor's office. In exercise of
02:02:41 11:41:08 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court's discretion, will deny. Going next to Ms. Stroud, statements and
02:03:1011:41:37 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
video made
02:03:2811:41:55 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BEJ\ll\fETTS/DOUG
VARIE,
Will look to see what they are missing and re-copy what they have asked for.
02:04:06 11:42:33 - Other: Owens, Nicole
For that reason withdrawn
02:04: 13 11 :42:40 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
02:05:23 11:43:50 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Withdrawn as well
02:05:32 11:43:59 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
Ms. Bennetts responded re: 2003 would not exhist, possible request of the
02:06:12 11:44:39 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
vendor that these calls may be found, but do not know what cost would be.
V ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
02:06:40 11 :45 :07 - State Attorney: VARIE,
Withdraw without prejudice
02:06:56 11 :45:23 - Other: Owens, Nicole
concurs
02:07:00 11 :45:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court will note withdrawn. Going next to Amanda Stroud and Eric Hall sexual
02:08:19 11:46:46 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
acts and aphyxiation.
02:08:35 11 :47:02 - Other: Owens, Nicole
response
02:09:21 11 :47:47 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Information would have to lead to the liklihood of discoverable evidence.
02:09:51 11:48:18 - Other: Owens, Nicole
response
02:10:32 11:48:59 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
Ms. Bennetts responded, some information was provided, can re-provide again,
02:11 :38 11 :50:05 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
13
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but do object to work product.
02:12:03 11:50:30 - Other: Owens, Nicole
If provides the transcript and video
VARIE,
BENNETTSIDOUG
02:12:24 11:50:51 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
03/1 0/03 video
02:12:38 11:51:05 - Other: Owens, Nicole
withdraw request
02:12:51 11:51:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
State will provide the audio of Amanda and transcript on this topic
02:13:38 11:52:05 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Written statements and statements made to or by Kathy Stroud.
02:14:4411:53:11 - Other: Owens, Nicole
some agreement reached, State has agreed to provide some photographs
02:15:04 11:53:31 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
BENNETTSIDOUG
Request that counsel advise what they are missing
02:15:21 11:53:48 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Disagreements on the summaries.
02:15:47 11:54:14 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
With respect to portions left to the Court, as a matter of discretion deny
02:16:07 11:54:33 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
summaries, work product of the State. Norma Jean Oliver portion withdrawn
02:16:52 11:55:18 - Other: Owens, Nicole
concurs
02:16:56 11:55:23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Withdrawing Dr. Pablo Stewart
02: 17:07 11 :55:33 - Other: Owens, Nicole
concurs
02:17:1011:55:37 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Law enforcement field notes and log books
02: 17:25 11 :55:52 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
BENNETTSIDOUG
VARIE,
Will look again and attempt to see if any further notes to provided.
02:17:55 11:56:22 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
Previously provide Det. Smith and Vucinovich, provide again
02:18:45 11:57:12 - Other: Owens, Nicole
agreement sufficient
02:18:52 11:57:19 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court cont'd
14
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02:19:4711:58:14 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Withdrew that request
02: 19:56 11 :58:23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court cont'd
02:20:4611:59:13 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
VARIE,
Do not know if one exhists, but will look again re: report on Kenneth Tiddle.
02:21:33 12:00:00 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court not aware of who this was
V ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
02:21:4612:00:13 - State Attorney: VARIE,
Ms. Bennetts stated was based on a lead
02:21 :59 12:00:26 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Will withdraw based on agreement
02:22:09 12:00:35 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Look and provide if exhists. Going to surveillance video of Cheryl Hanlon
02:23:22 12:01 :49 - Other: Owens, Nicole
referenced in two diff. police reports
VARIE,
02:24:23 12:02:50 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
Ms. Bennetts stated asked earlier on about a video from ID Power cameras. Do
VARIE,
02:25:26 12:03:53 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
not exhist anymore. Confirmed they could not get a copy to play in court.
02:26:55 12:05:22 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
02:26:59 12:05:25 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
Do not have recollection of why they were unable to locate copy
02:27:23 12:05:50 - Other: Owens, Nicole
ID Power had agreed to maintain a copy. There was a prior case that ID Power
02:29:16 12:07:43 - Other: Owens, Nicole
had done that as well
02:29:28 12:07:55 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Asking State to provide something they never had
02:29:5012:08:17 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
Ms. Bennetts stated officer's did make the attempt to get and don't recall if
02:30: 13 12:08:40 - State Attorney: V
VARIE,
ARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
it was taped over or what
02:30:21 12:08:48 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Ms. Bennetts stated had written a letter re: that video
02:30:54 12:09:21 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
15

001238

Ms. Bennetts will look for that letter and provide
02:31: 13 12:09:40 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court will have State inquire ofDet. Ayotte go back to ID Power and
02:31:51 12:10:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
inquire again and have him ask did you ever have it, does it still exhist.
02:33:06 12:11:33 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
rei event
Transcript and recordings of Jason Vanderesch, withdrawn. Copy of reievent
02:33:55 12:12:21 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
portion of crime lab activity re: underlying case
VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
02:34:18 12:12:45 - State Attorney: VARIE,
BENNETTS/DOUG
Ms. Bennetts stated may be missing a page and will provide again
02:34:35 12: 13:02 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Photo line up shown to Daro Lady
V ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
BENNETTSIDOUG
02:35:34 12:14:01 - State Attorney: VARIE,
Ms. Bennetts responded. Provided
02:36:13 12:14:41 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Withdrawn based on agreement.
02:38:00 12:16:28 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Notes re: crimestopper memo
02:38:18 12:16:46 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
BENNETTS/DOUG
Will look for that
02:38:28 12:16:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court will show as withdrawn. Copies of violent apprehension program.
02:39:15 12:17:43 - State Attorney: V
ARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
VARIE,
Apply to Henneman case
02:39:23 12:17:52 - Other: Owens, Nicole
referenced in the Hanlon sentencing.
02:40:54 12:19:22 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Det. Dave Smith referred to it as 15 page document
02:41:1912:19:47 - Other: Owens, Nicole
concurs, request information he was referencing to in his testimony
BENNETTSIDOUG
02:41:5012:20:18 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
What is relevent too. Need basis for it is needed
02:43:02 12:21:30 - Other: Owens, Nicole
Ms. Owens will withdraw
02:43:18 12:21:46 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Documentation for reward money
16
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02:44:45 12:23:14 - Other: Owens, Nicole
request information re: Hanlon case.
02:45:31 12:23:59 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
Ms. Bennetts will check
02:45:53 12:24:21 - Other: Owens, Nicole
would like the documentation on that as well
02:46:53 12:25:22 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court notes Ms. Bennetts will look for any documentation.
02:48:07 12:26:35 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court going next to jury question
02:48:39 12:27:07 - Other: Owens, Nicole
withdrawn,
02:48:5012:27:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Going next to visitation log at jail from all investigators and counsel
02:49:38 12:28:06 - Other: Owens, Nicole
withdrawn with prejudice
02:49:56 12:28:24 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court notes child support records may have been withdrawn as well
02:50:20 12:28:48 - Other: Owens, Nicole
concurs
02:50:24 12:28:53 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court will request Ms. Owens provide orders where she prevailed as well
02:50:53 12:29:21 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
as MS.Bennetts
Ms.Bennetts
02:52:32 12:30:59 - Operator
Stop recording:
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843

t5 2010

SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. # 5888
LS.B. # 7679
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B.
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

-------------)
----------------------------)

Case No. CV PC 0803085

NOTICE OF CHANGE IN
STATUS OF COUNSEL

(CAPITAL CASE)

Petitioner ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorneys at the State Appellate
Public Defender's office (hereinafter "SAPD"), hereby provides notice of change in the status of
his counsel. On April 27, 2010, Mr. Ackley will be leaving the SAPD and therefore will no
longer be representing Mr. Hall as lead counsel. Mr. Hall will continue to be represented by Ms.
Romero and Ms. Owens in these post-conviction proceedings.
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DATED this

\S1'v\ day of April, 2010.

S !ANNON N. ROMERO
I vepNY
l
l iSolate
e Appellate Public Defender

. ulxo
UJJJ1Q(J

NICOLE OWENS
(
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

NOTICE OF CHANGE IN STATUS OF COUNSEL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

\~~ay

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
of April, 2010, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document, NOTICE OF CHANGE IN STATUS OF COUNSEL, as follows:
JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

~ Statehouse Mail
----K.-

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

NOTICE OF CHANGE IN STATUS OF COUNSEL

3

001243

MOLL Y J. HUSKEY
MOLLY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. # 5888
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
Capital Litigation Unit
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

GRIGfNAL

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

-----------~)
----------------------~)

CASE NO. CVPC08-03085
NOTICE OF STATUS HEARING

(CAPITAL CASE)

COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his counsel at the State
Appellate Public Defender, and provides notice that a hearing will be held for the purpose of
discussing scheduling matters in the above-captioned case. In coordination with the Court's
clerk, and by agreement of the parties, the hearing will be held on the 22nd day of April, 2010, at
St., Boise, Idaho.
9:00 a.m., before the Honorable Thomas F. Neville at 200 W. Front S1.,

NOTICE OF STATUS HEARING
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DATED this 15 th day of April, 2010.

NICOL OWENS
Co-counsel for Erick Virgil Hall

NOTICE OF STATUS HEARING
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 15 th day of April, 2010 served a true and correct
copy ofthe attached NOTICE OF STATUS HEARING by the method indicated below:
JAN M. BENNETTS
VARIE
DOUGLAS R. VARIE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI - J BLOCK
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

U.S. Mail
~ Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

(~~~~~~-*-------)M
. Administrative Assistant

NOTICE OF STATUS HEARING
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Neville042210

Session: Neville042210
Session Date: 2010/04/22
Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Reporter: Wolf, Sue

Division: DC
Session Time:

Courtroom:

CR502

08:35

Clerk(s)
Ellis, Janet
State Attorneys:
Public Defender(s)
Prob.

Officer(s):

Court interpreter(s)

Case 10:

0001
Case Number: CVPC0803085
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK
Plaintiff Attorney:
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO
Co-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Public Defender:

2010/04/22
09:29:42 - Operator
Recording:
09:29:42 - New case
STATE OF IDAHO
09:30:07 - Other: Owens, Nicol
counsl for petitioner
09:30:17 - Other: Romero, Shannon
counsel for Petitioner
09:30:27 - Other: Varie, Douglas
counsel for State of Idaho/Respondent
09:30:38 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court notes here last October, thought there should of been
a order from that
09:31:07 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
hearing, but do not see one
09:31:14 - Other: Varie, Douglas
th9 process of putting that together.
In the
09:31:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court believes that was the only order that was forth coming
09:31:49 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Believe there were several orders but were all part of that
agreement
09:32:09 .- Other: Varie, Douglas
Believe can have to the Court by next week.
09:32:41 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
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Court notes Change of Counsel.
09:33:17 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Mr. Ackley stated he is going to Federal Defender's unit.
S
tatus conference
09:33:34 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
for this reason for change in counsel, and to get caught up
on orders from
09:33:56 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
last October.
Believe will need a change in the scheduling
order, probably
09:34:16 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
in the next 4-6 weeks
09:34:22 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Ms. Bennetts concurred.
09:36:05 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court will set out to June 4, 2010 @ 9:00 a.m.
Will tal
k about specific
09:36:23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
timelines.
09:38:16 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Mr. Ackley responded re: Ms. Romero's caseload will double w
ith his
09:39:10 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
departure.
09:41:19 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Ms. Bennetts responded.
Dates will need to be amended, depo
s were to be
09:42:33 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
completed by Apri126th and that schedule will need to be rev
ised.
09:42:49 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Inquired about replacement for Mr. Ackley.
09:43:04 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
States trying to get one handled, no deadline for closing.
Ms. Romero has
09:43:57 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
been 2nd chair in Abdullah and will go to first chair in tha
t case.
Ms.
09:44:18 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Romero is also handling Dunlap case.
In Hall, Supreme Court
is asking for
09:44:47 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
argument dates around end of August.
That will impact a lot
of cases,
09:45:06 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
especially jury contact issue.
09:45:12 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court will see counsel back on June 4th
09:45:30 - Operator
Stop recording:
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GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jan Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 4606
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
1

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-PC-08-03085

ORDER REGARDING
RESPONDENT'S MOTIONS
FOR DISCOVERY AND FOR
WAIVER OF ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE

-------------)
---------------------------)
The Respondent's Motions for Discovery and for Waiver of Attorney-Client
Privilege came before this Court for hearing on October 30, 2009.

This Court after

considering the pleadings, hearing the arguments of both parties and being fully advised in
the premises hereby ORDERS as follows:

ORDER REGARDING RESPONDENT'S MOTIONS FOR DISCOVERY AND
FOR WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE (HALL), Page 1
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1. Respondent's Motion for Discovery
The Respondent's Motion for Discovery is granted with respect to trial counsel's
files and materials. Petitioner shall produce or make available to Respondent's counsel
all of trial counsel's files and any other material related to trial counsel's representation of
Erick Virgil Hall to the extent that such materials are within Petitioner's possession
and/or control. This material and files shall be produced fully without any redactions,
deletions, or exceptions and shall include any and all material and files related to any
proceedings which were sealed by the Court. This Order also includes any and all files
and materials generated by attorneys assigned to represent Erick Virgil Hall trior to the

;/h1

appointment of Rob Chastain and Deborah Krist~when the case was handled by the Ada

;;7~
;7~

County Public Defender's Office.
This Order also includes work product generated by trial counsel, including trial
counsel in the Ada County Public Defender's Office, during their representation of Erick
Virgil Hall.
Pursuant to agreement by the parties, this Court defers ruling on Respondent's
Motion for Discovery as it relates to the State Appellate Public Defender files until such
time as that issue is brought back before the Court.
2. Respondent's Motion for Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The Respondent's Motion for Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege is granted
with respect to any and all communications and work product between Erick Virgil Hall
and any trial counsel who represented him during any stage of the prosecution of the
ORDER REGARDING RESPONDENT'S MOTIONS FOR DISCOVERY AND
FOR WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE (HALL), Page 2
001250

underlying criminal case, designated as Ada County case number H0300624. This waiver
includes any communications and work product related to any proceedings which were
sealed by the Court.
This Court was also presented with Petitioner's Motion for a Protective Order
relating to the Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege. Based upon agreement of the
parties, the Court will defer ruling on this issue until it is brought back before this Court.
This Court's factual findings, analyses, and rulings as set forth on the record on
October 30, 2009, are hereby incorporated by reference herein. This Order does not
change or deviate from any previous ruling of the Court relating to matters previously
addressed unless expressly stated herein.

IT IS SO ORDERED this

30.(£ day of (~.
3o.f!
)

2010.

Thomas F. Neville
District Judge

ORDER REGARDING RESPONDENT'S MOTIONS FOR DISCOVERY AND
FOR WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE (HALL), Page 3
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
1.S.B. # 4843

J. DAVID NAvARRO. Clerk
a,
JANET L. ELLIS
BJJANET
CEPUtY
CEI'UtY

SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. # 5888
NICOLE OWENS, 1.S.B. # 7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,

v.
.v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Case No. CVPC08-03085

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DISCOVERY ORDER
(Mall II)

(CAPITAL CASE)

-------------)
----------------------------)

On October 30, 2009, a hearing was held before this Court, with argument heard from
both parties, on the parties' respective motions for discovery as well as their responses and
replies thereto. Being fully informed, the Court ruled from the bench. The Court's analysis and
rulings during said hearing are incorporated herein by reference.

This Discovery Order

memorializes the Court's rulings regarding Mr. Hall's Motion for Discovery, filed August 17,
2009. Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
1.

DEPOSITIONS
A.

Members of the Trial Defense Team.
1.

Mr. Hall's request for the deposition of lead counsel Rob Chastain is
GRANTED.

DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL II)

y-
y--
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B.

II.

2.

Mr. Hall's request for the deposition of co-counsel Deborah Kristal is
GRANTED.

3.

Mr. Hall's request for the deposition of investigator Gary Starkey is
WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request upon further
investigation.

4.

Mr. Hall's request for the depositions of mitigation specialists Bruce and
James Whitman is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request
upon further investigation.

Subpoenas decus
dec us tecum.
1.

Mr. Hall's request for "Documentation identifying the cases that the
individual trial team member worked on during the course of their
representation" is DENIED.

2.

Mr. Hall's request for "All e-mail correspondence between the individual
trial team member and other team members including their agents, such as
expert witnesses" is GRANTED.

3.

Mr. Hall's request for "All trial counsels' email correspondence between
the individual trial team member and the Ada County Prosecutor's Office
and its agents" is GRANTED.

PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
A.

Documents in the Possession of the Ada County Coroner's Office
1.

Mr. Hall's request for "All bench notes from the Cheryl Hanlon autopsy,
sexual assault kit and any other procedures performed or observed by Dr.
Glenn Groben or any other Ada County Coroner personnel" is
GRANTED, to the extent such materials exist and to the extent such
materials are not duplicative of other materials to be provided by this
order.

2.

Mr. Hall's request for "Any peer review, formal or informal, whether
internal or external to the Ada County Coroner's Office, as well as any
documentation related thereto, of Dr. Groben's opinions based on his
examination and autopsy in the underlying criminal case, or confirmation
that no peer review was conducted" is GRANTED, to the extent such
materials exist and to the extent such materials are not duplicative of other
materials to be provided by this order.

3.

Mr. Hall's request for "Any notes, reports, or dictations of findings made
by Dr. Groben at or near the body recovery scene" is GRANTED IN
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PART, if such notes, reports, dictions or findings are separate
LIMITED PART,
and distinct from Dr. Groben's bench notes.
4.

Mr. Hall's request for "Copies of any diagrams prepared at the time of the
PART to
physical examination and autopsy" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART
the extent such information has not already been provided.

5.

Mr. Hall's request for "Any complaints filed against Dr. Groben and/or
the Ada County Coroner with any agency or professional association
hi slits professional performance, qualifications or veracity" is
regarding hishts
WITHDRAWN.

6.

Mr. Hall's request for "Scanned, accessible, high-resolution files of all
photos of Ms. Hanlon's body, including any reenactment photographs" is
WITHDRA WN without prejudice to renew the request upon further
WITHDRAWN
investigation.

7.

Mr. Hall's request for "A copy of the forensic pathology procedural
manual currently in effect as well as in effect in March 2003 for the Ada
WlTHDRA WN without prejudice to renew
County Coroner's Office" is WlTHDRAWN
the request upon further investigation.

8.

Mr. Hall's request for "All notes, reports and recordings made by or at the
direction of the Coroner's Office or its agents regarding the death of
Amanda Stroud" is WITHDRAWN.

9.

Mr. Hall's request for "Documentation of all correspondence between Dr.
Groben or his agents and other non-lay or expert witnesses or potential
witnesses or their agents" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART, based on
the prosecuting attorney's agreement to check Dr. Groben's file for such
information.

10.

Mr. Hall's request for "A copy of Dr. Groben's billing records or invoices
WlTHDRAWN.
for the instant case" is WlTHDRA
WN.

11.

Mr. Hall's request for "Any notes, reports, or results of tests in the Cheryl
Hanlon case regarding the following:
a.
b.
c.

Reconstruction of ligatures
Fingernail clippings
Blood sample (tube)

is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART, based on the prosecuting attorney's
agreement to inquire and provide if in existence.
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B.

12.

Mr. Hall's request for the "Death Certificate of Ms. Hanlon from Ada
County Coroner's office, signed by Glen Groben" is GRANTED IN
LIMITED PART, based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to
inquire and provide if in existence.

13.

Mr. Hall's request for "Ms. Hanlon's Record of Death from Ada County
Coroner" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART, based on the prosecuting
attorney's agreement to inquire and provide ifin existence.

Documents in the Possession of the Ada County Prosecutor's Office.
1.

Mr. Hall's request for "Color copies of any illustrative exhibits utilized
during the State's guilt phase case (including opening statements and
closing arguments)" is WITHDRAWN.

2.

Mr. Hall's request for "Color copies of any illustrative exhibits utilized
during the State's sentencing phase case (including opening statements
and closing arguments)" is WITHDRAWN.

3.

Mr. Hall's request for "Color copies of all PowerPoint slides and other
documents shown to the jury" is WITHDRAWN, based on the prosecuting
attorney's agreement to provide this request.

4.

Mr. Hall's request for "Copies of all e-mails between the Ada County
Prosecuting Attorney's office and the Ada County Public Defender's
office regarding the Hanlon case, including but not limited to, stipulations
regarding evidence, instructions, motions, and prospective jurors, as well
as any plea negotiations" is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The
prosecuting attorney has agreed to look through obvious files it is aware of
for email communications with the Ada County Public Defender's office
regarding the Hanlon case and provide the emails to Mr. Hall.

5.

Mr. Hall's request for "All documented communications, or summaries of
communications, by the prosecutor's office with all expert witnesses,
whether or not called at trial, including but not limited to the Ada County
Coroner's Office. This request also includes any tests or results of
examinations of the shoe prints found at the scene with shoes allegedly
worn by Erick Hall at the time of Ms. Hanlon's death" GRANTED IN
LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney has agreed to provide testing,
data or results of any testing of the shoe prints in its possession. The
remainder of Mr. Hall's request is DENIED.

6.

Mr. Hall's request for "All documented communications, or summaries of
communications, by the prosecutor's office with the media, including but
not limited to press releases" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to
renew the request upon further investigation.
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7.

C.

Mr. Hall's request for "Gary Starkey's dates of employment and the
names of the homicide and rape cases he worked on while employed by
the Ada County Prosecutor's office" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice
to renew the request upon further investigation.

Documents in the Possession of the Ada County Prosecutor's Office
Relating to Particular Witnesses.
1.

Jeff Carlson.
a.

2.

Mr. Hall's request for "All written statements and summaries of
statements made by Jeff Carlson regarding the nature and scope of
the argument he had with Cheryl Hanlon on February 28,
2003IMarch 1, 2003, and statements and summaries of statements
2003/March
made by any other individuals, regarding that argument" is
DENIED.

Amanda Stroud.
a.

Mr. Hall's request for "All written statements and summaries of
statements made by or attributed to Ms. Stroud, regardless of
medium, in the presence of the prosecuting attorney or
investigator" is DENIED.

b.

Mr. Hall's request for "All written statements and summaries of
statements made by or attributed to Ms. Stroud, regardless of
medium, in the presence of a law enforcement officer" is
WITHDRAWN, based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to
provide statements which exist and are in the custody of the
prosecuting attorney or their agents and which are identified by
Mr. Hall as missing from the materials currently in possession of
the SAPD.

c.

Mr. Hall's request for "All audio or video recordings, writings, or
other mediums of communications made by Ms. Stroud and
obtained by the prosecutor or law enforcement" is WITHDRAWN,
based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to provide audio,
video, writings, or other communications identified by Mr. Hall as
missing from the materials currently in possession of the SAPD.

d.

Mr. Hall's request for "All law enforcement and prosecution
investigative reports, notes, and files regarding the Amanda Stroud
homicide investigation" is WITHDRAWN.

e.

Mr. Hall's request for the "March 9, 2003 recordings from Ada
County Jail referenced in Affidavit for Search Warrant indicating
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Amanda Stroud called Kathy Stroud from Ada County Jail" is
WITHDRAWN based on the prosecuting attorney's statement such
recordings do not exist.

3.

4.

f.

Mr. Hall's request for "All recorded conversations between Erick
Hall and Amanda Stroud from the Ada County Jail as referenced in
the Affidavit for Search Warrant, not notarized, signed on notary
signature line by Judge Minder on April 17, 2003" is
WITHDRAWN based on the prosecuting attorney's statement such
recordings do not exist.

g.

Mr. Hall's request for "Any documentation in which Amanda
Stroud indicates that she had engaged in consensual autoerotic
asphyxiation with Erick Hall, or any other documentation
indicating that Mr. Hall expressed any interest in asphyxiation
during consensual sexual relations" is GRANTED IN LIMITED
P
ART, based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to provide a
PART,
transcript and video of the March 10, 2003 interview of Amanda
Stroud, if such exists.

h.

Mr. Hall's request for "Any documentation in which Amanda
Stroud indicates that Erick Hall ever "blacked out" or experienced
a mood change during sexual relations or when touched on the
neck" is WITHDRAWN.

Kathy Stroud.
a.

Mr. Hall's request for "All written statements and summaries of
statements made by or attributed to Ms. Stroud, regardless of
medium, in the presence of the prosecuting attorney or
investigator" is DENIED.

b.

Mr. Hall's request for "All written statements and summaries of
statements made by or attributed to Ms. Stroud, regardless of
medium, in the presence of a law enforcement officer" is
WITHDRAWN, based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to
provide missing statements identified by Mr. Hall.

c.

Mr. Hall's request for "Photographs provided by Kathy Stroud to
investigator Doug Traubel on March 5, 2007 showing brown shoes
allegedly taken between November 11, 2002 and January 1,2003"
is WITHDRAWN based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement
to provide missing photographs identified by Mr. Hall.

Norma Jean Oliver.
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5.

a.

Mr. Hall's request for "all written statements and summaries of
statements made by or attributed to Ms. Oliver, regardless of
medium, in the presence of the prosecuting attorney or
investigator, limited to such statements made following Mr. Hall's
arrest for the Hanlon and Henneman murders" is WITHDRAWN.

b.

Mr. Hall's request for "all written statements and summaries of
statements made by or attributed to Ms. Oliver, regardless of
medium, in the presence of a law enforcement officer, limited to
such statements made following Mr. Hall's arrest for the Hanlon
and Henneman murders" is WITHDRAWN.
WITHDRA WN.

Dr. Pablo Stewart.
a.

D.

Mr. Hall's request for a "Copy of the video tape deposition of Dr.
Pablo Stewart" is GRANTED, based on the prosecuting attorney's
agreement to provide the deposition.

Documents in Possession of Law Enforcement Agencies.
1.

Field notes and logbooks. Mr. Hall's requests for "all field notes and
logbooks generated by any law enforcement officer in the course of the
investigation of the Henneman and Hanlon homicides" is GRANTED IN
LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney shall check relevant police
files regarding the Hanlon murder investigation only, for notes not
contained in reports regarding the Hanlon murder investigation and which
have not already been turned over or are not the subject of other sections
of this discovery request.

2.

Unredacted Handwritten Notes.
Mr. Hall's request for "unredacted handwritten notes" is:
a.
b.
c.

WITHDRA
WN as to Officer Brett Quilter;
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN as to Officer Dave Smith; and
WITHDRAWN as to Mark Vucinich,

based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to provide these notes to
Mr. Hall if they exists.
3.

Correspondence.
Mr. Hall's request for "All correspondence or summaries of
correspondence between law enforcement and other state and federal
agencies regarding the Hanlon case homicide investigation" is
WITHDRAWN.
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4.

FBI I-Drives.
Mr. Hall's request for "Copies of all reports, communications or files
contained on any I-Drive of any FBI field office involved in the
Henneman or Hanlon investigation, including, but not limited to the Salt
Lake City and Boise field offices" is WITHDRAWN.

5.

Task Force Lead Assignments.
Mr. Hall's request for "task force lead assignments" is WITHDRAWN.

6.

Miscellaneous Investigative Reports and Other Documentation.
Mr. Hall's request for "Any and all FBI reports containing "profiling" of
the perpetrator in the Lynn Henneman and Cheryl Hanlon murders" is
WITHDRAWN.

7.

8.

Prior Offenses.
a.

Mr. Hall's request for a "Copy of all police reports and notes
regarding Ada County Case No. M0303573, the Failing to Register
as a Sex Offender case filed against Mr. Hall" is WITHDRAWN.

b.

Mr. Hall's request for "Police reports regarding Ada County Case
No. H9600534, the escape case filed against Mr. Hall" is
WITHDRAWN.

Media Contact.
Mr. Hall's request for "All documented communications, or summaries of
communications, by law enforcement with the media, including but not
limited to press releases" is WITHDRAWN.

9.

Documents. and Recordings.
Specific Reports. Documents,
a.

Mr. Hall's request for "A copy of the report of Officer Delgadillo
regarding the arrest of Kenneth Tittle referenced in Officer
Vucinich's report" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The
prosecuting attorney will check the relevant records and provide if
it exists.

b.

Mr. Hall's request for "A copy of the crime scene video, with audio,
initially made by Craig Nixon referenced in Tr., Vol. IX, p. 4668" is
GRANTED.
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10.

11.

c.

Mr. Hall's request for "A copy of the Idaho Power security camera
footage of alleged appearance of Erick Hall and Ms. Hanlon" is
GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney shall
request Detective Ayotte to inquire of Idaho Power whether the
video still exists. If the video exists, the prosecuting attorney shall
provide it to Mr. Hall.

d.

Mr. Hall's request for "A copy of the transcript and any recordings
of interview of Jason Vanderesch conducted by Greg Morgan and
Mark Ayotte" is WITHDRAWN, based on the prosecuting
attorney's agreement to provide this material.

e.

Mr. Hall's request for "A copy of the relevant portion of the
'Crime Lab Activity' electronic database referencing the
underlying case" is WITHDRAWN based on the prosecuting
attorney's agreement to provide Mr. Hall with the page he is
mlssmg.
mIssmg.

f.

Mr. Hall's request for "A copy of the photo lineup shown to Daryl
Lady on March 10, 2003 at 6:05pm" is WITHDRAWN, based on
the prosecuting attorney's agreement to provide this photo lineup.

g.

Mr. Hall's request for "A copy of attachment to lead sheet #50" is
WITHDRAWN, based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to
investigate provide this attachment if it exists.

h.

Mr. Hall's request for "Copies of the Violent Criminal
Apprehension Program" is WITHDRAWN.

Documentation regarding DNA evidence.
a.

Mr. Hall's request for "All documentation relating to entry of Mr.
Hall's DNA profile into the Idaho CODIS database, or any local or
state database" is WITHDRAWN on the assumption the
prosecuting attorney complied with the Court's order to provide
such information in Hall 1.

b.

Mr. Hall's request for "All documentation relating to entry of Mr.
Hall's DNA profile into the national NDIS database, or any
national database" is WITHDRAWN.

Rewards.
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Mr. Hall's request for "All documentation and infonnation regarding
reward money offered for assistance in the Henneman and Hanlon
homicide investigations including claims made on such reward" is
GRANTED IN PART, based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to
provide all documentation regarding any reward money offered for
assistance in the Hall II Hanlon case including claims made on such
reward.
12.

Documentation Regarding Sex Offender Registration.
Mr. Hall's request for "Documentation from the Idaho sex offender
registry involving registration, or attempts at registration, by Erick Hall" is
WITHDRAWN.

13.

Miscellaneous Documents and Reports.
Mr. Hall's request for "Copies of any and all written questions by jury to
the court, any bailiff, or other court personnel" is WITHDRAWN.

14.

15.

IMSI, Ada County Jail, Garden City Jail and Other Prison and Jail
Records.
a.

Mr. Halls request for "Copies of the Ada County Jail Visitation
logs regarding trial counselor investigator visits to Mr. Hall" is
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRA
WN without prejudice to renew the request upon
further investigation.

b.

Mr. Hall's request for "Copies of the Safety Practices Manual.
Any and all manuals, infonna1 or fonna1 policies, memoranda or
guidelines regarding safety practices for female correctional
officers or other female employees or volunteers and inmates
classified as or believed to be sexually violent toward women" is
WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request upon
further investigation.

Documents Requiring Subpoenas
a.

Mr. Hall's request for "Copies of all Washington DSHS Division
of Child Support records pertaining to Frank McCracken and Jean
McCracken/Hall in Case No. 70253" is WITHDRAWN.
McCrackenlHall

IT IS SO ORDERED this
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JUDGE THOMAS F. NEVILLE
District Judge
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843

J DAYlD NAVARRO; Caerk

SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. # 5888
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

------------)
--------------------------)

Case No. CV PC 0803085
MOTION FOR STANDING ORDER
ARATION OF
DIRECTING THE PREP
PREPARATION
TRANSCRIPTS IN ALL POSTPOST
CONVICTION HEARINGS

(CAPITAL CASE)

Petitioner ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorneys at the State Appellate
Public Defender's office (hereinafter "SAPD"), hereby moves this Honorable Court to order that,
without need for a separate order addressing each individual hearing, a transcript of any and all
proceedings or hearings held in this post-conviction case be prepared by the Court Reporter at
the conclusion of each hearing and be made part of the record in this case. Moreover, Mr. Hall
asks that a copy of each hearing/proceeding transcript be provided to counsel for both parties.
Information contained within these transcripts, and any statements by the prosecutor or
this Court, are relevant to Mr. Hall's request for post-conviction relief. This motion is made
pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and it is based upon all matters of record.
MOTION FOR STANDING ORDER DIRECTING THE PREPARATION
TRANSCRIPTS OF ALL POST-CONVICTION HEARINGS

OF
1
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...
DATED this 6th day of May, 2010.

NICOLE OWENS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

MOTION FOR STANDING ORDER DIRECTING THE PREPARATION OF
TRANSCRIPTS OF ALL POST-CONVICTION HEARINGS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6th day of May, 2010, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document, MOTION FOR STANDING ORDER DIRECTING THE
PREPARATION OF TRANSCRIPTS OF ALL POST-CONVICTION HEARINGS, as follows:
JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702
ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMA TE # 33835
INMATE
IMSI
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery

..,c

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

Administrative Assistant

MOTION FOR STANDING ORDER DIRECTING THE PREPARATION OF
TRANSCRIPTS OF ALL POST-CONVICTION HEARINGS
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.
MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. # 5888
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

-------------)
-----------------------------)

Case No. CV PC 0803085

.,."
.,.'

STANDING ORDER DIRECTING
PREP ARA TION OF TRANSCRIPTS
THE PREPARATION
IN ALL POST-CONVICTION HEARINGS

(CAPITAL CASE)

Motion having
baving been made and the Court otherwise being fully informed,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that as a matter of course, without need for a separate order
addressing each individual hearing, a transcript of any and all proceedings or hearings held in this
post-conviction case be prepared by the Court Reporter at the conclusion of each hearing and be
made part of the record in this case. Once prepared, it is further ordered that a transcript of each
hearing/proceeding be provided to counsel for both parties.

STANDING ORDER DIRECTING THE PREPARATION OF TRANSCRIPTS OF ALL
POST CONVICTION HEARINGS
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~
DATED this 13'"'-day of May, 2010.

THOMAS F. NEVILLE
District Judge

STANDU'JG
ST
ANDU'JG ORDER DIRECTU'JG THE PREPARATION OF TRANSCRIPTS OF ALL
POST CONVICTION HEARU'JGS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~day of May, 2010, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document, STANDING ORDER DIRECTING THE PREPARATION OF
TRANSCRIPTS OF ALL POST-CONVICTION HEARINGS, as follows:
JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

/statehouse
~tatehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

SHANNON ROMERO
SAPD
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
BOISE, ID 83703

" Statehouse Mail
_JJ.S. Mail
7Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

SUE WOLF
COURT REPORTER
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE
BOISE, IDAHO

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail

~acsimile
~and

Delivery

STANDING ORDER DIRECTING THE PREPARATION
PREPARATION OF TRANSCRIPTS OF ALL
POST CONVICTION HEARINGS
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GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jan M. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 4606
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise,Id. 83702
Telephone (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV PC 2008 3085

MOTION FOR AN ORDER
TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE
OF THE RECORD IN CASE NO.
CR-FE-2003-0000624 (HALL II)

------------)
----------------------------)

COMES NOW, Jan M Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and hereby moves this Court for an Order taking judicial
notice of the record as set out below.
The State requests that this Court, pursuant to I.R.E. 201(d), issue an Order Taking
Judicial Notice of the Clerk's Record, transcripts, pleadings, responsive pleadings, all
pretrial and trial proceedings and documents that are part of the record, and including any
MOTION FOR AN ORDER TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE RECORD IN CASE
NO. CR-FE-2003-0000624 (HALL II) 1
001269

•
and all filed or lodged documents in Case No. CR-FE-2003-0000624, the underlying
criminal case, for the purpose of addressing the Petitioner's post-conviction claims.
Idaho Code § 19-4906(a) requires that, "[I]fthe application is not accompanied by
the record of the proceedings challenged therein, the respondent shall file with its answer
the record or portions thereof that are material to the questions raised in the application."
Furthermore, in Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 808 (1992), the Idaho Supreme Court
stated, "we hold that prior to dismissing a petition for post-conviction relief, the district
court is required to obtain that portion of the trial transcript as is necessary to a
determination 'on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and the record,' that
there are no material issues of fact and that the petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction
)."
19-4906(b)."
relief. I.C. § 19-4906(b
The district court may take judicial notice of the record of the underlying criminal
case. Hays v. State, 113 Idaho 736, 739, 745 P.2d 758, 767 (Ct. App. 1987), ajJ'd 115
Idaho 315, 766 P.2d. 785 (1988), overruled on other grounds State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho
981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992).
The State submits that taking judicial notice of the clerk's record, transcripts, and
other documents, as noted above that are part of the record in the underlying criminal
case, will be necessary for addressing the Petitioner's claims.

J?IV day of May 2010.
DATED this til/V
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

By:

c1::'~

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

MOTION FOR AN ORDER TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE RECORD IN CASE
NO. CR-FE-2003-0000624 (HALL II) 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

.2t Y

2010,
day of May 20
I0, I caused to be

served, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for An Order Taking Judicial
Notice of the Record upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted:
Name and address: State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane,
Boise, Idaho 83703

~ositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first
class.
o By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.

o By infonning the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for
pickup at the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
o By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number: _ _ __

Legal Assistant

MOTION FOR AN ORDER TAI(lNG
TAIQNG JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE RECORD IN CASE
NO. CR-FE-2003-0000624 (HALL II) 3
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NO.
~
A.M.,.
_
_.A
M
_- -

MOLLY 1. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
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;'$\«<

JUN - 9 2010
J. DAVID NAVMPtJ,
NAVMPtJ. CIeItt
By JANET L ews
oEPUlY

SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. # 5888
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. #7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

GRrGINAL

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV PC 0803085

RENEWED MOTION TO
RELEASE REDACTED JUROR
QUESTIONNAIRES

(CAPITAL CASE)

Petitioner ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorneys at the State
Appellate Public Defender (herein "SAPD"), hereby renews his Motion to Release Juror
Questionnaires in the underlying criminal case, State v. Hall, Ada County Case No.
H0300624, filed on March 26, 2008. Mr. Hall submits that the questionnaires must be
made available to assess and support claims raised in his Amended Petition for PostConviction Relief, filed April 7, 2009 (herein "Amended Petition") regarding the
effectiveness of his trial counsel in selecting his jury. This motion is based on Mr. Hall's
rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments (Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses) to the United States Constitution, Article I, Sections 5, 6, 7,

RENEWED MOTION TO RELEASE REDACTED JUROR QUESTIONNAIRES
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and 13 of the Idaho Constitution, Idaho Code §§ 19-2719 and 19-4901 et seq., Idaho
Criminal Rule (I. C.R.) 23.1, and all matters of record.
ARGUMENT
THE COMPLETED JURY OUESTIONNAIRES MUST BE DISCLOSED TO
PROTECT MR. HALL'S CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO
MEANINGFUL POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
A.

Relevant Procedural Background
Prior to voir dire in the underlying criminal case, prospective jurors were

provided with a lengthy questionnaire which included questions about their knowledge of
the law, the facts of Mr. Hall's case, and their views about the death penalty. In the
course of completing the questionnaires, prospective jurors signed an oath and
affirmation. (Tr.Vol.1 of 11, pp.44, 71.) This Court informed prospective jurors that the
questionnaire would only be used by the Court and counsel. (Tr. Vol. 1, p.92.)
Both this Court and the parties relied heavily upon the completed questionnaires
to frame their in-person voir dire of the prospective jurors. (See generally Tr. Vol. 1 of 11
- Vol. 8 of 11.) During the in-person voir dire, many of the prospective jurors reported
that the questionnaire was confusing, overwhelming, or otherwise frustrating, and some
jurors either left questions unanswered, or answered them incorrectly. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol.
2 of 11, pp.36I, 440, 512-13, 566, 841; Tr. Vol. 3 of 11, pp.I978, 2037, 2045; Tr. Vol. 4
of 11, p.2244; Tr. Vol. 70f 11, pp.3I47, 3173; Tr. Vol. 80f 11, p.3780.)

Some

prospective jurors revealed that the questionnaire itself triggered latent memories about
061the facts of the case, or other crimes associated with Mr. Hall. (Tr. Vol. 2 of 11, pp.I 061
63, 1066.)
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During these post-conviction proceedings, Mr. Hall filed a Motion for Release
Juror Questionnaires on March 26, 2008.

This Court denied the motion without

prejudice. Mr. Hall now renews his request and asks that the completed juror
questionnaires be disclosed, subjected to the same redactions of jurors' names, dates of
birth and places of birth, as were made in Hall I. Mr. Hall further agrees to redact the
jurors' signatures. A copy of this Court's order relating to the jury questionnaires in Hall
I is attached for ease of reference. (See Order Granting Access to Completed Juror
Questionnaires, Erick Hall v. State of
Idaho, Case No. SPOT0500155.)
ofIdaho,
B.

The Completed Jury Questionnaires Must Be Disclosed To Protect Mr. Hall's
Substantial Rights
Mr. Hall has a statutory right to raise any factual or legal challenge to his

judgment of conviction and sentence in these post-conviction proceedings. I.C. §19
§ 192719(3); I.C. §19-4901(4). Mr. Hall has just one opportunity to identify and raise these
challenges. See I.C. § 19-2719(4)-(6); McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700-01, 992
P.2d 144, 149-50 (1999); State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 807, 820 P.2d 665, 677
(1991). To satisfy due process, this opportunity cannot be reduced to a mere formality.
See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,401(1985) ("[W]hen a State opts to act in a field where

its action has significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with the
dictates of the Constitution--and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process Clause.");
see also State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 864, 828 P.2d 891, 893 (1992) (recognizing

capital post-conviction proceedings serve to protect a condemned person's federal and
state right to due process); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799, 992 P.2d 789, 794
(Ct. App. 1999) ("failing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful
opportunity to have his or her claims presented may be violative of due process").
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Because this is a capital case, Mr. Hall is entitled to greater, not lesser procedural
safeguards and protections. See Hoffman v. A
rave , 236 F.3d 523, 539-540 (9th Cir. 2001)
Arave,
(recognizing the "long line of cases requiring heightened procedural safeguards in capital
cases"); Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 125-27, (1991) (weighing the "special
importance of fair procedure in the capital sentencing context"); Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104 (1982) (discussing heightened protections in capital cases); Beck v.
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (noting the Court's "often stated" principle that "there is a

significant constitutional difference between the death penalty and lesser punishments");
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (finding that "the penalty of death is

qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment").
Mr. Hall has challenged his conviction and sentence by alleging inter alia that his
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during jury selection, including when they
agreed to excuse prospective jurors based solely on their questionnaire responses. See
Amended Petition, pp.18-51 (Claim E, "Deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel
during jury selection"). Mr. Hall must review and analyze the completed questionnaires
to meaningfully assess trial counsels' performance, and to provide further support for his
claims. In order to assess trial counsel's performance, Mr. Hall must have access to the
completed questionnaires to see exactly what information trial counsel had at the time
they were making crucial decision about jury selection. Mr. Hall's right to meaningful
post-conviction proceedings will be rendered illusory ifhe is not given the opportunity to
review all documents relevant to his claims and the points of error identified in his
Amended Petition. Cf Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 279-80 (1964); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956); Ebersole v. State, 91 Idaho 630, 636, 428 P.2d 947,
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953 (1967) (holding that the inability to review a transcript of the defendant's
arraignment precluded an effective appeal and violated due process).
Mr. Hall is entitled to the completed questionnaires because they are necessary to
evaluate the assistance his trial counsel rendered. See, e.g., Bellas v. Superior Court of
th
Cal.App.4th
Alameda County, 85 Cal.AppA
636, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 380 (Ct. App 2000). In Bellas,

after the defendant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced, his attorney
refused to comply with an order to return copies of the completed juror questionnaires to
the court. Id. at 640. The attorney argued that he had highlighted and made notes on the
questionnaires, and had otherwise relied on them for jury selection. /d. Therefore, the
attorney believed the questionnaires were work product that needed to be preserved for
potential use by defendant's counsel on appeal. Id.

The district court disagreed and

ordered the return of the completed questionnaires, basing its decision solely on its desire
to protect "juror's privacy and confidentiality." Id. at 642. The district court then held the
attorney in contempt for refusing to return the questionnaires to the court. /d
On appeal, the California Court of Appeals observed that "this case concerns
continuing access to the content of juror questionnaires by defendant and defense
th
Cal.App.4th
at 646 (emphasis
counsel, and not simply access by the public." Bella, 85 Cal.AppA

added); see also Zamudio v. Superior Court, 64 Cal.AppAth
Cal.App.4th 24, 30, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 765
(1998). The Court then found that the district court had erred in holding counsel in
contempt where the defendant and his counsel were entitled to the jury questionnaires,
which had potential value to appellate counsel in framing issues for an eventual appeal on
the defendant's behalf, and which contained information that could be used to support
th at 646-47. In
Cal.App.4th
decisions made by trial counsel during jury selection. Bella, 85 Cal.AppA
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so holding, the Court recognized the desire of trial courts to protect jurors' privacy
interests. Id. at 652. However, the Court prevailed upon trial courts to understand that
"[n]o comprehensive offer of protection from public disclosure of information
communicated on juror questionnaires is legally effectual where public access is
mandated by the First Amendment." Id.
Information gathered and relied up by the parties and the court for the purpose of
assisting with capital jury selection, such as jury questionnaires, is crucial for post
postconviction and appellate counsels' review of trial counsel's performance injury selection.
It has long been acknowledged that jury selection is a "critical stage" of a criminal trial.

Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873 (1989). In capital cases, this is particularly

true because juries not only determine whether a defendant is guilty, they also determine
whether a defendant, in light of the charged crime and the surrounding circumstances,
should live or die. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find the aggravating factors or circumstances
necessary for the imposition of the death penalty). Because juries play such a pivotal and
critical role in the guilt and penalty phases of capital trials, it is imperative that post
postconviction counsel thoroughly investigate all potential claims related to jury selection.
See Commentary to ABA Guideline 10.1 0.2 (advising of the importance and complexity

of voir dire and jury selection process and warning counsel of the substantial time
necessary); John H. Blume et aI., Probing "Life Qualification" Through Expanded Voir
Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1209, 1209 & n.1 (2001) ("The conventional wisdom is that

most trials are won or lost injury selection.").
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Here, prospective jurors filled out and submitted completed questionnaires in
order to assist the court and the parties with jury selection. (See generally Tr. Vol. 1 of
11 - Vol. 8 of 11.) The questionnaires served as both an alternative and a supplement to
jurors' oral disclosure of the same information in open court; thus, the questionnaires
were a critical part of voir dire. After the completed questionnaires were submitted to the
court and given to the parties, the parties stipulated to the removal of certain jurors based
solely on their questionnaire responses. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol 1, 9/7/07, p.123, L. 21 - p.
130, L.20.) The questions and answers in the questionnaires were also utilized by counsel
and the court to promote discussion during oral voir dire. (See generally Tr. Vol. 1 of 11
- Vol. 8 of 11.) Thus, Mr. Hall should be given the opportunity to know what trial
counsel, the State and this Court knew when selecting a jury, in order to accurately assess
and evaluate trial counsels' performance during jury selection.

7
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant Mr. Hall's renewed motion for
the release of the completed and redacted jury questionnaires, including the
questionnaires of those potential jurors who were actually selected, those who were
seated as alternates, those who were stricken for cause, those struck through the exercise
of peremptory challenges, and those who were stricken by agreement of the parties. Mr.
Hall asks this Court to employ the same redaction of juror information as in Hall I, with
of juror signatures.
the additional redaction ofjuror
Dated this

~~ay of June, 2010.

MERO
S ANNONN.
eputy State Appellate Public Defender

\l~u.
\l~u·

NICOLE OWENS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this ~day of June, 2010, served a true
and correct copy of the forgoing RENEWED MOTION TO RELEASE JUROR
QUESTIONNAIRES as indicated below:
JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

fsV MELISSA RICHESON GALLEGOS----
Administrative Assistant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICw:'iP.ISTRId'1
JUDICw:'tPISTRId'1.••t
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
200S
6 2005

A.FJt -

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)

Respondent.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~))

J. DAVl&A'J.J..!_~
,.RRO.c~
J.DAVl&~:'~

CASE NO
NO.,.. SPOT050<ft..,-soEPulV'
SPOT050<fr..,-soEPUlV·
ORDER GRANTING
." ACCESS TO COMPLETED
JURy QUESTIONNAIRES

(CAPITAL CASE)

Motion haVing been made "and
'and the Court otherwise being sufficiently advised during a
telephonic hearing held on .January 6, 2006, in-court hearings held on February 15 2006, and in
part by stipulation of the parties
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to I.C.R. 23.1 that the Ada County Jury Office
custodian of the completed jury questionnaires, as assisted by this Court's staff, in Ada County
Hall, provide to Petitioner's counsel those questionnaires
Case No. H0300518, State v. Erick Hall.
over which she has custody, as specified below:
a. The custodian shall make copies of the questionnaires for only those prospective
jurors who were passed or excused for cause, that is those brought into the court room
for questioning or excused beforehand by stipulation;
b. The custodian shall redact all names, addresses, phone numbers and information from
which identity could be readily determined of the afore,mentioned
afore.mentioned prospective jurors;

and
. c. The custodian shall provide copies of the aforementioned questionnaires (as redacted)
"c.
directly to counsel for Petitioner or their agent forthwith.

(/

ORDER GRANTING ACCESS TO COMPLETED JURy QUESTIONNAIRES
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1
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I.C,R. 23.1 that Petitioner's
,IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to I.C.R.
counsel· be provided copies of any jury questionnaires (as redacted) retained by or in the
H03005l8, State v. Erick Hall,
possession of the district court presiding in Ada County Case No. H0300518,
including the twenty-six page jury questionnaire (as redacted) specifically tailored for the
death/life qualification process, as specified below:
a. Petitioner's access to copies of the aforementioned questionnaires is limited to only
those prospective jurors who were passed or excused for
fOf cause, that is those brought
into the courtroom for questioning or excused beforehand by stipulation;
b. The aforementioned questionnaires shall be redacted of all names, addresses, phone
numbers, and information from which identity colild
coUld be readily determined.

IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to I.C.R. 23.1 that counsel for the
Petitioner shall take measures to protect juror confidentiality and shall not relinquish possession
of the aforementioned questionnaires or otherwise provide copies to Petitioner.
of any ofthe
Dated this

"ftt
"ft1

day of Jilly, 2006.

THOMAS F. NEVILLE
District Judge

00510
ORDER GRANTINGACCESS TO COMPLETED JORy QUESTIONNAIRES
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
CERTWICATE

~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of July, 2006, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING ACCESS TO COMPLETED JURY
QUESTIONNAIRES by method indicated below to:

MARK ACKLEY
MARK.
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
BOISE ID 83703
ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

Mail
- - U.S.
Statehouse Mail

-LFacsimile -e.~
-e.~
_ _ Hand Delivery

- - U.S. Mail

_"_ Statehouse M~
~ Facsimile - "
_ _ Hand Delivery
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Session: Neville061110
Session Date: 2010/06/11
~eville, Thomas F.
Judqe: ~eville,
Repo..rter-;~ Wolf,
Repo.rter-;~
Sue

•

Division: DC
Session Time:

•

Page 1

Courtroom: CR501

08:29

Clerk(s):
Ellis, Janet
State Attorneys:
Public Defender(s):
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s)

Case ID:

0002
Case Number: CVPC08-03085
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL
Plaintiff Attorney:
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO
Co-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney: OWENS, NICOL
State Attorney: VARIE, DOUGLAS
Public Defender:

2010/06/11
11:18:11 - Operator
Recording:
11:18:11 - New case
, STATE OF IDAHO
11:18:33 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Time aet for further status conference.
11:19:17 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court notes orders from prior hearing have been entered and
sent out.
Court
11:19:38- Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
inquired about revised scheduling order.
11:19:48 - Pers. Attorney: OWENS, NICOL
Ms. Owens indicated that trying to hire new lead counsel and
that might
11:20:08 - Pers. Attorney: OWENS, NICOL
happen sometime around July 12th.
11:20:34 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court· inquired about coming back after lead counsel hired.
Will set August
11:21:31 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
6, 2010 @ 10:30 a.m. Court notes new motions filed, Motion f
or st,3.nding
11:21:58 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
order, Court entered that order on May 15th, thereafter Sate
filed Motion for
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11:22:17 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Judicial notice by State, will enter that order as soon as g
et out of Court.
11:22.:40
11:22~40 Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court has renewed Motion to release redacted questionnaires.
11:23:14 - General:
V~rie stated have been working towards an agreement, wil
Mr. V~rie
1 try to work
11:23:52 - State Attorney: VARIE, DOUGLAS
towards stipulation.
11:23:59 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court stated did release redacted questionnaires in Hall I.
11:25:33 - State Attorney: VARIE, DOUGLAS
Will work towards a resolution, if cannot reach agreement wi
11 advise the
11:25:53 - State Attorney: VARIE, DOUGLAS
Court.
11:25:59·- Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court: will take up on August 6th if haven't reached an agree
ment
11:26:19- Operator
Stop recording:
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FILED

Friday. June 11. 2010 at 11 :51 AM

J. DAVID NAVARRO, CLERK OF THE COURT
BY:

f\~
'-Y
DeUCIefk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

3

4
5
6

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. CV-PC-2008-03085

NOTICE OF STATUS CONFERENCE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

7
8

9
lO
10

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED That a Status Conference has been set on
Friday, August 06, 2010, at 10:30 AM, in the Ada County Courthouse regarding the
above entitled matter.

11

Dated this 11th day of June, 2010
12

13
14
15

16
17

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 11th day of June, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to bemailed.postageprepaid.to:
SHANNON ROMERO
NICOL OWENS
SAPD VIA EMAIL

18

19
20

JAN BENNETTS
DOUGLAS VARIE
ADA CO PROSECUTOR VIA EMAIL

21

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

22

~)) V I a !LY:.r..----"
!LY~-"
By'
~
-::D:-e-p-u-\~:--:f:~rk~="":""""':=--='---. -=D:-e-p-u-\~:--:f:~rk~="":""""':=--='----

23
24

(

25
26

Notice of Status Conference
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RECEIVED

MAY 2 1 2010
Ada County Cieri<

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

:

R&BS:
:
II j ;;:n
. . . . u -P!M...M!M- - -

NA,0

M

12 2010
JUN 12

Jan M. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 4606
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise,Id. 83702
Telephone (208) 287-7700

NAVARRO, CIIIk
J• DAVIDJANET
JANETLEWS
1- EW8
9iDEPUTY
91
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Case No. CV PC 2008 3085
ORDER TAKING JUDICIAL
NOTICE OF THE RECORD IN
CASE NO. CR-FE-2003-0000624
(HALL II)

THE COURT, having reviewed the State's Motion for an Order Taking Judicial Notice of
the Record in case number CR-FE-2003-0000624, and the Court being fully advised in the
premIses;

IT IS HE1lliBY
HEllliBY ORDERED, that the Court will take judicial notice of the clerk's record,
transcripts, pleadings, responsive pleadings, all pretrial and trial proceedings and documents that
CR-FEare part of the reqord, and including any and all filed or lodged documents in Case No. CR-FE

2003-0000624, the underlYi~inal
underlyi~~~i~al case.
DATED this J...L~
J..L~_2mb.
201

b.

Thomas F. Neville
District Judge

ORDER TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE RECORD IN CASE NO. CR-FE
CR-FE2003-0000624 (HALL II), Page 1
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A.M...

JUL. 30 2Q\0
J DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
•

eARLY LATIMORE
By CARLY
OEPUTY

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Jan M. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 4606
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CV-PC-08-03085
Case No. CV-PC-08-03085
STATE'S MOTION FOR
INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE
SAPD CONFLICT
(HALL II)

------------)
------------------------------)

COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and requests that this Court hold a hearing and to inquire
into whether or not the State Appellate Public Defender (hereinafter "SAPD") has a
conflict in representing the Petitioner in these post-conviction proceedings.
The State inquired of Mr. Ackley, prior to his leaving the office of the SAPD, to
determine if there were any conflict issues in this case. Although Mr. Ackley did not
believe there were, the State prefers to address this issue now rather than later. The State

STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRE INTO POSSIBLE CONFLICT (HALL 11), Page
1
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hopes to avoid additional delays that would be caused were we to discover later that there
is indeed a conflict. In addition, it is appropriate that a record be made at the district court
level on this issue rather than attempting to address it at a later time during appellate
proceedings.
It is noteworthy that the SAPD did represent the Petitioner in the Hall I post
post-

conviction proceedings during the time that Rob Chastain and Deborah Kristal
represented the Petitioner in the present case, including during Mr. Chastain and Ms.
Kristal's preparation for this case, the trial itself and the capital sentencing proceedings.
The fact that the SAPD represented the Petitioner on another case may not in and of itself
create a conflict. However, in an abundance of caution and in an effort to avoid
unnecessary delays in these post-conviction proceedings, the State requests that this Court
inquire of post-conviction counsel to ensure that there is no conflict.
The State further requests that the SAPD disclose any correspondence, notes,
documents and conversations members of the SAPD staff had with Erick Hall and/or trial
counsel for Erick Hall prior to the SAPD post-conviction appointment on January 4,
2008, on the Hall II case regarding matters that related to the Hall II case. The State
understands that the SAPD represented the Petitioner in Hall I post-conviction
proceedings during this time frame, and is not seeking communications, correspondence
or documents related to Hall I, but only those regarding Hall II. The State wants to ensure
that no conflict arose during the course of Hall II proceedings.
The State contends that any of these conversations, documents, correspondence or
notes that related specifically to the Hall II case prior to the SAPD appointment in the
Hall II case would not be protected by the Attorney-Client Privilege because the SAPD
did not represent the Petitioner on Hall II during those time frames. Should the Court
conclude otherwise,

or should it become necessary to divulge

confidential

communications, the State requests that the Court inquire of the SAPD outside the State's

STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRE INTO POSSIBLE CONFLICT (HALL ll), Page
2
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presence on the record and review these documents en camera to determine whether these
communications demonstrate that a conflict exists. In addition, it is entirely possible that
this information would be relevant in responding to and addressing the Petitioner's postpost
conviction claims.

')f)A')f)A

RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this .:2LL day of July 2010.
RESPECTFULLY

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

~JfI~
J
. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

.~ of-day of July 2010, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing State's Motion for Inquire into Possible Conflict was served on Mark 1.
Ackley, Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho
83703 in the manner noted below:
ftrst
o By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, fIrst
class.
o By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
o By informing the offIce
offtce of said individual(s) that said copies were available for
pickup at the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
o By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _ _ __

STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRE INTO POSSIBLE CONFLICT (HALL 11), Page
3
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~eville080610
~eville080610

Ses;~on~
Ses;~on~ ~eville080610
~eville080610
Session Date: 2010/08/06
Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Reporter: Wolf, Sue

Division: DC
Session Time:

Courtroom: CR501
09:19

Clerk(s):
Ellis,. Janet
State Attorneys:
Public Defender(s)
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s):

Case ID: 0001
Case Number: CVOC08-03085
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK
Plaintiff Attorney:
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO
Co-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Public Defender:

2010/08/06
10:42:41 - Operator
Recording:
10~42:41 10~42:41
New case
, STATE OF IDAHO
10:43:09 - Other: Varie, Doug
here on behalf of State of ID
10:43:26 - Other: Owens, Nicol
on behalf of Eric Hall
10:43:32 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court indicated the last time we were here was on June 1
1, 2010.
10:46:19 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court stated tha
Court notes new lead counsel, Mr. Thomsen.
t when we were
10:46:41 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
last here, counsel were almost in agreement on redacted ques
tionnaire.
10:46:58- State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Ms. Bennetts stated we are close, but in light of potential
review of a
10:47:15 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
conflict have kind of stalled
10:47:25 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
Stated under orders of SAPD while independent counsel review
for any possible
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10:48:00 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
conflict.
Stated should be rapped up within the next 2-3 we
eks.
10:48:56 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court notes new filings in the court file.
Ex Parte Motion
for possible
10:49:23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
conflict under seal.
10:49:37 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Have,not seen that motion.
10:49:44 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court, should not sh
Court inquired if there was a reason why Court.
ow respondent's
10:50:16 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
counsel copy of this motion.
10:50:27 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
State's there is reason.
10:50:42 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court states the specific contents are not specific, are ver
y general, do not
10:51:03 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
see any harm or any compromise of Mr. Hall's position.
10:51:23 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
In light of State's motion last week, Ms. Owens and Ms. Benn
,etts
. etts spoke.
If
10:53:01- Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
Court~should release to State,
Court~should
was not specific enough to ca
use any
10:53:45 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
compromise.
10:53:47-- Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
10:53:47'Court does not see i t as harmful.
Court would like to share
i t with the
10:54:09 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
State.
10:54:12 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
If there are no specifics or facts in
it, would not have is
sue, believe
10:54:29 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
there has been a waivor from Mr. Chastain & Ms. Kristal.
Fa
irly broad
10:54:47- State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
waivor.
To that extent do not believe i t would be a problem
Not asking for
10:55:07 ~ State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
conversations between SAPO and Mr. Hall.
10:55:44 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
Mr. Thomsen stated their notice is in response to another ca
se in the
10:56:13 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
courthouse.
This is in response to an issue in that case, a
nd the motion was
10:56:27 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
out of abundance of caution.
Attorney's in SAPO were concer
ned, wanted this
10:56:56 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
looked at now rather than later.
Do not want to be in posit
ion of creating
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10:5~:19
10:5~:19

- Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
further appellate issues later.
10:57:52- Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court inquired if can share a copy of this motion today with
the state
10:58:10 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
Mr. Thomsen responded re: Ms. Romero's view
10:58:55 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court will give the State copy of ex parte motion.
10:59:10 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court going next to SAPD's Ex Parte Motion under seal re
: vacating stat
10:59:50 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
conf.
Court effectively already denied that motion since t
he Court wanted
11:00:13 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
to keep this stat conf on for today.
Going next to the Stat
e's Mption,
M()tion,
11:00:38 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
inquired if SAPD opposed
11: 00:46 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
Mr. Thomsen stated would oppose.
11:00:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court inquired about even if in camera
11:01:15 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
would oppose at this stage
11:01:22 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court going back to ex parte motion provided to State this m
orning.
11:02:39 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court notes first assertion with the Court requesting th
The Cburt
at testing
11:03:01 - Judge:
JUdge: Neville, Thomas F.
information from Hall I be shared with trial counsel in Hall
II.
2nd
11:03:33 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
assertion of possible conflict with Ms. Swenson talking with
trial counsel.
11:04:17 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court does not see any detail or specifics of the contac
t in assertion
11:04:43 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
#2.
Understand that Mr. Benjamin is reviewing the possible
conflict and
11:06:17 .~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
will speak with Mr. Hall on whether any conflict would be wa
ived.
11:08:53 -~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Cburt
Court re: examination of conflict and Court making inqui
rYe ~~n order for
11:09:54 - Judge:
JUdge: Neville, Thomas F.
the Court to make this inquiry the State would need to know.
The Court
11:10:29 '- Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
stated both sides should be allowed to respond.
The Court c
onsidering
11:10:49 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
setting up hearing on the issue of conflict for the Court to
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make inquiry.
11:12:02 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
If Court finds there is conflict that the Court would need t
o appoint counsel
11:12:28 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
of Court's choosing.
The Court does not have specific infor
mation on the
11:12:51 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
contact.
Probably prudent of SAPD to appoint Mr. Benjamin t
o conduct
11:13:25 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
independent inquiry, but i t is up to this Court to make inqu
iry.
The Court
11:13:50~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
11:13:50~
does not have to bound by what Mr. Benjamin should determine
The Court has
11:14:53 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
a lot of regard for Mr. Benjamin.
11:15:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The C0urt would like to set the State's Motion for Inquiry
11:15:44 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
Mr. Thomsen stated would oppose that, have motion to file, w
hich basically
11:16:05 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
states what Court just placed on record, agree that i t is th
e Court's
11:16:20 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
decision.
At this moment do oppose.
Mr. Benjamin is the D
e Facto counsel
11:17:16 ~ Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
when there are issues like this.
Would like the Court to he
ar from Mr.
~ttorney:
11:18:29 ~ Pers. ~ttorney:
THOMSEN, IAN
Benja'nin.
Difference in this case and Judge Copsey's case i
s that Mr. Hall
11:19:09-- Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
had another case with SAPD on i t .
11:20:32'- Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court has had high regard for SAPD's office.
11:23:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The State's general notion to resolve this up front in' their
motion, Court is
11:24:20 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
on board with that.
Court would like to set for hearing.
W
ould:like to keep
11:24:36 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
this case moving.
11:25:05 ~ Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
Recei'Jed notice for oral argument the first week of November
on Hall I.
11:25:30~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
11:25:30~
The cburt
Cburt has August 26th at 2:30 p.m.
11:26:16'- State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
State is available
11:26:22 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
concurs
11:27:22- Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
Should have something back from Mr. Benjamin by that date as
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• well
11:27:37 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court always happy to hear from Mr. Benjamin, but Court
has to make its
11:28:43 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
own inquiry.
11:29:13 - Operator
Stop recording:
11:29:36 - Operator
Recording:
11:29:36 - Record
, STATE OF IDAHO
11:30:05 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
Do Not need to bring defendant in here
11:30:50 ~ State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Would like to have a written waivor from defendant
11:31:04 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court would like to see written waivor
11:31:48 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
May need to include Mr. Benjamin in that as well
11:31:58 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
Mr. Thomsen responded.
11:32:05 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
If State intending to file a response, would like to set tim
eline on that
11:32:23- State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
state will file by August 13th.
11:32:41 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court-would be out of office on August 13th
11:32:53 ~ State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Will file by August 16th then
11:33:02 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
Would like to have until August 20th to reply.
11:33:14- Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court will look for responses, if not going to file, request
advise
11:33:33 - Operator
Stop recording:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CVPC08-03085

RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION
FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE
SAPD CONFLICT (HALL II)

(CAPITAL CASE)

Counsel for Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through the State Appellate
Public Defender's (SAPD) Office, responds to the State's Motion For Inquiry Into Possible
SAPD Conflict. Counsel for Mr. Hall asks that the Court consider the Ex Parte Notice filed on
June 29, 2010, and the subsequent Ex Parte Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing filed on
June 27, 2010, as an anticipatory response to the State's request that "this Court inquire of postconviction counsel to ensure that there is no conflict." Counsel for Mr. Hall respectfully requests
that the Court wait until independent counsel has made a preliminary determination as to whether
any conflict, either perceived or actual, does in fact exist. It is then incumbent on independent
counsel, as well as undersigned counsel, to notify the court of any apparent conflict and to
appropriately proceed with a hearing in order to determine the extent and nature of the conflict,
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and whether an informed consent waiver can be obtained from Mr. Hall. However, as the State
has also mentioned, in order to avoid future delays and in order to create a record prior to
appellate proceedings, the SAPD agrees that clarification on the issue is warranted. In response
to the State's other request, the SAPD must respectfully refuse to divulge or disclose any contact
that any staff member or attorney had with Mr. Hall once an attorney-client relationship was
formalized when the SAPD was initially appointed as post-conViction counsel after the
Henneman trial (Hall I), regardless of the content of those contacts. That refusal is in keeping
with the obligations imposed on counsel by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct since all
communications are protected by attorney-client privilege, the work product rule, and rules of
attorney-client confidentiality.
I. ARGUMENT
A. Conflict Free Representation
It is undisputed that a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free

representation. See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703, 215 P.3d 414, 423 (2009), citing

Woodv. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981). Idaho appellate courts have recognized a statutory
right to post-conviction counsel for non-frivolous claims, as opposed to a constitutionally
grounded right. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793, 102 P.2d 108, 1112 (2004); Plant v.
§19State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629,632 (Ct.App. 2006); see also I.C. §19-852(b); I.C. §19
4904. However, even in the absence of a constitutional right to post-conviction counsel, Idaho
appellate courts have still acknowledged a petitioner's constitutional right to post-conviction
representation unmarred by conflict. See Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 289-290, 17 P.3d 230,
233-234 (2000) ("Because these facts do not identify a conflict other than the one related to the
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trial, they also fail to support the claim of ineffectiveness of appellate/post-conviction counsel as
a result of a conflict of interest.").
It should be clear that the critical issue in identifying whether a conflict of interest exists

lies in determining if the interests of counsel conflict with his or her client's interests, thereby

u.s. 688, 692 (1984)
compromising counsel's duty of loyalty. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
(recognizing that counsel who labors under an actual conflict of interest breaches the duty of
loyalty to his or her client, which is "perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties."). The United
States Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between actual and theoretical conflicts of interest,
finding that '''an actual conflict of interest' meant precisely a conflict that affected counsel's
performance-as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties." Mickens v. Taylor, 535
U.S. 162, 171 (2002) (emphasis in the original). That court held that "an 'actual conflict,' for
Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's
performance." Id. at 172 n.5.
B. Standards of Professional Conduct

However, in Idaho, counsel has an ethical and professional duty and responsibility to
both his or her client and to the bar generally. Those duties are codified in the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct (I.R.P.C. 2003). Attorneys have a duty to "act with commitment and
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."
I.R.P.C. Rule 1.3, Commentary [1]. Consistent with counsel's duty of zealous advocacy, counsel
has an ethical duty not to represent a client if that representation "will be materially limited by a
lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by the personal
lawyer.... " I.R.P.C. 1.7(a)(2).
interests of the lawyer...."

RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE SAPD
CONFLICT (HALL II)

3

001298

The Rules of Professional Conduct require a two-step analysis when addressing conflicts:
first, determine whether a concurrent conflict exists, and then, second decide whether
notwithstanding the conflict, the lawyer may continue to represent the client. In relevant part,
Rule 1.7 reads:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of
interest exists if:
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client
or a third person or by the personal interest of the lawyer, including family and
domestic relationships. I.R.C.P. Rule 1.7(a).1
And even where an "actual" conflict is found to exist, a lawyer
... may represent a client if:
(I) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other
proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. I.R.C.P.
Rule 1.7(b).
The commentary to the rule requires that attorneys spend considerable energy and effort in
identifying possible conflicts. They suggest that "to determine whether a conflict of interest
exists, a lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures." Rule 1.7, Commentary [3]. Mr. Hall's
counsel has generally outlined to the Court ex parte the procedures undertaken by the SAPD. In

I The Commentary to Rule 1.7 expounds on counsel's ethical duty with the following suggestion
under "Identifying Conflict of Interest: Material Limitation." "Even where there is no direct
adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to
consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially
limited as a result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests....
interests .... The critical questions are
the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will
materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering
alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the
client." Commentary [8].
RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE SAPD
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an abundance of caution and in order to avoid creating any future appellate issues the SAPD has
retained independent counsel to review any possible conflicts to meet with Mr. Hall, and to
advise him of any potential conflicts, appearances of conflict, and any future consequences, if
any, that those issues might have on his potential claims for relief or on appeal. The SAPO has
made all files, notes, and materials available to independent counsel. Counsel also has access to
any of the staff or attorneys working at the SAPD, and current contact information for Ms.
Swensen and Mr. Ackley.
It cannot be emphasized enough that neither Paula Swensen nor Mark Ackley, post-

conviction counsel for Mr. Hall at the time of the Hanlon (Hall II) trial, currently work for the
SAPD. The current state of Idaho law clearly indicates that even where one attorney currently
employed by the same public defender office labors under a conflict, that conflict will not
necessarily be imputed to all other attorneys in the same office. State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784,
794, 171 P.3d 1282, 1292 (CLApp.
(Ct.App. 2007). 2 The Court of Appeals explains in its reasoning that
Public Defenders represent an otherwise unique situation in the world of legal representation
where the "potential for conflict that exists in representation by members of a private firm does
not exist" primarily because there is "no financial incentive," and where" 'the inbred adversary
protection. '" Id. at 793 (bracketed language
tendencies of [public defense] lawyers are sufficient protection.'"
in original). Consequently, the Court of Appeals ultimately held that "a per se rule imputing
conflicts of interest to affiliated public defenders is inappropriate where there is no indication the

2 In Cook, the Idaho Court of Appeals reviewed a case where one public defender at the Kootenai
Public Defender was representing a defendant at trial and another attorney in the same office
"had recently represented or was currently representing numerous of the state's witnesses in
Cook's case." 144 Idaho at 787, 171 P.3d at 1285. Although the facts in the instant case do not
involve a conflict of representation between multiple defendants or witnesses in a case involving
Mr. Hall, the fact that even such a clear apparent conflict did not lead the Court of Appeals to
impute the conflict to all other attorneys at the Public Defender's Office is telling.
RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE SAPD
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conflict would hamper an attorney's ability to effectively represent a client." Id. at 794.

The

holding in Cook was ultimately adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Severson, 147
.3d 414 (2009).
Idaho 694, 215 P
P.3d
If there was any contact between Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Swensen and trial counsel in
Hall II that would amount to a theoretical or actual conflict, those would be personal conflicts
limited to those attorneys. The conflict could only be considered as one of "personal interest"
I.R.P.C.
C. Rule 1.7. According to Rule 1.10, personal interest conflicts ordinarily are not
under I.R.P.
firm.33
imputed to other lawyers in a law firm.

Even if Mr. Ackley or Ms. Swensen were still

employed at the SAPD, neither the Rules of Professional Conduct, nor current Idaho law would
require the imputation of such conflict to current lead counselor co-counsel for Mr. Hall.
Any subsequent inquiry into actions taken by post-conviction counsel could conceivably
tum them into witnesses arguendo in post-conviction proceedings or future hearings. However,

because both attorneys no longer work for or with the SAPD, in any capacity, their role as
possible witnesses does not present any problem for the Court, or for the State. Rule 3.7 of the
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct precludes an attorney from acting as an "advocate at a trial
in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness." I.R.C.P. 3.7 (a).4 This prohibition does

33 The relevant language is found in Rule 1.lO(a):
1.1O(a): "While lawyers are associated in a firm, none
of them shall knowingly represent a client when anyone of them practicing alone would be
prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9, unless the prohibition is based on a personal
of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk ofmaterially
of materially limiting the
interest ofthe
representation ofthe
of the client by the remaining lawyers in thejirm. (Emphasis added.)
4 The Commentary to Rule 3.7 contemplates such a scenario under the heading "Conflict of
Interest: In determining if it is permissible to act as advocate in a trial in which the lawyer will
be a necessary witness, the lawyer must also consider that the dual role may give rise to a
conflict of interest that will require compliance with Rule 1.7 or 1.9. For example, if there is
likely to be substantial conflict between the testimony of the client and that of the lawyer, the
representation involves a conflict of interest that requires compliance with Rule 1.7." I.R.P.c.
I.R.P.C.
IS not
Rule 3.7, Commentary [6]. Furthermore, "Paragraph (b) provides that a lawyer is
RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE SAPD
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not apply in the instant case because neither Mr. Ackley nor Ms. Swensen will be in the position
as Mr. Hall's advocate in any future pleading or court proceeding. In addition, their prior
involvement would not taint Mr. Hall's arguments or pleadings because a final amended petition
has not been filed in Hall II; and in fact, as of the filing of this response no depositions have been
made or taken concerning Hall II in preparation of finalizing claims for post-conviction relief.
C. Necessity for Further Judicial Inquiry
Counsel for Mr. Hall admits that the ultimate responsibility of ensuring conflict-free
counsel for the petitioner lies with the Court. "Whenever a trial court knows or reasonably
should know that a particular conflict may exist, the trial court has a duty of inquiry." State v.
Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278, 285 (2003) (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261,

272-73 (1981). "Upon the trial judge rests the duty of seeing that the trial is conducted with
solicitude for the essential rights of the accused ... The trial court should protect the right of an
accused to have the assistance of counsel." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484, 98S.Ct.
1173, 1179 (1978). That inquiry should necessarily reflect the same two-step analysis reflected
in I.R.P.C. Rule 1.7. The Court should make an inquiry that is both "searching" and "targeted at
the conflict issue." State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259, 77 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct.App. 2003). If the
court determines that an actual conflict exists, it then "must obtain the defendant's knowing and
intelligent waiver to the conflict, or provide the defendant with the opportunity to seek new
counsel." Id.

disqualified from serving as an advocate because a lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated in
a firm is precluded from doing so by paragraph (a)." Id., Commentary [7].
RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE SAPD
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D. Preference for Conflict Determinations to Be Made by Counsel and Justification for
Ex Parte Filings
It has also been suggested that trial courts necessarily rely on defense counsel's good

faith and good judgment to determine, both professionally and ethically, whether a conflict of
interest exists or will likely develop in the course of their representation. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U.S. 335, 347 (1980). The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct also suggest that "determining
whether or not such a conflict exists is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved."
I.R.P.C. Rule 3.7, Commentary [6]. The same Rules also make it clear that an attorney's failure
to faithfully comply to those established standards provide grounds for discipline. See I.R.P.C.,
Preamble [19].5
The preference for defense counsel to make the determination as to the existence and
effect of a conflict, in the absence of a judicial inquiry, is also underscored in the very nature of
the attorney-client privilege and the fact that the SAPD actively represented Mr. Hall at the time
he was on trial for the instant case (Hall II). In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct.
1173 (1978), the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of the extent to which
appointed counsel is required to make disclosures to the Court regarding the basis for conflict of
interest. In Holloway, counsel had been appointed to represent three co-defendants at a joint
trial.

Counsel had made motions requesting that separate counsel be appointed because of

conflicts of strategy and defense that had arisen after counseling with his three clients
individually. The Supreme Court acknowledged that "as to presenting the basis for that claim in
more detail, defense counsel was confronted with a risk of violating, by more disclosure, his duty

The United States Supreme Court has noted that "when a considered representation regarding a
conflict in clients' interests comes from an officer of the court, it should be given the weight
commensurate with the grave penalties risked for misrepresentation." Holloway v. Arkansas,
435 U.S. 475,486,98 S.Ct. 1173, 1179 (1978).
RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE SAPD
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ld. at 485. However, the Court noted that their holding does
of confidentiality to his clients." Id.
not "preclude a trial court from exploring the adequacy of the basis of defense counsel's
representation regarding a conflict of interest without improperly requiring disclosure of the
confidential communications of the client." Id. at 487. 6
II. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE PREVENTS DISCLOSURE TO THE STATE OF
ANY COMMUNICATION WITH MR. HALL
All contacts with Mr. Hall by attorneys or staff from the SAPD are covered by the
attorney-client privilege, work product rule, and rules of attorney-client confidentiality. When
Mr. Hall was tried before the Court for the murder of Ms. Hanlon, the SAPD had already formed
an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Hall. Consequently, all subsequent communication,
regardless of its content, falls under the mandates of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct
which prevent disclosure. 7
The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct are unambiguous in its order that "a lawyer
shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client gives informed

6 The accompanying warning from the Supreme Court cautions about "a court's power to compel
an attorney to disclose confidential communications that he concludes would be damaging to his
client ... Such compelled disclosure creates significant risks of unfair prejudice, especially when
the disclosure is to a judge who may be called upon later to impose sentences ....
...."" Id. at 487,
n.ll.
7 The attorney-client privilege may be the oldest recognized privilege in the Common Law, and
has been recognized at least since the reign of Queen Elizabeth. See, e.g., Hartford v. Lee, 21
Eng. Rep. 34 (Ch. 1577). And, as Wigmore notes, the privilege was virtually "unquestioned"
even then. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2290, at 547 (3d ed. 1940). The attorney-client privilege
encourages "'full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
justice. '"
promotes broader public interests in the observance If law and the administration of justice.'"
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403, 118 S.Ct. 2081 (1998) (quoting Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677 (1981).) "The privilege encourages
clients to make full disclosure to their lawyers, and a 'fully informed lawyer can more effectively
serve his client.'" Reed v. Baxter, 134 F.3d 351, 356 (6 th Cir. 1998). It is not hyperbole to
suggest that the attorney-client privilege is a necessary foundation for the adversarial system of
justice. In re Lott, 424 F.3d 446,450 (6 th Cir. 2005).
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consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the
disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b)." I.R.P.C. Rule 1.6 (a). There is no informed consent
from Mr. Hall permitting current counsel to divulge the nature or content of any communications
with his counsel. The few exceptions to the rule are enumerated as follows:
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) To prevent the client from committing a crime, including disclosure of
the intention to commit a crime;
(2) To prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(3) To prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted
from the client's commission of a crime in furtherance of which the client has
used the lawyer's services;
(4) To secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these
Rules;
(5) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal
charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client
was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the
lawyer's representation of a client; or
(6) To comply with other law or a court order. I.R.C.P. Rule 1.6 (b).
(Emphasis added.)
None of the preceding exceptions apply, preventing the SAPD from disclosing any
communication with Mr. Hall.

The State argues that "these conversations, documents,

correspondence or notes that related specifically to the Hall II case prior to the SAPD
appointment in the Hall II case would not be protected by the Attorney-Client Privilege because
the SAPD did not represent the Petitioner on Hall II during those time frames." State's Motion
for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD Conflict, p. 2. The argument is a gross misunderstanding of the
attorney-client privilege since the Rules of Professional Conduct specifically refer not to the
representation of a case, but to "representation of a client." I.R.P.C. Rule 1.6 (a).8

8 Hopefully, counsel for the State would acknowledge that one would expect post-conviction
counsel to discuss any open cases (particularly where both are capital cases) with their client, and
RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE SAPD
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A brief analysis of the Rules of Professional Conduct layout the scope of "representation
of a client" and mandate that an attorney adequately communicate with their client.

The

Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities to the I.R.P.C. emphasizes that "as advisor, a lawyer
provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and
explains their practical implications ... as an evaluator, a lawyer acts by examining a client's
legal affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others."

I.R.P.C., Preamble [2].

Elsewhere, "a lawyer should maintain communication with a client concerning the
representation. A lawyer should keep in confidence information relating to representation of a
client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or
other law." Id. at [4]. "A lawyer can be sure that preserving client confidences ordinarily serves
the public interest because people are more likely to seek legal advice, and thereby heed their
legal obligations, when they know their communications will be private." Id. at [8]. And finally,
"a lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation." I.R.P.C. Rule 1.4(b).9
Consequently, the SAPD objects to the disclosure of all privileged information to the
State regardless of its relevance to the conflict issue. And the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct recognize a client's authority to circumscribe or prevent the disclosure of privileged
particularly any impact that case and its outcome might have on current arguments in postpost
conviction litigation or on appeal, and whether a client's fundamental rights in determining the
strategy of his open case might affect any post-conviction claims or appeals. See lR.P.C. Rule
1.2 (to plead guilty or not guilty, to testify, and whether or not to waive a jury). To not do so
would be ineffective assistance of counsel, and at the very least in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
9 The comments add that "the client should have sufficient information to participate
intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which
they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so ... For example, when
there is time to explain a proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important
provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement." IRPC Rule 1.4, Commentary [5].
RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE SAPD
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information and communication, subject to the narrow exceptions noted above.

The

Commentary to I.R.P.C. Rule 1.6 provides as follows:
[2] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the
absence of the client's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information
relating to the representation. See Rule l.O(e) for the definition of informed·
consent. This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer
relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to
communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally
damaging subject matter ...
[3] The principle of client-lawyer confidentiality is given effect by related
bodies of law: the attorney-client privilege, the work produce doctrine and the
rule of confidentiality establishes in professional ethics. The attorney-client
privilege and work-product doctrine apply in judicial and other proceedings in
which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce
client-lawyer confidentiality applies in
evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer
situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through
compulsion of law. The confidentiality rule, for example, applies not only to
matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information
relating to the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose
such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional
Conduct or other law. See also Scope.
[4] Paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from revealing information relating to
the representation of a client. This prohibition also applies to disclosures by a
lawyer that do not in themselves reveal protected information but could
reasonably lead to the discovery of such information by a third person ...
[13] A lawyer may be ordered to reveal information relating to the
representation of a client by a court or by another tribunal or governmental entity
claiming authority pursuant to other law to compel the disclosure. Absent
informed consent of the client to do otherwise, the lawyer should assert on behalf
of the client all nonfrivolous claims that the order is not authorized by other law
or that the information sought is protected against disclosure by the attorney
attorneyclient privilege or other applicable law. In the event of an adverse ruling, the
lawyer must consult with the client about the possibility of appeal to the extent
required by Rule 1.4....
1.4....
[14] Paragraph (b) permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the purposes
specified. Where practicable, the lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to
take suitable action to obviate the need for disclosure. In any case, a disclosure
adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary to accomplish the purpose. If the disclosure will be made in
connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner
that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other person having a need
to know it and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be
RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE SAPD
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sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable.
Commentary [2],[3] [4],[13],[14].

I.R.P.C.

Rule 1.6,

In keeping with the mandates and spirit of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
undersigned counsel has chosen to submit all motions regarding any investigation into possible
conflict by way of ex parte filings.
III. CONCLUSION
Counsel for Mr. Hall respectfully requests that the Court take under consideration
independent counsel's current open investigation into the existence and implications of any
possible conflicts with prior attorneys at the SAPD, and deem the SAPD's efforts through
independent counsel adequate until further representations can be made to the Court ex parte.
Counsel for Mr. Hall recognize that this Court will always have the duty and power to order a
future hearing in order to fully satisfy the Court that Mr. Hall is afforded conflict-free counsel, or
that an informed waiver of such conflict could be obtained. The petitioner also requests that the
Court deny the State's request for disclosure of correspondence, notes, documents and
conversations between members of the SAPD staff and Mr. Hall as they are protected by the
attorney-client privilege.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 6th day of August, 2010.

~~
IAN H. THOMSON
Le d Counsel for Erick Virgil Hall

NICOLE OWENS
Co-counsel for Erick Virgil Hall
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 6th day of August, 2010 served a true and correct
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Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
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Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 4606
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ERICK VIRGIL HALI..,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV PC 2008 3085
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF STATE'S MOTION FOR
INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE
SAPD CONFLICT
(HALL II)

-------------)
----------------------------)

COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of
ofldaho, and submits this Memorandum in Support of the State's Motion for Inquiry
Ada, State ofIdaho,
into Possible State Appellate Public Defender (hereinafter "SAPD") Conflict.

I. LAW
"Where a constitutional right to counsel exists, our Sixth Amendment cases hold that
there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest." Wood v.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO
POSSIBLE SAPD CONFLICT (HALL), Page 1
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•
Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981). "Whenever a trial court knows or reasonably should know

that a particular conflict may exist, the trial court has a duty of inquiry." State v. Lopez, 139
Idaho 256 (Ct. App. 2003) (internal quotations omitted), citing State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53
(2003). "In order to ensure that a defendant receives conflict-free counsel, a trial court has an
affirmative duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever it knows or reasonably should know
that a particular conflict may exist." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703 (2009), rehearing
denied (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "A trial court's failure to conduct an

inquiry, under certain circumstances, will serve as a basis for reversing a defendant's
conviction." ld.
"In order to satisfy the inquiry requirement, a trial court's examination of the potential
conflict must be thorough and searching and should be conducted on the record." ld. at 704.
"The court must make the kind of inquiry that might ease the defendant's dissatisfaction, distrust,
or concern. However, in determining whether a conflict exists, trial courts are entitled to rely on
representations made by counsel. A court may inquire into the facts, but is under no original or
continuing obligation to do so." ld. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
"Once a court conducts an inquiry, it must determine whether a conflict actually exists. If
the court concludes defense counsel does have a conflict, it must obtain a knowing and voluntary
waiver from the defendant or give the defendant an opportunity to acquire new counsel. If, on
the other hand, the court concludes that a conflict of interest does not exist, the representations
may continue without a waiver." ld. (internal citations omitted).

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO
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II.

DISCUSSION

1. Conflict of Interest

Based upon the case law, this Court should engage in a two-step process to handle this
potential conflict issue. First, this Court should conduct an inquiry on the record. It should be
noted that in Severson, the trial court conducted a hearing on the record and gave both sides the
opportunity to address the potential conflict.

Id. at 705.

Second, this Court will need to

determine if a conflict actually exists and if a conflict does exist, then the Petitioner should be
given the opportunity to either knowingly and voluntarily waive the conflict or acquire new
counsel.
This Court itself is required to make inquiry into the conflict. Accordingly, this Court
cannot rely upon Mr. Benjamin's independent review. This Court must conduct its own inquiry
on the record.
2. Attorney-Client Privilege

The second issue that runs parallel to the conflict of interest inquiry is the extent to which
the State is entitled to obtain and explore communications and/or work product that are the result
of communications the SAPD had with trial counsel about Hall II matters.

Those

communications may well be the subject of ineffective assistance of counsel claims the SAPD
now alleges in this post-conviction proceeding.
In the Petitioner's Response to the State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD
Conflict, the Petitioner requests that appellate counsel not be required to divulge confidential
communications.

The communications the State should be entitled to explore are those

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO
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•
communications the SAPD had with trial counsel regarding Hall II matters - not communications
related to Hall I matters.!
At the outset, it is worth noting that the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct outline
circumstances in which a "lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary."

I.R.P.C. 1.6(b).

Two of those

circumstances may apply in this case. The first applicable exception is as follows: "to establish
a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to
establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in
which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the

lawyer's representation of a client." Id at 1.6(b)(5).

This section makes clear that disclosure

may be necessary to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of a client. This proceeding is a proceeding in which the Petitioner is claiming
that his trial counsel were ineffective during the course of their representation of him. Similarly,
I.R.E. provides that there is no attorney-client privilege under the I.R.E. 502 "as to a
communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the lawyer's client or by
the client to the client's lawyer." I.R.E. 502(d)(3). The second potentially applicable section is
as follows: "to comply with other law or a court order." I.R.P.C. 1.6(b)(6). This section may
apply were the court to conclude disclosure is necessary in order to make inquiry into whether a
conflict exists.

1 The State presumes that the SAPD would not have communicated with the Petitioner about Hall II matters outside
trial counsel's presence.
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Furthermore, this Court granted the Respondent's Motion for Waiver of Attorney-Client
Privilege with respect to any and all communications and work product between the Petitioner
and trial counsel who represented him during the prosecution of Hall II.
To the extent that the SAPD communicated with trial counsel during preparations and/or
trial in this case, the State is entitled to obtain that information in order to respond to the
Petitioner's post-conviction allegations.

The Petitioner's Response in many ways begs the

question. If the SAPD had communications with trial counsel that trial counsel then used to
inform their decision-making in this case, the State is entitled to inquire of trial counsel about the
nature of those communications and whether those communications informed any of their
decisions. For example, if the SAPD communicated with trial counsel about a particular issue
and that issue is now the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the State is entitled
to explore those communications so the State may respond to the post-conviction allegation. The
Petitioner cannot use the privilege as a sword and a shield. He cannot make allegations that his
trial counsel were ineffective and at the same time claim that communications current counsel
(SAPD) had with trial counsel during their representation cannot be used to respond to those
allegations.
The State is cognizant of the complexity of this issue because of the overlapping
representation of the SAPD who represented the Petitioner on Hall I post-conviction proceedings
during the time trial counsel represented the Petitioner in Hall II trial proceedings. However, the
State should not be hamstrung from obtaining information that is critical for responding to postconviction claims. At a minimum, the State should be entitled to consult with trial counsel about

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO
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these SAPD communications so that the State may appropriately respond to post-conviction

claims.
Finally, if there is a question about whether the State is entitled to obtain certain

information because of that information is privileged, this Court could make inquiry into those
specific areas on the record outside the State's presence to ensure that the State is not obtaining

information that is cloaked in the privilege.

III. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing reasons, the State requests that this Court conduct its own

inquiry into whether a conflict of interest exists.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1:{"T>day
/:{7>day of August, 2010.

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor

~;1(~
J
. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

--------------~)
----------------------------~)

CASE NO. CVPC08-03085
REPLY TO MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION
FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE
SAPD CONFLICT (HALL II)
(CAPITAL CASE)

Counsel for Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through the State Appellate
Public Defender's (SAPD) Office, submits the following reply to the State's Memorandum in

Support of State's Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD Conflict [hereinafter Memorandum].
In so doing, Counsel for Mr. Hall desires to respond to the States Memorandum and address the
nature of the Court's inquiry into any potential conflict, along with the importance of the
attorney-client privilege and confidentiality, and to suggest to the Court three distinct paths of
possible inquiry.
I.

Conflicts of Interest

Counsel for Mr. Hall agrees in principle with the Court's standard of inquiry as outlined
by the Court on August 6, 2010. The State, in its Memorandum, relies principally on State v.
REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION
FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE SAPD CONFLICT
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'

Severson, 147 Idaho 694 (2009), in arguing that the Court is under "an affirmative duty to

inquire into the potential conflict." However, the standard set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court
in Severson was developed specifically "because Severson objected to the conflict of interest at
trial." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 704 (2009). It is clear in reading Severson that the
Supreme Court was particularly concerned about those cases where an objection by the
defendant had been raised at the time of trial, necessitating an inquiry by the Court to' determine

the nature of the conflict and whether a waiver could be obtained. I Counsel for Mr. Hall has
already acknowledged the Court's "affirmative duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever
it knows or 'reasonably should know that a particular conflict may exist.' State v. Lovelace, 140
Idaho 53, 60 (2003)."

Severson, 147 Idaho at 703 (2009) (italics added).

However, it is

important to remember that in Severson, the defendant had raised an objection to the relationship
his court-appointed attorney had with another attorney representing the mother of the decedent,
Id. at 701. In the other case the Supreme Court cites, State v. Lovelace, the State had raised the

objection as to a conflict because the defense attorney was running for the position of County

The Supreme Court's particular concern is evidenced by its rather lengthy discussion as to the
ramifications of a defendant making an objection to a possible conflict of interest with his own
appointed counsel. In Severson, the defendant had filed a pro se motion to reinstate former
counsel because the defendant "argued that the appointment of Mr. Frachiseur violated his right
to be represented by conflict-free counsel." 147 Idaho 694, 701 (2009). The entire discussion
about the standard of review, and the implications of a defendant making an objection at the time
of trial, can be found at II (A)(2) in the opinion. Id. at 702 through 704. There the Court
discusses at length the effect of whether a defendant makes an objection at the time of trial.
"[O]nce a defendant raises a timely objection to a conflict, the trial court is constitutionally
obligated to determine whether an actual conflict of interest exists. A court's failure to make a
proper inquiry after a defendant's timely objection will result in the automatic reversal of the
defendant's conviction. Because the trial court's duty to inquire after a defendant makes a timely
objection is a separate and distinct obligation, a defendant in such circumstances need not show
that an actual conflict adversely affected the lawyer's performance." Id. at 703 (internal citations
omitted). Also see FN8 and FN9. !d. at 704.
REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION
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Prosecuting Attorney at the time of his original appointment. 2 Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 59
(2003).
In the instant case, Mr. Hall has never raised an objection or concern with the Court.
Instead, the SAPD filed a notice informing the Court of its own concern and of a desire to allow
Mr. Hall to consult with independent counsel regarding the issue. The SAPD believed that
consultation with an independent conflict attorney would provide Mr. Hall with the opportunity
to take any appropriate action they deemed necessary, including a motion for change of counsel,
without interference from the SAPD. Although it is well recognized that the ultimate assurance
of conflict-free counsel and the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment falls upon the Court, Counsel
for Mr. Hall believe that the necessity for a thorough inquiry is triggered by an objection by the
defendant, or specific information already known to either the Court or the District Attorney
giving rise to a potential conflict. A general concern, as expressed in the State's original Motion

for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD Conflict, does not establish sufficient grounds for a fishing
expedition into counsels' communications with Mr. Hall. See State's Motion for Inquiry Into
Possible SAPD Conflict (Hall II), p. 1, ~2. The very purpose of the SAPD selecting independent
counsel to advise Mr. Hall was with the intent of allowing Mr. Hall to determine whether he
wanted to bring a potential conflict to the Court's attention without interference from the SAPD.
An expression of that desire can only be made by Mr. Hall under the advice ofMr. Benjamin. 3

2

It should also be noted that in Lovelace, although the prosecution originally moved to have

counsel disqualified on the basis of his current campaign, Lovelace subsequently consented and
waived any potential conflict of interest. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 58 (2003). Lovelace later filed
a motion to proceed pro se and asked that his appointed counsel be dismissed "due to a possible
future conflict of interest." Id. at 59.
3 See discussion in the following paragraph. It is clear that part of the reason the Courts have
been concerned in providing a thorough and searching review of the conflict, which will
withstand appellate review, is that the defendant must be provided with the type of inquiry which
REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION
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As the State indicates in its own Memorandum, the Idaho Supreme Court has determined
that:
[i]n order to satisfy the inquiry requirement, a trial court's examination of the
potential conflict must be thorough and searching and should be conducted on the
record. The court 'must make the kind of inquiry that might ease the defendant's
dissatisfaction, distrust, or concern.' However, in determining whether a conflict
exists, trial courts are entitled to rely on representations made by counsel. A
court may inquire further into the facts, but 'is under no original or continuing
obligation to do so.' Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 704 (2009) (internal citations
omitted, italics added).
Counsel is aware that neither the Court nor the State should necessarily be satisfied with
representations made by the SAPD as to the nature of any potential conflict since the SAPD first
raised the issue; however, counsel also believes that representations made by Mr. Benjamin, as
independent conflict counsel, should not suffer the same skepticism and would certainly allow
the Court to rely on his representations. The State's assertion in its Memorandum that "this
Court cannot rely upon Mr. Benjamin's independent review" stands in stark contrast to the Idaho
Supreme Court's decision in Severson. See Memorandum, p. 3, ~2.
II. Attorney-Client Privilege
Counsel for Mr. Hall has already addressed at length the absolute importance of the
attorney-client privilege in its Response to State's Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD

Conflict (Hall II). See Part II. However, counsel for Mr. Hall asserts that the State has not
demonstrated any legitimate interest or authority in participating in any subsequent hearing
regarding the existence of a conflict where confidential communications may be revealed. The
State is entitled to all correspondence and documents in possession of the SAPD from
Ms. Krystal and Mr. Chastain. The State has already been offered all of those documents. It is

will "ease the defendant's dissatisfaction, distrust, or concern."
concern." Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d
1314, 1320 (8 th Cir. 1991), adopted by Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 704 (2009) (emphasis added).
REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION
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not disputed that many of those materials necessarily waive any attorney-client privilege that
Mr. Hall would have had with trial counsel. If given the opportunity to depose Ms. Krystal and
Mr. Chastain, the State will also have an opportunity to conduct the same.
Where privileged or confidential communications between the SAPD and Mr. Hall are
called into question, the inquiry as to an existence of a conflict is for the Court to decide. As
previously cited, the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct (IRPC),
(lRPC), Rule 1.6 indicates that counsel
should take all steps to limit the distribution of any confidential communications:
[13] A lawyer may be ordered to reveal information relating to the
representation of a client by a court or by another tribunal or governmental entity
claiming authority pursuant to other law to compel to the disclosure. Absent
informed consent of the client to do otherwise, the lawyer should assert on
behalf of the client all nonfrivolous claims that the order is not authorized by
other law or that the information sought is protected against disclosure by
the attorney-client privilege or other applicable law. In the event of an adverse
ruling, the lawyer must consult with the client about the possibility of appeal to
the extent required by Rule 1.4. Unless review is sought, however, paragraph
(b)(6) permits the lawyer to comply with the court's order.
[14] Paragraph (b) permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the purposes
specified. Where practicable, the lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to
take suitable action to obviate the need for disclosure. In any case, a disclosure
adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary to accomplish the purpose. If the disclosure will be made
in connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a
manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons
having a need to know it and appropriate protective orders or other
arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable.
Commentary to IRPC, Rule 1.6 (emphasis added). Consequently, counsel for Mr. Hall objects to
the release of any privileged or protected information to the State.
Such request for privileged communications would not be unlike the State seeking to
depose opposing counsel. This issue was most directly addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court in
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50 (2004), and State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998). In those cases,

the Supreme Court developed a three-prong test to determine the appropriateness of deposition
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of opposing counsel. First, it must be shown that there is no means to obtain the information
other than deposing opposing counsel; second, the information sought must be relevant and not
privileged; and third, the information must be crucial to the preparation of the case-or in this
case in the State's preparation to defend Mr. Hall's post-conviction claims. See Dunlap v. State,
141 Idaho 50, 65 (2004); State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 107-08 (1998). The State cannot meet
any of the three required showings in this case. In addition, counsel for Mr. Hall reserves the
right to request that any documents or communications eventually disclosed to the Court be
under a protective order pursuant to LR.C.P. 26(c).
III. Three Suggested Paths of Inquiry
Counsel for Mr. Hall asks that the Court inquire of Mr. Benjamin at the Hearing
scheduled for Thursday, August 26, 2010, as to Mr. Hall's desire to file a motion for inquiry into
a potential conflict. If it is Mr. Hall's desire to proceed, then the SAPD would have no reason to
object to a "thorough and searching" inquiry by the Court. In the event that the Court determines
that further inquiry is warranted, Mr. Hall respectfully suggests three distinct alternatives. First,
counsel for Mr. Hall would request that if the Court chooses to conduct such an inquiry, that it
rely on the representations provided by Mr. Benjamin. Second, the Court has already made some
indication that additional counsel may be required to advise Mr. Hall. In that event, the SAPD
would respectfully request that the Court recognize that the SAPD has taken the appropriate
actions in contracting with Mr. Benjamin, and has satisfied its obligation to Mr. Hall in providing
independent counsel to advise him as to his options. Any additional counsel appointed by the
Court, would be at the expense of Ada County, and should be considered as court-appointed
counsel to Mr. Hall, with a limited scope of representation. Third, if the Court determines that
representations by counsel would not be sufficient to satisfy the Court's obligation, then counsel
REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION
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for Mr. Hall advises the Court that Mr. Hall would reserve the right to file a motion for
disqualification of His Honor for the very limited purpose of that inquiry.
A. The Court May Rely on the Representations of Mr. Benjamin as Conflict Counsel

Once the SAPD identified involvement between its own post-conviction attorneys and
trial counsel on Hall II (Hanlon), the SAPD decided out of an abundance of caution to contract
with independent counsel for the purpose of determining if a conflict exists. Because the SAPD
recognized that any evaluation of the nature and quality of the conflict made by its own attorneys
would be compromised, the SAPD contracted with Conflict Counsel to evaluate the
communications and independently advise Mr. Hall of the potential conflict and any rights he
might have as a result. Mr. Benjamin was contracted by the SAPD as "counsel to Mr. Hall" and
not as counsel to advise the SAPD. The SAPD has given Mr. Benjamin full access to attorney
and client files regarding Mr. Hall's cases, and all communications with Hall II trial counsel.
Any subsequent communications between the SAPD and Mr. Benjamin have been solely limited
to providing him information regarding the scope of his inquiry and the reason for the inquiry.
The process used by the SAPD in selecting Mr. Dennis Benjamin as conflict counsel was
the exact same process used by the SAPD in selecting conflict counsel for appellate cases
originally assigned to the SAPD for direct appeal or post-conviction representation where a
conflict is identified.

The Legislature has provided that the SAPD select and compensate

conflict counsel in such cases. Idaho Code § 19-871 provides as follows:
Should the state appellate public defender be unable to carry out the duties
required in this act because of a conflict of interest or any other reason, the state
appellate public defender shall arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to be
compensated out of the budget of the state appellate public defender.

REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION
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Here, the SAPD identified a situation in which it believed it was unable to adequately advise
Mr. Hall.

Consequently, the SAPD arranged for counsel and has assumed the financial

responsibility for such an assignment.
The selection of such conflict counsel is not unlike the procedure used at the trial level by
the Ada County Public Defenders Office. In fact, Hall II was just such a case at trial. Originally,
Mr. Hall was assigned attorneys from the Ada County Public Defenders Office for both the
Henneman and Hanlon murders. Once Mr. Hall was convicted and sentenced for the murder of
Ms. Henneman, concerns were raised about the ability of the Ada County Public Defenders to
continue to represent Mr. Hall once a post-conviction petition was filed alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel against the Ada County Public Defenders Office and Mr. Hall waived his
attorney-client privilege with those attorneys. Consequently, Mr. Chastain and Ms. Krystal were
appointed to act as conflict trial counsel for Mr. Hall on the instant case. The Court did not
participate in the selection of trial counsel and instead allowed Mr. Trimming and the Ada
County Public Defenders to fulfill that function, as is common practice in such cases where the
Public Defender will be responsible for payment.
To question the independence of the conflict counsel appointed by the SAPD, would
necessarily call into question the independence of all conflict counsel used by the SAPD in any
case where the SAPD determines that a conflict exists. In fact, in those cases where conflict
counsel is normally appointed the SAPD has already determined the presence of an actual
conflict which disqualifies the SAPD from providing adequate representation to a defendant. In
the instant case, the SAPD has contracted with conflict counsel solely to determine whether or
not a conflict actually does exist and to advise the defendant of his rights if an actual conflict

does exist.

To call into question the independence of conflict counsel and his ability to

REPL Y TO MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION
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detennine and advise as to the nature of a conflict, would necessarily call into question the
independence of conflict counsel where an actual conflict has already been identified.
B. The Court May Appoint Independent Counsel to Conduct a Review and Advise Mr. Hall at
the Court's Expense

If the Court, for any reason, were not satisfied by the representations and investigation
undertaken by Mr. Benjamin, the Court certainly has the discretion to appoint independent
counsel, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence (hereinafter IRE) 706, which pennits the court to
appoint experts. However, in criminal cases and certain types of civil cases, the cost of the
expert is "payable from funds which may be provided by law in criminal cases and civil actions .
..
.."" IRE 706(b). As this is a post conviction case, and Mr. Hall is indigent, the cost of this expert
would be borne by the county as outlined in I.C. §§19-4904.
19-4904.
When indigent petitioners file post conviction petitions, I.C. §§ 19-4904 and 19-860
require the county to bear the cost of expenses in that post conviction case. While the SAPD
recognizes that pursuant to I.C. §§19-87l(d),
19-871(d), the SAPD has statutory responsibility to represent
capital client in post conviction, and concomitantly to pay for the costs incurred as part of that
representation, the SAPD believes that they have satisfied that statutory burden by contracting
with Mr. Benjamin. The cost of yet another independent counsel's services would not be a cost
incurred by the SAPD, but would instead be a cost incurred by the district court requiring those
services. When the SAPD incurs a cost, it does so pursuant to contractual agreement between
the SAPD and the expert or conflict counsel.
If the Court were to appoint separate counsel to review the record and to provide advice
to Mr. Hall, in addition to that already provided by Mr. Benjamin, such services would amount to
expert opinion regarding the nature and extent of the conflict, and the various options available
to Mr. Hall. The relevant statute can be found in I.C. §19-860(b):
§ 19-860(b):
REPL
Y TO MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION
REPLY
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If a court before whom a person appears upon a formal charge assigns an attorney
other than a public defender to represent a needy person, the appropriate district
court, upon application, shall prescribe a reasonable rate of compensation for his
services and shall determine the direct expenses necessary to representation for
which for which he should be reimbursed. The county shall pay the attorney the
amounts so prescribed. The attorney shall be compensated for his services with
regard to the complexity of the issues, the time involved, and other relevant
considerations.

In appointing such an attorney, the Court would be selecting an attorney other than the public
defender and in defining the scope of representation would "determine the direct expenses

19-860(b) Ada County would then be
necessary to representation." Thus, pursuant to I.e.
I.e. §
§19-860(b)
responsible for the remuneration of such legal services. That representation would have to be
sufficiently limited to the scope of an investigation into any potential conflict, and advising Mr.
Hall, as his court-appointed attorney, as to what the ramifications may be and in making a
decision whether such a conflict should be waived.
I.C. §19-871, no determination has yet been made that the
Additionally, pursuant to I.e.

SAPO is unable to carry out the duties required in the Act; indeed, the SAPO remains counsel of
record for Mr. Hall on both his post conviction case and the appeal from the judgment of
conviction and Notice of Imposition of Death. Therefore, until an actual conflict is identified

and a waiver of that conflict is not obtained, the SAPO is able, and willing to execute its
statutory and constitutional obligations to Mr. Hall.
C. A Judicial Inquiry Before a Different Judge Where Potential Bias or Prejudice Would be
Removed

If the Court determines that a full judicial inquiry or in camera review of specific facts
and communications were necessary, Counsel for Mr. Hall would file a motion for

REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION
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disqualification for cause for the limited purpose of that review or hearing. 4 The necessity for
such a disqualification would not be based on an argument that this Court is biased or prejudiced
for or against Mr. Hall, under I.C.R. 25(b)(4), but in order to avoid future disqualification under
the same section at subsequent proceedings were the Court to review documents that would
contain privileged communications between Mr. Hall and counseLs The Court should ask that
the case be reassigned to another judge for the purpose of determining the presence of a conflict
and in obtaining an adequate waiver from Mr. Hall if necessary.6 Such a cautious approach
would allow the Court to avoid the unpleasant prospect of being privy to otherwise confidential
and protected communications that could inevitably effect future rulings or sentencings by the
Court.
IV. Conclusion
Counsel for Mr. Hall respectfully requests the Court to take under thoughtful
consideration Mr. Benjamin's assessment and evaluation of the existence of any potential
conflict of interest.

The Court may rely on those representations, particularly where the

4 Although the Supreme Court has recently suspended Idaho Criminal Rule 25(a)4, the rest of the
rule, including I.C.R. 25(b)(4),(c) and (e), remains in effect. See In re: Suspension of Idaho
(fCR.) 25 (a), Order Suspending Rule, issued July 23, 2010, by the Idaho
Criminal Rule (feR.)
Supreme Court.
S The need for frankness cannot be overemphasized in conducting a thorough and adequate
investigation into the existence of any conflict. However, the United States Supreme Court has
cautioned that care should be taken to curb "a court's power to compel an attorney to disclose
confidential communications that he concludes would be damaging to his client ... Such
compelled disclosure creates significant risks of unfair prejudice, especially when the disclosure
.... " Holloway v,
is to a judge who may be called upon later to impose sentences ...."
v. Arkansas, 435
U.S. 475, 487 (1978).
6 The process would not be unlike that used occasionally by the courts in asking a "money
judge" to make certain limited rulings. For instance, in Dale Shackelford's capital case in Latah
County, the district court judge presiding over Mr. Shackelford's jury trial and sentencing
appointed a money judge to handle requests for expert assistance and make other funding
decisions. (State of Idaho v. Dale Shackelford, Case No. CR-00-00260, Order appointing
"money judge.")
REPL
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defendant has raised no objection. In the event that the Court requires further inquiry, Counsel
asks that such an inquiry be assigned to a separate judge for review, and that the State be barred
from those proceedings, where they have established no interest in the nature of those
communications which are clearly protected under attorney-client privilege and confidentiality.
RESPECTFULLY
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED, this 20 th day of August, 2010.

{L~~
IAN H. HOMSON
Lea Counsel for Erick Virgil Hall

NICOLE OWENS
Co-counsel for Erick Virgil Hall
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20 th day of August, 2010 served a true and correct
copy of the attached REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION
FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE SAPD CONFLICT by the method indicated below:
ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI - J BLOCK
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

U.S. Mail
~ Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

JAN BEN1\TETTS
BENl\TETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery
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Session: Neville082610
Session Date: 2010/08/26
Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Reporter: Wolf, Sue

Division: DC
Session Time: 10:25

Courtroom: CR501

Clerk(s):
Ellis, Janet
State Attorneys:
Public Defender(s)
Prob.
Probe Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s)

Case ID: 0004
Case Number: CVPC08-03085
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL
Plaintiff Attorney:
Defendant: ST OF IDAHO
Co-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
State Attorney: Bourne, Roger
Public Defender:

2010/08/26
15:07:11 - Operator
Recording:
15:07:11 - New case
, ST'OF IDAHO
15:07:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Time set for further hearing.
15:11:32 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Argues there i
Ms. Bennetts argued inquiry should be taken.
s basis for Court
15:13:17 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
to make inquiry
15:13:24 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
Mr. Thomson responded.
Mr. Benjamin here and the Court can
inquire of Mr.
Attor~ey: THOMSON,
15:19:27 - Pers. Attor~ey:
IAN
Benjamin
15:19:36 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court's limited question is if any objection to the Cou
rt making inquiry
15:20:17 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
Mr. Thomson responded.
15:22:09 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court responded.
15:22:27 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
No objection
Not enough specificity in the State's motion.
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to the Court
15:23:03 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
inquiring, willing to concede the Court has to be satisfied.
Would request
15:24:·10
15:24:-10 '- Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
the Court inquire of Mr. Benjamin who has reviewed the file
and spoke with
15:24:27 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
defendant to inquire if he has an objection, and if not, the
n would object to
15:24:52 ~ Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
further inquiry
15:24:57- State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Ms. Bennetts responded.
15:26:18 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
The Court has to be satisfied and don't believe the Court ca
n rely on a
15:26:34 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
statement or conclusion.
Inquiry would need to be on the re
cord
15:27:19 ~ Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
Mr. Thomson responded re: the Court may rely on statements 0
f counsel
15:27:49 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Ms. Bennetts notes defendant waived his right to be here tod
aye

.

15:28:39 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court has a duty to inquire.
The Court has carefully co
nsidered argument
15:29:42 '- Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
of counsel on both sides.
15:30:14 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court will grant State's motion for inquiry of possible
conflict of SAPO.
15:30:30- Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court needs to decided proper scope.
15:34:3~
THOMSON, IAN
15:34:3~ .~ Pers. Attorney:
Mr. Thomson responded without a waivor or an order, not allo
wed to disclose
15: 36: 01 '. ~ Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
anything further re: nature of conflict.
15:36:15 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court stated dd not understand case was conflicted out t
o Mr.(Benjamin
15:36:35'- Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
Limited purpose of advising Mr. Hall on what action he shoul
d take.
15:37:47 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court inquired of State's view of inquiring of Mr. Benja
min
15:38:00 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Ms. Bennetts sees conflicting a case to new counsel, may nee
d further
15:39:17 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
information
15:39:30 ~ Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
Mr. Thomson responded
15:40:06 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
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th~s fu
Ms. Bennetts requested brief moment to think through th~s
rther
15:40:29 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court unclear whether Mr. Benjamin would be taking witne
ss stand.
15:41:15 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
Mr. Thomson stated did not want to leave impression that Mr.
Benjamin would
15:41:38 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
be taking over case.
He would only be making representation
s to the Court
15:41:56 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
not as a witness.
15:42:09 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court will take 10 minutes recess
15:42:29 - Operator
Stop recording:
15:58:23 - Operator
Recording:
15:58:23 - Record
, ST OF IOAHO
15:58:35 - Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY
responds on behalf of SAPO, Mr. Benjamin is there on behalf
of the conflict
15:59:48 ~ Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY
issue~
issue~
SAPO is counsel of record unless a conflict is found

16:00:13 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Ms. Bennetts states appreciates explanation.
Would be appro
p. to talk to Mr.
16:00:41 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Benjamin and inquire what he was tasked to do.
Court has to
inquire and make
16:00:55 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
a record.
Until we hear further of Mr. Benjamin, i t is hard
to see if this
16:01:27 ~ State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
needs to go further
16:01:46 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court if Mr. Benjamin bound by atty/client privilege, no
t sure how
16:03:05 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
helpful this would be.
Court only aware that trial counsel
had cOntact with
16:03:36 ,- Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
16:03:36·SAPO, not sure of anything further beyond that and whether t
here really is a
16:03:56 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
conflict, need to know the basis.
16:06:03 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court would like the SAPO to supplement the notice and file
by Monday an
16:06:27 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
amended notice that gives the Court something specific that
gives-the
gives "the basis
16:06:42 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
for a conflict.
16:08:07 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
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Court will set over to September 1, 2010 @ 2:00 for further
inquiry.
16:12:04 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court will wait to hear from Mr. Benjamin until after th
e Amended Notice
16:12:28 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
filed.
16:13:04 - State Attorney: Bourne, Roger
Mr. Bourne stated at some point the Court i~ going to need t
o know where
16:13:36 - State Attorney: Bourne, Roger
advice was given.
If the SAPO claiming they gave advice and
trial counsel
16:14:29 - State Attorney: Bourne, Roger
followed that advice and now claim ineffective assistance of
counsel for
16:14:43 - State Attorney: Bourne, Roger
following that advice.
16:15:11 - Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY
Ms. Huskey responded re: not placing add'l information that
could place Court
16:15:57 ~ Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY
in awkward position, that is why Mr. Benjamin was called in
to keep Court
16:16:21 .~ Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY
neutral and isolated and protected for level of appellate re
view
view... Feel
16:16:42- Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY
cannot provide the add'l information Court is inquirng, woul
d have to inquire
16:17:01- Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY
of Mr. Benjamin.
Request that at this point to be able to d
efer to Mr.
16:17:49 - Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY
Benjamin on this issue.
16:18:16 '- Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court's understanding that Judge Copsey concluded there was
a conflict based
16:18:33 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
on the filings made.
The Court is not at that point, so una
ble to make a
16:18:49 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
finding.
16:20:32 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court responded
16:22:00 - Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY
In order for the Court to determine if there is a conflict,
believe this has
16:22:22 - Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY
to come from Mr. Benjamin
16:22:30 ;- State Attorney: Bourne, Roger
The state views that differently
16:22:41 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The SAPO stated this notice filed in June and there must hav
e been something
16:23:02 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
there to file that notice that cause the SAPO to hire Mr. Be
njamih to look at
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16:23:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
the possible conflict.
The SAPO still should have a basis f
or filing that
16:23:39 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
notice.
16:25:08 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
Mr. Thomson responded
16:25:17 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court willing to hear from Mr. Benjamin but would like a
basis for what
16:26:22 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
triggered the notice of conflict
16:26:36 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
Mr. Thomson responded.
Believe the Court is turning to the
wrong attorney
16:28:01 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court stated would be more pursuaive if SAPO was out of
case and Mr.
16:28:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Benjamin was making that argument
16:28:57 -~ Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
Don't 'believe case needs to conflicted out unless there is
a conflict, and
16:29:15 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
we don't know that yet.
16:29:49 ~ Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY
Ms. Huskey responded
16:30:50- Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court would at least like some bench marks on what it is tha
t caused the
16:31:15 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
notice of possible conflict.
16:32:50- Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY
inquired if Mr. Benjamin would be allowed to file an objecti
fo~ disclosing
on fo~
16:33:1~ 16:33:1~
Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY
that
16:33:22
Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court'did not want to go that route
16:33:52 ~ Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY
Inquired if Court could inquire of Mr. Benjamin if he would
object to SAPO
16:34:13 L Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY
filing an Amended Notice
16:34:24 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court wo
The Court belives there is a basis or not a basis.
uld like to know
16:35:13 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
what the concern is.
Court does not mind having something f
iled by Mr.
16:36:11- Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Benjamin as well.
16:37:07 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
Mr. Thomson stated there was no preliminary concern by SAPO
to believe there
16: 37 : 26,- Pers . Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
is a conflict, was merely on abundance of caution with thing
s that happened

001334

SeS.l;lio,J1:
61 0
Ses~iop: Neville082
Neville082610

.,

Page 6

'

16:37:43 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
in the Abdullah case.
16:38:13 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court will see the parties next wednesday at 2:00 p.m.
16:38:32 - Operator
Stop recording:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,

)
)

Petitioner,
v.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CVPC08-03085
AMENDED NOTICE OF
POSSIBLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST

(CAPITAL CASE)

Undersigned counsel for the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, at this Court's request, hereby
provides notice of previous contact between post-conviction counsel from the State Appellate
Public Defender's Office (SAPD) and Mr. Hall's trial counsel.
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Hall was found guilty in connection with the rape, kidnapping and killing of Lynn
Henneman in October of 2004 in Ada County Case Number CR-FE 2003-0000518. As a result

of his conviction of first degree murder, Mr. Hall received a sentence of death. Thereafter, the
SAPD was appointed to represent Mr. Hall, and that case has since been designated "Hall I."
Mark Ackley and Paula Swensen were the attorneys at the SAPD assigned to represent Mr. Hall

in Hall I. While the SAPD was representing Erick Hall in Hall I, the above-captioned case
against Mr. Hall involving the death of Cheryl Hanlon was proceeding in the district court where
AMENDED NOTICE OF POSSIBLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST
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Mr. Hall was represented by Deb Kristal and Rob Chastain. That case involving the death of
Cheryl Hanlon has since been designated "Hall II."
During their representation of Erick Hall in Hall I, Mr. Ackley and Ms. Swensen retained
experts and filed original and amended petitions on his behalf with this Court. During the course
of Hall I's post-conviction case proceeding, the case against Mr. Hall in Hall II was also moving
forward at the trial level, where Mr. Hall was represented by Deb Kristal and Rob Chastain.
Due to the overlap between some of the experts and testing in Hall I and Hall II, this
Court encouraged the SAPD to cooperate with Mr. Hall's trial counsel in Hall II by sharing
testing results and expert reports, in an effort to preclude duplication of efforts and unnecessary
expenditure of scarce resources. The SAPD did cooperate with trial counsel in Hall II by sharing
Hall!.
testing and expert information obtained in Hall
I.
In light of lengthy delays caused by conflict concerns in an unrelated case, and out of a
desire to avoid any similar delays in the post-conviction litigation of Mr. Hall, counsel from the
oflnterest with the Court on June 29, 2010,
SAPD filed an Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict ofInterest
informing the Court of contacts between Mr. Ackley and Ms. Swensen and Mr. Hall's trial
counsel. On August 3, 2010, the State filed a related Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD
Conflict. On August 6, 2010, this Court heard from both sides regarding the Ex Parte Notice and
the State's Motion for Inquiry, and ordered the following: (1) that the State be provided with a
copy of the Ex Parte Notice filed by the SAPD on June 29, 2010; (2) that both the State and
counsel for the Petitioner file memoranda in support of their respective positions; and (3) that all
parties return for further hearings on August 26, 2010. The Court was informed that the SAPD
had contracted with Dennis Benjamin to handle that matter, and that he would be advising
Mr. Hall.

AMENDED NOTICE OF POSSIBLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST
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At that hearing, undersigned counsel opposed the State's Motion for Inquiry and stated
that Mr. Benjamin was present in order to address the Court as to the status of his investigation
and representation of Mr. Hall for the limited purpose of determining whether a further inquiry
was necessary.

This Court subsequently asked that the SAPD file an Amended Notice of

Possible Conflict, stating the type and extent of contact that gave rise to the original Notice of
Possible Conflict of June 29.
During the period between the appointment of Ms. Kristal and Mr. Chastain and the
postsentencing of Mr. Hall in Hall II, there were numerous contacts between trial counsel and post
conviction counsel. Over the course of several months those contacts included the following:
emailsbackandforth,primarilybetweenMr. Ackley and Ms. Kristal; phone calls between
Mr. Ackley and Ms. Kristal or Mr. Chastain; meetings on at least two occasions where all
attorneys were present; in addition to contacts with staff at the SAPD in order to facilitate or
arrange the exchange of information regarding testing and experts. Given the SAPD's recent
vigilance and sensitivity to conflict concerns, the Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict was filed
due to the extent of the communications between counsel.
Since Ms. Kristal and Mr. Chastain were involved in all communications with the SAPD
regarding Hall II, and Mr. Hall has waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to his trial
counsel, the content and nature of those communications have already been made available to the
State by providing complete access to trial counsels' files. In addition, if the State desires to
inquire further, Ms. Kristal and Mr. Chastain would be free to discuss those matters in person.
Because Mr. Hall has not waived any privilege or confidentiality with the SAPD, any further
disclosure as to the specific content of those communications should be directed at
Mr. Benjamin.
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DATED this 30th day of August, 2010.

IAN H. THOMSON
Lead counsel for Erick Virgil Hall
"

NICOLE OWENS
Co-counsel for Erick Virgil Hall
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30th day of August, 2010 served a true and correct
copy of the attached AMENDED NOTICE OF POSSIBLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST by the
method indicated below:

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI - J BLOCK
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

U.S. Mail
~ Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

- - Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery

AMENDED NOTICE OF POSSIBLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST
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...
Dennis Benj amin
ISBA# 4199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000
(208) 345-8274 (f)

:~ ____F"""tj;j~!?1'
AUG

~

0 ?em

CII,};-'!
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Cll,};-'!
By E. HOLMES
U:?U-:-V
u:?t;-:'Y

Attorneys for Petitioner as to the Conflict ofInterest Issue Only
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF ADA
)

)
)
)
)

ERICK HALL,
Petitioner,
vs.

NO. CV PC 2008-03085
LIMITED NOTICE OF
APPEARANCE

)
)
)
)
)

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

--------------)
-----------------------------)
Dennis Benjamin of the firm Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP enters a limited
appearance as attorney for petitioner as to the conflict of interest issue on ly.
'\jl--.

DATED
DA TED this~ day of August, 2010.

DeJAV\'3~
,~
Dennis Benjamin
\

1·

LIMITED NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

ORIGI~JAL
ORIGI~JAL
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.-. .,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on th~ay of August, 2010, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be:
&'mailed
faxed
hand delivered
to:

Roger Bourne
J an Bennetts

Deputy Ada County Prosecuting Attorneys
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St., Rm. 3191
Boise, ID 83702
Ian Thomson
Nicole Owen
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
Capital Litigation Unit
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83707

2·

LIMITED NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
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Dennis Benjamin
ISBA# 4199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000
(208) 345-8274 (£)

NO.
--::::-:'~
NO.-----:::-:'!r--.T1~'t-~.q.
A.M _ _
A.M

"ILl13,
--'~ILJ,ll.4
~

AUG 3 0 '010
J. DAVID NAVARRO, CIQr~;
ByE. HOLMEe
O::::PUTV
D::::PUTV

Attorneys for Petitioner as to the Conflict of Interest Issue Only
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF ADA
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ERICK HALL,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

NO. CV PC 2008-03085

NOTICE OF FILING
UNDER SEAL

-------------------------------)
--------------)
Please take note: The Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin is attached under seal hereto.
DATED

this~~day
this~~dayof August, 2010.

u~~
Den';;is Benjamin

1·
I·

NOTICE OF FILING UNDER SEAL

OR\G\NAL
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"
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

•

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this~1d'ay
this~1d'ay of August, 2010, I caused a tme and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be:

(C

mailed
faxed
hand delivered

to:

Roger Bourne
Jan Bennetts
Deputy Ada County Prosecuting Attorneys
Ada County Courthouse
W. Front St., Rm. 3191
200 w.
Boise, ID 83702
Ian Thomson
Nicole Owen
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
Capital Litigation Unit
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83707

~~~--~~~--Dennis Benjamin

2·

NOTICE OF FILING UNDER SEAL
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Page 1

Sessj<.m:
Sessi<.m: Neville090110
iA.

Session: Neville090110
Session Date: 2010/09/01
Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Reporter: Wolf, Sue

Division: DC
Session Time:

Courtroom: CR501
13:02

Clerk{s)
Clerk(s)
Ellis, Janet
State Attorneys:
Public Defender{s)
Defender(s)
Prob. Officer{s):
Officer(s):
Court interpreter{s):
interpreter(s):
-~-----------------------------;---------------------"l
----------------------------------------------------------~--------------------------------------~

Case ID:

0002
Case Number: CVPC08-03085
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL
Plaintiff Attorney:
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO
Co-Defendant{s)
Co-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney: OWENS, NICOLE
State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Public Defender: THOMSEN, IAN

2010/09/01
14:37:13 - Operator
Recording:
14:37:13 - New case
, STATE OF IDAHO
14~37:44
Other: BOURNE, ROGER
14~37:44 here on behalf of State with Doug Varie
14:38:02 - Other: Benjamin, Dennis
States has filed a Notice of Limited App
lict Issue as
14:38:24 - ·Other: Benjamin, Dennis
well.
14:38:36 - Public Defender: THOMSEN, IAN
Notes for record Petitioner does not wan
se hearings
14:39:40 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court notes several documents filed by M
t 30th.
14:40:18 ~ State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Ms. Bennetts stated did see all of those
14:40:36 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court inclined to ask State for add'l fi
he State,
14:41:22 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
inquired how long that hearing would tak
14:41:40 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN

nd Jan Bennetts
arance for the Conf

to be here for the
. Benjamin on Augus

ing or brief from t
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Sessi<9l1: Neville090110
....tt

e

abOU~
I

e

Page 2

Ms. Bennetts believed i t would take
3 weeks
14:42:56 - Pers. Attorney: OWENS, NICOLE
Believes may run through most of Septemb r
14:43:17 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court will request State's response by 0 tober 4th and then
hearingon October
14:43:48 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
19, 2010 ~ 1:30 p.m.
14:44:09 - Public Defender: THOMSEN, IAN
Mr. Thomson inquired what would all happ n on October 19
14:44:32 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The co.urt has granted the motion for inq iry, hearing on the
19th.
14:45:18 ~ Public Defender: THOMSEN, IAN
Inquired if Court would be ok with filin
a written outline
14:46:57 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
L
Court will request written outline of su~gested
su~gested procedures b
y the 12th
I
14:47:43- Operator
'

t

g

---------------1------------

-- .. __
__ sto,,-recOrdin
sto,,-recOrdin ,,_ _ _ - - - - - - - - -..-

1

- - - - 

--- -

~._-----~-

- - - .

- -

..
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NO.,,
NO']
A.M
{)- ~ 0
A.MJ)·

FILED
FILED

P.M. _ - 
-

0 4 2010
OCT 04

~J~
J

By-.:::lW.f~~::f:-~--

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Jan M. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 4606
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

.Case No. CV-PC-08-03085
!NOTICE
INOTICE OF FILING UNDER
SEAL

-------------)
----------------------------)

COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of
Ada, State of Idaho, and gives Notice that the State has filed the State's Response to SAPD's
Amended Notice of Possible Conflict and Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin under seal.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

If""=
If1':=.

day of October 2010.

IGREG
'GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

~J111xMdC
J
. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

NOTICE OF FILING UNDER SEAL (HALL II), Page 1
001347

•
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

1f'

day of October 2010, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing NOTICE OF FILING UNDER SEAL was served on Ian Thompson, Deputy
State Appellate Public Defenders, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho 83703 and Dennis
Benjamin, 303 W. Bannock St. Boise, Idaho 83702 in the manner noted below:

.~ By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, first class.
o By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at
the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
~

By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number: _ _ __

NOTICE OF FILING UNDER SEAL (HALL m, Page 2
001348
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STATE OF
OF IDAHO

IN CHAMBERtFFICE OF HE STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

OCT 12 2010
THOMAS F. NEVILLE

20 10
October 12, 2010

DISTRICT ,IUDGE

Judge Thomas F. Neville
200 W. Front Street, 5th Floor
Boise, ID 83702
Re: Conflict Inquiry in Hall II

Dear Honorable Judge Neville,
In deciding how to proceed with a conflict inquiry'l
inquiry'i it appears that there are four distinct
routes that the Court may take in satisfying its obligation. First, the Court could make an inquiry
of Mr. Benjamin, placing on the record the efforts he has made and his evaluation and
consultation with Mr. Hall. Second, the Court could follow the model established by Judge
Copsey in the case of Azad Abdullah and decide to appoint Mr. Hall yet another attorney, at the
county's expense, to review the privileged files and counsel Mr. Hall as to any possible conflict
issues. Third, the Court could determine that there must be an ex parte in camera review of
documents in order to determine for itself whether there is a conflict. And finally, the Court
could order that the SAPD hand over the contents of its files and order that privileged
communications be disclosed to the State and be subject to examination in an adversarial
hearing. In order to fully explore those options, I will address them one at a time.

First, the Court may rely on the representations

o~

Mr. Benjamin and accept the advice

given to Mr. Hall on his evaluation of whether a conflict eDdsts. The SAPD made an attempt to
avoid the need of a full-blown hearing by contracting with Mr. Benjamin to act as conflict
counsel for Mr. Hall for the limited purpose of assessing the conflict issue. I believe that if the
Court were to hear from Mr. Benjamin, on the record, his representation and analysis would

State Appcllate
Appellate PulJlic Defcndcr
Defender
Slale

3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703
l3oise.ID
Telephone: (208) 334-2712 FAX: (208) 334-2985
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.

accomplish the exact same function as did Mr. Roark in the case of Mr. Abdullah before the
Honorable Judge Copsey.
(1) Mr. Benjamin
I believe that Mr. Benjamin would be able to establish the following: (l)

contracted with the SAPD as counsel to Mr. Hall for the specific purpose of evaluating whether
any conflict exists, and advising Mr. Hall on how he should proceed; (2) Mr. Benjamin has not
had any contact with the SAPD regarding his investigation into the matter, or his advice to Mr.
Hall, beyond obtaining materials necessary to his review; (3) Mr. Benjamin's communications
with Mr. Hall fall under the attorney-client privilege, and consequently, he has not divulged that
information to anyone, including the SAPD; (4) Mr. Benjamin was granted complete access to
the SAPD client file with Mr. Hall for both Hall I and Hall II, including all attorney notes from
Mr. Hall's counsel during the period in question, and all documentation relating to any
communication between the SAPD attorney and staff and Mr. Chastain and Ms. Kristal; (5) Mr.
Benjamin also had the opportunity to speak with Mr. Ackley, Ms. Swensen, Mr. Chastain, and
Ms. Kristal; and (6) according to his affidavit he does not believe a conflict exists in having the
SAPD continue to represent Mr. Hall and has advised his

cl~ent

accordingly.

Such a path should satisfy the Court that a searching and independent inquiry has been
made into the issue. In addition, this path would be the least expensive and least intrusive. The
SAPD notified the Court in June that it was concerned with the amount of interaction between
the SAPD staff and Mr. Hall's trial counsel during the leap up to the trial in Hall II. Knowing
that the conflict issue had significantly delayed Mr. Abdullah's proceedings, we attempted to
speed up the process and avoid the need for court-appointed counsel to conduct what we
considered to be the inevitable. Mr. Benjamin's review did require several weeks and included a
fairly exhaustive review of correspondence notes. The SA\PD
SAlPD has already contracted to pay for
the conflict work being done by Mr. Benjamin, at no cost to Ada County. In addition, relying on
Mr. Benjamin's representations would avoid the problematic issue of asking yet another attorney
to act as counsel to Mr. Hall, creating yet another protected attorney-client relationship between
Mr. Hall and another attorney.
I suggest that relying on the assistance of Mr. Benjamin would allow for a similar process
to that established by Judge Copsey. (For Your Honor's consideration I have enclosed with this
letter a copy of the transcript from Mr. Abdullah's conflict inquiry, conducted by Judge Copsey
on April 23, 2010.) In the case of Mr. Abdullah, the Coutt appointed Mr. Roark as counsel to
2
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.

Mr. Abdullah. That appointment was as counsel to Mr. Abdullah, and was never considered an
independent investigator for the Court. Mr. Roark reviewed the client's files and all of the
materials that he subsequently requested to review. Conse~uently, he appeared before the Judge
to make representations as to what efforts had been undertdken and what advice he had provided
to Mr. Abdullah. It was then through the privileged counsel provided by Mr. Roark that Mr.
Abdullah made a knowing and voluntary waiver of any conflict that may have been identified.
Mr. Benjamin's representation would accomplish the same thing by avoiding the need for an
identical inquiry being made by a similarly situated attorney, but this time at the county's
expense.

Second, the Court certainly has the prerogative and ,power to appoint counsel to Mr. Hall
in order to assess any possible conflict issue and to advise him as to how to proceed. This would
be the same route taken by Judge Copsey in the case of Mr. Abdullah. However, the only
noticeable difference between such a court appointment and the reliance on Mr. Benjamin's
work would be whether the SAPD or the Court had selected the attorney to be contracted. If the
Court chooses to contract such an attorney, our position would be that such an appointment
would be at county expense since our office has already paid for the exact same service being
provided. It is worth noting that the fact that the SAPD selected Mr. Benjamin as conflict
counsel should not be any different from the normal procedure in cases where there are conflicts.
Both at the trial and appellate level the Ada County Public Defender or the SAPD is generally
charged with not only selecting a conflict attorney but also paying for those services.

The third option for the Court would be to order a judicial inquest into the contents of
privileged SAPD files. Such an order would be a piercing of the attorney-client privilege and
would expose Mr. Hall and the SAPD to unprotected breaches of any confidentiality. If the
Court were to order that the SAPD produce files that are protected under the attorney-client
privilege, in order for the Court to evaluate the existence of any conflict, the SAPD would most
likely file a motion requesting a recusal by Your Honor and asking that a separate judge review
the documents and make a determination of the conflict issue. Such a request would ensure that
the Court would be insulated from any possible prejudice or conflict (real or perceived) in
making decisions regarding either of Mr. Hall's pending

c~ses

post-conviction cases, or in any

3
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·.
future decisions made by the Court. It would also be requested that such an inquiry be conducted

ex parte, since the State can offer no justifiable interest to participate in the Court's investigation.
The purpose of the investigation would be to determine whether the SAPD is conflicted with
respect to Mr. Hall's case and whether such a conflict could be waived. To make the State a
party in a proceeding that could determine its own adversary would be tantamount to allowing
the State to help select opposing counsel.
The State's most recent response suggests that the Court itself must conduct an inquiry
into the conflict issue. However, the State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Possible
speCUlation.
Conflict and Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, is replete with speculation.

Although there are

countless suggestions of what might be the case, none of it is founded in either reason or based
on fact. Such is the very definition of a fishing expedition.

The final option would be for Your Honor to order that the SAPD produce attorney-client
files and turn them over to the State as part of discovery in preparation for an adversarial hearing
on the conflict issue. To allow the State to enter into

priv~leged

files for the ostensible purpose

of rooting out possible conflict, would simultaneously graIilt the State the opportunity to search
those files for all other information relevant to the underlying litigation. It is impossible to grant
the State access to privileged information "for a limited purpose." Any privileged information,
once it is released, will never again enjoy the protections of privilege-it is akin to trying to put
the genie back in the bottle. If the Court were to pursue such a path, the SAPD would counsel
with Mr. Hall concerning his rights to file an interlocutory appeal contemplated by Commentary
No. 13 to Rule 1.6 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct.

We acknowledge that the Court has a serious duty to ensure that Mr. Hall is represented
by conflict-free counsel. We also acknowledge that the Court has a wide array of options in
determining how that duty can be met. In consideration of that duty, we would respectfully
request that Your Honor also take into consideration and weigh the following factors: (1) the

con~ervation of limited County and State
avoidance of additional and unnecessary delays, (2) the con~ervation
resources, (3) the protection of the attorney-client privilege, and (4) a concerted effort to avoid
creating any future or unnecessary conflicts with the Court. We suggest that the first option laid
out in this letter would both satisfy the Court's obligation while at the same time take into
4
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account these other important factors. Consequently we would request that Your Honor order an
ex parte hearing where Mr. Benjamin could testify, on the record, as to the actions he has taken
and the determinations he has made in reviewing the SAPD's files with Mr. Hall. Such a hearing
would provide the Court with ample opportunity to question Mr. Benjamin in order to determine
whether any conflict can be identified on behalf of Mr. Hall.

s~cerelY,

~~

Ian H. Thomson
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

Enclosure
Transcript in the case of Abdullah v. State, April 23, 2010
cc:

Jan Bennetts, Ada County Prosecutor
Mr. Dennis A. Benjamin, Esq., Nevin, Benjamin & McKay
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,

I

) DOcket No.
)

Petitioner-Appellant,)
)

vs.

) Case No. CV-PC-05-21802

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)
)

Respondent.

)

-----------------------------)
-------------)
A~PEAL
TRANSCRIPT ON A~PEAL
Hearing Date: April 23, 2010

Appealed from the District Court of the
Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
the County of Ada, in the City of Boise
Honorable Cheri cL Copsey
Judge
District Court JUdge

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate PUb~ic
Pub~ic Defender·
Boise, Idaho
Attorney for Appellant
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
Attorney for Respondent

<'\
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~ ,~~
,~~
~
~,,~~
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Q.~G
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~~
~~~ ~~Y:01.:.,~
~~~~\\~.,~~~
~<r('f('fitot,.~Q~
t.~~
~~~~.
<oi~~C
Of;-'
<oi~ ').C Q

~\j~\)
~..j~V

Reported by
Melanie L. Gorczyca
Idaho Certified Shorthand Reporter #729
Registered Professional Reporter
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

1

2

) Docket No.

AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,
3

)

Petitioner-Appellant,)
4

)

vs.

) Case No. CV-PC-05-21802

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

5

)

6

)

Respondent.
7

)
)

8
9

10
11

Received from Melanie L. Gorczyca,
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Registered
Professional Reporter, of the above-entitled action,
and lodged with me this 1st day of June 2010.

12
13
14

15
16

17

J. David Navarro
Clerk of the District Court

18
19

20
21
22

23
24

MA1llEY J. THIf/B
THIf;S~'
MAmEf
Deputy Cler.~i"
Cler~ .
Deputy

25
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1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

2
3
)

AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,
4
Plaintiff,
5

vs.

)
)
)

6

STATE OF IDAHO,
7

)
)

Defendant.
8

Case No. CV-PC-05-21802

)
)
)

------------)
--------------------------)

9

WAIVER HEARING

10

Held on April 23, 2010
Before the Honora~le
Honora~le Cheri C. Copsey
District Court Judge

11
12

APPEARANCES

13

For the Plaintiff:
The Roark Law Firm
R. KEITH ROARK
409 North Maih
Hailey, ID 83333

14
15
16
17
18

For the Defendant:
.
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
SHAWNA DUNN
200 West Front Street
Boise, ID 83702
,

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Reported by
Melanie L. Gorczyca
Certified Shorthand Reporter #729
Registered Professional Reporter
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1
2
3
4

: Docket liIo.
1iI0. _ _ _ __

Petitioner-AppellAnt, )

5

)

) Ca.a.
Ca.8e Mo. CV-PC-05-21802

v.s.

6

)

$'fA"! OF IDAHO,

)
I)
)

Respondent.

Respondent.
RespOndent.

8

tRABSCRI
fRABSCRI PT ON APPBAL
HeadnljJ Date, Apt:il 23, 2010

9

10

10

Appealed from the DhtC'i,ct
Dhtd,ct Court or the
Fo\U'th JUdicial Di.strict
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State of Idaho,
Idaho. in and for
the County ot Ad.,
Ad•• In the <:i'r..Y or Boi.se
Hono:t.bh Ched <:. Cop.sey
Dbt;rict
Dbt;riet cow:t .Jud,e
.Iud,e

12
13

15

MOLLY J. HUSKEiY

16

StlS"
StiS" Appellate Public: D6teftder
Boise,
Bobe, Idaho
Atto;rney fO;r Ap~l!tllan.t

,.

11
12
13
14
15
1S
16
17

N.\SD£)J
LAWRUCB G. N.\SD£"

!

Received from Melanie L. Gorczyca,
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Registered
Professional Reporter, of the above-entitled action,
and lodged with me this 1st day of June 2010.

J. David Navarro
Clerk of the District Court

18

Attorney Gener.l
&t.ata
&t.ate or Idabo
Attorney foz Ra_pondent
Re_pondent

19
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----------,)
--------------------)
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) Docket No. _________ _
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vs.
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)
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AZAD HAll ABDULLAH,
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18
sUtflEME COURr OF TBB STATE or IDAHO
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRI6
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

3
AZAD HAll ABDUu.AH,

4

) Case No. CV-PC-OS-21802
)

Plaintiff,

5
8

)
)
Defendant.

)

---------)
------------------)

9

WAIVER HEARING

10

Held on April 23, 2010
Before the Honorable Cheri C. Copsey
Dlstr1ct Cou rt Judge

11

12

APPEARANCES

13

for the Plaintiff:
The Roark Law firm
R. KEITH ROARK
409 North Main
Halley, ID
10 83333

14
15
18
17
18
19

For the Defendant:
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
SHAWNA DUNN
200 West front Street
Boise, 10 83702

20

21
22

23
24
25

Reported by
Melanie L. Gorczyca
Certified Shorthand Reporter #729
Registered Professional Reporter

1 of 7 sheets

2

the matter, I want to make sure everyone got a copy
of the letter that Mr. Abdullah sent to me.

5

)
STATE OF IDAHO, .'

THE COURT: Before we get to the heart of

3
4

)

7
8

)
)

vs.

4

1

MS. DUNN: The State did, Your Honor.
Thank you.

6

MR; ROARK: I did, Your Honor.

7

THE COURT: Mr. Abdullah, I want to remind

8

you that anything you send to me I have to turn over

9

to everybody else. Okay?

10

THE DEFENDANT: (Nods head In the

11
12

affirmative. )
affirmative.)

13

an ex parte communication. So Just so you know, If

14

you write me anything In the future, everybody gets a

15

copy. An right?

16
17

18

THE COURT: Otherwise It Is what they call

TH E DEFENDANT: (Nods head In the
affirmative.)
THE COURT: Now I do want to address a

19

couple of things In the letter so that I can answer

20

some of your questions because I think they are

21

questfons. And then what we will do Is,
legitimate questions.

22

Mr. Roark, I will then ask you to kind of layout ---

23

without divulging any advice that you have given or

24

any of your findings, to layout sort of the process

25

and to at that point Indicate to me whether you feel

Page 1 to 4 of 28
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1
2
3

4
5
S

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

5
that Mr. Abdullah has sufficient information and has
been given the opportunity to be prepared to decide
whether he can waive any conflict that might exist.
Okay?
MR. ROARK: Yes.
THE COURT: So, Mr. Abdullah, you asked a
couple of questions and I am going to answer those.
Now obviously the decision to either waive the
conflict or not is yours. It can't be made by any
attorneys, friends, family. It is really your
decision.
You have indicated you want to know what
would happen If you don't waive the conflict and you
get new counsel and you wanted to know whether that
person would be allowed to modify or add additional
post-conviction claims.
And I know the State Is not going to like
this. But if you do get new counsel, I think it's
only fair to allow that individual to review the
record and determine whether they believe additional
flied.
daims or any modification of claims should be filed.
is give that person
And so what 1
I would do Is
review everything. And It
it Is
is
the opportunity to revIew
obviously going to take them -- they are going to
have a lot of material to look at. And If they feel

•

6
1 -- and it's up to them -- they want to add or modify
2 or delete any of the dalms that have been flied,
3 then I will allow them to tile a motion; and most
4 likely, assuming there's a good basis for it, I would
5 all4>w them to do so, because I think It's only fair,
S If ~ou get new counsel, that they have the
determination. So the
7 opportunity to make that determinatIon.
8 answer to the -- I guess the short answer to the long
is that yes, I WOUld.
9 question Is
Now with respect to the SAPO, I would not.
10
11 And the reason I wouldn't is that they have been
12 working on this case for six years. They have gone
13 through a number of amendments. I don't see any
14 reason that -- because even though I know Mr. Ackley
15 is leaving, essentially the same team has been in
16 place for some time and so I would require them to
17 proceed along the lines that we have already been
18 proceeding. And I am now -- at this point, 1
I have
19 read all of the Amended Petition, I have read all of
20 the responses and so I am pretty familiar with what
21 everybody has alleged.
22
Now you asked about the process. A couple
23 of things. You will have a couple of options today.
24 If you decide not to waive the conflict -- excuse me
25 -- ,f you decide to waive the conflict and keep the

7

8

1 SAPO, which you can do, then -- I'm sorry. Let me
2 start that over again. I have to get this right.
3
4
5

6
7
8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
18
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

If you dedde that you want me to appoint
new counsel and you say, "I am not waiving the
conflict,· then the process that I would use Is this.
First, obviously If you want to hire someone
yourself, you can hire anybody you want. That's up
to you. You could, of course, decide to represent
yourself. I would recommend against that. If you
decide that you are even thinking about it, I want
you to let me know so that we can schedule a hearing
and 1
I can explore that with you because I really
think it is a very bad Idea. The third possibility
is that I would order the SAPO to -- what I would
have them do is provide me a list of attorneys who
are qualified by the Supreme Court to represent an
individual like you on a capital case in
post-conviction and in that list, I would want them
to Indicate whether they have ongoing contracts. In
other words, these are people who are willing to
contract with the SAPD to be conflict counsel. And
then -- and With
with their qualifications.
And then what I would do Is schedule a
hearing and ask those Individuals who are Interested
in actually taking the work to appear in court with

1
2

you present so that you can hear the discussion. And
I would inquire of each of them a couple of things.
1
3 One, do they have the time to devote to your case.
4 Because It
it is not a -- this is a difficult case and
5 there's a lot of material. And so -- and 1
I know Mr.
6 Roark has put a lot of time into this.
7
And then I would also inquire and make sure
8 we don't get ourselves In-the same position we are in
9 now, to make sure there are no conflicts. That is
10 going to be a very probing inquiry, very important,
11 because as now, I read all the material.
12
It is clear to me that there are a number
13 of attorneys here In the state who participated in
14 one form or another In this trial, therefore, they
16 would likewise be disqualified. 1
I can think of some
16 w'1ere they ended up ghostwriting material, where they
17 aqually did that. And that is the basis of actually
18 on~ of your claims is that you didn't know that was
19 happening. So I would have to make sure that they
20 did
dl~ not participate with the Toryanskls
Toryanskis In
in the trial
21 of this case because I don't want to go down that
22 path again.
23
So you would be present, but I would have
24 to make the decision as to who would be appointed
appOinted and
public expense, it's
25 -- because when we appoint at pUblic
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cal/. The
the Judge's responsibility to make that call.
only thing I can do is assure you, Mr. Abdullah, that
I am going to be very careful to make sure they don't
have a conflict, that they are very qualified to take
this on and that they have the time to do it because
I don't want you to have someone who Is not going to
devote the time to It that it needs to have done.
Okay? Does that answer your questions?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Thank you, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Now,
NoW, to me, I am
goIng to hear argument from anyone else because
not going
this Is really about Mr. Abdullah. So, Mr. Roark, a
couple of months ago, I gave you a task. And I want
to make It very clear on the record and I want to
make sure you agree with me. You and I have had no
conversations. Is that correct?
MR. ROARK: That is absolutely correct.
THE COURT: Everything that has occurred
between you and I have been copied to all counsel.
MR. ROARK: That Is correct, as well, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Now If you can kind
of layout -- and what I want to tell you Is that
ultimately I am going to have you do an actual

11
1
2
3
4
6
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
16
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
26

look at that end and the light of the tunnel. I am
starting to be too old to even think about being here
for a long time.
So I want to make sure that there's enough
of a record so that any future court proceedings,
they know exactly what happened. And I've tried to
this case. I've kept jUst
just about
do that throughout thIs
every piece of paper I can possibly Imagine.
So with that in mind --- and I also want any
depositions that you took also to be filed under
depOSitions
just for the record. So if you can layout
seal, Just
dId. I've already determIned
determined
process-wise what you did.
there Is a conflict. I have not determined the
extent of the conflict. I have not made any
determinations because I have not done the
Investigation.
I will note that the SAPO did ask me to
actually conduct a target Investigation. Because of
where we were procedurally, I decided I wasn't even
going to respond to that. The reason I decided not
to do my own Investigation Is that makes me part of
this process and I don't want to be in the position
of either Inadvertently or even on purpose learning
anything about any attorney-client
attomey-cllent Involvement,
involvement, any
discussions between the parties. I don't want to be
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10
1 written document that is going to layout what you
did:, including what advice you gave. That Is going
2 didi,
3

4
5
6
7
8
9

to be sealed, under Rule 32, from the Court, as well
as ~II counsel. And I want you to file two copies.
I

An{j the reason I want you to file two copies -- well,
pOint, one copy. If Mr. Abdullah decides
deddes he
at ~hls point,
wants me to appoint new counsel, then I want that new
counsel to be able to have access to that material so
that that person can examIne It, with the mind-set of
whether they are going to have additional
post-conviction claims.
But the bottom line here Is -- and if he
stays with the SAPD, then It Is going to remain
sealed. And the purpose behind that is to provide a
very clear record for any other successive Petitions,
appeals, habeas, whatever may occur in the future, so
that there's a clear record of what Mr. Abdullah knew
when he made this decision, what he was advised and
what material he reviewed.
I hope you agree with that way of handling

10
11
12
13
14
16
16
17
18
19
20
21 It. I I want to make sure we have a record. Because,
kinds of cases,
22 aSlwe all know, unfortunately, these kInds
23 qulite frankly, have lives of their own and long after
24 I ~m probably dead, somebody will be working on this
25 b~use now I am going to be 63, so I am starting to
12
1 in that position. I want to make sure that I remain
is
2 in the position I am supposed to remain In, which Is
3 as the neutral judge and not really looking beyond
4 that. So I have -- that Is the reason that I chose
6 not to do my own Investigation. I certainly could
6 have. There's some case law that suggests that it Is
7 okay. But the process I have used has also been
8 approved, at least by the Court of Appeals, by way of
9

10
11
12
13
14
16
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24

25

comment on a case that I was actually involved with
called State versus Lopez, where I also had someone
advise the person. So that is the reason that I have
done that.
Now with that In mind, Mr. Roark, If you
want to tell us, you know, what you did, but nothing
a~out any advice.

~
MR. ROARK: Certainly, Your Honor. May it
pi ase the Court -- and I may not be encydopedic
encyclopedic in
m~ recitation of what I have done In this case, nor
wUl attempt to
even necessarily chronological, but I will
do that.
Inquiry, of course, wIth
with a
I began my InqUiry,
consideration of this Court's order appointing me to
this POsition.
POSition. I then reviewed the response by the
SAPO to this Court's inquiry regarding the conflict
and also reviewed the memorandum from the Ada County

Page 9 to 12 of 28

001359

13
1
2
3
4
6
6
7
8
,
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Shawna Dunn,
responding to SAPO involvement with trial and
pretrial and tried to at that point review all of the
documentation upon which the conflict was based, to
the extent that such documentation exists.
I then undertook to review In detail, and
as chronologically as I could, the Petitions that
have been filed, first the Petition for
Post-conviction for Relief and then a series of
amended petitions, so that I could track, to the
extent possible, the evolution and the refinement of
the issues presented to the Court for post-conviction
relief and concluded that Inquiry with what has been
styled the Rnal Amended Petition for Post-conviction
Relief that was filed with this Court on the 29th of
August 2008. And this is the document that extends
approximately 400 pages.
Once that had been completed, I did have
previously two less-than-comprehensive phone
conversations with Mr. Abdullah. I met with him then
at the Idaho State Penitentiary where he Is
Incarcerated. We held four such meetings over the
appOintment and today's
course of time between my appointment
with him, as my work
date so that I could discuss With
progressed, what I had discovered, what opinions I

15
adVice,
1 Toryanski that dealt specifically with advice,
2 counsel, assistance she had received from attorneys
3 outside her Office,
office, including, of course,
4 partlcular1y those conversations or e-mail exchanges
5 with members of the team from SAPO.
6
I also received from Ms. Huskey's office
7 their Policy and Procedures Manual and the Policy and
8 Procedures Manual for the Capital Utigation Unit,
9 both of which I have reviewed. I haven't read It In
10 their entirety, but I have reviewed as regards to
11 policies that may touch upon the matters that we
12 confront in this particular case.
Each time I met with Mr. Abdullah, we
13
14 discussed precisely what it was the Court was
with; we reviewed the case law; we reviewed
16 concerned With;
16 in detail the implications of waiving the conflict,
17 as well as the implications of declining to do so.
18
The Court actually answered this afternoon
19 a question that Mr. Abdullah has had for a
20 significant period of time, which I felt to be beyond
21 the scope of what this Court had ordered me to do.
provided him with any advice
22 So I have never prOVided
adVice as to
23 what process this Court would employ, in the event
24 that successive counsel was required.
reqUired. As I say, I
25 felt that was beyond the charge which was given to me

14
1 held in regard to what had been discovered and what
2 the implications were.
3
I also, because a Petition and Application
4 fori Interlocutory Appeal was filed in this case, read
therewith,
5 thC!t Petition and the materials submitted thereWith,
6 as Well as the rather comprehensive response filed by
7 the Attorney General's Office to that Petition or
which was
8 that application for Interlocutory relief, Which
ultimately, of course, denied.
9 Ultimately,
10
THE COURT: See, I didn't even know that it
11 had been denied. Nobody has told me anything.
12
MR. ROARK: Well I think actually it may
13 have been withdrawn.
14
THE COURT: Okay.
16
MR. ROARK: I then took, in February of
16 this year, the depositions of Molly Huskey, Kimberly
17 Simmons and Mark Ackley. Those depositions were
18 transcribed and the transcription of the depositions
19 were provided to Mr. Abdullah. During one of our
20 meetings lasting two, two and-a-half hours, we
21 discussed in detail the material that was contained
22 within those depositions.
23
i
I also read and reviewed in its entirety
24 th¢
thE\! deposition of Kim Toryanski,
Toryanskl, giving particular
at\lention to those portions of the deposition of Ms.
26 at\1ention
16
1 in this case.
2
I also declined to Inquire of this Court or
3 to offer an opinion as to what this Court's policy
4 might be, In the event that Mr. Abdullah chose not to
5 waive the conflict and subsequent counsel felt it
6 appropriate to ask this Court for leave to amend, one
7 more time, the Petition. But I believe that the
8 Court has thoroughly answered those questionsj
questions; and to
9 the extent that they bear upon Mr. Abdullah's
dedsion will reflect that.
10 decision, I am sure his decision
Now I have given him adVice
advice as to what I
11
12 consider to be the extent of the conflict. I have
13 pr"9vided him with adVice
advice as to whether or not I
14 thought that the conflict was reflected in any
15
16 ~empt or failure by the SAPO to vigorously litigate
16 th~se Issues that might be implicated by the
17 cohfllct.
18
I have also discussed with him what, If
19 any, implications may be involved in this case, as
20 far as expert witness testimony or .even fact
21 testimony might be concerned at the time this case
22 goes to trial. So I feel that Mr. Abdullah has had
23 the benefit of such adVice as I could offer in those
24 areas.
25
I met with Mr. Abdullah personally for the

page 13 to 16 of 28

4 of 7 sheets

001360

e

e
18

17
1 last time last week and we discussed again at length
2 the nature of the conflict, the extent to which that
3 conflict may have debilitated the SAPD's Office, the
4 extent to which the SAPD's Office had declined or
6 neglected to vigorously pursue issues principally
8
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
26

involving those areas of communication with the
Toryanskis that had occurred and what Mr. Abdullah
fadng, in terms of either exercising or
would be facing,
failing to exercise his right to waive.
I believe, based upon another lengthy
conversation that we had yesterday via phone, that
Mr. Abdullah Is now satisfied that he has received
all of the legal and practical advice, for that
matter, necessary for him to make an informed
deciSion he
decision. I have emphasized that the decision
makes is irreversible; that this Court will not
permit him and no appellate court would permit him to
waive the conflict and then assert it at a later
date.
THE COURT: Which was the Court's concern.
MR. ROARK: Yes. And he fully understands
that fact. So I believe, Your Honor, that Mr.
Abdullah Is prepared, at least in terms of the
services that I have tried
trIed to render to him, to make
his decision and to announce that decision to the

1 Court this afternoon.
2
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Roark.
MR. ROARK: And I will follow up with --3
THE COURT: A report.
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

,

THE COURT: Right. And then I want to
emphasize again when you send that In,
in, I want it
under seal and I want the top part of it to have a
caption and show that it is under seal, even from the
CO~rt; that no court personnel, including the Judge
Co~rt;
willi open that, because that's not -- it is not going
to happen. And then put a signature line for myself
to sign under yours to show nIt is SO ordered," If
you would do that.
MR. ROARK: I will.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And
thank you for the thoroughness of your report.
Mr. Abdullah, before we proceed, I know
that you are upset. If you want to take a few
minutes, if you want to talk to Mr. Roark one more
time, that would be fine. That's up to you. Would
you like to do that?
THE DEFENDANT: Please.
THE COURT: All right. Why don't we let

20

19
him go back in the holding cell and, Mr. Roark, you
can talk to him. When he Is
is ready to come in, let me
know.
MR. ROARK: Absolutely.
THE COURT: Thank you.
THE BAIUFF: All rise, please.
8
(Whereupon, there was a break In
in the
7
8 proceedings from 1:23 to 1:35 p.m.)
9
THE BAIUFF: All rise, please. District
10 Court is again In session.
THE COURT: Please be seated. Mr.
11
12 Abdullah, are you ready to go forward then?
13
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. And you've had
14
15 further discussion with Mr. Roark?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
16
THE COURT: Okay. You don't have to stand
17
18 up, If you don't want to. I just want to ask you
19 whether you have reviewed all of the material that
20 Mr. Roark provided you.
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, Judge.
21
THE COURT: You did. Before you tell me
22
23 what your decision Is, has anyone pressured you or
24 threatened you or tried to get you to make a
25 decision?
deciSion?

1
2
3
4
6

.'j
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MR. ROARK: -- a more thorough report in

writing.

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
1
THE COURT: Okay. Because it has to be
2
3 your decision.
4
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. I understand.

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

I
I

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Roark can't make the
decision for you. Your prior -- your counsel can't
decision. It has to be your decision.
make the deciSion.
THE DEFENDANT: I understand.
THE COURT: All right. And SO
so the question
I have for you is do you want to waive the conflict
an~ keep the SAPD or do you want to have me appoint
new counsel?
THE DEFENDANT: I do not waive the
conflict.
THE COURT: All right. You want me to
appoint new counsel then?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
!
!
THE COURT: Okay. And that is your
decision?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. I note that the
SAPO's office is present. I am going to Issue an
act~al written Order, but I am going to order the
SAPO's Office to contact the people with whom you
normally contract for conflict. They have to be
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capital certified. They also have to be -- before I
start running through the names, I want to make sure
that you have spoken to them to make sure that they
would be willing to accept an appointment. And then
what I would like you to do is provide me that list
with a resume of each of them and then I will
schedule a hearing at which I would ask those parties
to -- maybe a series of hearings In which they would
(n court to make
appear. I would ask them to appear In
sure that they don't have any conflict and to make
sure that they have the time to actually devote to
Mr. Abdullah's case. And you are?
MS. HUSKEY: I am Molly Huskey, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Huskey.
MS. HUSKEY: If I could, there would be two
issues that we -- and I apologize for my voice today.
THE COURT: That's all right.
MS. HUSKEY: We only have three individuals
on contract; only one of them is capital qualified,
Dennis Benjamin.
THE COURT: And he Is disqualified.
MS. HUSKEY: And that's baSically
basically what I
was going to apprise you of. The second Issue, Your
Honor -- and we have Mr. Josh Tewalt from the
Department of Anancial Management or I have his

1
2
3
4
5
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7
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16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

MS. HUSKEY: Your Honor, then I would like
to make a record. I have copies of Mr. Tewalt's
affidavit or I can call him as a witness. But I can
tell you right now that the State Appellate Public
Defender's Office has approximately, with projected
spending, $5,000 remaining In Its budget to get us
through until June 30 of this year.
THE COURT: Then you are going to have to
go to the legislature and see If you can get
additional funding.
MS. HUSKEY: I have previously
preViously spoken with
Mr. Tewalt about that. There is no constitutional
method or process by which we can obtain additional
funding before July 1.
l.
THE COURT: Well you are going to have to
find a way to do it.
MS. HUSKEY: Then, Your Honor --
THE COURT: Because he has a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and like I said, it is the
SAPO's fault that we are at this pOint.
point. It is not
the Court's fault. It is not the State's fault. It
really Is your fault that we are here. So you are
going to have to find a way. As I indicated, there's
a good possibility that we won't actually have
anybody aPPOinted
appointed until July first, but that -- and

1 affidavit that we could submit via an exhibit. The
2 SAPO simply has no funds to contract with any
3 attorney to represent Mr. Abdullah until July one of
4 this year.
6
5
i
THE COURT: What we are going to do is I am
6 gOing to issue an Order and if you have to go and
7 find funds someplace, you are going to have to find
8 them. The reason that I do that, Ms. Huskey, Is, in
9 my view, it Is the SAPO's Office that created this
10 problem, not Mr. Abdullah. He did not create this
11 prOblem. The SAPO's Office, through its actions,
12 created this problem that brought us to this
13 position.
14
So it may be that we actually don't get
15 anyone on board until July 1, so maybe it will be a
16 moot issue. But since you don't have anybody on
comtract -- you said there's only really one that is
17 cOliltract
18 death penalty qualified -- then what I am going to do
19 Is I do have the list and I will send out a letter
20 that goes to all of them and they will be paid for by
21 the SAPO by order of this Court because I don't have
22 anybody else to make them pay. The Court doesn't
23 have the money and, as I said, Mr. Abdullah doesn't
24 have the funds. So you are going to take it out of
26 your office budget. That is the bottom line.
25

24

23

affidavits. But in my
1 you can certainly file those affidaVits.
2 View, with an Indigent defendant, the mere fact that
3 you have funding problems is not sufficient to excuse
4 yo~ from the responsibility of providing him with an
6 attprney.
5
So what I am going to do is send out Orders
6
7 and also letters to all people on the capital list
8 and find out what their conflicts are. We will
9 schedule a hearing, have them come in and explain to
10 the Court If they have the time and if they do, then
11 I am going to end up appointing them.
12
MS. HUSKEY: If I may, Your Honor, two
13 additional questions. One, we will seek
-14 interlocutory appeal from this order on the -
16
15
THE COURT: What will be your standing?
-16
MS. HUSKEY: Our standing is -
17
i
THE COURT: You no longer represent Mr.
18 Abdullah.
19
MS. HUSKEY: Our standing, Your Honor, is
20 that this Court has ordered us to do something that
21 Is legally impossible for us to comply with.
22
THE COURT: Then you can file a separate
within
23 actfon because I don't think you can file It wIthIn
24 this case.
25
MS. HUSKEY: Definitely, Your Honor. Who
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will be representing Mr. Abdullah between now and the

is appointed?
time In which counsel Is
THE COURT: I think what I am going to do

26

1

Interlocutory
interlocutory appeal. What you are complaining about

2

is that the Court is going to be ordering you to

3

provide him with legal counsel and you claim that you

4

is continue Mr. Roark in that position. He hasn't

4

can't do that. That has nothing to do with this

5

completed all of his actions and so we are going to

6

case.

everything was stayed. I had a problem with that

6
7
8
9
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because I didn't -- in reading the repeal, I didn't

23

24

see that this was anything that Mr. Abdullah was

24

I

will do Is stand In recess. Mr. Roark, you will

26

requesting. But I don't see any basis for an

25

i

provide the additional material. In the meantime, if

6

go ahead and have him continue in that. Is that

7
8

acceptable to you, Mr. Roark?

9

10
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MR. ROARK: It Is.
THE COURT: So that If he has any Questions
during this period of time -- but, obviously, nothing
else is going to be happening In this case until we
get new counsel on.
MS. HUSKEY: So am I to understand then the
Court is denying our request that this Court stay
that order pending an inter1ocutory appeal?
THE COURT: Ms. Huskey, I appoint counsel.
Mr. Abdullah has refused to waive the conflict that
exists after a full advice. You are no longer
representing him In
in that capacity. That's the bottom
line. And I had a problem, quite frankly, with an
interlocutory appeal because at that point,

MS. HUSKEY: And then thirdly, Your Honor,

when you issue your final written Order, as I
understand it, the process is that we would sort of
provide you with a list of individuals and then the
Court would select. But under Idaho Code 19-869,
choice of conflict counsel Is left to the discretion
of the State Appellate Public Defender's Office. So
if you would just clarify that in your written Order
as well.
THE COURT: I will make it very clear

because at this point, I think you also have a
conflict.
MS. HUSKEY: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And I want to make sure that
Mr. Abdullah gets a conflict-free counsel and that is
the Court's responsibility.
MS. HUSKEY: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. What we

27
1

he has any questions, you can answer those questions

2

until you are relieved.

ze
REPORTER"S (;BRTU'lCA'l'B
t:BR'l'lf'lCA'l'B

3

MR. ROARK: I Will,
will, Your Honor.

S'l'A'r!
S'l'A'I'! OF IDAHO

4

THE COURT: Thank you.

COUNTY OF ADA

5
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THE BAIUFF: All rise, please.

I. M. GORCZYt:A,
GORCZn::A~ Cntified Shorthand lleporter and

(Whereupon, the above proceedings concluded

Re9i.stered P.I'of.,s,sional
P.I'of.,s.sional Jteporte.J:, do hereby certJfy:

at 1:43 p.m.)

That 1 am

tn.

COUJ:t repoJ:ter
repoEter who took. the

proceedln.g11
proceedin.g1l had in the Above-entitled action in
IU.cb1ne .:thorthaud
1oIa3 :teduced
.:thorthand and the:tcafte.r 10143
z:educed into
10

11

typevritin9 "ndez:
'lude:t my direction; uad
That the foregoing Reporter' So T:taMcdpt
'IJ:4MCz:1pt contaiDII
contaiDil

• full, true and
a.nd ec'Cur4te
ecocurate re'Co.rd
record of the proc:eedipgs
prooeedipg!l
13
II

b4d
4bove and fougoift9
foregol1\9 eau",.,
eaU38, ..mich
vtlich was hea..I'd
he4.1'd
ba.d in the above

14

in BoiM, 1daiho.
Idaho.

15
16

11
II IITHESS WHEREOF, I b4ve
bave be.reunto
bar.unto .:tee
see

.y band

tbb 13t day ot JUne 201D.

17

M. GorczycA,
Rra
GorczYCA, CSR. RPa

23

24
Z$

24

26
25
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

1
. ,

2

STATE OF IDAHO

3

COUNTY OF ADA

4
5

I, M. GORCZYCA, Certified Shorthand Reporter and

6

Registered Professional Reborter, do hereby certify:

7

That I am the court reporter who took the

8

proceedings had in the above-entitled action in

9

machine shorthand and

10
11
12

ther~after
ther~after

was reduced into

typewriting under my direction; and
That the foregoing Reporter's Transcript contains
a full, true and accurate record of the proceedings
I

13

had in the above and foregoing cause, which was heard

14

in Boise, Idaho.

15
16

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
this 1st day of June 2010.

17
18
19

tn.~
7n.~
M. Gorczyca, CSR, RPR

20
21
22
23
24
25
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Sessi~n:
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Neville101910

Session: Neville101910
Session Date: 2010/10/19
Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Reporter: Wolf, Sue

•

Page 1
Division: DC
Session Time:

Courtroom: CR501

Clerk(s)
Ellis, Janet
State Attorneys:
Public Defender(s):
Prob. Officer(s):
Probe
Court interpreter(s)

Case ID:

0001
Case Number: CVPC08-03085
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL
Plaintiff Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO
Co-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney:
State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Public Defender:

2010/10/19
13:45:17 - Operator
Recording:
13:45:17 - New case
, STATE OF IDAHO
13:45:46 - Other: OWENS, NICOL
for Erick Hall
13:45:59 - Other: Benjamin, Dennis
here on behalf of Erick Hall on conflict
issue only.
13:46:34 ~ Other: Varie, Doug
on behalf of State of Idaho
13:46:44 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court notes last proceeding in September and documents filed
with the Court.
13:47:53 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court notes letter from SAPO summarizing what they believe a
re the Court's
13:48:25 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F .
a copy of a transcript from the Abdullah case.
with.a
. options with
Court notes this
13:48:42- Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
was received in chambers rather than filed.
13:49:00 - Plaintiff Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
Mr. Thomsen stated letter states argument that would help Co
urt to make i t
13:49:33
Plaintiff Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
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clearer.
Would like the letter part of the record and in th
e file.
Can
13:50:52 - Plaintiff Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
provide copy to the court reporter, jUs
jus did not want to hav
e to argue all
13:51:09 - Plaintiff Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
statements made in the letter
13:51:29 - Plaintiff Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
Mr. Thomsen stated Mr. Chastain and Ms. Kristal's files will
be open for the
13:52:01 - Plaintiff Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
State to view.
Defendant waived that p ivilege.
13:52:45 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Ms. Bennetts stated before conflict iss e, believe Mr. Ackle
y was going to
13:53:26 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
copy of those files but when conflict arose there was issue
issue.
on whether these
13:54:00 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
files were privileged.
13:54:58 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Believe that SAPO is stating now that th State has to copy
the files and pay
13:55:16 ~ State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
for those out of State's budget where in past SAPO used to c
opy them and
13:55:34 ~ State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
provide.
13:55:56 ~ Other: Owens, Nicol
stated in past on another case the State copied what they wa
nted and paid
13:56:32 - Other: Owens, Nicol
for that.
13:56:38 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court requested counsel continue to ork on that issue.
13:57:10 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
There
Ms. Bennetts responded re: letter dated ctober 12th.
are some
13:58:09 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
There
differences between this case and the Ab ullah case.
were identifiable
13:58:25- State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
conflicts in Abdullah, Mr. Benjamin stat ng there is no conf
lict.
One issue
13:58:50 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
is whether the experts might be a confli
13:59:22 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
appointed by the Court in Abdu
Mr. Roark appOinted
14:02:06 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
14:09:14 - Plaintiff Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
distinct·on between this cas
Mr. Thomsen responded regarding distinct'on
e and Abdullah.
14:,12:40 - Other: Benjmin, Dennis
Believes there is not a conflict of inte est that would aris
e

14:17:46 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Ms. Bennetts responded.
14:21:44
Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
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The Court would like to consider argume1t further.
14:23:13 - Operator
Stop recording:

-----------------------------

.

--------------------
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDIC~
JUDIC~ nI~ IRJ4ii)~
..
M. __
......._..1-10_'"
A.M
P.M.

1

2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TfIE COUNTY qj~7
qj~7

3

2010

J.
~J.~.

E1y-~~~~ll4ii~ir::::.

4

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
5
6
7

Petitioner,

Case No. CV-PC-2008-03085
CV-PC-2008-03085

vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
APPOINTING KEITH ROARK AS
INDEPENDENT CONFLICT COUNSEL

8
9

10

STATE OF IDAHO,

11

Respondent.
12
13

14

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

15

Erick Virgil Hall was convicted of the rape and first-degree murder of Cheryl Hanlon on October

16

22, 2004 (Hallll). In the period of time during which the trial took place, the Petitioner was represented

17

by the State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD") on the matter of his post-conviction and appeal of his

18

conviction for the kidnapping, rape, and first-degree murder ofLynn Henneman (Hall ij. In his Hall IT

19

amended post-conviction petition, filed in this case on April 7, 2009, the Petitioner alleged that his trial
20

counsel in the Hall IT case provided ineffective assistance of cqunsel.
21
22

Molly Huskey is the State Appellate Public Defender. rhe Deputy State Appellate Public

23

Defenders who have been assigned to represent Mr. Hall over time include Paula Swensen, Mark

24

Ackley, Nicole Owens, Shannon Romero, and, more recently, Ian Thompson. (Throughout, the term

25

"SAPD" is used to refer to the office in general and not a specific person). On September 15, 2009, in

26
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connection with the capital post-conviction proceedings in Ada County Case No. CV-PC-2005-00308,
CV -PC-2005-00308,
1

2

Judge Cheri Copsey held that the SAPD had a conflict of interest in its representation of that Petitioner

3

because attorneys in the SAPD's office, including Molly Huskey and Mark Ackley, provided advice to

4

trial counsel in the underlying case during the trial phase and then subsequently filed claims of

5

ineffective assistance of counsel in the post-conviction proceeding. Judge Copsey appointed

6

independent conflict counsel to advise that Petitioner regarding the conflict.

7

On June 29,2010, the SAPD in this case filed its Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest.
8

In that notice, the SAPD claimed that it "cooperated with trial counsel in Hall IT by sharing testing and
9

10

expert information obtained in Hall f' and further admitted that at least some of the attorneys in that

11

office formerly assigned to this case "may have had contact with trial counsel and that contact may

12

present a conflict of interest in the SAPD's continued representation of Mr. Hall." The Ex Parte Notice

13

also informed the Court that the SAPD had conducted an internal review and had selected attorney

14

Dennis Benjamin to "independently evaluate the conflict" and to advise the Petitioner whether or not the

15

conflict should be waived. In the Ex Parte Notice, the SAPD did not admit or deny that it had a conflict
16

in this case.
17
18

Meanwhile, without having received notice of the SAPD's Ex Parte Notice, the Respondent
Respondent-

19

State filed its Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict (Hallll) on July 30, 2010. In that Motion,

20

the State claimed that it had contacted Mark Ackley prior to his departure from the SAPD's office and

21

inquired whether there was a conflict in this case, and that Mr. Ackley represented to the State that he

22
23

did not believe that there was a conflict. The State filed its Motion for Inquiry "in an abundance of
caution and in an effort to avoid unnecessary delays in these post-conviction proceedings."

24

The Court heard oral argument on the State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict
25

(Hallll) on August 26,2010 and granted the motion at that hearing. After granting the State's motion,
26
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the Court's first action in furtherance of an inquiry was to instruct the SAPD to supplement its Ex Parte
1

2

Notice of Possible Conflict to include the factual basis for the !SAPD's
iSAPD's conclusion that there was a

3

possible conflict. The Court noted that the Ex Parte notice was vague, referring only to "contact"

4

between the SAPD and the Petitioner's trial attorneys. In order to facilitate its inquiry, the Court

5

requested further details about such contact and asked specific~lly for information regarding whether the

6

SAPD had given advice to the Petitioner's trial attorneys.

7

In response to the Court's instruction, the SAPD filed its Amended Notice of Possible Conflict 0
8

Interest on August 30, 2010. That document reiterated that there were "numerous contacts between trial
9

10

counsel and post-conviction counsel" during the trial phase. However, the Amended Notice only

11

provided the Court with details about the methods by which the contact occurred (email, telephone and

12

meetings) and did not provide any information about the substance of the conversations or disclose

13

whether the SAPD gave advice to trial counsel, despite this Court's specific request.

14
15

The Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin was also filed on August 30, 2010. In his Affidavit, Mr.
I

Benjamin stated that he had been hired by the SAPD "to deterrhine whether they have a conflict of

16

interest in representing Erick Hall and to advise Mr. Hall of my findings." Mr. Benjamin stated both
17

factual and legal conclusions in his Affidavit. Those conclusions, in the order listed in his affidavit,
18
19

were that: (1) there is no conflict of interest; (2) it is clear that the SAPD lawyers decided to not give

20

advice to trial counsel due to a concern over creating a conflict of interest; (3) one of the former SAPD

21

lawyers gave advice to trial counsel; (4) that advice does not c~ate a conflict of interest because the

22

result was favorable to Mr. Hall; (5) even if the former SAPD lawyers had a conflict of interest, it would

23

not be imputed to Mr. Hall's current SAPD attorneys. Mr. Benjamin did not disclose which of the

24

former SAPD lawyers gave advice or give any information about the substance or subject of that advice.
25

26
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On September 1, 2010, the Court held a Status Conference and invited counsel to submit further
1

2

briefing on this matter. The State filed its Response to SAPDiAmended Notice of Possible Conflict and

3

Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin (Hall IT) on October 4,2010. On October 12,2010, the SAPD submitted

4

a letter to the Court. A hearing was held on October 19, 2010:

5

DISCUSSION

6

Procedural safeguards are particularly important in a case where, as here, the Petitioner is facing
7

the death penalty. "The death penalty is qualitatively different from any other punishment, and hence
8

must be accompanied by unique safeguards to ensure that it is a justified response to a given offense."
9

Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring). Furnishing one such safeguard,
10

Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2 provides for the mandatory appointment of counsel for post-conviction
11

proceedings after imposition of the death penalty.
12

Every defendant has the right to be represented by conflict-free counsel. Wood v. Georgia, 450
13

U.S. 261, 272-73 (2003). In order to ensure that a defendant receives conflict-free counsel, a trial court
14

has an affirmative duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever it "knows or reasonably should
15

know that a particular conflict may exist." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278,285 (2003).
16

Accordingly, having received notices of concern about a possible conflict of interest from the State as
17

well as from the SAPD, this Court granted the State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible Conflict of
18

Interest (Hall IT).
19

Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2 requires that counsel appointed to capital defendants in a post
post20

conviction proceeding be someone other than trial counsel. This requirement is necessary in order for
21
22

the defendant to obtain an objective assessment of trial counsel's performance. Porter v. State, 139
Idaho 420, 423, n.2, 80 P.3d 1021, 1024, (2003). Similarly, if the SAPD was giving advice to trial

23

counsel, they may be unable to assess objectively trial counsel's performance with respect to those
24

matters for which they gave advice.
25
26
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1

In his Affidavit, Mr. Benjamin stated that communication between the SAPD and the Petitioner's

2

trial lawyers concerning this case could result in a conflict of interest if advice was given; the trial

3

lawyers took the advice; and the advice turned out badly for Mr. Hall. That is but one of many examples

4

of how a conflict could arise in a situation where post-conviction counsel was involved in formulating

5

strategy at the trial level. A conflict could arise from failing to bring a viable claim in the petition for

6

ineffective assistance of counsel in an area where advice was given. A conflict could arise from bringing

7

a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel ifthe SAPD's advice on that topic was taken by trial

8

counsel. Additionally, even if the advice was not taken by trial counsel, the simple fact that trial counsel

9

consulted with experienced lawyers at the SAPD's office may present a defense to ineffective assistance

10

of counsel claims. "[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation oflaw and facts relevant to

11

plausible options are virtually unchallengeable" as ineffective assistance of counsel. Knowles v.

12

Mirzayance, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009)(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,690 (1984)).

l3
13

If claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were brought in any area where the SAPD offered

14

advice to trial counsel, the State may wish to call the SAPD attorneys that gave the advice as witnesses

15

in order to show that trial counsel's actions were part of a strategic choice made after careful

16

investigation. There are still more ways in which a conflict could arise, but the Court will not list them

17

all here. The Court's present duty is to inquire to determine whether the SAPD is conflicted in

18

representing the Petitioner in this case where his very life is literally at stake.

19

Structure of the Inquiry

20
21
22

23
24

This Court has carefully considered how to structure the inquiry. In State v. Severson, 147 Idaho
694, 215 P.3d
P3d 414 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court held that in order to satisfy the inquiry requirement
... a trial court's examination of the potential conflict must be thorough and searching and should
...a
be conducted on the record. The court must make the kind of inquiry that might ease the
defendant's dissatisfaction, distrust, or concern. However, in determining whether a conflict
exists, trial courts are entitled to rely on the representations made by counsel. A court may
inquire further into the facts, but is under no original or continuing obligation to do so.

25
26
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Id. at 704, 215 P.3d at 424 (internal quotes and citations omitted). In its letter dated October 12,
1

2

2010, the SAPD urged the Court to rely on the representations of counsel. However, the SAPD has not

3

made any representations to the Court except that contact occurred between the SAPD and trial counsel

4

and that contact may present a possible conflict. That represetittation
represetiltation was made in June in the Ex Parte

5

(HaHn) and
Notice. The SAPD opposed the State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict (Halln)

6

even after the motion was granted, the SAPD declined to provide the Court with further details when

7

asked at the hearing on August 26, 2010. Instead, the SAPD referred all questions from the Court to Mr.
8

Benjamin, including questions about what events prompted the SAPD to file the Ex Parte Notice of
9

10

Possible Conflict of Interest and to retain Mr. Benjamin. When specifically instructed by this Court to

11

supplement the Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest with details about whether the SAPD

12

gave advice to trial counsel, the SAPD filed an Amended Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest which

13

was silent on that issue.

14

15

The SAPD contacted Mr. Benjamin about this matter before filing the Ex Parte Notice of
Possible Conflict of Interest. At different times the SAPD has l compared its view of what Mr.

16

Benjamin's role should be, or is, to that of conflict counsel at trial, and to independent counsel appointed
17

by the Court. However, neither description is particularly apt.· The comparison to independent counsel
18
19

appointed by Judge Copsey after determining that the SAPD was conflicted in that case is inapt because

20

that attorney was selected and appointed by the Court and not the SAPD. The comparison to conflict

21

counsel at trial is inapt because conflict counsel is unnecessary and typically not assigned until after

22

counsel determines that they are conflicted in a particular matter. Here, the SAPD has not offered an

23

opinion whether a conflict exists, and has thus far declined to respond to this Court's repeated requests

24

to state the factual basis for the filing of the Ex Parte Notice. Instead of being forthcoming and candid
25

with the Court about the facts in this case, the SAPD has chosen to alert the Court to the vague
26
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possibility of some unnamed conflict, hire outside counsel on the conflict issue only, and defer all
1

2
3

questions to Mr. Benjamin even though he represents the Petit~oner and not the SAPD.
It is important to note that the SAPD has not requested leave to withdraw from representing the

4

Petitioner. Neither has it turned over the entire case to Mr. Behjamin. Rather, the SAPD asserts that Mr.

5

Benjamin is counsel for Mr. Hall on the conflict issue only and that it remains counsel for Mr. Hall for

6

all other issues in this case. As counsel for the Petitioner, the SAPD has the duty to act in the best

7

interest of its client, a capital defendant with a fundamental constitutional right to conflict-free counsel.
8

Additionally, Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 requires candor toward the tribunal. There are
9

10

affirmati~e misrepresentation. See I.R.P.C. 3.3
instances when a lack of disclosure may constitute an affirmati~e

11

cmt. 3. For these reasons, the SAPD's refusal to answer questions about the factual basis for the filing

12

of the vague Ex Parte Notice is of great concern to this Court. As demonstrated by recent events in the

13

Payne post-conviction case, the SAPD has demonstrated that, even in the face of an inquiry into whether

14

the SAPD is conflicted, it can be forthcoming and candid when it so chooses. Nevertheless, the

I

15

performance of the SAPD in this case has been markedly diffel1ent.
diffeI1ent.

16

This Court has carefully considered the representations made by Mr. Benjamin and will continue
17

to consider those representations throughout the inquiry. The etourt
d:ourt holds Mr. Benjamin in high regard
18
19

professionally and personally, and respects his efforts to date. However, the question of whether a

20

conflict actually exists is for the Court to decide and not for counsel. This Court does not believe that its

21

duty to conduct a thorough and searching inquiry would be sati~fied in this case by simply accepting the

22

opinions of counsel regarding whether a conflict exists without any disclosure of the factual bases for

23

that opinion. While the Court mayor may not eventually reach I\the same conclusion as Mr. Benjamin

24

about whether a conflict exists, this Court is presently lacking the factual background necessary to reach
25

any conclusion.
26
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The Court has given both the SAPD and Mr. Benjamin several opportunities to come fOlWard
1

2

voluntarily with the details of the communications between the SAPD and Hall II trial counsel. In each

3

instance, counsel has chosen not to voluntarily disclose the details of those communications. This is so

4

even though communications between the SAPD and trial counsel about this case are not privileged

5

because the SAPD had not yet been appointed to this case when the communications occurred;

6

furthermore, Mr. Hall waived his attorney-client privilege with respect to trial counsel when he made

I

7

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
8

Lacking voluntary disclosure, one option the Court has considered in order to gain the factual
9

10
11

background necessary to determine whether the SAPD is conflicted in its representation of Mr. Hall is to
order an in camera review of SAPD files. However, the SAPD did represent the Petitioner on the Hall I

12

post-conviction case during the time frame in which these communications occurred and the Court is

13

unaware ofthe extent to which the contact between the SAPD and trial counsel for Hall II intermingled

14

discussions about Hall I and Hall II, and the Court does not wish to expose itself to privileged

15

information concerning Hall I.

16

Appointment of Independent Conflict Counsel
17

This Court's first duty is to determine whether a conflict exists, and the Court is presently lackin
18
19

enough facts to make that determination. Having considered a number of ways to structure the inquiry,

20

and being mindful of the attorney-client privilege issues in this case, the Court hereby appoints R. Keit

21

Roark as independent conflict counsel. Mr. Roark is private counsel certified by the Idaho Supreme

22

Court as qualified to represent indigent defendants at trial and in post-conviction and appellate death

23

penalty cases. Mr. Roark will represent the Petitioner and shall conduct an inquiry into whether

24

conflict exists. As part of this appointment, the Court authorizes Mr. Roark to conduct a thorough and
25

searching review of the SAPD's pre-trial, trial and pre-sentence involvement in the trial of Hall II up to
26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 8

001375

its appointment to represent the Petitioner in this Hall II post-conviction and appeal case. Mr. Roark is
1

2
3

authorized to take depositions in furtherance of his inquiry qf anyone he considers necessary including
but not limited to, if appropriate in his view, the SAPD or Dennis Benjamin.

4

Following a thorough review of the record and any investigation he deems necessary, Mr. Roar

5

shall present his findings to this Court, keeping in mind the attorney-client privilege issues involved i

6

any intertwining of the Hall I and Hall II cases. Independent counsel may submit his report to the Co

7

in affidavit format, to be followed by a hearing.

Specifically, the Court requests a report on the

8

following issues: (1) whether a conflict exists; (2) if so, the general nature of the conflict; (3) the facts
9

10

surrounding or underlying the conflict; and (4) whether independent counsel believes that such conflic

11

may be imputed to the entire SAPD's office. The report shall at all times consider the attorney-clien

12

privilege issues implicated by the SAPD's representation of Mr. Hall on the Hall I post-conviction and

13

appeal.

14

15

If independent counsel finds it appropriate to prepare a further report detailing the extent of the
conflict and other issues that should not be presented to the Court, he may file such a report under seal

16

thus providing a record for review should there be any subsequent post-conviction petitions. Should the
17

sue
Court conclude that there is a conflict of interest, Mr. Roark will advise the Petitioner regarding suc
18
19
20
21

22
23

conflict and any waiver of the conflict.
Other issues

In its letter dated October 12, 2010, the SAPD

state~

that, in the event of the appointment

0

independent counsel, "our position would be that such an appointment would be at county expense since
our office has already paid for the exact same service being provided." This position is not well-take

24

for several reasons.
25
26
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First, if there is a conflict in this case, it is a result of actions taken by the SAPD. Second,
1

2

appointment of independent counsel may not have been neces~ary had the SAPD been more forthcoming

3

in this case in order to provide the Court with a factual basis on which to make a determination. Third,

4

the SAPD has not provided the "exact same service." Mr. Benjamin was chosen by the same office tha

5

is potentially conflicted in this matter, and did not have the authority to depose. He is closely aligned

6

with the SAPD in that he regularly acts as conflict counsel for the SAPD and therefore, a portion of his

7

income is dependent to some degree upon his relationship with that office. Although the Court holds
8

Mr. Benjamin in high regard, he is not this Court's choice or independent counsel and would not have
9

10

been this Court's choice of independent counsel had the SAPD consulted with the Court before choosin

11

him. Further, Idaho Code § 19-871 provides that counsel for indigent defendants shall be compensate

12

out of the budget of the state appellate public defender when tbe state appellate public defender is unable

13

to carry out its duties due to a conflict of interest or any other reason. For the foregoing reasons, the cost

14

of independent conflict counsel appointed by this Court shall be borne by the SAPD.

15

Respondent-State seeks guidance from this Court whether it is free to discuss with Hall II trial

16

counsel conversations held in the presence of the Petitioner where the SAPD was also present.
17

Additionally, the Respondent-State has inquired whether it is free to discuss with Hall II trial counsel
18

19

conversations held with the SAPD whether or not the Petitioner was present. The State is not free to

20

hold such discussions at this time, but may raise the issue again following the submission of independen
independen

21

counsel's report. AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

22
23

Dated this .J:L~ay Of~ ,2010.

24

25

Thomas F. Neville
Nevil1e
District Judge

26
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1

2
3
4

5
6
7

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

ofDtr:edet20 10, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of
~~ay ofDtr:edet2010,

the within instrument to:
Ian H. Thomson
Nicole Owens
IDAHO STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
3647 Lake Harbor Ln
Boise, ID 83703
Tel: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985

8
9

10
11

Jan M. Bennetts
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W Front St, Rm 3191
Boise, ID 83702
Tel: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709

12

13
14

15
16
17

18
19
20

Dennis A. Benjamin
NEVIN BENJAMIN MCKAY & BARTLETT, LLP
303 W Bannock St
PO Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
Tel: (208) 343-1000
Fax: (208) 345-8274
R. Keith Roark
ROARK LAW FIRM
409 NMain St
Hailey, ID 83333
Tel: (208) 788-2427
Fax: (208) 788-3918

21
22

23

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

24

25

D

Clerk
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--:=-=:-"""':~--AM______F.J~~
F~~ ~;rJ
A.M'-

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843

JAN 1 0 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JANET EWS
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ORiGINAL

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CVPC08-03085
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
MEM!ORANDUM DECISION
MEMjORANDUM
AND ORDER
I

(CAPITAL CASE)

Undersigned counsel for the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, having received this Court's

Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel
(hereinafter "Memorandum Decision and Order") as a result of its inquiry into any possible
conflict of interest regarding the State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), now files this timely
Motion to Reconsider that order under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure II(a)(2)(B). Counsel for
Permission to Appeal together with this motion, in an attempt
Mr. Hall is also filing a Motion for Pennission
to abide by the fourteen-day deadline for filing impos1d by both the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule II(a)(2)(B), and Idaho Appellate Rul¢ 12(b).

Mr. Hall incorporates the

arguments and caselaw contained in his Motion for Permission to Appeal.
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Mr. Hall asks this Court to reconsider the findinJs and conclusions in its Memorandum
information. and argument included in this motion.
Decision and Order in light of the additional information,
I

Namely, Mr. Hall asks the Court to revise its holding with regards to the following findings and
orders: (1) whether the SAPD has been candid and forthcoming with the Court while
I

investigating any possible conflict; (2) whether the SAPD has been willing to share information
concerning contacts when no attorney-client privilegel prevents that release; (3) whether
appointing Mr. Roark to act as conflict-counsel for Mr. Hall is any different than the work
i

already performed by Mr. Benjamin; (4) whether any further conflict inquiry is justified in light
of the information now before the Court; and (5) whether the State should be permitted to contact
and inquire of trial counsel (Rob Chastain and Deb Kristal) about their communications with the
SAPD.

I. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Earlier Proceedings and Evidence of SAPD and Trial qounsel Contact

Mr. Hall was found guilty in connection with the rape, kidnapping and killing of Lynn
Henneman in October of 2004 in Ada County Case Numl1er CR-FE-2003-0000518. As a result
of his conviction of first degree murder, Mr. Hall received a sentence of death. Thereafter, the
SAPD was appointed to represent Mr. Hall, and that case has since been designated "Hall I,"
SPOT Case No. 05-00155 in post-conviction. While the SAPD was representing Erick Hall in
I

Hall I, the case against Mr. Hall involving the death of Cheryl Hanlon was proceeding in the
qhastain and Deb Kristal. That case
district court where Mr. Hall was represented by Rob Cfhastain
involving the death of Cheryl Hanlon, representing the above-captioned matter, has since been
designated as "Hall II," Case No. CV PC 08-03085 in post~conviction.
post~conviction.
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For a period of several months after receiving his first death sentence, Mr. Hall was
SAPD-constit\!lting his appellate and post-conviction
represented by two sets of attorneys, the SAPD-eonstih,!lting
!

counsel in Hall I-and Mr. Chastain and Ms. Kristal-who were his trial attorneys on Hall II.
Consequently, Mr. Hall had an established attorney-client relationship with both sets of
attorneys, independent from his representation by the otper. During that time, counsel at the
I!

SAPD was undertaking investigation and preparation of his post-conviction claims in Hall I at
the very same time that his trial attorneys were preparing for a guilt and mitigation phase in Hall
II. Both sets of counsel were appearing before this Court puring 2006 and 2007, litigating issues
relevant to their respective cases.
On numerous occasions, this Court and the State heard multiple representations by both
attorneys at the SAPD and from Mr. Chastain, that a certain amount of information sharing was
I

being contemplated between post-conviction counsel and trial counsel. This information was
never the result of an investigation by the Court or by the State, and was frequently brought up
by counsel in order to inform. the Court of the progress and
developments in their investigation.
I
On several occasions, counsel sought guidance from the Court as to the extent of information
sharing that should be allowed, and also requested input from the State as to whether there were
any objections. In some instances, the Court even

encour~ged

or permitted such cooperation by

counsel.
As early as July 5, 2006, Mr. Ackley (then at the SAPD) indicated to the Court that, "I
think the reason for that is because trial counsel separated Idocuments they thought were relevant
to the Hanlon case and gave that to conflict counsel, I think, Rob Chastain and Deborah Kristal,
and then gave us some files. And in the course of reviewing Ms. Kristal

and Mr.

Chastain's

files we have confirmed that." Case No. SPOT 05-00155, ITr. 7/5/06, p. 141, Ls. 17-22, attached
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hereto as Appendix 1. Mr. Chastain also referred to somel collaboration and cooperation with the
SAPD in seeking information and testing for the Mr. Hall. Specifically, both trial counsel in
I

Hall II and the SAPD filed similar motions in September 2007, leading to the following
exchange:
COURT:
. . . Another unrelated subject, Motion for Fragile-X Blood Test filed
September 27, last week, by Mr. Chastain and Ms. Kristal. ...
don'~ know ifthe SAPD has filed a similar
MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, as I understand-I don'~
motion, but it's-we only need one sample, I think. But it's-this was-as the Court
may recall, Doctor Meracangus (sic) came up while we were picking a jury.
COURT: Yes.
MR. CHASTAIN: This was as a result of, I guess, some of his findings and his
suggestion.
COURT: Okay.
MR. CHASTAIN: And so we filed this contemporaneously with SAPD.
COURT: Yes, I should have said, because I'm aware of-in fact, I have a copy of the
motion here from the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, which are the petitioners
in the postconviction relief for the last murder casF. They also have filed a motion here
and I have access to it somewhere here. And I haven't had a chance to see if there is any
difference, but it is intended to be the same motion.
MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, Your Honor.
Case. No. CV PC 08-03085, Tr. 10/2/07, p. 3980, Ls. 16-18; p. 3981, Ls. 13-p. 3982, Ls. 7,
I!

attached hereto as Appendix 2. Later on March 1, 2007, in his motion to withdraw as counsel
Mr. Chastain mentions that there had even been meetings along with the SAPD attorneys,
MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, it really came to a head during meetings held out at the
penitentiary between Ms. Kristal, myself, certain of our experts. The State Appellate
Public Defender was there....
there ....
In essence--in essence, called me a liar. He said that I didn't hear what I heard. And we
tried to rectify that. Ms. Kristal and a member of the SAPD went out two days later to try
to make sure that yes, that was what was said, that we had
[....
[.... ]
COURT: When was the meeting at the penitenti¥y that you spoke about where there
wasth
14th.
•
MR. CHASTAIN: In the last 10 days. I don't know that I can tell you. The 14
th
14th
COURT: the 14
of February?
MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: Of2007?
Of20077
I
i
MR. CHASTAIN: Yes. And then Ms. Kristal went back two days later.
COURT: So just literally 14 days ago.
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MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, sir.
COURT: Fifteen days ago.
MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: And she went back two days after that.
MR. CHASTAIN: It may have been a couple of days later than that. There were some
transport issues. But she--don't quote us on the two days later, but-but-
Case. No. CV PC 08-03085, Tr. 311107,
3/1/07, p. 18, Ls. 6-9, 16-20; and p. 21, L. 16-p.
l6-p. 22, L. 9,
attached hereto as Appendix 3.
Mr. Chastain also indicates, in a hearing where both Mr. Chastain and Mr. Ackley were
present together, along with the State, that the trial attorneys would be sharing information with
the SAPD.
MR. CHASTAIN: [...]
[... J I-we spoke with the testing people. The-the MRI part of the
exam has been completed. However, the physician that's going to read it will not do that
until next week.
In terms of sharing it with the State Appellate Public Defender, we're glad to do that. We
don't see any conflict or any-any conflict of interest in-in doing that.
We don't know what the results are, don't know what-what they're going to show. We
can't promise that we're going to, necessarily, use those in our-in mitigation phase,
until we speak with the professionals.
But in terms of saving money, time, and effort, we're glad to-to share those-those
those--those
tests, and those results, with Mr. Hall's appellate lawyers.
COURT: Now, it-was it just an MRI?
MR. CHASTAIN: It was a PET scan.

[[ ....J]
COURT: But you're-okay.
you're--okay. That answers the first question. You're willing to share
this with petitioner's Counsel on the postconviction matter.
MR. CHASTAIN: Absolutely.
COURT: Okay. Does the State have any objection to that being shared?
MR. BOURNE: No, sir.
MS. BENNETTS: No, Your Honor, in both cases.
COURT: Okay. All right. But I-I presume, from this-this renewed motion, as
entitled, that you're looking for much more than a PET scan; is that-is that fair to say?
MR. ACKLEY: Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: Okay. Do you want to be heard in support ofthe motion?
MR. ACKLEY: Yes, thank you....
you....
Case. No. SPOT 05-00155, Tr. 2116107,
2/16/07, p. 44., L. 17-p. 45, L. 9; p. 46, L. 13-p. 47, L. 6, attached
hereto as Appendix 4. In following up to that February 16, 2007, hearing, the SAPD filed a
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•related Order to Transport Petitioner No Later Than February 26, 2007 for Radiological and

Serological Testing, attached hereto as Appendix 5. As part of that order, the SAPD submitted
an attached email from Mark Ackley to Janet Ellis and Roger Bourne. In that email.Mr. Ackley
had indicated to all parties that the request for the results to be sent directly to Dr. Merikangas
was "a reference to our agreement to share these tests with the Hanlon defense team." !d. at p. 4.
The longest discussion concerning the extent of cooperation between the SAPD and the
Hanlon trial team appears in a discussion between Mr. Ackley and the Court on June 15, 2007,
where Mr. Ackley seeks the Court's guidance on how continued exchange of information should
be handled.
MR. ACKLEY: And so any directive that the Court can give us, I'm just going to
continue to err on the side of filing matters under seal.
Along that line, we were speaking to trial counsel on the Hanlon case, Deborah Kristal
and Rob Chastain; and they were going to join our motion for the Dodd-for the release
ofthe Dodd information that I mentioned earlier.
COURT: The serial rapist murder in Washington state?
MR. ACKLEY: Yes. And I actually hesitated. I chose not to give to them what we
actually submitted under seal because it was submitted under seal. So I guess
guessCOURT: They have already filed just todayMR. ACKLEY: Oh. Did they?
COURT: -a motion for discovery on that issue.
MR. ACKLEY: Okay. Great.
[.... ]
COURT: And I think you have done it correctly.
MR. ACKLEY: okay. And I will continue that.
As we receive confidential information through the course of our investigation or through
Court orders, and if it's relevant, say, to the mitigation case in the Henneman case, it
would clearly seem from our perspective to be relevant in the Hanlon case. Are we free
to share that with trial counsel if we inform them of the confidential nature or the manner
in which we acquired this information in the Hanlon case?
COURT: Well Jan Bennetts, who is prosecuting the so-called Hanlon case, the second
capital case that hasn't yet-that was spectacularly unsuccessful in getting a jury for here
after eight long days, I think she should be asked as well.
My sense is that-and I don't speak for Ms. Bennetts, obviously. But my sense is that
she would think that was fair, at least to make them aware and that they need to ask this
Court for something and-such as they did today in the document that they filed vis-a-vie
Mr. Dodd today for specific discovery . .. I would rather have that information
known to trial counsel before that than after. And so that's what my general sense
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is of what should happen. But it-so it's kind of a rebuttable presumption thinking yes,
probably that information should be shared, but I think Ms. Bennetts needs to be in
the loop and they may need to make a specific request, just like they have today.
Case. No. SPOT 05-001155, Tr. 6/15/07, p. 27, L. 19-p. 28, L. 13; p. 29, L. 7- p. 30, L. 7 ; p. 30,
Ls. 15-22 (emphasis added), attached hereto as Appendix 6.
B. The SAPD Filings in the Context of Abdullah v. State

Although the SAPD has made passing reference to the unrelated proceedings involving
Judge Copsey, counsel for Mr. Hall cannot overemphasize the impact the conflict inquiry in that
case had on the deliberations and filings made in the above-captioned matter. Consequently, as a
full explanation of that impact, Mr. Hall now files a Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice
(hereinafter "Motion for Judicial Notice "). In particular, the Court should note that attorneys,
including Ms. Owens and Ms. Romero were positioned at the SAPD to have been assigned
counsel to the cases of both Mr. Hall and Mr. Abdullah. See Motion for Judicial Notice.
In the matter of Abdullah v. State, after the Judge inquired as to whether contacts between
the SAPD and trial counsel gave rise to any conflict, the SAPD filed its own representations that
upon review no conflict existed. Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit C. Although the State did
not contest that finding, the Court, nevertheless, entered a finding that a conflict did exist and
that "the SAPD had a conflict in its representation of Mr. Abdullah." Motion for Judicial Notice,
Exhibit D.

Only after that finding did Judge Copsey then appoint Mr. Roark to act as an

independent counselor to Mr. Abdullah. Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit F. In that case, the
SAPD had been asked to make a representation as to the existence of the conflict, and even in
spite of that representation the court then found to the contrary and appointed separate counsel.
It was not until May 7, 2010, that Mr. Abdullah finally waived the conflict and the SAPD was

reappointed to represent him. Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit J.
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C. The Ex Parte Notice and Subsequent Proceedings
On June 28, 2010, the SAPD filed an Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest
(hereinafter "Ex Parte Notice") under seal, which indicated that due to the extent of contact
between staff at the SAPD (representing Petitioner in post conviction proceedings on Hall I) with
trial counsel (representing Petitioner at trial in Hall II), the SAPD became concerned of the
appearance of a possible conflict of interest. The SAPD contracted with Dennis Benjamin, to act
as Mr. Hall's attorney, to review those contacts and to advise Mr. Hall as to any possible conflict
which he could identify. The SAPD asked the Court to reschedule and vacate an upcoming
hearing, pending the resolution of the conflict issue. In that order the "SAPD did not admit or
deny that it had a conflict in this case." Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 2, Ls. 15-16.
On August 3, 2010, without having seen the SAPD's Ex Parte Notice, the State filed a
Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD Conflict (Hall II) (hereinafter "State's Motion for
Inquiry"). In that motion the State asked that the Court inquire as to whether there was any
conflict of interest between the SAPD and Mr. Hall, due to the cooperation with trial counsel and
also requested that the SAPD be ordered to disclose any correspondence, notes, documents and
conversations with Mr. Hall or trial counsel "prior to the SAPD post-conviction appointment on
January 4, 2008, on the Hall II case regarding matters that related to the Hall II case." State's
Motion/or Inquiry, p. 2. According to the State, these documents "would not be protected by the
Attorney-Client Privilege." Id.
The SAPD filed a Response to State's Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD Conflict
(Hall II) (hereinafter "Response") on the same day of the originally scheduled status conference,
August 6, 20 10. In that Response, the SAPD requested that the Court wait in ruling on the

MOTION TO RECONSIDER MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

8
001386

-State's motion until Mr. Benjamin could finish his review of the issue. This would allow the
Court to have a representation from Mr. Hall's attorney (Mr. Benjamin) as to whether any
conflict existed, and if so the nature and extent of that conflict before conducting a targeted
inquiry and determining whether a waiver would be necessary.

In the Response, Mr. Hall

addressed the applicable Standards of Professional Conduct, and counsel's duty to make conflict
determinations. See discussion, Response at 3-7. The SAPD represented that in order to fulfill
that obligation the SAPD had contracted with conflict counsel in order to advise Mr. Hall on any
potential conflict and any possible consequences a conflict might have. The Response also
emphasized the fact that the two attorney in question at the SAPD, Mr. Ackley and Ms. Swensen,
were no longer at the office and that this dramatically effected any evaluation of whether Mr.
Hall's current counsel would be compromised in the event a conflict was found. See discussion,
Id. 6. The Response suggested that the Court had no duty to undertake an inquiry until it was

had information which would provide a basis to believe that a conflict may exist, and that in the
absence of Mr. Hall or the State raising a specific issue, the Court should rely on conflict counsel
to make those representations. See discussion, Id. at7-9.
The SAPD noted that all communications with Mr. Hall were protected by either the
attorney-client privilege, work product rule, or notions of attorney-client confidentiality, and that
the Rules of Professional Conduct "specifically refer not to the representation of a case, but to
'representation of a client.' I.R.P.C.
I.R.P .C. Rule 1.6(a)" Response, p. 10. Consequently, the SAPD was
legally and ethically prevented from sharing the contents of those communications with either
the State or the Court. The SAPD asked in conclusion that the Court "take under consideration
independent counsel' current open investigation into the existence and implications of any
possible conflicts with prior attorneys at the SAPD, and deem the SAPD's efforts through
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independent counsel adequate until further representations can be made to the Court." Response,
p.13.
At the previously scheduled hearing of August 6 th , in light of the State's motion, the
Court disclosed the SAPD's Ex Parte Notice to the State, asked the State to reply to the SAPD's

Response by August 16th , and gave the SAPD an opportunity to file a subsequent answer by
August 20th • The Court also asked the parties to return on August 26th , for a further hearing.)
The State filed a Memorandum in Support of State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible

SAPD Conflict (Hall II) (hereinafter "Memorandum in Support") on August 16,2010. The State
simply reiterated that the Court's examination of any potential conflict must be thorough and
searching and that the State would be entitled to explore all SAPD communications with Mr.
Hall or trial counsel in order for the State may respond to any post conviction claims.

Memorandum in Support, p. 5.

The State also made the argument that the attorney-client

privilege does not apply where the communications of the SAPD had to do with Hall II matters
(as opposed to Hall
I). See discussion, Id. at 3-4.
Hall!).
On August 17, 2010, the State filed another motion for inquiry into a conflict with the
SAPD on an unrelated capital case before this Court.

See State's Motion for Inquiry Into

Possible Conflict with the State Appellate Public Defender, in Darrell Edward Payne v. State of
Idaho, Case No. CV PC 2010-11137, Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit K.
The SAPD filed a Reply to Memorandum in Support of State's Motion for Inquiry into

Possible SAPD Conflict (Hall II) (hereinafter "Reply"), on August 20, 2010. In the SAPD's
Reply, counsel for Mr. Hall pointed out that targeted inquiries by the Court are generally raised

) Because no transcript has been prepared for the hearings referred to in this Motion, the
representations are in accordance with counsel's best recollection. Counsel defers to the Court's
memory or notes where there may be differences of opinion, until a proper transcript can be
prepared, if necessary.
MOTION TO RECONSIDER MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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-by the defendant (like in State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694 (2009», or by the specific allegations
by the State (like in State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53 (2003». Reply, p. 2. Here, Mr. Hall had
never raised any concern with the Court, and the State's Motion for Inquiry did not include any
infonnation that would lead one to believe that a conflict did exist. "The SAPD believed that
consultation with an independent conflict attorney would provide Hall with the opportunity to
take any appropriate action they deemed necessary." Reply, p. 3. The SAPD acknowledged that
the Court should not necessarily be satisfied with the SAPD's own representations as to the
nature of any potential conflict since we first raised the issue, "however, counsel also believes
that representations made by Mr. Benjamin, as independent conflict counsel, should not suffer
the same skepticism and would certainly allow the Court to rely on his representations." Id. at 4.
In response to the State's assertion that they would be entitled to explore trial counsel's
communications, the SAPD agreed. Id. at 4-5 ("The State is entitled to all correspondence and
documents in possession of the SAPD from Ms. Krystal [sic] and Mr. Chastain. The State has
already been offered all of those documents. It is not disputed that many of those materials
necessarily waive any attorney-client privilege that Mr. Hall would have had with trial
counsel.").
counse1.").

However, the SAPD maintained that post conviction counsel was required to

continue to assert the attorney-client privilege that existed between the SAPD and Mr. Hall,
which has never been waived, with regards to the SAPD's own documentation. See discussion
Id. at 5-6.

The Reply raised three possible courses the court could take, but suggested that the Court
counsel. The SAPD cited its statutory
rely on the representations of Mr. Benjamin as conflict counse1.
obligation to provide Mr. Hall with counsel where the SAPD believes that they are unable to
carry out its duties. See discussion of Idaho Code §19-871, Id. at 7-8. ("Here, the SAPD
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-identified a situation

III

which it believed it was unable to adequately advise Mr. Hall.

Consequently, the SAPD arranged for counsel and has assumed the financial responsibility for
such an assignment." Id. at 8. "[T]he SAPD has contracted with conflict counsel solely to
determine whether or not a conflict actually does exist and to advise the defendant of his rights if
an actual conflict does exist." Id.) The SAPD made the argument that by contracting with Mr.
§ 19-871 (d), and argued that if
Benjamin, it had satisfied its statutory obligation under I.e. §19-871
another attorney was appointed by the Court, then any such appointment would be in
9contravention of §19-871 and would fall under I.C. §19-860(b). See discussion in Reply, pp. 9
10. If a second attorney was appointed to investigate a conflict, that attorney would be engaged
19-4904
as an advisor to the court and the County would incur the related expenses under I.C. §§19-4904
and §19-860. /d. at 9.
At the hearing held on August 26, 2010, the SAPD opposed the State's motion for an
inquiry into the conflict, without hearing from Mr. Benjamin. Although Mr. Benjamin was
present in court, he was not allowed to address the Court with his findings or make any
representations about his own inquiry into the conflict and consultation with Mr. Hall. The
Court granted the State's motion, but made no final determinations as to the scope or type of
proceeding it would follow. Instead, the Court requested that the SAPD file an Amended Notice
of Possible Conflict of Interest by August 30, 2010, and scheduled another hearing for
September 1, 2010.
The SAPD filed an Amended Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest (hereinafter
"Amended Notice") on August 30, 2010. In the Amended Notice, the SAPD represented that

attorneys and staff had cooperated with trial counsel in Hall II by sharing testing and expert
information obtained during the course of post-conviction proceedings in Hall I, and that the

MOTION TO RECONSIDER MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

12
001390

-Court had encouraged certain sharing of infonnation at that time. Amended Notice, p. 2. The
postSAPD also noted that there had been numerous contacts between trial counsel and post
..emailsbackandforth.primarily between Mr.
conviction counsel at the SAPD, which included ..emailsbackandforth.primarily
Ackley and Ms. Kristal; phone calls between Mr. Ackley and Ms. Kristal or Mr. Chastain;
meetings on at least two occasions where all attorneys were present; in addition to contacts with
staff at the SAPD in order to facilitate or arrange the exchange of infonnation regarding testing
and experts." !d. at 3. It was reiterated that "since Ms. Kristal and Mr. Chastain were involved
in all communications with the SAPD regarding Hall II, and Mr. Hall has waived the attorneyattorney
client privilege with respect to his trial counsel, the content and nature of those communications
have already been made available to the State by providing complete access to trial counsels'
files. In addition, if the State desires to inquire further, Ms. Kristal and Mr. Chastain would be
free to discuss those matters in person." Id.
The final suggestion by the SAPD in the Amended Notice is that "disclosure as to the
specific content of those communications should be directed at Mr. Benjamin," who had been
contracted by the SAPD to represent Mr. Hall on the conflict issue. Id. In that vein, Dennis
Benjamin filed a Limited Notice of Appearance with this Court on August 30, 2010.

In

of Dennis Benjamin on the same
conjunction with his notice of appearance, he filed the Affidavit ofDennis

day. Mr. Benjamin indicated in his affidavit that he had been hired to determine whether the
SAPD has "a conflict of interest in representing Erick Hall and to advise Mr. Hall of my
of Dennis Benjamin,
findings. In this matter, my client is Mr. Hall." Affidavit ofDennis

~5.

He indicated

that he had conducted an extensive and thorough investigation of the record, including the postpost
conviction petitions, attorney-client files, copies of correspondence, and SAPD notes. Id. at

~7.

He also interviewed most of those involved (including Paula Swenson, Mark Ackley, Robert
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Chastain, Deborah Kristal, Michael Shaw, and Gary Starkey).

Id.

Mr. Benjamin made

representations to the Court that in his estimation and professional judgment no conflict between
~1 O. In addition, he had informed his client of that finding
Mr. Hall and the SAPD exists. 2 Id. at ~l

and advised him accordingly. Id. at ~5.
At the conflict hearing on September 1,2010, the Court noted that he had received the
additional filings by the SAPD and Mr. Benjamin. In response the Court requested that the State
file any additional brief in response to those filings by October 4, 2010, and scheduled a hearing
for October 19,2010. The Court also allowed the SAPD to submit to the Court, by October 12,
2010, a letter including its suggestions to the Court how it should proceed with its inquiry.
of Possible Conflict and
The State filed their State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice ofPossible
of Dennis Benjamin (hereinafter "State's Response"), under seal, on October 4, 2010.
Affidavit ofDennis

The State persisted in its position that they should be entitled to receive SAPD correspondence
and communications with trial counsel. State's Response, p. 3. It also expressed a reluctance to
inquire with trial counsel about any communication with the SAPD or advice that may have been
given. See Id. at 2. In addition, the State argued that "SAPO counsel cannot make ineffective

It is worth noting that Mr. Benjamin makes the representation that in his evaluation the "SAPO
did not give trial counsel advice on how to proceed in Hall II." Id. at ~1O.
~IO. And that "with one
exception ... it is clear that the SAPD lawyers decided to not give advice to trial counsel due to
a concern over creating a conflict of interest." Id. at ~ll.
~11. Mr. Benjamin goes on to explain that
there was one instance of advice given to trial counsel by the SAPO, that the trial lawyers took
that advice and that the result was favorable to Mr. Hall. Id. at ~12. In explanation, Mr.
Benjamin indicates that "there is no claim in the Amended Petition that trial counsel were
ineffective for taking this action. Further, there is no legal basis for SAPO to challenge that
decision in the post-conviction proceedings because the result was favorable to Mr. Hall. Thus,
this single piece of advice does not create a conflict of interest under Rules of Professional
Conduct." Id.
2
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assistance of counsel claims and at the same time be potential witnesses regarding those same
claims.,,3 Id. at 3.
The remainder of the State's Response is filled with "[e]xamples
"[ e]xamples of scenarios where a
potential conflict could arise.,,4 Id. at 4. However, there was no evidence presented by the State
that any of their scenarios were founded in materials in possession by the State, in either the Ex

Parte Notice or the Amended Notice submitted by the SAPD, or in the Affidavit of Dennis
Benjamin. The State's "concern is that neither the State nor this Court know the content of all
the material [Mr. Benjamin] reviewed or the content of all of the interviews he conducted.
Therefore, neither the State nor the Court can compare the nature of the material and the
conversations with claims made in the Amended Petition. Without the content, the Court is
unable to decide the conflict question." State's Response, p. 7. The State characterizes the
August 30th filings by the SAPD and Mr. Benjamin, by concluding that "[t]here is no substance
to any of the conclusory statements. There is no record upon which this Court can base a ruling.
Nor is there a record upon which an appellate court could base a decision." Id., p. 10 (citation
omitted). However, the State admitted that "it makes sense for this Court to conduct an inquiry

3 The State never addresses in any of its filings how any communication by or with Mr. Ackley
or Ms. Swensen, who are no longer at the SAPD, would make any person currently representing
the petitioner at the SAPD a witness. See petitioner's discussion of Mr. Ackley and Ms.
Swensen as potential witnesses in Response at pp. 6-7.
4 "A conflict could arise if the SAPD gave advice to trial counsel on a particular issue and now
the SAPD raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on that issue, claiming that trial
counsel did not do what the SAPD advised them to do." Id. at 4; "a conflict could arise if
communication the SAPD had with trial counsel involved strategy, even if the SAPD did not
give 'advice' per se." Id. at 5; "what if the SAPD created expectations with the Petitioner about
how this case would proceed during trial counsel's representation of the Petitioner and this
expectation that was created led to a breakdown in the Petitioner's relationship with trial
counsel?" Id. at 6; and "What if the SAPD advised or suggested things to the Petitioner about
this case in the absence of trial counsel?" Id.
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of Mr. Benjamin and detennine if this Court is satisfied that his review was searching and
thorough." Id., p. 10.
On October 12, 2010, Ian Thomson, counsel for Mr. Hall at the SAPD, submitted an
th

argument prior to the October 19 hearing by way of a letter including the different possible
courses of action in any inquiry taken by the Court (hereinafter "Letter "). Along with that letter,
the SAPD included a transcript of the record from the transcript in Abdullah v. State, on April 23,
2010. Case No. CV PC 05-00308, Tr. 4/23110,
4/23/10, attached hereto as Appendix 7. At the hearing on
October 19, 2010, undersigned counsel asked that the letter and transcript be admitted as part of
the record in lieu of lengthy oral argument and the Court granted that request. The SAPD argued
that the Court ought to rely on the representations found in the Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin,
when considering whether a more specific and targeted inquiry ought to take place. The SAPD,
agreed with the State and suggested that the Court should inquire ofMr. Benjamin on the record.

See Letter, at pp. 1-2 ("I believe that if the Court were to hear from Mr. Benjamin, on the record,
his representation and analysis would accomplish the exact same function as did Mr. Roark in
the case of Mr. Abdullah before the Honorable Judge Copsey.") "Such a path should satisfy the
Court that a searching and independent inquiry has been made into the issue. In addition, this
path would be the least expensive and least intrusive." Id. at p. 2. And finally, "Mr. Benjamin's
representation would accomplish the same thing by avoiding the need for an identical inquiry
being made by a similarly situated attorney, but this time at the county's expense."s Id., p. 3.

The SAPD also noted that there were three other conceivable alternatives: (l)
(1) the Court could
alternatively appoint another attorney to evaluate the conflict, noting that doing so would be
imprudent and inappropriate.; (2) the Court could order a judicial inquest and order that all
privileged files be turned over to the Court for its own review of the conflict; noting that such an
order would likely precipitate a motion asking for a separate Judge; and (3) the Court could order
the SAPD to tum over to the State all privileged materials, noting that such a step would likely
lead to an appeal of such an order. See discussion in Letter, pp. 3-4.
S
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-The SAPD's recommendation took into consideration the Court's need to consider "(1) the
avoidance of additional and unnecessary delays, (2) the conservation of limited County and State
resources, (3) the protection of the attorney-client privilege, and (4) a concerted effort to avoid
creating any future or unnecessary conflict with the Court." !d., p. 4.
At the October 19,2010, hearing the Court did not hear from Mr. Benjamin, and did not
of Dennis
inquire any further into the nature and content of the Amended Notice or the Affidavit ofDennis
Benjamin. The Court did not issue an oral decision, and instead notified the parties that a
decision would be issued in writing.
D. The Court's Memorandum Decision and Order
The Court filed its Memorandum Decision and Order on December 27, 2010. In that
Memorandum Decision and Order, the Court makes several factual findings and conclusions of
law. The Court found that "the SAPD did not admit or deny that it had a conflict in this case" in
the Ex Parte Notice filed on June 29,2010. Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 2, Ls. 15-16.
It also indicates that after the filing and several court dates, the Court instructed the SAPD to

disclose "further details about such contact and asked specifically for information regarding
whether the SAPD had given advice to the Petitioner's trial attorneys." Id. at 3. The Court also
found that the Amended Notice only provided the Court with details about the methods by which
the contact occurred, and "did not provide any information about the substance of the
conversations or disclose whether the SAPD gave advice to trial counsel, despite this Court's
specific request." Id. The Court, however, later admitted that the Affidavit ofDennis
of Dennis Benjamin
(filed on the same day as the Amended Notice) states that one of the former SAPD lawyers gave
advice to trial counsel. See Id., p. 3.

II. ARGUMENT
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Counsel for Mr. Hall requests this Court incorporate by reference all arguments already
made in the submissions and filings referenced herein, including those in the Motion for

Permission to Appeal. 6
Mr. Hall asks this Court to reconsider various findings and orders contained in its

Memorandum Decision and Order. Namely, Mr. Hall asks the Court to now reconsider its
several holdings and determine that: (1) the SAPD brought the conflict attention to the Court as
soon as it realized that there might be an appearance of conflict in light of the Abdullah case, and
has been candid and forthcoming with the Court while investigating any possible conflict; (2)
the SAPD has been willing to share information concerning contacts when no attorney-client
privilege prevents that release; (3) appointing Mr. Roark to act as conflict-counsel for Mr. Hall is
no different than the work already performed by Mr. Benjamin, and will lead to additional
expense and delay; (4) no further conflict inquiry is justified in light ofthe information presently
before the Court; and (5) the State should be permitted and encouraged to inquire of trial counsel
(Rob Chastain and Deb Kristal) about their communications with the SAPD in order to resolve
any doubts as to the existence of a conflict in the most expeditious manner.
A. The SAPD Has Been Candid and Forthcoming With the Court

In its attempt to be as forthcoming as possible with the Court-by raising the issue in the
first place-the SAPD has unintentionally led this Court to believe that it is somehow hiding
information from the Court. It is clear, after reading the Court's Memorandum Decision and

Order, that in retrospect, the SAPD's error was in projecting onto this Court its experience in the
Abdullah case. Mr. Hall acknowledges that, as the issue is framed by the Court, the SAPD's

To the extent that the Court must take judicial notice of the record in the case of Hall I, we ask
that this court take judicial notice of those transcripts for this purpose.

6
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actions since its filing of the Ex Parte Notice could be seen as evasive. However, if placed in its
proper context, the facts show the contrary.
The SAPD has been very concerned with its candor and willingness to fully disclose all
non-privileged information to the Court during the course of its conflict review. In fact, the

evidence shows that the SAPD shared with the Court the fact that it had been communicating and
sharing information with trial counsel at the time those contacts were occurring. In addition, it
was the SAPD who first brought to the Court's attention that it believed a conflict review was
necessary in this case, and was neither responding to the State's motion or an inquiry made by
the Court. Due to its recent experience in the Abdullah case, the SAPD chose to allow that
conflict review to be conducted by a contracted conflict attorney. As a result, the SAPD felt
constrained in making an explicit representation to the Court as to whether a conflict existed, and
instead believed that the review and analysis provided by the conflict attorney would satisfy the
Court's wishes.
During the course of the SAPD's representations in post-conviction proceedings on Hall
I, the SAPD did cooperate with Mr. Hall's trial counsel on the instant case. Those contacts were
never hidden from the court or the State and references were repeatedly made to those contacts
by Mr. Ackley and Mr. Chastain. See generally discussion supra. at I(A).
J(A). It is evident that on
multiple occasions, the fact that information from discovery and investigation was being shared
in both directions between the SAPD and trial counsel. In addition, Mr. Ackley, even went so
far as to ask the Court for guidance as to whether the SAPD was appropriately handling the
exchange of that information. See Motion for Judicial Notice, Case No. SPOT 05-001155, Tr.
6/15/07, p. 27, L. 19-p. 28, L. 13; p. 29, L. 7- p. 30, L. 7; p. 30, Ls. 15-22. During that period
the SAPD never attempted to hide from the Court any communications it had with trial counsel,
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and never evaded questions posed to it by the Court. These contacts represent many of the very
same contacts that have been raised by the SAPD in its Ex Parte Notice.
In June of 2010, the SAPD had recently undergone a painstaking and lengthy conflict
inquiry in another case, which was precipitated by only a few contacts between trial counsel and
the SAPD prior to any attorney-client relationship being formed between the SAPD and that
petitioner. Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit D. It should be noted that the Abdullah conflict
inquiry occurred several years into the post-conviction proceedings, and only months before an
evidentiary hearing on the final amended petition for post-conviction relief. Because of the
devastating nature of the Court's findings and the lengthy delay and expense that the
investigation caused, the SAPD was extremely sensitive to the effect that such an inquiry might
have on its other cases. Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit G. It also believed that any conflict
issues should be resolved as soon as possible.
Counsel for Mr. Hall made the decision to undertake a more complete conflict review of
the instant case. That review was in accordance with the obligations found in the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7. Logically, the SAPD believed that the appearance of conflict
with Mr. Hall was possible given the recent finding in the case of Mr. Abdullah.

In that case,

the SAPD had already conducted its own review and determined in response to the Court's
inquiry that no conflict existed. Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit C. Even though the State
had no reason to dispute the SAPD's determination in its own memorandum, Judge Copsey
nevertheless made a finding that an actual conflict existed. Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit
D. The appointment of Mr. Roark was made after the Judge had already made a preliminary
determination that a conflict existed, and the Court asked Mr. Roark to advise Mr. Abdullah as to
how he should proceed. Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit F. It should be clear that such a
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finding of a conflict, in direct opposition to the finding made by counsel could have a significant
impact on the attorney-client relationship and any existing relationship of trust.
Mr. Abdullah eventually waived the conflict and the SAPD was reappointed to represent
him on May 7, 2010. Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit J. Ultimately, the SAPD determined
that in order to be as forthcoming and transparent as possible with the Court, it would file an Ex

Parte Notice informing the Court that a conflict review was underway and that a conflict
attorney had been arranged for Mr. Hall. In its attempt to notify the Court that more time was
necessary in order to reach a satisfactory conclusion that no conflict existed, and to vacate an
upcoming status date, the SAPD unintentionally precipitated a full-scale judicial inquiry into the
existence of a conflict.
It cannot be overlooked that if the SAPO were attempting to evade the Court, or hide

information from the Court regarding any contacts between the SAPD and trial counsel, the
SAPD would never have filed the Ex Parte Notice on its own. The State did not file anything
raising the issue until almost six weeks later. Furthermore, ifthe SAPO was concerned about the
State or the Court discovering the actual nature and contents of the communications Mr. Ackley
and Ms. Swensen had with trial counsel, the SAPD would not be as insistent that the State
contact and discuss those very questions with Mr. Chastain and Ms. Kristal.
The statutory charter of the State Appellate Public Defender makes it clear that "should
the state appellate public defender be unable to carry out the duties required in this act because of
a conflict of interest or any other reason, the state appellate public defender shall arrange for
counsel for indigent defendants to be compensated out of the budget of the state appellate public
defender." Idaho Code §§19-871.
19-871.
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The Court makes repeated reference in its Memorandum Decision and Order that the
SAPD has refused to make any determinations as to whether a conflict actually exists. The
SAPD has refrained from making such a representation in order to insulate itself from allegations
of bias or that its judgment is compromised. In the Court's eyes, this wariness may have been
unwarranted and could be seen as the primary mistake of the SAPD in handling the inquiry as it
has. However, the SAPD did not want to advise Mr. Hall as to whether a conflict existed, only
to have that representation contradicted by another attorney or the Court, as happened in the
Abdullah case. Instead, the SAPD, in contracting with Mr. Benjamin, was willing to "live or

die" by his evaluation and whatever course of action he and Mr. Hall decided to take.
When the Court ordered on August 26, 2010, that an Amended Notice of Possible
Conflict should be filed to answer questions regarding the nature of the contact between the
SAPD and trial counsel, the SAPD was under the impression that its Amended Notice in
conjunction with the Affidavit ofDennis
of Dennis Benjamin would satisfy the request made by the Court,
and was not under the impression that the answer to the Court's question must come from the
SAPD itself. In addition, the SAPO did not want to appear, by making representations as to the
conflict issue, that it was in collusion with Mr. Benjamin or using his determination to bolster its
own evaluation. The Court, however, does not find whether the Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin
sufficiently provides those details that were requested by the Court, or whether the Amended
Notice was considered in conjunction with the affidavit to have satisfied the Court's request.

From the very beginning, the SAPO has shared with the Court that there was contact with
trial counsel in order to share and facilitate information helpful to Mr. Hall. In addition, as soon
as it became clear to the SAPD, in light of the Abdullah case, that there might be a specter of
conflict raised in this case, the SAPD immediately filed its Ex Parte Notice to the Court. It then
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arranged to provide Mr. Hall with conflict counsel in order to make a determination of whether a
conflict exists.

The SAPD refrained from interfering in that investigation, or making any

representations itself as to whether a conflict existed in order to avoid an appearance of further
bias. For all of these reasons, the Court should reconsider its Memorandum Decision and Order
and find that the SAPD has been diligent in its handling of the issue and candid with the Court.
B. The SAPD Has Been Willing to Share Information with the Court Whenever There is No
Attorney-Client Privilege

The Court characterizes the SAPD's actions through these proceedings in the following
way, "[i]nstead of being forthcoming and candid with the Court about the facts in this case, the
SAPD has chosen to alert the Court to the vague possibility of some unnamed conflict, hire
outside counsel on the conflict issue only, and defer all questions to Mr. Benjamin even though
he represents the Petitioner and not the SAPD." Id. at 6, L. 24 - 7, L. 2. In relationship to that
finding, the Court does not recognize that an attorney-client privilege existed between the SAPD
and Mr. Hall at the time of the communications in question. Instead, the Court intimates that the
SAPD's lack of disclosure "may constitute an affirmative misrepresentation." Id. at 7, L. 9.
In the same breath the Court makes reference to the post-conviction of Payne v. State,
and suggests that the SAPD "can be forthcoming and candid when it so chooses. Nevertheless,
the performance of the SAPD in this case has been markedly different." Id. at 7, Ls. 14-15.
Again, the Court fails to make a finding as to whether an attorney-client privilege was ever
asserted by the SAPD in either the Abdullah or Payne case, and draws no distinction between the
facts underlying the SAPD's representation of Mr. Hall in this case. It is left to be assumed that
the Court sees the nature of the relationship between the SAPD and Mr. Hall in this case at the
time there was contact with trial counsel is indistinguishable from the facts in Mr. Payne and Mr.
Abdullah, where no attorney-client privilege existed at the time there was contact with either Mr.
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Hall or trial counsel, respectively. 7 The Court additionally finds that it has given the "SAPD and
Mr. Benjamin several opportunities to come forward voluntarily with the details of the
communications between the SAPD and the Hall II trial counsel." Id. at 8, Ls. 1-2.
As the Court knows, the Payne case involved contacts between the SAPD and Mr. Payne
during a time after sentencing relief had been granted and the SAPD no longer represented Mr.
Payne. Those contacts were never protected by an attorney-client privilege, and the SAPD never
asserted any privilege or notion of confidentiality.8 Likewise, the communications between the
SAPD and the Toryanskis in the case of Mr. Abdullah, were not protected by any privilege since
the SAPD did not represent Mr. Abdullah at the time he was awaiting trial. See Motion for

Judicial Notice, Exhibit C, Addendum B. Those documents had come to the attention of the
court due to their submission by the SAPD in the final amended petition of Mr. Abdullah.

Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit A.
Here, the SAPD has repeatedly stated that the only reason it cannot share with the State
and the Court the contents of its attorneys' files is because an attorney-client relationship existed
between the SAPD and Mr. Hall at the time the communications were taking place.

See

discussion in Response at pp. 9-13, and in Reply at pp. 4-6.
The SAPD maintains the position that the attorney-client privilege and confidentiality is
just that-a prohibition on divulging any information by an attorney in regards to any

7 The only specific finding made in this respect is the comment that "the SAPD did represent the
Petitioner on the Hall I post-conviction case during the time frame in which these
communications occurred and the Court is unaware of the extent to which the contact between
the SAPD and trial counsel for Hall II intermingled discussions about Hall I and Hall II, and the
Court does not wish to expose itself to privileged information concerning Hall I." Id. at 8, Ls.
11-15. It is left to the reader to draw the conclusion that the Court believes that no privilege or
attorney-confidentiality exists where the communications are related to one's client, but not
specifically related to the case to which an attorney has been appointed.
8 The notes of those hearings are also unavailable to petitioner, but may be produced if requested
to render any decision.
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•representation of that client. It is not, as both the Court and the State seem to believe, an
attorney-case privilege, where protections only attach when the material or communications have
to do with a specific case. 9

The Rules of Professional Conduct clearly refer not to the

representation of a case, but to "representation of a client." LR.P.C. Rule 1.6(a).

In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the Court notes that the SAPD "can be
forthcoming and candid when it so chooses." Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 7, L. 14. In
light of the clear distinction between the present case and the cases of Mr. Abdullah and Mr.

Payne, where no attorney-client privilege was asserted, Mr. Hall asks the Court to reconsider its
finding that the SAPD's performance "in this case has been markedly different." Id. at p. 7, L.
15. Instead, Mr. Hall asks that the Court find that there was an attorney-client privilege between
Mr. Hall and the SAPD during 2006 and 2007, and that consequently all attorney files and notes

are protected under the joint notions of privilege and confidentiality. In the event that the Court
agrees, it should be underscored that the nature and content of those communications would still
be available to all parties through the emails and files of Rob Chastain and Deb Kristal, with

whom Mr. Hall has already waived his privilege.
C. The Appointment of Keith Roark is Unnecessary, Duplicative, and Will Not Accomplish
Anything that Cannot Be Provided by Mr. Benjamin

The Court finds that the representation of Mr. Benjamin is unsatisfactory and does not
meet the needs of the Court in determining whether a conflict exists in this case. In light of the
fact that the Court has not attempted to ask follow-up questions or Mr. Benjamin, or authorized

him to depose, if necessary; the Court has not fully exhausted the benefit of Mr. Benjamin as

The Court finds in its Memorandum Decision and Order that "communications between the
SAPD and trial counsel about this case are not privileged because the SAPD had not yet been
appointed to this case when the communications occurred". Id. at 8, Ls. 3-5. However, the
Court does not find that there was no attorney-client privilege between the SAPD and Mr. Hall,
but only as related to information on Hall II.
9
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conflict counsel in this case. Instead, the Court's appointment could be construed as attorneyshopping. 1O The Memorandum Decision and Order contains no findings that specifically call
into question the independence or adequacy of Mr. Benjamin's representations to the Court.
Instead, the Court simply relies on the solitary fact that "he is closely aligned with the SAPD in
that he regularly acts as conflict counsel for the SAPD and therefore, a portion of his income is
dependent to some degree upon his relationship with that office." Id. at 10, Ls. 5-7. The SAPD
admitted in prior filings that the appointment of additional counsel would be within the
prerogative and discretion of the Court, but that presupposed that the Court would provide a
sufficient reason as to why Mr. Benjamin's representation did not, or could not, satisfy the Court.
It also noted that the Court would be responsible for any costs associated with additional counsel.

If the Court deems that Mr. Benjamin is compromised in his evaluation of the conflict
and in his representation of Mr. Hall, for the sole reason that he frequently works as conflict
counsel for the SAPD, then the Court must also acknowledge that such a ruling calls into
question every conflict appointment made by a public defender in the State of Idaho. This would
include every time a conflict attorney is appointed to represent a criminal defendant by the State
Appellate Public Defender in their appeals, because the SAPD did not consult with the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court first.

Likewise, the Court's finding allows for any judge to

question the independence of a conflict attorney appointed by a public defender at the trial level,
unless such an appointment is made with prior consultation of the trial judge. The process used
in selecting Mr. Benjamin is the same process used by the SAPD in selecting conflict counsel for
any of its many conflicts. To the extent that the Court is finding that Mr. Benjamin is not

The Court admits that Mr. Benjamin "is not this Court's choice of independent counsel and
would not have been this Court's choice of independent counsel had the SAPD consulted with
the Court before choosing him." Id. at 10, Ls. 8-10.
10
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sufficiently independent from the SAPD because he is being paid for his services by the SAPD,
it cannot go without noting that the same will hold true for Mr. Roark pursuant to the Court's
order. If the Court is suggesting that Mr. Benjamin's independent representation of Mr. Hall
may be compromised in an effort to please the SAPD so that future conflict contracts may be
forthcoming, such a tenuous argument can be made of every conflict attorney selected by a
public defender.
Furthermore, appointing Mr. Roark as conflict counsel does not even find precedence in
the case of Abdullah v. State. There, Judge Copsey had already made a finding that a conflict, in
fact, existed and was removing the SAPD and appointing Mr. Roark to advise Mr. Abdullah as to
the ramifications of such a conflict, and whether he should waive the conflict. Id.

at~·

13. Here,

the Court has not yet made a determination that a conflict exists, but is interfering with the
attorney-client relationship that already exists between Mr. Hall and the SAPD, and Mr. Hall and
Mr. Benjamin. 11 Likewise, in the Abdullah case, no conflict attorney had already provided the
evaluation and counsel sought by the Court when Mr. Roark was appointed.
Under the Court's order, there are two primary distinctions between the services rendered
already by Mr. Benjamin and those requested of Mr. Roark. First, Mr. Benjamin was appointed
of Dennis Benjamin at ~ 5. The
by the SAPD to represent Mr. Hall in this matter. See Affidavit ofDennis

Court appears to be appointing Mr. Roark, ostensibly to represent Mr. Hall, but also requires

II It should be noted that in another case where Judge Copsey appointed "conflict counsel" to
advise a defendant as to whether to waive a conflict, there was already a presumptive conflict.
See State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256 (2003). There, trial counsel had brought it to the Judge's
attention that he had previously represented the victim in the case eleven years prior, and that the
victim's mother had worked for the trail attorney at the time. Lopez, 139 Idaho at 257. The
Court chose to appoint a public defender to advise the defendant of a possible waiver and the
Court of Appeals found that the procedure had adequately protected the defendant's rights. !d. at
259. In that case, the facts certainly give rise to the appearance of an actual conflict under
I.R.P.C. Rule 1.9: Duties to Former Clients. No such finding is present here.
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-certain disclosures and actions to be taken by Mr. Roark pursuant to the Court's order. And
secondly, Mr. Benjamin was not authorized to depose in this matter and the Court has extended
that authorization to Mr. Roark. Mr. Hall notes that the Court has not inquired of Mr. Benjamin
as to whether he would find it helpful to depose anyone he interviewed in making his evaluation.
That difference could certainly be remedied without requiring separate counsel to come in and
start the investigation from the beginning.
But there is a third critical distinction, because it is also uncertain as to whether Mr.
Roark will be able to perform the same function as Mr. Benjamin. In the case of Mr. Benjamin,
because he was provided a waiver from Mr. Hall on the matter, Mr. Benjamin had access to all
of the SAPD files and communications and was able to perform an extensive review of the
relevant files.

See Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin at

~~

5 and 7; and Notice for Release of

Information. Because the SAPD would not release attorney-client files to anyone without a

release from Mr. Hall, no guarantee can be made that Mr. Roark will have access to the same
information or that Mr. Hall will cooperate with Mr. Roark.

The SAPD could envision a

scenario in which Mr. Roark would be left to review the exact same information now available to
the State and the Court-the files of Mr. Chastain and Ms. Kristal, along with the public record,
and the statements of anyone willing to speak with Mr. Roark regarding the possible conflict.
Furthermore, the Court's order makes no mention of the implications that the purported
attorney-client privilege established between Mr. Hall and Mr. Roark may have on his ability to
satisfy the court's request. And in fact, the order is silent as to whether Roark should consult
with or advise Mr. Hall on the matter, but is only specific as to the information being requested
by the Court. Instead, only if "the Court conclude that there is a conflict of interest, Mr. Roark
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will advise the Petitioner regarding such conflict and any waiver of the conflict." Memorandum

Decision and Order, p. 9, Ls. 17-18.
The Court orders that the SAPD should pay for Mr. Roark's services to the Court. Three
reasons are given: first, any conflict that may exist are due to the SAPD's own actions; second,
Mr. Roark's appointment may not have been necessary had the SAPD been more forthcoming;
and third, Mr. Benjamin has not provided the "exact same service" which is being sought by the
Court in appointing Mr. Roark.

Id. at 10, L. 4.

The Court questions Mr. Benjamin's

independence from the SAPD because "he regularly acts as conflict counsel for the SAPD and
therefore, a portion of his income is dependent to some degree upon his relationship with that
office." Id.
In establishing a procedure to appoint "conflict counsel," this Court erroneously relied
upon Idaho Code § 19-871 for its authority to order the SAPD to compensate "conflict counsel"
from the SAPD budget. Specifically, because there is not a conflict in Mr. Hall's case and
because Mr. Roark is an expert attorney appointed by the Court to conduct its inquiry and report
to the Court regarding whether a conflict exists, Idaho Code § 19-871 does not require the SAPD
to pay for Mr. Roark. When the SAPD incurs a cost, it does so pursuant to contractual
agreement between the SAPD and the expert. No such arrangement or contract exists between
the SAPD and Mr. Roark.
§ 19-871 provides as follows:
Idaho Code §19-871
Should the state appellate public defender be unable to carry out the duties
required in this act because of a conflict of interest or any other reason, the state
appellate public defender shall arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to be
compensated out ofthe budget ofthe state appellate public defender.
Comparatively, Idaho Code §19-860(b)
§ 19-860(b) states:
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If a court before whom a person appears upon a formal charge assigns an attorney
other than a public defender to represent a needy person, the appropriate district
court, upon application, shall prescribe a reasonable rate of compensation for his
services and shall determine the direct expenses necessary to representation for
which he should be reimbursed. The county shall pay the attorney the amounts so
prescribed. The attorney shall be compensated for his services with regard to the
complexity of the issues, the time involved, and other relevant considerations.
In this case, the Court has selected an attorney other than the public defender and in
defining the scope of representation, "determined the direct expenses necessary to
representation." Thus, pursuant to I.C. 19-860(b) Ada County, not the SAPD, is responsible for
§19-871, no
the remuneration for Mr. Roark's services. Additionally, pursuant to I.e. §19-87l,
determination was made by the SAPD that it was unable to carry out the duties required in the
Act. The SAPD's statutory obligation to "arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to be
compensated out of the budget of the state appellate public defender[,]" is triggered by the
SAPD's inability to carry out its duties. Absent an inability to carry out its duties, the SAPD has
no obligation to pay for alternate counsel. Here, the SAPD has already arranged to provide Mr.
Hall with that service and has entered into a contract with Mr. Benjamin to that effect.
Pursuant to these provisions, it is within the power of the SAPD to decide who it will
contract with to provide legal representation to indigent clients when the SAPD is unable to do
so. The SAPD's power and ability to contract with outside counsel is dependent on having
sufficient funds to so contract. See Appendix 8 {Affidavit of Josh Tewalt, p.2,

~

16 ("That all

state contracts must contain a clause that indicates that any contract is subject to sufficient
appropriation from the Legislature[.]"); p.3,

~

21 ("That any contract currently initiated by the

SAPD would not have the guarantee of sufficient Legislative General Fund Appropriations[.]").
The SAPD's budget is wholly dependent upon an annual appropriation of funding from the Idaho
CONST., art. VII, § 13 {"No money shall be drawn from the
State Legislature. See IDAHO CaNST.,
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treasurer, but in pursuance of appropriations made by law."). "An appropriation in this state is
authority of the Legislature given at the proper time and in legal form to the proper officers to
apply a specified sum from a designated fund out of the treasury for a specified object or demand
against the state." Blaine County Inv. Co. v. Gallet, 35 Idaho 102, 204 P. 1066, 1067 (Idaho
1922). Presently there is no money allocated to pay for Mr. Roark's services. See Appendix 11.
Because Mr. Benjamin has already provided the same services the Court requests of Mr.
Roark, and the Court has been unable to show why Mr. Benjamin's work as conflict counsel
should not be relied upon, the Court should reconsider its appointment of R. Keith Roark. To
appoint Mr. Roark where no preliminary determination of a conflict has been found, and where
independent advice has already been given to Mr. Hall is unprecedented, unnecessary and
extraordinarily wasteful in paying for the same service twice. Consequently, the Court should
consider inquiring ofMr. Benjamin as to whether he would like to depose any witnesses.
D. No Further Inquiry Is Justified at This Time
In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the Court summarizes the proceedings leading
up to its decision and concludes that "this Court is presently lacking the factual background
necessary to reach any conclusion." Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 7, Ls. 25-26. Mr.
Hall submits that the Court does not have sufficient information to continue the conflict inquiry
at the present time.
In summary, the Court received an Ex Parte Notice from the SAPD that the office had
undertaken a conflict review of Hall II, because of the various contacts that the Court was
already well aware of during the period that both the SAPD and Hall II trial counsel represented
Mr. Hall. The Court was informed that the SAPD had arranged and contracted with Mr. Dennis
Benjamin to advise Mr. Hall in determining whether there was a conflict, and in the event that
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there was, how to proceed. The State subsequently filed a motion indicating that they had
previously inquired of Mr. Ackley as to whether there was a conflict, and he had stated that there
was not. See State's Motion at p. 1. ("The State inquired of Mr. Ackley, prior to his leaving the
office of the SAPD, to determine if there were any conflict issues in this case. Although Mr.
Ackley did not believe there were, the State prefers to address this issue now rather than later.").
Neither the State, nor the Court, has found any contact between the SAPD and Mr. Chastain and
Ms. Kristal beyond the general cooperation and exchange of information which had been brought
to the attention of the court back in 2006 and 2007. Once Mr. Benjamin was appointed, Mr.
Benjamin was provided a limited waiver of his attorney-client privilege with the SAPD in order
to grant him full access to all relevant files and documents at the SAPD. See Authorization for
Information, attached hereto as Appendix 9. After conducting a review of those files
Release of
ofInformation,

and correspondence, he counseled with Mr. Hall and advised him that although he found one
instance where the SAPD had offered advice to trial counsel, since it was adopted by trial
counsel and turned out favorable to Mr. Hall, there was no conflict. Further, he stated that the
contacts had occurred between Mr. Chastain, Ms. Kristal, Mr. Ackley and Ms. Swensen-none
of whom are currently at the SAPD. Consequently, in his evaluation there was no conflict. In its
order, the Court does not articulate any other specific facts that substantiate further inquiry into
the matter.
The Court has placed considerable emphasis on the court's "affirmative duty to inquire
into a potential conflict whenever it 'knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict
may exist.' (citation omitted)" Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 4, Ls. 14-15. However,
the order seems to abdicate this duty to Mr. Roark, by not only asking Mr. Roark to provide the
court with information, but asking Mr. Roark to also report his determinations of law, including

MOTION TO RECONSIDER MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

32
001410

•

•

"whether a conflict exists," "if so, the general nature of the conflict," and "whether independent
counsel believes that such conflict may be imputed to the entire SAPD's office.,,12 !d. at 9, Ls.
8-11.
The SAPD maintains, that the specific and targeted inquiry required by the Courts should
correspond to the quality and content of the information raising the possibility of a conflict. The
Court should recognize its obligation to inquire as a continuum, where an ever greater inquiry
and concern is warranted when more problematic facts are available to the court. In cases like

State v. Severson 13 , 147 Idaho 694 (2009), State v. Lovelace 14 , 140 Idaho 53 (2003), or State v.
Lopez 15 , 139 Idaho 256 (Ct. App. 2003), where actual facts are presented to the Court that give
rise to a clear potential for conflict, the Court is required to at least inquire as to whether an
actual conflict exists. Here, no such facts are available. And, in fact, the Court's sole basis for
granting the State's Motion for Inquiry on August 26, 2010, was the fact that it had received
"notices of concern about a possible conflict of interest from the State as well as from the
SAPD." Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 4, Ls. 16-17.
The Court also found that "[i]f claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were brought in
any area where the SAPD offered advice to trial counsel, the State may wish to call the SAPD
attorneys that gave the advice as witnesses in order to show that trial counsels' actions were part
of a strategic choice made after careful investigation." Id. at 5, Ls. 13-16. The Memorandum

12 The Court expresses some frustration with the fact that the Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin
includes similar conclusory statements, and noted that the affidavit included legal conclusions.
See Memorandum Decision and Order at p. 3.
13 Where trail counsel worked with another attorney who "had represented [the victim's] mother
in a civil suit that was directly related to the criminal case." 147 Idaho at 701.
14 Where the appointed attorney was running for county prosecutor at the time of representation,
subsequently won the election and was removed after being sworn in. 140 Idaho at 59.
15 Where trial counsel had brought it to the Judge's attention that he had previously represented
the victim in the case eleven years prior, and that the victim's mother had worked for the trail
attorney at the time. Lopez, 139 Idaho at 257.
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Decision and Order is silent on whether a conflict created by making the attorneys in question,

Mr. Ackley and Ms. Swensen, witnesses to these proceedings would therefore be imputed to the
entire office of the SAPD.

The finding, however, seems to indicate that it would since it

necessitates a further inquiry by the Court, whereas if no such claim could be imputed to the
entire SAPD, then no further inquiry would be necessary.
The SAPD has done everything within its power to provide Mr. Hall with sufficient
opportunity to raise a conflict issue with the SAPD by providing him with an independent
conflict counsel. In addition, the SAPD has offered the notes, files, and communications of trial
counsel for the State to review, in order to gauge the nature and content of all documented
communications with the SAPD and suggested that the State be allowed to interview and inquire
of trial counsel regarding the same issue. In the absence of such facts, the Court should be
satisfied that no conflict of interest exists between the SAPD and Mr. Hall.
E. There is No Reason that the State Should be Prevented From Inquiring of Trial Counsel
In the final paragraph of its order, the Court denies the State its request to "discuss with
Hall II trial counsel conversations held in the presence of the Petitioner where the SAPD was
also present." Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 10, Ls. 15-16. As has been repeatedly
suggested by the SAPD, there is one simple way to circumnavigate the attorney-client privilege
and notions of confidentiality asserted by the SAPD-inquire of Mr. Chastain and Ms. Kristal,
whose privileged communications and files have already been waived by Mr. Hall. All of those
documents have been repeatedly offered to the State for their review. Given the fact that there is
an easy remedy to discover any advice that trial counsel received from the SAPD during their
representation of Mr. Hall, it makes little sense as to why the Court would prohibit the State from
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inquiring of trial counsel about those issues, but instead prefer a lengthy and expensive
investigation by yet another attorney in the case.
Mr. Hall asks the Court to sincerely reconsider its order to prohibit the State from
contacting and inquiring about any advice that may have been tendered by the SAPD during the
lead up to the trial in Hall II. It would present the path of least resistance, accomplish the
Court's desire by providing the Court with specific facts by which it could make its ultimate
determination, and only inconvenience Mr. Chastain and Ms. Krista!.
C. CONCLUSION
For the reasons submitted, Mr. Hall respectfully requests this court to reconsider the
several holdings and orders in its Memorandum Decision and Order.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 10th day of January, 2011.

jc~B~
Ian H. Thomson
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

\JJJiuo
VJJiuo

Nicole Owens
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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State v. Erick V. Hall
Page 138
1

2
3
4
5
6
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11
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14
15
16
17
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20
21
22
23
24
25
25

Page 140

1
MR. BOURNE: F(6) and F(7) for the police reports
7, at the top is No.6. I've indicated to Counsel that
2 from the sex offender case.
I will inquire as to whether or not police reports
3
THE COURT: Okay.
still exist in No.6 there.
4
MR. BOURNE: And No. 12, on page 22, so we are at
TIIE COURT: Okay.
MR. BOURNE: And I've agreed on No.8, still on
5 F(12)
F(l2) now -- are Lynn Henneman's cellular telephone-telephone-
page 7 there.
6
THE COURT: Records?
to-
TIIE COURT: Yes. You've agreed to-MR. BOURNE: It is her usage on her telephone after
7
8 she became missing on September 24th, 2000. What I
MR. BOURNE: Number 8(a) -- oh, wait a second.
9 agreed to do is to see if we ever had those, or if we
Yes, I agree, but that will require the Court's order,
110
0 still have her telephone usage records.
of course, because that's a grand jury transcript, but
11
THE COURT: Okay.
it is okay with me if the grand jury transcript -- I
think I may have one, and if the Court gives the go
12
MR. BOURNE: And then, page 23. It is number "g"
13 there on page23.
ahead, I'll just make a copy.
14
THE COURT: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay.
15
MR. BOURNE: I just agreed to make inquiries about
MR. BOURNE: 8(b), the photographs. I'll make
1 6 reward information. I just don't know the answer to
Counsel a copy of the photographs, and I'll check to
17 any of that. I don't have any documents, but I agreed
see if there is any negatives.
18 to look into that, and then I will teU
tell Counsel what I
Actually, "b" and "c" are about the same. It
19 find out, and we can decide what should be released.
is just all photographs, but I agreed to give them the
20
THE COURT: You're thinking -- you're going to
photographs.
21 inquire whether there, for example, might have been an
And then "g" -- 8(g), I will inquire of Garden
22 airline employee reward or something --
City Police whether there are any tape recorded
23
MR. BOURNE: Yeah. I just don't know anything
statements still in existence from that 1991 case.
2 4 about the rewards, and I told him I would find out if a
Then we take up again at page 13, it looks
25 reward was even offered. I just don't know that.
like. Page 13 refers to the notes and files and other
Page 139

1

2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
1
166
17
18
1199

20
21
22
23
24

25

July 5, 2006

COWlty Coroner's
things from Dr. Groben and the Ada County
_. well, about all
Office. There is not very much that -I can say about that is that I've agreed to inquire
with the Coroner's Office on all of these things to see
what is available, and what we can release, and that
Counsel and I will work out all the details of that
after I find out what is available.
Did I get that right?
MR. ACKLEY: Pretty much.
MR. BOURNE: Then page 18. On page 18,No.4,we
18,No. 4, we
agreed to get copies of the PowerPoint slides used by
the Prosecutor's Office during the closing arguments of
that case, of both the guilt and penalty phases.
THE COURT: I'm sorry. So it is actually page 18,
miscellaneous?
MR. BOURNE: Yes, and it is just No.4.
THE COURT: A(4)?
MR. BOURNE: Yes.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. BOURNE: And number 21 -- on page 21, I mean.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BOURNE: No.6, are the police reports for
HaU's -- Erick Hall's escape. I'll try and
the -- Mr. Hall's
get him copies of those reports.
THE COURT: And that is F(6)? Thank you.

Page 141
1

2
3
4

5
6
7

8
9
110
a
11
12
13
14
15
16
117
7
18
19

20
21
22
23
24

225
5

I think they are going to do some follow up on
some other ones, but that is where my notes leave off.
Is that it?
MR. ACKLEY: Yes. There were some other informal
ones that we discussed like, we are going to take
responsibility to identify specific documents in the
of Corrections, by
possession of the Idaho Department ofCorrections,
name, for Mr. Bourne -- and there are a couple of other
areas.
I should also add that there have been
attempts by both myself and Mr. Bourne in the past to
try to work out other discovery issues. For instance,
there are some materials that were disclosed in
discovery during the underlying criminal case, which
just didn't show up in trial counsel's files when he
turned them over to us. And I think the reason for
that is because trial counsel separated documents they
thought were relevant to the Hanlon case and gave that
counsel, I think, Rob Chastain and Deborah
to conflict cOWlsel,
Kristal, and then gave us some files. And in the
course of reviewing Ms. Kristal and Mr. Chastain's
files we have confirmed
confinued that.
Those requests are actually a big part ofthis
of this
motion for discovery, and I think we will be able to
work that out, if we ever find the time. Because I
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State v. Hall - October 2,
2. 2007

3979

3981

1

courtroom down here this afternoon at 1: 30. I denied

1

underlying data, things of that nature and have the

2

that. When asked for an explanation for my denial, I

3

did not respond. I wanted that of record.

2
3

opportunity to speak with whatever expert might be
presented, that -
--

Logistics of the bus route. These are

4

4

THE COURT: In advance of testimony?

5

unrelated wave top issues here, just sort of stream

5

6

of consciousness.

6

understand it's only if we get to mitigation. And

7

counsel has assured me that that is correct.

7

But I've spoken to Marji Shepherd and I

MS. BENNETTS: Yes, in advance. And I

8

understand that the bus contractor is out of Boise.

8

MR. CHASTAIN: That is correct, Your Honor.

9

The bus will go back to Boise every night and will

9

THE COURT: All right. Now this is asking

10

start from Boise early in the morning and it will

10

the Ada County Sheriffs Office to do a blood drop

11

come first to the Bliss Sinclair station.

11

and to provide that -- and to take care of the

12

transmittal of it to the lab in Denver.

JURY COMMISSIONER: First to Gooding.

12

THE COURT: First to Gooding to the

13

-- I
MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, as I understand -

13

14

fairgrounds, which are just about a mile north of

14

don't know if the SAPO has filed a similar motion,

15

town here on Route 46. And the people from Wendell

15

-- we only need one sample, I think. But
but it's -

16

will have to drive up. They will be given mileage

16

-- as the Court may recall, Doctor
it's -- this was -

17

for that and they will be picked up at the Gooding

17

Meracangus (ph) came up while we were picking a jury.

18

stop'.
fairgrounds. And that will be the first stoP..

18

And then the second stop will be back on

19

20

Highway 26 to Bliss at the Sinclair station. The

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. CHASTAIN: This was as a result of, I

19
20

21

people from Hagerman and Bliss will have to assemble

21

22

there. So there will be two stops.

22

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CHASTAIN: And so we filed this

23
24
25

snacks and meals and having a hot meal waiting for

1

-- something like 8:30 in
them in Ada County before -

1

motion here from the State Appellate Public

2
3

the morning.
JURY COMMISSIONER: That is correct, sir.

2

Defender's Office, which are the petitioners in the

3

postconviction relief for the last murder case.

Madam jury commissioner is going to discuss
deSires about
with them the timing of that and their desires

23
24
25

guess, some of his findings and his suggestion.

contemporaneously with SAPO.
THE COURT: Yes. I should have said,
because I'm aware of -
-- in fact, I have a copy of the

3980

THE COURT: Have you had that conversation

4
5
6

yet?

3982

4
5

JURY COMMISSIONER: I've been speaking with

They also have filed a motion here and I

have access to it somewhere here. And I haven't had

6

a chance to see if there is any difference, but it is

7

the jury about that just a few minutes ago and we are

7

intended to be the name motion.

8

going to wait now until we see who is actually

8

MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, Your Honor.

9

-empaneled to maybe -

9

THE COURT: And Mr. Bourne of your office

10

THE COURT: Make those choices.

11

JURY COMMISSIONER: Yes. Exactly.

11

represented in the motion itself that he has no

12

THE COURT: But you have a cORtract for

12

objection.

10

represents the State in that matter. It's

13

gOing and coming.
snacks and the bus going

13

MS. BENNETTS: I believe that was correct.

14

JURY COMMISSIONER: I do.

14

THE COURT: I'll get to those Orders as

15

THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. Another

15

soon as I can. I haven't had an opportunity to

16

unrelated subject, Motion for Fragile-X Blood Test

16

examine them or sign them yet because I wanted to

17

filed September 27, last week, by Mr. Chastain and

17

discuss them all with you.

18

Ms. Krista!. I have had the occasion to read the

18

19

motion. Has the State had access to the motion?

19

motion says, but the testing takes about two or three
weeks, once they get the blood.

MS. KRISTAL: I don't remember what the

20

MS. BENNETTS: Yes, Your Honor.

20

21

THE COURT: Is there objection?

21

THE COURT: So it needs to happen soon.

22

MS. BENNETTS: No, Your Honor, with the

MS. KRISTAL: Right.

23

understanding that the trial would not be delayed;

24

that the State would have an opportunity to review

22
23
24

25

any expert opinions, documents, written documents,

25

THE COURT: Okay. I will make it a
priority.
MS. KRISTAL: Thank you.
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v Hall - March 1,

16

put forth? In other words, you said that he has a
strong view of how to defend this case and what the
defense should be. What is his defense?
MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, to some extent, we
are relying on some of the comments that come under
Rule 1.16.
THE COURT: Of the Rules of Professional
I
•

1
2
3

he didn't trust you and was very unhappy about the
approach you were taking? And I think you said in
your affidavit that there's a complete breakdown in

4
5
6
7

communication. When did that complete breakdown in
communication occur?
MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, it really came to a
head during meetings held out at the penitentiary

11
12
13
14

attended one -- I attended that meeting. Ms. Kristal
attended it. And when we met with Mr. Hall the next
day, we tried to talk with him about it and he
that certain things Were ever said,
toUllly denied -that

MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, oh, I am not sure I
can, other than to say it is completely at odds with

15
16
17

things that we know to be true from the scientific
testing we have done, our review of his interviews,
our review of the State's eVidence and our own
investigation. It is not a defense that has any

18

that certain advice was ever given.
In essence -- in essence, called me a liar.
He said that I didn't hear what I heard. And we
tried to rectify that. Ms. Kristal and a member of

19
20
21

the SAPO went out two days later to try to make sure
that yes, that was what was said, that we had --THE COURT: Said by whom?

defense is.
THE COURT: Can you tell me what his

J defense is?
•I
,

18

between Ms. Kristal, myself, certain of our experts.
The State Appellate Public Defender was there.
And it was simply manifested by -- I

And I can further say that our investigation of Mr.
I Hall's proposed defense did not bear it out. We
Z cannot independently corroborate or support what his
I

•

8
9
10

Responsibility?
MR. CHASTAIN: Professional Responsibility.

)

~

=

substance.
THE COURT: So his defense is in conflict
with testing results and other things that you know

22
23

CHASTAIN: Various people that were
MR. CHASTAIN;
there.
THE COURT: Okay. Gotch ya.

24
25

MR. CHASTAIN: I can't give you what the

17
,

MR. CHASTAIN: Yes.
THE COURT: -- to be true.

t
•

MR. CHASTAIN: Yes.
THE COURT: So his defense would be totally
countered off everything you know and you are not

~

able to corroborate anything that would underlie his

~~

defense.

I
~

il

19
1
2

advice --- you know, what the ramifications were, but
Mr. Hall essentially denied it all.

3
4

And there has been tension all along. Mr.
Hall has had his view of how the case should go

5
6

forward. We felt we could work around that. We felt
there was a chance to resolve the case successfully

7
8

and favorably in his behalf. That is not going to
happen now.

MR. CHASTAIN: That's correct.
COURT: Is -- do you feel that hiS
THE COURT;
apparent lack of trust for you and Ms. Kristal and

9
10

Mr. Hall is committed to go to trial. And
we believe that, frankly, that the course he wants to

his unhappiness with you and Ms. Kristal have to do

11

take and that he will take when he takes the stand

With the defense he would have you take and approach
with

12
13

will utterly ensure that a second death penalty will
be imposed.

he would have you take to defending him and how that
-- and not to anything else?
MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, I think his distrust
of us and his lack of confidence in our services
stems from that, is that we don't see the case the
same way he does; that his interpretation of what the
evidence shows is diametrically opposed to what our
evaluation of the case tells us and what we believe
jUry is going to believe.
the jury

It's such a course that -- and we made no

14
15

bones about it with Mr. Hall that this case, unique

16
17

as it is, and being a second death penalty case for
this -- for the same defendant, that, you know, this

18

isn't something that a jury is going to look at like

19
20

you would a nickel and dime burglary or auto theft,
something like that. The stakes are way too high.

21

And so when I told the State that we filed

THE COURT: Let me -- you've had this case
for a little bit over two years. And earlier, did

22

this motion knowing the consequences --- we know what

23

it costs the State and the Court to get ready, to

the conflict -- when did the conflict become

24
25

gear up for a case like this. We know what it takes
to be prepared for trial.

point where you felt
apparent, In other words, to the pOint
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1
2

20
.
.
And Ms. Kristal and I, you know, frankly,

presentation would be completely at odds with what
Mr. Hall is going to say and how he wants it
presented; and as a result, I can't in good
conscience tell the Court that I can be an effective,
trusted counselor to Mr. Hall when I am not.
And we tried to the very last instant to
get a reasonable resolution for Mr. Hall. He has
rejected that. That's his right. He made that

11
12
12
13
13
14
14
15
15

clear.
State, which you presented to him.
MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And from a great distance, my

16
16
17
17
18
18

guess is that that offer may have taken the death
penalty off the table and that was presented in an
offer to -- through you to your client from the

19

State.

20
21
22
23

MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And he has rejected that.
MR. CHASTAIN: Absolutely.
THE COURT: And he has rejected that,
having heard your advice that there is a high
likelihood of conviction and imposition of the death

24
25

MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Fifteen days ago.
MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, Your Honor.

4
5

THE COURT: And she went back two days
after that.

6
7
8
9

MR. CHASTAIN: It may have been a couple of
days later than that. There were some transport
issues. But she -
-- don't quote us on the two days
-later, but -

are otherwise prepared for trial, except that our

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

THE COURT: So there was an offer from the

22

1
2
3

10
11
12
13
14
15

THE COURT: I have the sense that Mr. Hall,
based on our last time being here together on the
27th day of February '07, was unhappy about this
-Court's decision to have him housed starting -
full-time housed at the jail. That Mr. Hall was not
happy with that and did not wish to be housed at the

16
17

jail and made available for that. That was my sense
from a distance, Did that play into this?

18
19
20

MR. CHASTAIN: He has told us that before,
-- that's a minor issue in the
Judge. That's a minor -
bigger scheme of things.

21
22
23
24

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CHASTAIN: But I will state for the
record he preferred to be housed at the prison and
transported back. He told us that. He would rather

25

23

21

-- pled gUilty
guilty to certain whatever -
-- whatever
taken -

1
2
3
4

THE COURT: Sure. Okay. What is it that
-- specifically that the defendant feels that you
should have done, which you have not done? Can you
say that?

5
6

charges and that the death penalty, were taken off the
table and that there's high likelihood if he goes to

5
6

MR. CHASTAIN: I don't know what he thinks
that is possible. He has given us instructions,

7
8

trial in this case with the death penalty on the
table, that he will be convicted and the death

7
8

which we have endeavored to carry out, in terms of
locating witnesses, having evidence examined. And

9

penalty will be awarded by a jury, he has still

10

11

turned all of that down.
MR. CHASTAIN: He has categorically

9
10

12

rejected the offer; and the offer is no longer on the

13

table, Judge. That is part of what the discussions
were in the week. The State has removed that offer

1
2
3

penalty in this case.
MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So knowing that he could have

4

14

11

15
16
17
18

penitentiary that you spoke about where there was -
-MR. CHASTAIN: In the last 10 days. I

19

don't know that I can tell you. The 14th.

from the table at this time.
THE COURT: When was the meeting at the

that he feels you should have done that you didn't
do?

14
15

MR. CHASTAIN: I think you would really
have to ask Mr. Hall because we have endeavored to do
everything that we can.

16
17
18

20

THE COURT: The 14th of February?

21
22
23

MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, Your Honor.

21

THE COURT: Of 2007?

22
23

MR. CHASTAIN: Yes. And then Ms. Kristal
went back two days later.
THE COURT: So just literally 14 days ago.

THE COURT: So at this point, what is it

12
13

19
20

24
25

that has occurred over the course of more than a
year, all of which haven't panned out. And-
And--

He asked us to file -- I guess I could say
he has asked us to file a motion to suppress his
videotaped interview. We have not done that. We
don't see any legal grounds for that.
He did ask us to file a motion to change
venue. We have done that. That has not been argued
yet.

24

25

THE COURT: All right.
MR. CHASTAIN: I mean it's -
--
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District Court of the Fourth Judicial District
in and for the County of Ada
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HA~L,
HA~L,

) Case No.

SPOT05-00155

)

Petitioner-Appellant,

)
)

vs.

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Respondent.

)
)

----------------)
----------------------------------)
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Hon. THOMAS F. NEVILLE, District Court Judge
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For the State
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By:
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Fax (208) 287-7709

For the Defendant
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By:
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3647 Lake Harbor Lane
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(208) 334-2712
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Page 44

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

And so, that's why we thought it was
useful to have everybody in the courtroom at once,
to -- to talk about this matter.
SO,I just wanted to bring that to the
So,1
Court's attention, so that we could all be
thinking about it, when we're thinking about what
should be done next.
THE COURT: Okay.
Mr. Chastain, I -- I know you've been
invited here, and I appreciate your presence here.
You're defending your client, Mr. Hall, in a
matter that's ongoing, that's set for status
conference, here, at -MR. CHASTAIN: 1
11:30.
1:30.
11 :30. I don't know whether
THE COURT: -- 11:30.
you know whether or not testing was accomplished.
MR. CHASTAIN: It was, Judge. I -- we spoke
with the testing people. The -- the MRI part of
the exam has been completed. However, the
physician that's going to read it will not do that
until next week.
In terms of sharing it with the State
Appellate Public Defender, we're glad to do that.
We don't see any conflict or any -- any conflict
of interest in -- in doing that.

1
2
3
4
I 5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

•

week, so. We understand it's going to happen
Monday.
THE COURT: And who do you understand that
to be, the doctor that's going to do that?
MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, I didn't bring that
information.
THE COURT: But is it an MD -
-MR. CHASTAIN: Yes.
THE COURT: -- radiologist or somebody?
MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, yes.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CHASTAIN: Yes.
THE COURT: But you're -- okay. That
answers the first question. You're willing to
share this with petitioner's Counsel on the
postconviction matter.
MR. CHASTAIN: Absolutely.
THE COURT: Okay.
Does the State have any objection to
that being shared?
MR. BOURNE: No, sir.
MS. BENNETTS: No, Your Honor, in both
cases.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. But I -- I
presume, from this -- this renewed motion, as

Page 45
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Page 46

Page 47

We don't know what the results are,
1
don't know what -- what they're going to show. We 2
can't promise that we're going to, necessarily,
3
use those in our -- in mitigation phase, until we
4
speak with the professionals. '
5
But in terms of saving money, time,
6
and effort, we're glad to -- to share those -7
8
those tests, and those results, with Mr. Hall's
j
appellate lawyers.
1
9
THE COURT: Now, it -- was it just an MRI?
MR. CHASTAIN: It was a PET scan.
11
THE COURT: PET scan.
12
MR. CHASTAIN: I'm not using the right
13
medical terminology.
14
THE COURT: Okay. It was a PET scan?
15
MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, Your Honor.
16
THE COURT: And that's -- that has been
17
conducted now?
18
MR. CHASTAIN: It is done and-and -19
THE COURT: But it won't be read until next
20
21
w~k?
week?
MR. CHASTAIN: Well, it's done, but it-it -22
the test results have to be read by a -- by a -- a
23
person who's trained.to do that. And that -- the
24
doctor who's going to do that isn't available this
25

110

entitled, that you're looking for much more than a
PET scan; is that -- is that fair to say?
MR. ACKLEY: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to be heard
in support of the motion?
MR. ACKLEY: Yes, thank you.
I'd first like to address a matter
that the Court made reference to, and that is the
CVof
Dr. Marikangas. That was attached to an original
affidavit.
THE COURT: 1-
I-Court-MR. ACKLEY: I think the Court-
THE COURT: I've got an old file here, from
a June, 2006 --
MR. ACKLEY: That's correct.
THE COURT: -- filing. I do -- I have
located the motion. That's what -- part of what I
was doing in there, is looking for the right file.
MR. ACKLEY: If I could just briefly
explain. The second affidavit, which is part of
this renewed motion, incorporated, I believe in
its entirety, the original affidavit. And so,
that's why I think that language is in there about
the attached CV.

11 (Pages 44 to 47)
Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho, (208) 345-3704
www.etucker.net

001427

•

•

•

..

•

..

5 XlaN3dd'V

APPENDIX 5

001428

•

.-....

•

[N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIA L DlS;.ucr OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNl V OF ADA

)

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,

v.

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

------------>
----------------------~

J!'fMj.~<b
''fM
t<'r>__

16 t007
f .....i 16

.L ~~.:tt:::
Case No. SPOT050')155
_A~
SPOT050,)155 ill
~~

~~~

ORDER TO TRANSPORT
PETITIONER NO LATER THAN
FEBRUARY 16, 14107 FOR
RADIOLOGICAL AND
SEROLOGICAL TESTING
(Capital Case)

The maner having come before the Court on Petitioner's Rene-v:ed Motion for Medical
Testing and good cause appearing therefore:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Idaho Department of Corrections ("IDOC"),
("IDOC").
transport Petitioner.
Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, no later than February 26. 2007, to Intermountain Medical
Imaging.
teleph:me 367-8222, for the
Imaging, 2929 E. Magic View Drive, Meridian, Idaho, 83642, teleph;>ne
purpose of completing the following radiological and serological tests,

3-;
30;

noted in the attached

requisitions for radiological and blood testing signed by Dr. James Merikalgas:
cllntrast;
(a) (functional) MRI scans of the brain, with and without cllntlaSt;
(b) X-Ray of the cervical spine;
(c) VDRLIRPR blood testing;
(d) T3, T4, n, and TSH blood testing;
(e) 5 hour glucose tolerance testing; and
(f) blood test for syphilis.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT at the conclusion of the appointment, the
Petitioner shall be returned to the custody of the IDOC;

~/

ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER NO LATER mAN
FEBRUARY 26, 2007 FOR RADIOLOGICAL AND
SEROLOGICAL TESTING
001429

•

•

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Intennountain Medkal Imaging forward the

results of the testing only to Dr. James Merikangas at 4938 Hampden Lane, #428, Bethesda,
Maryland 20814, to be kept by him in accordance with the privileges aa:tendant
:tendant to doctor/patient
and anorney/client unless otherwise requested by Petitioner. through hh attorneys of record, and
as otherwise agreed by his attorneys during the hearing held February 16.2007.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Clerk of the Coun

s~rve

a copy hereof upon

the IDOC. and Intennountain Medical Imaging,
Imaging. forthwith and certify to t'le same.

Datedthis~b~yof
Dated
this-.--tb~yof

~

,2007.

HONO~NEVILLE

District Judge

ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETmONER NO LATER THAN
FEBRUARY 26, 2007 FOR RADIOLOGICAL AND
SEROLOGICAL TESTING

2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

b...

200'1, I served a true and
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of February, 20()",
PEmIONEI~ NO LATER THAN
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER TO TRANSPORT PEmIONEI~
FEBRUARY 26, 2007 FOR RADIOLOGICAL AND SEROLOGICAL TESTING by
method indicated below to:

MARK ACKLEY
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
BOlSE~ID837Q3
BOlSE~ID837Q3

ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3]9]
BOISE, ID 83702
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING
2929 E. MAGIC VIEW DRIVE
MERIDIAN, ID 83642
DENNIS DEAN
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0018
FAX NO.: 327-7480
WARDEN JOHN HARDISON
INSTIruTION
IDAHO MAXIMUM SECURITY INSTInJTION
P.O. BOX 51
BOISE, ID 83707
FAX NO.: 334-4896

U.S. HaJl
U.s.

Statehouse Mail
Facsinile
_ _ Hand >elivery

--I-

U.S. l\lail
Stateh.,use
Stateh.)use Mail
~ Fac:sinile
Hand]I>elivery
>elivery
_ _ Hand

>.
,0

U.S. Mail
U.s.
Stateh< use Mail
Fac:simile
I'elivel)'
_ _ Hand I'clivel)'
U.S. Mul
StatehoJSe Mail
-:J- Fac:simi Ie
_ _ Hand D::livery

U.S. MEil
StatehOtlse Mail
t'BC:iimi. c
~ t"BC:iimi.
. ___ Hand Ot:livery
Dt:livery

ORDER TO TRANSPORT PEmlONER NO LATER THAN
FEBRUARY 26, 2007 FOR RADIOLOGICAL AND
SEROLOGICAL TESTING

3
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Janet Ellis
From:

Mart( Ackley [rnackleyOsapd.state.id.us]
Marl(

Sent:

Friday, February 16,20074:00
16.20074:00 PM

To:
Cc:

Janet Ellis; Roger Bourne

Subject:

53723

Paula Swensen

Attachment.: 53726.POF; 53723.do:

Janet & Roger,
Attached is the proposed order for medical testing, as well as the 1equisitions by Dr.
Merikangas referenced in the proposed order as an attachment. My records reflect that
these requisitions were previoulsy filed as Attachment A to our original motion for
testing.
I tried to mirror the Hanlon order re: PET scans, but deviated as follows:
• I thought attaching Dr. Merikangas's requisitions to the order would be helpful
caIJs this afternoon with both Intermountain Medical
based on my telephone calls
Imaging who will conduct the radiological tests (MRl and X-rays) and draw blood
to be sent to their lab of choise for blood testing (IDX Patholugy). After discussing
the tests (and the costs) with the folks over there, it seemed that the requisition fonn
attached is a standard form they are most comfortable with and will facilitate the
testing. If the Court decides to revise the order and remove thl~ attachment, we have
no objection.
• In the second "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED," we included language that the tests
should be sent directly to Dr. Merikangas. This was pursuant to prior conversations
with Dr. Merikangas for the purpose of expediting his review. Also in that
paragraph, it says in part that Dr. Merikangas shall hold the te:its unless requested
by his attorneys as agreed at the hearing held today; this is an ference to our
agreement to share these tests with the Hanlon defense team. Again, if the Court
decides to revise the order for greater clarification, then we ha':e no objection.
• Finally, we drafted a courtesy certificate of service, which incl.ldes service
to Dennis Dean and the Warden; inclusion of them by name was at the request of
IMSI based on a call to them this afternoon.
Mark
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

1

2
3

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,

)

Docket No. 35055

)

Petitioner-Appellant,)

4

)

5

Vs.

)
)

6

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

7
8

9

Respondent.

)

--------------)
------------------------------)

TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL
Hearing Date:
June 15, 2007

10
11
12

13

Appealed from the District Court of the
Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
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And I speak -- for instance, we receive

1

2

PSIs all the time,

for instance, in appellate

3

records.

And in this case, we received some juvenile

4

records.

We're asking for medical records.

5

received jury questionnaires and so we've -- grand

6

jury transcripts.

7

that.

8

caution.

9

when Ms. Swensen addresses the jury contact issue,

We've

And the list goes on in terms of

And I guess I'm trying to err on the side of
I hope the Court will see that ultimately,

10

that there is an appreciation from our side in terms

11

of privacy interest as well.
But my point is simply that in the future,

12
13

is there a particular protocol that the Court would

14

like us to follow when submitting motions under seal?

15

I know that either I myself or someone from

16

our office contacted, I believe, Janet; and very

17

helpful in giving us some direction.

18

tried to contact Mr. Bourne about that too.
And so any directive that the Court can

19
20

give us,

21

side of filing matters under seal.

22

I think maybe I

I'm just going to continue to err on the

Along that line, we were speaking to trial

23

counsel on the Hanlon case, Deborah Kristal and Rob

24

Chastain; and they were going to join our motion for

25

the Dodd -- for the release of the Dodd information

001438
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1

that I mentioned earlier.
THE COURT:

2
3

•
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The serial rapist murder in

Washington state?
MR. ACKLEY:

4

Yes.

And I actually

5

hesitated.

6

actually submitted under seal because it was

7

submitted under seal.
THE COURT:

8
9

I chose not to give to them what we

MR. ACKLEY:

11

THE COURT:

Oh.

Did they?

-- a motion for discovery on

that issue.

13

MR. ACKLEY:

14

THE COURT:

15

They have already filed just

today -
--

10

12

-So I guess -

Okay.

Great.

And I saw that document earlier

this afternoon on a piece of paper from their office

16
17

MR. ACKLEY:

18

THE COURT:

Okay.
-- in that case.

And madam

19

clerk asked me if your -- showed it to me and asked

20

me if it related to this and I said it might, but I

21

don't know yet because I read the name and I said I

22

don't even recognize the name of this gentleman as

23

being one that I have even heard as -- you know, in

24

one of 300 prospective witnesses in this case.

25

don't even remember it being on that list.

I

And so I
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1

said we will have to see what we hear and I thought I

2

might hear something today.

3

the loop for me.

4

MR. ACKLEY:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. ACKLEY:

7

THE COURT:

8

Okay.
So they are now seeking it.
Okay.
And I think you have done it

correctly.
MR. ACKLEY:

9

10

And so you are closing

Okay.

And I will continue

that.
As we receive confidential information

11

12

through the course of our investigation or through

13

Court orders, and if it's relevant, say, to the

14

mitigation case in the Henneman case, it would

15

clearly seem from our perspective to be relevant in

16

the Hanlon case.

17

trial counsel if we inform them of the confidential

18

nature or the manner in which we acquired this

19

information in the Hanlon case?

Are we free to share that with

THE COURT:

20

Well Jan Bennetts, who is

21

prosecuting the so-called Hanlon case, the second

22

capital case that hasn't yet -- that was

23

spectacularly unsuccessful in getting a jury for here

24

after eight long days,

25

well.

I think she should be asked as
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My sense is that -- and I don't speak for

1

2

Ms. Bennetts, obviously.

3

would think that was fair, at least to make them

4

aware and that they need to ask this Court for

5

something and -- such as they did today in the

6

document that they filed vis-a-vie Mr. Dodd today for

7

specific discovery.
Mr. Bourne, arguably you are a supervisor

8

9

But my sense is that she

of the entire Criminal Division, including Ms.

10

Bennetts.

11

fact that that question has been asked of me.

12

can't speak for Ms. Bennetts.

13

might think that that was fair for you to share

14

information.

15

gone to a guilt phase trial; I would rather have that

16

information known to trial counsel before that than

17

after.

18

what should happen.

19

rebuttable presumption thinking yes, probably that

20

information should be shared, but I think Ms.

21

Bennetts needs to be in the loop and they may need to

22

make a specific request,

23

with respect to Mr. Dodd in the H03 case, the case

24

that's -- and then we will see where that goes.

25

Maybe you could just chat with her on the
I

I suspect that she

I would rather have the case not yet

And so that's what my general sense is of

MR. ACKLEY:

But it -- so it's kind of a

just like they have today,

Okay.
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1 of 7 sheets

3

of the letter that Mr. Abdullah sent to me.

5

STATE OF IDAHO,

9

the matter, I want to make sure everyone got a copy

THE COURT: Before we get to the heart of

4

)

vs.

7

8

) Case No. CV-PC-OS-21802

4

1
2

MS. DUNN: The State did, Your Honor.
Thank you.

6

MR. ROARK: I did; Your Honor.

7

THE COURT: Mr. Abdullah, I want to remind

8

you that anything you send to me I have to turn over

9

to everybody else. Okay?

10

THE DEFENDANT: (Nods head In the

11
12

affirmative.)

13
14

an ex parte communication. So Just so you know, if

15

copy. All right?

16

17
18

THE COURT: Otherwise It Is what they call

you write me anything In the future, l!Verybody
everybody gets a

THE DEFENDANT: (Nods head In the
affirmative.)
THE COURT: Now I do want to address a

19

couple of things in the letter so that I can answer

20
21

legitimate questions. And then what we will do Is,

some of your questions because I think they are

22

Mr. Roark, I will then ask you to klnd of layout ---

23

without divulging any advice that you have given or

24

any or
of your ftndlngs,
findings, to layout sort of the process

25

and to at that point Indicate to me whether you feel
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001446

.

--

ee

.

5

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9

10
11
12
13
14
16
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
26

that Mr. Abdullah has sufficient information and has
been given the opportunity to be prepared to decide
whether he can waive any conflict that might exist.
Okay?
MR. ROARK: Yes.
THE COURT: So, Mr. Abdullah, you asked a
couple of questions and I am going to answer those.
Now obviously the decision to either waive the
conflict or not Is yours. It can't be made by any
attorneys, friends, family. It is
Is really your
decision.
You have indicated you want to know what
would happen if you ~on:t waive the c~>nflict
c~>nflict and you
get new counsel and you wanted to know whether that
person would be allowed to modify or add additional
post-conviction claims.
And I know the State is not going to like
this. But if you do get new counsel, I think it's
only fair to allow that individual to review the
record and determine whether they believe additional
daims or any modification of claims should be filed.
And so what I would do is give that person
the opportunity to review everything. And It is
obviously going to take them -- they are going to
have a lot of material to look at. And If they feel

7
1 SAPO, which you can do, then -- I'm sorry. Let me
2 start that over again. I have to get this right.
If you dedde that you want me to appoint
3
"I am not waiving the
4 new counsel and you say, HI
5

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23

24
25

I would use is this.
conflict, then the process that 1
first, obviously if you want to hire someone
yourself, you can hire anybody you want. That's up
to you. You could, of course, decide to represent
yourself. I would recommend against that. If you
decide that you are even thinking about it, I want
you to let me know so that we can schedule a hearing
and I can explore that with you because I really
think it is a very bad Idea. The third possibility
is that I would order the SAPO to -- what I would
prOVide me a list of attorneys who
have them do is provide
are qualified by the Supreme Court to represent an
individual like you on a capital case in
post-conviction and in that list, I would want them
to Indicate whether they have ongoing contracts. In
other words, these are people who are willing to
contract with the SAPO to be conflict counsel. And
then -- and with their qualifications.
Is schedule a
And then what I would do IS
hearing and ask those individuals who are interested
in actually taking the work to appear in court with
D

1
2
3
4
6
8

7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
26

6

-- and it's up to them -- they want to add or modify
or delete any of the dalms that have been filed,
then I will allow them to file a motion; and most
likely, assuming there's a good basis for it, I would
allow them to do so, because I think It's only fair,
if you get new counsel, that they have the
opportunity to make that determination. So the
answer to the -- I guess the short answer to the long
question Is that yes, I would.
Now with respect to the SAPO, II would not.
And the reason I1 wouldn't is that they have been
six years. They have gone
working on this case for sIx
through a number of amendments. I don't see any
reason that -- because even though I know Mr. Ackley
is leaving, essentially the same team has been in
place for some time and so I1 would require them to
proceed along the lines that we have already been
pOint, I have
proceeding. And I am now -- at this point,
read all of the Amended Petition, II have read all of
the responses and so I am pretty familiar with what
everybody has alleged.
Now you asked about the process. A couple
of things. You will have a couple of options today.
If you decide not to waive the conflict -- excuse me
-- if you decide to waive the conflict and keep the

8

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24

25

you present so that you can hear the discussion. And
I would inquire of each of them a couple of things.
One, do they have the time to devote to your case.
Because it is not a -- this is a difficult case and
there's a lot of material. And so -- and I know Mr.
Roark has put a lot of time into this.
And then I would also inquire and make sure
we don't get ourselves In the same position we are in
now, to make sure there are no conflicts. That is
going to be a very probing Inquiry,
inquiry, very important,
because as now, I read all the material.
It is clear
dear to me that there are a number
of attorneys here in
In the state who participated in
one form or another In this trial, therefore, they
would likewise be disqualified. I can think of some
where they ended up ghostwriting material, where they
actually did that. And that is the basis of actually
one of your claims is that you didn't know that was
happening. So I would have to make sure that they
did not participate with the Toryanskis in the trial
of this case because I don't want to go down that
path again.
So you would be present, but I would have
to make the decision as to who would be appointed
apPOinted and
-- because when we appoint at public expense, It's

Page 5 to 8 of 28
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9

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9

10
11
12
13
14
16
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
26

the Judge's responsibility to make that call. The
only thing I can do is assure you, Mr. Abdullah, that
I am going to be very careful to make sure they don't
have a conflict, that they are very qualified to take
this on and that they have the time to do it because
I don't want you to have someone who Is not going to
devote the ttme to It that It needs to have done.
Okay? Does that answer your questions?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Thank you, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: All right. NOW,
Now, to me, I am
not going to hear argument from anyone else because
this Is really about Mr. Abdullah. So, Mr. Roark, a
couple of months ago, I gave you a task. And I want
to make It very clear on the record and I want to
make sure you agree with me. You and I have had no
conversations. Is that correct?
MR. ROARK: That is absolutely correct.
THE COURT: Everything that has occurred
between you and I have been copied to all counsel.
MR. ROARK: That Is correct, as well, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Now If you can kind
of layout -- and what I want to tell you Is
is that
ultimately I am going to have you do an actual

10
1 written document that is going to layout what you
2 did, including what advice you gave. That Is going
3

to be sealed, under Rule 32, from the Court, as well

4 as all counsel. And I want you to file two copies.
6

6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
16
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

And the reason I want you to file two copies -- well,
pOint, one copy. If Mr. Abdullah decides he
at this point,
wants me to appoint new counsel, then I want that new
counsel to be able to have access to that material so
that that person can examine It, with the mind-set of
whether they are going to have additional
post-conviction claims.
But the bottom line here is -- and if
jf he
stays with the SAPD, then It is going to remain
sealed. And the purpose behind that is to provide a
very clear record for any other successive Petitions,
appeals, habeas, whatever may occur in the future, so
that there's a clear record of what Mr. Abdullah knew
advised and
when he made this decision, what he was adVised
reviewed.
what material he reViewed.
I hope you agree with that way of handling
it. I want to make sure we have a record. Because,
as we all know, unfortunately, these kinds of cases,
quite frankly, have lives of their own and long after
I am probably dead, somebody will be working on this
because now I am going to be 63, so I am starting to

11

12

1 look at that end and the light of the tunnel. I am
2 starting to be too old to even think about being here
3 for a long time.
So I want to make sure that there's enough
4
6

6
7

8
9

10
11
12
13
14
16
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
26

of a record so that any future court proceedings,
they know exactly what happened. And I've tried to
do that throughout this case. I've kept just about
every piece of paper I can possibly Imagine.
So with that in mind -- and I also want any
depositions that you took also to be filed under
seal, Just
just for the record. So if you can layout
process-wise what you did. I've already determined
there Is a confiict.
conflict. I have not determined the
extent of the confiict.
conflict. I have not made any
determinations because I have not done the
investigation.
I will note that the SAPD did ask me to
actually conduct a target Investigation. Because of
where we were procedurally, I decided I wasn't even
going to respond to that. The reason I decided not
to do my own Investigation Is that makes me part of
this process and I don't want to be in the position
of either Inadvertently or even on purpose learning
anything about any attorney-client involvement, any
discussions between the parties. I don't want to be

3 of 7 sheets

1
2
3
4
6
6

7
S

9

in that position. I want to make sure that I remain
In, which is
in the position I am supposed to remain in,
as the neutral judge and not really looking beyond
that. So I have -- that Is the reason that I chose
not to do my own Investigation. I certainly could
have. There's some case law that suggests that it Is
okay. But the process I have used has also been
approved, at least by the Court of Appeals, by way of
comment on a case that I was actually involved with
called State versus Lopez, where I also had someone
adVise the person. So that Is the reason that I have
done that.

10
11
12
13
Now with that in mind, Mr. Roark, If you
14 want to tell us, you know, what you did, but nothing
15 about any advice.
16
MR. ROARK: Certainly, Your Honor. May It
17 please the Court -- and I may not be encydopedic
encyclopedic in
18 my recitation of what I have done In this case, nor
will attempt to
19 even necessarily chronological, but I wlll
20

do that.

21
22
23

Inquiry, of course, with a
I began my InqUiry,
consideration of this Court's order appointing me to

24

25

this position. I then reviewed the response by the
inquiry regarding the conflict
SAPD to this Court's inquIry
and also reviewed the memorandum from the Ada County

Page 9 to 12 of 28
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1
2
3
4

6
6

7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
16
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25

Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Shawna Dunn,
responding to SAPD Involvement with trial and
pretrial and tried to at that point review all of the
documentation upon which the conflict was based, to
the extent that such documentation exists.
I then undertook to review In detail, and
as chronologically as I could, the Petitions that
have been filed, first the Petition for
Post-conviction for Relief and then a series of
amended petitions, so that I could track,
traCk, to the
extent POSSible,
possible, the evolution and the refinement of
the issues presented to the Court for post-conviction
relief and concluded that Inquiry with what has been
styled the Anal Amended Petition for Post-conviction
Relief that was filed with this Court on the 29th of
August 2008. And this is the document that extends
extendS
approximately 400 pages.
Once that had been completed, I did have
previously two less-than-comprehensive phone
conversations with Mr. Abdullah. I met with him then
at the Idaho State Penitentiary where he is
Incarcerated. We held four such meetings over the
course of time between my appointment and today's
date so that I could discuss with him, as my work
progressed, what I had discovered, what opinions I

--

14
1 held In regard to what had been discovered and what
2 the implications were.
3
I also, because a Petition and Application
4 for Interlocutory Appeal was filed in this case, read
5

that Petition and the materials submitted therewith,

6 as well as the rather comprehensive response filed by
7 the Attorney General's Office to that Petition or
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

that application for Interlocutory relief, which was
ultimately, of course, denied.
THE COURT: See, I didn't even know that it
had been denied. Nobody has told me anything.
MR. ROARK: Well I think actually it may
withdrawn.
have been Withdrawn.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ROARK: I then took, in February of
this year, the depositions of Molly Huskey, Kimberly
Simmons and Mark Ackley. Those depositions were
transaiption of the depositions
transcribed and the transaiptlon
were provided to Mr. Abdullah. During one of our
hOUrs, we
meetings lasting two, two and-a-half hours,
discussed in detail the material that was contained
within those depositions.
I also read and reviewed in its entirety
the deposition of Kim Toryanski, giving particular
depOSition of Ms.
attention to those portions of the deposition

15
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Toryanski that dealt specifically with advice,
counsel, assistance she had received from attorneys
outside her Office,
office, including, of course,
particularly those conversations or e-mail exchanges
with members of the team from SAPO.
I also received from Ms. Huskey'S office
their Policy
Polley and Procedures Manual and the Policy and
Procedures Manual for the Capital Utlgatlon Unit,
both of which I have reviewed. I haven't read it In
in
their entirety, but I have reviewed as regards to
policies that may touch upon the matters that we
confront in this particular case.
Each time I met with Mr. Abdullah, we
discussed precisely what It was the Court was
concerned with;
With; we reviewed the case law; we reviewed
in detail the implications of waiving the conflict,
as well as the Implications of declining to do so.
The Court actually answered this afternoon
a question that Mr. Abdullah has had for a
significant
sIgnificant period of time, which I felt to be beyond
the scope of what this Court had ordered me to do.
So I have never provided
prOVided him with any advice as to
what process this Court would employ, in the event
that successive counsel was required.
reqUired. As I say, I
felt that was beyond the charge which was given to me

16
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in this case.
Inquire of this Court or
I also declined to InqUire
to offer an opinion as to what this Court's policy
might be, in the event that Mr. Abdullah chose not to
waive the conflict and subsequent counsel felt it
appropriate to ask this Court for leave to amend, one
more time, the Petition. But I believe that the
questions; and to
Court has thoroughly answered those questionSj
the extent that they bear upon Mr. Abdullah's
decision, I am sure his decision will reflect that.
Now I have given him advice as to what I
consider to be the extent of the conflict. I have
provided him with advice as to whether or not I
in any
thought that the conflict was reflected In
vigorously litigate
attempt or failure by the SAPD to Vigorously
those issues that might be implicated by the
conflict.
what, If
I have also discussed with him What,
any, Implications may be involved in this case, as
far as expert witness testimony or .even fact
testimony might be concerned at the time this case
goes to trial. So I feel that Mr. Abdullah has had
the benefit of such advice as I could offer in those
areas.
I met with Mr. Abdullah personally for the
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last time last week and we discussed again at length
the nature of the conflict, the extent to which that
conflict may have debilitated the SAPD's Office, the
extent to which the SAPD's Office had declined or
neglected to vigorously pursue issues principally
involving those areas of communication with the
Toryanskis that had occurred and what Mr. Abdullah
would be facing, in terms of either exercising or
failing to exercise his right to waive.
I believe, based upon another lengthy
conversation that we had yesterday via phone, that
Mr. Abdullah Is now satisfied that he has received
adVice, for that
all of the legal and practical advice,
matter, necessary for him to make an informed
decision. I have emphasized that the decision he
makes is irreversible;
irreversiblej that this Court will not
permit him and no appellate court would permit him to
waive the conflict and then assert it at a later
date.
THE COURT: Which was the Court's concern.
MR. ROARK: Yes. And he fully
fUlly understands
that fact. So I believe, Your Honor, that Mr.
Abdullah is prepared, at least in terms of the
services that I have tried to render to him, to make
his decision and to announce that decision to the

MR. ROARK: And I will follow up with ---

3

4
THE COURT: A report.
MR. ROARK: --- a more thorough report in
5S
6 writing.
7
THE COURT: Right. And then I want to
In, I want It
8 emphasize again when you send that in,
9 under seal and I want the top part of It to have a
10 caption and show that it is under seal, even from the
11 Courtj
Court; that no court personnel, including the Judge
12 will open that, because that's not --- it is not going
13 to happen. And then put a signature line for myself
14 to sign under yours to show "It is so ordered,· If
15 you would do that.
16
MR. ROARK: I will.
17
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And
18 thank you for the thoroughness of your report.
19
Mr. Abdullah, before we proceed, I know
20
21
22
23
24

25

that you are upset. If you want to take a few
minutes, if you want to talk to Mr. Roark one more
time, that would be fine. That's up to you. Would
you like to do that?
THE DEFENDANT: Please.
THE COURT: All right. Why don't we let

19
1

2

3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

him go back in the holding cell and, Mr. Roark, you
can talk to him. When he Is ready to come in, let me
know.
MR. ROARK: Absolutely.
THE COURT: Thank you.
THE BAIUFF: All rise, please.
(Whereupon, there was a break In the
proceedings from 1:23 to 1:35 p.m.)
THE BAIUFF: All rise, please. District
Court is again In session.
THE COURT: Please be seated. Mr.
Abdullah, are you ready to go forward then?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. And you've had
further discussion with Mr. Roark?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. You don't have to stand
up, if you don't want to. I just want to ask you
materIal that
whether you have reviewed all of the material
Mr. Roark provided you.
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, Judge.
THE COURT: You did. Before you tell me
what your decision Is, has anyone pressured you or
threatened you or tried to get you to make a
decision?

5 of 7 sheets
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1 Court this afternoon.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Roark.
2

20
1
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
2
THE COURT: Okay. Because it has to be
3 your decision.
4
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. I understand.
5
66
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
18
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18
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20
21
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THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Roark can't make the
decision for you. Your prior -- your counsel can't
make the decision. It has to be your decision.
THE DEFENDANT: I understand.
THE COURT: All right. And so the question
I have for you is do you want to waive the conflict
and keep the SAPD or do you want to have me appoint
new counsel?
THE DEFENDANT: I do not waive the
conflict.
THE COURT: All right. You want me to
appoint new counsel then?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. And that is your
decision?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. I note that the
SAPD's office is present. I am going to Issue an
actual written Order, but I am going to order the
SAPD's Office to contact the people with whom you
normally contract for conflict. 'rhey have to be
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21
capital certified. They also have to be -- before I
start running through the names, I want to make sure
that you have spoken to them to make sure that they
would be willing to accept an appointment.
appOintment. And then
what I would like you to do is provide me that list
with a resume of each of them and then I will
schedule a hearing at which I would ask those parties
to --- maybe a series of hearings in which they would
appear. I would ask them to appear In court to make
sure that they don't have any conflict and to make
sure that they have the time to actually devote to
Mr. Abdullah's case. And you are?
MS. HUSKEY: I am Molly Huskey, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Huskey.
MS. HUSKEY: If I could, there would be two
Issues that we --- and I apologize for my voice today.
THE COURT: That's all right.
MS. HUSKEY: We only have three individuals
on contract; only one of them is capital qualified,
Dennis Benjamin.
THE COURT: And he Is disqualified.
MS. HUSKEY: And that's basically what I
was going to apprise you of. The second Issue, Your
Honor --- and we have Mr. Josh Tewalt from the
Department of Financial Management or I have his
23
MS. HUSKEY: Your Honor, then I would like
to make a record. I have copies of Mr. Tewalt's
affidavit or I can call him as a witness. But I can
tell you right now that the State Appellate Public
Defender's Office has approximately, with projected
spending, $5,000 remaining in Its budget to get us
through until June 30 of this year.
THE COURT: Then you are going to have to
go to the legislature and see if you can get
additional funding.
MS. HUSKEY: I have previously
preViously spoken with
Mr. Tewalt about that. There is no constitutional
method or process by which we can obtain additional
funding before July 1.
THE COURT: Well you are going to have to
find a way to do it.
MS. HUSKEY: Then, Your Honor --THE COURT: Because he has a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and like I said, it is the
SAPO's fault that we are at this point. It is not
the Court's fault. It is not the State's fault. It
really is your fault that we are here. So you are
going to have to find a way. As I indicated, there's
a good possibility that we won't actually have
anybody appointed
aPPOinted until July first, but that -- and
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affidavit that we could submit via an exhibit. The
SAPO simply has no funds to contract with any
attorney to represent Mr. Abdullah until July one of
this year.
THE COURT: What we are going to do is I am
going to issue an Order and if you have to go and
find funds someplace, you are going to have to find
them. The reason that I do that, Ms. Huskey, Is, In
my view,
View, it is the SAPO's Office that created this
problem, not Mr. Abdullah. He did not create this
problem. The SAPD's Office, through its actions,
created this problem that brought us to this
positlon._
position.
_
So It may be that we actually don't get
anyone on board until July I,
1, so maybe it will be a
moot issue. But since you don't have anybody on
contract -- you said there's only really one that is
death penalty qualified --- then what I am going to do
is I do have the list and I will send out a letter
that goes to all of them and they will be paid for by
SAPO by order of this Court because I don't have
the SAPD
anybody else to make them pay. The Court doesn't
have the money and, as I said, Mr. Abdullah doesn't
have the funds. So you are going to take it out of
your office budget. That is the bottom line.
24
you can certainly file those affidaVits.
affidavits. But In
in my
view, with an Indigent defendant, the mere fact that
sufficient to excuse
you have funding problems is not suffiCient
you from the responsibility of providing him with an
attorney.
So what I am going to do is send out Orders
and also letters to all people on the capital list
and find out what their conflicts are. We wI/I
will
schedule a hearing, have them come in and explain to
the Court if they have the time and if they do, then
I am going
gOing to end up appointing them.
MS. HUSKEY: If I may, Your Honor, two
additional questions. One, we will seek
interlocutory appeal from this order on the --THE COURT: What will be your standing?
MS. HUSKEY: Our standing is --THE COURT: You no longer represent Mr.
Abdullah.
MS. HUSKEY: Our standIng,
standing, Your Honor, is
that this Court has ordered us to do something that
Is legally impossible for us to comply with.
THE COURT: Then you can file a separate
action because I don't think you can file It wIthin
within
this case.
MS. HUSKEY: Definitely, Your Honor. Who

Page 21 to 24 of 28

0014516 of 7 sheets

•

25
1

will be representing Mr. Abdullah between now and the

2

time in which counsel is appointed?
THE COURT: I think what I am gOing to do

3
4
5
6

go ahead and have him continue in that. Is that

7

acceptable to you, Mr. Roar1<?

1

26

interlocutory appeal. What you are complaining about

2

is that the Court is going to be ordering you to

3

provide him with legal counsel and you claim that you

is continue Mr. Roark in that position. He hasn't

4

can't do that. That has nothing to do with this

completed all of his actions and so we are going to

Ii
I)

case.

6

MS. HUSKEY: And then thirdly, Your Honor,

20

line. And I had a problem, quite frankly, with an

21
22

interlocutory appeal because at that point,
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everything was stayed. I had a problem with that

22

MS. HUSKEY: Thank you, Your Honor.
MS,

23

because I didn't -- in reading the repeal, I didn't

23

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. What we

24

see that this was anything that Mr. Abdullah was

24

will do is stand in recess. Mr. Roar1<, you will

26

requesting. But I don't see any basis for an

25

provide the additional material. In the meantime, if
prOVide
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he has any questions, you can answer those questions
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MR. ROARK: It Is.
THE COURT: So that if he has any questions
during
dUring this period of time -- but, obviously, nothing
else is going to be happening in this case until we
get new counsel on.
MS. HUSKEY: So am I to understand then the
Court is denying our request that this Court stay
that order pending an interlocutory appeal?
THE COURT: Ms. Huskey, I appoint counsel.
Mr. Abdullah has refused to waive the conflict that
exists after a full advice. You are no longer
representing him in that capacity. That's the bottom

when you issue your final written Order, as I
understand It, the process Is that we would sort of
provide you with a list of individuals and then the
proVide
Court would select. But under Idaho Code 19-869,
choice of conflict counsel is left to the discretion
of the State Appellate Public Defender's Office. So
if you would just clarify that in your written Order
as well.
THE COURT: I will make It very clear
because at this point, I think you also have a
conflict.
MS. HUSKEY: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I want to make sure that
Mr. Abdullah gets a conflict-free counsel and that Is
the Court's responsibility.

27
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2.

until you are relieved.

REPORTER'S C£R'I'1:FICA'1'E
C£R'I'l:FICA'l'E

MR. ROARK: I will, Your Honor.

STA'TE OF IDAHO

THE COURT: Thank you.

COUNry OF ADA

THE BAIUFF: All rise, please.

1, M. GORCZY'C'&,
GORCZY'CJ., cert.if1ed
cert.ifled Shorthand Reporter and

(Whereupon, the above proceedings concluded

Re;istered
Ra;istered Professional Ile:portPlr r do hereby cert.ify.
certify.

at 11:43
:43 p.m.)

Tha.t I am the
th_ court. reporter whe
who took tha
px:oceeding!l
p:r:oceeding!l had in the above-entitled
above-anti tlecl action in
ift
machine shDrthllnd
ShDtthllnd and thereafter wa.s redUced int<l
intCl
10
11

typewriting under my direction; a.nd
That 't.he foregoiN1
foregoi"9 Reporter'a Tum.script l;ontaiM
I;ontain.s

12

.. full, T-rue
ttue and
aftd accurate record of the proceedings

13

hlld in the abo\Je and fore.goiN1
fore.goi"9 cause, which 1HI.s
lHI.s heel'd

14

in Boi:le,.
Boille,. Idaho.

1~

16

ttl WITNESS iiHEREOF, I M\Je hee-unto

~et

my hand

thb
this 1i!lt
li!1t day of June 201D.

,7

17

,.

M. Gorczyca,
GClrczyca, CSR. 9PR

20

21
22
23

25

23
24
26
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2

STATE OF IDAHO

3

COUNTY OF ADA

4
5

I, M. GORCZYCA, Certified Shorthand Reporter and

6

Registered Professional Reporter, do hereby certify:

7

That ! am the court reporter who took the

8

proceedings had in the above-entitled action in

9

machine shorthand and thereafter was reduced into

10
11

typewriting under my direction; and
That the foregoing Reporter's Transcript contains

12

a full,

13

had in the above and foregoing cause, which was heard

14

in Boise, Idaho.

15
16

true and accurate record of the proceedings

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
this 1st day of June 2010.

17
18
19

M. Gorczyca, CSR, RPR
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
IAN THOMSON
Deputy, Capital Litigation Unit
I.S.B. # 5888
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. SPOT 0500308
AFFIDAVIT OF
JOSHTEWALT

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) ss
County of Ada.
)
Josh Tewalt, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am employed by the State ofIdaho, Division of Financial Management
(hereinafter, DFM);

2.

That I have been employed with DFM since June, 2008;

3.

I have been the financial analyst for the Office of the State Appellate
Public Defender (hereinafter, SAPD) since 2009;

4.

I am currently the financial analyst for the SAPD;

5.

That I am familiar with the codes, regulations and other rules that govern
the financial dealings of state agencies;

6.

That I am familiar with the SAPD's FY2011 actual budget and the
SAPD's FY2012 budget;

AFFIDAVIT OF JOSH TEW
ALT
TEWALT

1
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7.

That the budget year for FY2011 began on July 1, 2010 and will end on
June 30, 2011;

8.

That the SAPD's FY2011 budget was $1,954,800, which was a 10.25%
reduction as compared with the FY2010 budget; That from the Operating
expenses, the SAPD hires contract attorneys to handle conflict cases and overflow
cases when the SAPD caseload is too high for the Appellate Unit attorneys;

9.

That in FY2011,
FY20ll, the SAPD had only $85,000 for non-capital conflict
contracts;

10.

That this amount was insufficient and so for FY2011,
FY20ll, the SAPp
SAPP is
seeking, and the Governor has approved, a supplemental appropriation in the
amount of $86,500 to cover shortfalls in those existing contracts;

11.

That the Legislature has not yet approved the Supplemental Request;

12.

That the $86,500 supplemental was requested for, and is specifically
designated, for existing contract shortfalls in the Appellate Unit, as outlined
above;

13.

That because of the budget shortfalls, and because of fixed costs in the
operating expenses, for example, rent, telephone and data lines, the SAPD has
scheduled three (3) furlough days to date during Fiscal Year 2011;

14.

Any additional furlough dates have not yet been ruled out;

15.

That the SAPD requested an $180,500.00 FY2011
FY20ll Supplemental
Appropriation to be used in capital cases, and requested this amount as an onon
going request for the SAPD budget, but that request was not approved by the
Governor and therefore it is unlikely that it would be funded by the Joint Finance
and Appropriations Committee of the Legislature;

16.

That all state contracts must contain a clause that indicates that any
contract is subject to sufficient appropriation from the Legislature;

17.

That any remaining money in personnel cannot be "moved" to cover
operating expenses without the permission ofDFM and David Fulkerson, (State
Financial Officer);

AFFIDAVIT OF JOSH TEWALT
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That currently, the SAPD would not be pennitted to move any remaining

18.

personnel money into operating because any unspent money would have to be
reverted to the State to help offset any budget shortfalls for FY20 11;
That the SAPD does not have the legal authority to "carryover" personnel

19.

money from one fiscal year to another; any unspent personnel money, absent
consent from DFM to move to cover operating expenses, must be reverted to the
General Fund at the end of the FY2011 Budget Year;
That any contract currently initiated by the SAPD would not have the

20.

. guarantee of sufficient Legislative General Fund Appropriations;
21.

Thus, the SAPD has no money in the FY2011 budget to cover an
of Idaho;
additional contract for conflict services in Erick Hall v. State ofIdaho;

22.

That the SAPD's FY2012 budget recommendation is $2,040,200;

23.

That the FY20 12 budget recommendation is broken down as follows:
$1,613,700 in personnel costs, $426,500 for operating costs, and $0.00 for capital
outlay;

24.

That the FY2012 operating expense must cover fixed costs like rent
(approximately $78,000 for FY20l2), data and telephone lines (approximately
$20,000), and legal research ($34,000);

25.

That given those fixed expenses, the SAPD has only $123,000 to cover all
other operating expenses not listed above;

26.

That until the final FY2012 is approved by the Joint Finance and
Appropriation Committee, the SAPD does not know the amount of the FY2012
Appropriation except that it will not exceed the above numbers and could, in fact,
be less than the above numbers;
That in light of the above, DFM would recommend against entering any

27.

additional contracts for legal services in FY2012, as such contracts may not be
sufficiently funded and there is no mechanism to assure the contract is sufficiently
funded;
28.

Further, your affiant sayeth naught.

DATED this 10th day of January, 2011.

ALT
AFFIDAVIT OF JOSH TEW
TEWALT
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to

,2010.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ICY"" day of January, 2010, a true and correct copy
ofthe foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: ,A../.7
,A./.7 fh~(0:J
fh~(0:J J ~t:-It-e£..eTf'J,.r-7
~t:-Jt-c£...eTf'J,.r-7
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EVAN SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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State Appellate Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712
(208) 334-2985 (fax)

AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION

I, Erick Virgil Hall, do hereby authorize the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) to release
whatever records or information in their possession to Dennis Benjamin of the firm Nevin, Benjamin,
McKay & Bartlett so that he may determine the nature and extent of a potential conflict of interest in my
case, CV PC 080 3085. This release of information/records includes, but is not limited to, handwritten
notes from any current or former SAPD staff member, typewritten notes, electronic mail, transcripts, and
pleadings.
This document also authorizes Mr. Benjamin to discuss otherwise confidential information with my prior
counsel, Mark J. Ackley and Paula M. Swensen, as well as any current members of the SAPD staff as he
deems appropriate, and to communicate the results of his inquiry to me.
II understand that the purpose of this disclosure is to assist my legal representative, Dennis Benjamin, in
determining the nature and extent of a potential conflict of interest and to advise me accordingly regarding
whether I should or should not waive any conflict as identified by Mr. Benjamin. I understand that
authorizing the release of this information is voluntary and that I can refuse to sign this authorization. I
understand that II may inspect or obtain a copy of the information to be used or disclosed.
II understand that this authorization will automatically expire one (l)
(1) year from the date signed unless
revoked sooner. II understand that II have the right to revoke this authorization at any time by notifying my
attorney in writing. II understand that revocation will not apply to· information that has already been

released in response to this authorization.
A photo or faxed copy of this authorization and request for release of information shall be deemed to be
of the sarrie full force and effect as an original.

/1 s - /tJ

Date of Birth:

Dated:

SS#:

_::zW/
_
Client:_~
_ _'_
' _ _1/_._~
___

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25 th day of June, 2010.
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MOLL
Y 1. HUSKEY
MOLLY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Case No. CV PC 080 3085

MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO
APPEAL

(CAPITAL CASE)

COMES NOW Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his attorneys at the office of the
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), and hereby moves this Honorable Court for
pennission to appeal, pursuant to the Idaho Appellate Rules, Rule 12, from this Court's

Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel
(hereinafter, "Memorandum Decision and Order", filed December 27,2010.)

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The procedural history of the litigation of a possible conflict of interest is lengthy and set
forth in Mr. Hall's Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order (hereinafter, "Motion
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to Reconsider"), filed concomitantly with this motion, and need not be repeated here. Mr. Hall
hereby incorporates by reference the entirety of his Motion to Reconsider, including the procedural
history. Mr. Hall believes that he has raised genuine points for clarification and alternate avenues.
of action in his Motion to Reconsider and is filing the instant motion solely out of a need to
preserve his right to pennissive appeal should this Court deny his Motion to Reconsider. It is not
Mr. Hall's intention to in anyway diminish his desire for reconsideration by filing the instant
motion. However, should the Court deny his Motion to Reconsider Mr. Hall reserves the right to
amend this motion for pennissive appeal to include any further findings of this Court. Indeed, Mr.
Hall believes that as things currently stand, an appeal, prior to completion of these post-conviction
proceedings, is necessary to protect his substantial rights.
MOTIVATION FOR FILING

The instant case represents the third time in the last year the SAPO has found itself
litigating the issue of whether it has a conflict of interest in representing one of its capital clients in
post-conviction proceedings. (See, Motion to Reconsider, p.5)

Until this issue arose in Mr.

Abdullah's case, case SPOT0500308, the SAPO had never faced this question. Now it seems the
State will be automatically filing motions raising the issue of a conflict, whether or not there are
facts to support such a motion, in every capital post-conviction case the SAPO represents. l
In addressing this issue in Mr. Abdullah's case, the SAPO represented to the district court
that it had reviewed the record and made a detennination there was nothing in the unsolicited and
minimal pretrial, trial and post-trial contact with trial counsel that would give rise to a potential or

1 Allegations of a conflict of interest raised by the State should be reviewed with extreme caution.
See, Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988) ("[T]he Government may seek to
'manufacture' a conflict in order to prevent a defendant from having a particularly able defense
counsel at his side; [accordingly] trial courts
... must take it into consideration along with all of the
courts...
other factors which infonn" a decision involving an alleged conflict of interest.)
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actual conflict of interest between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD. Despite this assertion, the district
court detennined that an unspecified conflict of interest existed.

Thereafter the district court

appointed counsel outside the SAPD to investigate and advise Mr. Abdullah regarding whether he
should waive the unnamed conflict at the SAPD. Mr. Abdullah motioned the Idaho Supreme Court
for pennission to appeal the issue of whether an actual conflict of interest existed in his case. The
Idaho Supreme Court declined to grant pennission to appeal. The appointment of conflict-counsel
postand the subsequent investigation by conflict-counsel resulted in great delay in Mr. Abdullah's post
conviction proceedings and burdensome expense to the SAPD.
Wishing to avoid the same delay and overwhelming cost, the SAPD in this case attempted
to learn from its experience in Mr. Abdullah's case and detennined it should hire independent
counsel to investigate the record, decide if a conflict existed, advise Mr. Hall, and make unbiased
representations to this court. Indeed, the SAPD in this case, without any direction from the Idaho
Supreme Court, detennined that this was the best course of action to take in order to protect Mr.
Hall's rights and give him an option to raise the issue of conflict and to expedite the proceedings.
However, as the record indicates, this conflict inquiry has been lengthy and has resulted in the
SAPD being particularly unsure of how to proceed.
Thus, the SAPD seeks clarification by the Idaho Supreme Court as to the proper procedure
to be followed in detennining whether a conflict of interest exists, not only in the instant case but in
future cases, as this issue is now routinely being raised in all capital post-conviction cases.
At its core, this case deals with both the nature and scope ofthe
of the SAPD's statutory duty to
provide competent appellate and post-conviction representation to capital defendants, and the
circumstances under which a district court may interfere with the SAPD's representation of
indigent capital clients.
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ARGUMENT

Permissive Appeal From This Court's Order Appointing Keith Roark To Conduct A Further
Inquiry And Ordering The SAPD To Pay For His Representation Where The SAPD Has Already
Paid For An Independent Contract-Attorney To Conduct The Very Same Inquiry Presents A
Controlling Question Of Law As To Which There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of
Opinion And In Which An Immediate Appeal May Materially Advance The Orderly Resolution Of
These Post-Conviction Proceedings
A.

Introduction
The SAPD moves for permission to appeal the district court's order requiring it to pay for

conflict counsel to represent Mr. Hall and to conduct the same inquiry already conducted by
independent counsel hired by the SAPO. Moreover, because independent counsel and counsel at
the SAPD have determined that no conflict of interest actually exists and because the State and this
Court cannot provide a factual basis warranting further inquiry, there is nothing to support
appointment of additional counsel by the Court. Finally, because the SAPD has already arranged
for counsel to perform the duties outlined by this Court for its expert attorney to perform, and
because the SAPO cannot pay for the Court appointed expert attorney due to budgetary limits
which stem from the Idaho Legislature's failure to allocate sufficient funds to the SAPO, resolution
of this issue is necessary to protect Mr. Hall's substantial rights.
B.

This Court's Order That A Further Inquiry Be Conducted By A Court-Appointed Attorney
Where An Independent Contract-Attorney Has Already Performed The Very Same Inquiry
This Court Has Ordered Involves A Controlling Ouestion Of Law As To Which There Are
Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion
Pursuant to I.A.R. 12, a request for permission to appeal must be made to the district court

prior to filing a motion for permissive appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. Permission for an
interlocutory appeal may be granted by the district court where there is "a controlling question of
law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate
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appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation."
I.A.R. 12(a).
1.

This Court's Order That A Further Inquiry Be Conducted By A Court-Appointed
Attorney Where An Independent Contract-Attorney Has Already Performed The
Very Same Inquiry This Court Ordered Involves A Controlling Question Of Law

This Court has appointed Keith Roark to independently review the record and conduct
investigation as to whether the SAPD is conflicted in its representation of Mr. Hall. Prior to Mr.
Roark's appointment, the SAPD, out of an abundance of caution, hired Denis Benjamin to conduct
and independent review of the record, investigate, and advise Mr. Hall on whether a conflict of
interest exists.

The controlling question of law is whether a district court in a capital post-

conviction proceeding can validly appoint a separate court appointed expert attorney to
independently review the record and conduct investigation, where the SAPD has already contracted
with and paid for independent counsel to conduct the same review and investigation. This is a legal

Budell v.
question of first impression and is a substantial legal issue of great public interest. See Rudell
Todd, 105 Idaho 2,3-4,665 P.2d 701, 702-03 (1983).
2.

There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion Involving This Court's
Order That A Further Inquiry Be Conducted By A Court-Appointed Attorney Where
An Independent Contract-Attorney Has Already Performed The Very Same Inquiry
This Court Ordered

Substantial grounds for difference of opinion regarding this controlling question of law stem
from case law cited in the SAPD's filings regarding this issue including the Ex Parte Notice of

Possible Conflict of Interest, the Response to State's Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD
Conflict and the Reply to Memorandum in Support of State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible
SAPD Conflict, which are incorporated here by reference. "The

Sixth

Amendment

right

to

counsel includes a correlative right to representation free from conflicts of interest." Lewis v.

Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2004). It must be established the defendant's counsel actively
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represents conflicting interests to establish an actual conflict of interest. See Dunlap v. State, 141
Idaho 50, 62 106 P.3d 376, 388 (2004) (Dunlap III) (citing State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 98, 967
P.2d 702, 712 (1998». As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:
The effective performance of counsel requires meaningful compliance with the
duty of loyalty and the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, and a breach of these
basic duties can lead to ineffective representation. More than a mere possibility of
a conflict, however, must be shown. The Sixth Amendment is implicated only
when the representation of counsel is adversely affected by an actual conflict of
interest.
reI. Woodard v. Dist.
United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 375 (4th Cir.l991); see also People ex rei.

Ct., 704 P.2d 851, 853 (Col. 1985) ("[A] trial court may not disqualify counsel on the basis of

conjecture .... ").
speculation or conjecture....").
Although it is well recognized that the ultimate assurance of conflict-free counsel and the
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment falls upon the Court, the necessity for a thorough inquiry is
triggered by an objection by the defendant, or specific information already known to either the
Court or the District Attorney giving rise to a potential conflict. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694
(2009). A general concern by the State or Court does not establish sufficient grounds for a fishing
expedition into counsels' communications with their client. Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268,
1272 (Colo. 2005) ("[O]pposing counsel cannot be disqualified on the basis of speculation or

.
conjecture...
conjecture
... ")
1.

There Is Not A Valid Basis For The Court's Failure To Accept Mr.
Benjamin's Assertion That A Conflict Of Interest Does Not Exist In The
SAPD's Continued Representation Of Mr. Hall

In Mr. Hall's case, there is not a valid basis for this Court to decline to accept the
representations made by Mr. Benjamin that a conflict of interest does not exist.

Indeed, this

Court's reasoning for not accepting Mr. Benjamin's representations include the facts that Mr.
Benjamin is "not this Court's choice of independent counsel" and the fact that "he is closely
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aligned with the SAPD in that he regularly acts as conflict counsel for the SAPD and therefore, a
portion of his income is dependent to some degree upon his relationship with that office."
p.10, Ls. 4-11.) However, these arguments do not justify the
(Memorandum Decision and Order, p.lO,
appointment of yet another attorney to conduct the same evaluation already performed by
Mr. Benjamin.
This Court, in its Memorandum Decision and Order appointed Mr. Roark as "independent
conflict counsel" and charged Mr. Roark with the duty to provide a report to the Court on four
separate issues: "(1) whether a conflict exists; (2) if so, the general nature of the conflict; (3) the
facts surrounding or underlying the conflict; and (4) whether independent counsel believes that
such conflict may be imputed to the entire SAPD's office." (Memorandum Decision and Order, p.9,
Ls.7-11.i
Mr. Benjamin was hired by the SAPD to review all the material in Mr. Hall's case,
determine if the SAPD was conflicted in its representation of Mr. Hall, and to advise Mr. Hall on
the matter. (See, affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, filed on August 30,2010). In fact, Mr. Benjamin's
role as "independent conflict counsel" mirrors that of Mr. Roark's. The only difference between
the two is that the SAPD hired Mr. Benjamin while the Court appointed Mr. Roark. The Court
takes issue with the fact that Mr. Benjamin is routinely hired by the SAPD to perform conflict
work. However, this does not evidence a motive for forming a biased opinion but is instead the
normal procedure in selecting outside counsel. This is true both at the trial and appellate level - the

It is particularly important to note that this Court did not require Mr. Roark to report on the facts
of this case should Mr. Roark determine a conflict does not exist. This is true even though the
Court indicates that its duty to inquire further into the facts of Mr. Hall's case is a result of the lack
of disclosure of facts by the SAPD and Mr. Benjamin even though they hold the opinion no conflict
exists. (Memorandum Decision and Order, p.8, Ls. 1-3; p.6, L. 24 - p.7, L.2.)
2
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Ada County Public Defender or the SAPD is generally charged with not only selecting a conflict
attorney but also paying for those services.
The Court's rejection of Mr. Benjamin's work and its appointment of Mr. Roark to perform
the same work is attorney shopping by the Court. It is generally recognized that forum shopping is
disfavored. Stockwell v. State, 98 Idaho 797, 806 (1977). This is because litigant's efforts to find a
particularly sympathetic forum and manipulate the system in their favor should not be rewarded in
a judicial system that attempts to treat everyone with equality. [d. The same principles apply in
this instance. Simply because Mr. Benjamin is not this Court's choice of counsel does not mean
the Court can engage in attorney shopping where it has not been demonstrated that Mr. Benjamin's
evaluation was flawed warranting a repeat of his efforts by another attorney.
II.

The District Court's Order Appointing Keith Roark Interferes With Mr.
Hall's Right To Choice of Counsel

The attorney-client relationship is sacrosanct in American jurisprudence. It is fundamental
that once the attorney-client relationship is formed, "a distinct set of constitutional safeguards
aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship takes effect." Patterson v.
Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290 n.3 (1988) (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)). The

constitutional safeguards include the Sixth Amendment guarantee that the accused has the right to
rely on counsel and "imposes on the State an affirmative obligation to respect and preserve the
accused's choice to seek [that] assistance." Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171. Once appointed counsel has
established an attorney-client relationship with an indigent defendant, that relationship is no less
inviolate than if counsel had been retained. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 22-23 & n.5 (1983)
(Brennan, J., concurring in result) ("[C]onsiderations that may preclude recognition of an indigent
defendant's right to choose his own counsel ... should not preclude recognition of an indigent
defendant's interest in continued representation by an appointed attorney with whom he has
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developed a relationship of trust and confidence"); People v. Harlan, 54 P.3d 871, 881 (Colo.
2002) (noting the fact that counsel had represented defendant over a period of seven years in a
complex capital case "weighs heavily against disqualification"); Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d
216, 222 (Tex.Cr.App. 1989) ("Once counsel has been validly appointed to represent an indigent
defendant and the parties enter into an attorney-client relationship it is no less inviolate than if
counsel is retained.").
This Court's Memorandum Decision and Order undermines the attorney-client relationship
between Mr. Hall and the SAPO. Where the SAPO hired Mr. Benjamin and he has asserted that
there is no conflict of interest, the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order sends a message to
Mr. Hall that the SAPO's advice and guidance cannot be trusted and that Mr. Benjamin's advice
and guidance similarly cannot be trusted. For this Court to force substitute counsel upon Mr. Hall
for the primary purpose of investigating Mr. Hall's lawyers, further undermines that relationship.
Mr. Hall recognizes that if a conflict truly threatens to compromise either the adequate
representation of a defendant or the institutional interest in rendering a just verdict, a trial judge has
both a duty to conduct an inquiry and the discretion to appoint separate counsel if necessary. See
State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259, 77 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct. App. 2003) (noting that the district court

"appointed separate counsel, a public defender, to inquire into the conflict, determine if it was
subject to waiver, and to advise Lopez thereon.") However, because appointment of separate
counsel constitutes an interference with an established and on-going attorney-client relationship,
"[m]easures of this kind could be justified, if at all, only upon a substantial showing of necessity.
Nothing in the record indicates the existence at trial of a potential conflict between [Mr. Hall] and
[his] attorneys warranting interference with the [] established attorney-client relationships." Knix v.
State, 922 P.2d 913, 919 n.7 (Alaska App. 1996).
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This Court has appointed Mr. Roark, and has preemptively authorized Mr. Roark to conduct
depositions of Mr. Abdullah's current lawyers. (See, Memorandum Decision and Order, p.9, Ls. 113.) (Specifically noting that "Mr. Roark is authorized to take depositions in furtherance of his
inquiry of anyone he considers necessary including but not limited to, if appropriate in his view, the
SAPD or Dennis Benjamin.") (Emphasis added.) This Court's order is based on the unwarranted
belief that the SAPD has acted neither with candor nor in good faith in response to this Court's
inquiry regarding the purported conflict of interest, in violation of the SAPD's ethical obligations.
Deposing Mr. Hall's current lawyers will inevitably and unnecessarily reveal confidential
infonnation covered by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. Such an
extreme intrusion into the current, on-going attorney-client relationship, without justification,
cannot be countenanced.
Absent an actual conflict, or serious potential for a conflict, this Court's interference with
the attorney-client relationship violates Mr. Hall's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, his
right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and unnecessarily delays these proceedings.
C.

This Court's Order That A Further Inquiry Be Conducted Where Mr. Benjamin Has
Advised The Court A Conflict Does Not Exist. Where The State Has Not Presented Any
Evidence Of A Conflict. And Where The Court Does Not Have The Facts Necessary To
Support Further Inquiry Involves A Controlling Question Of Law
The record before this Court demonstrates that a conflict of interest does not exist in the

SAPD's continued representation of Mr. Hall. In fact, Mr. Benjamin has conducted an independent
review of the record and detennined that there is not a conflict of interest. The State has not
presented any factual support that would require this Court to engage in any inquiry into whether a
conflict of interest exists. Moreover, this Court cannot point to any factual basis that would result
in a requirement that the Court conduct further inquiry into a conflict of interest.

MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL

10
001470

1.

This Court's Order That A Further Inquiry Be Conducted Where Mr. Benjamin Has
Advised The Court A Conflict Does Not Exist. Where The State Has Not Presented
Any Evidence Of A Conflict. And Where The Court Does Not Have The Facts
Necessary To Support Further Inquiry Involves A Controlling Question Of Law

This Court in its Memorandum Decision and Order finds that it is "lacking enough facts to
make [the] determination [of whether a conflict exists.]" (Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 8,
Ls. 18-19.) This Court also finds that it is "presently lacking the factual background necessary to
reach any conclusion." (Memorandum Decision and Order, p.7, Ls. 25-26.) Additionally, the only
factual assertion contained in the record is that of Mr. Benjamin indicating a conflict of interest
does not exise. Moreover, the State has not presented any factual basis warranting further inquiry
into whether a conflict exists. The controlling question of law is whether a district court in a capital
post-conviction proceeding can validly appoint a separate court appointed expert attorney to
independently review the record and conduct investigation, where there are no facts indicating
further inquiry is warranted and where the only facts before the Court indicate a conflict does not
exist. This is a legal question of first impression and is a substantial legal issue of great public

Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2,3-4,665 P.2d 701, 702-03 (1983).
interest. See Rudell
2.

There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion Involving This Court's
Order That A Further Inquiry Be Conducted By A Court-Appointed Attorney Where
Mr. Benjamin Has Advised The Court A Conflict Does Not Exist. Where The State
Has Not Presented Any Evidence Of A Conflict. And Where The Court Does Not
Have The Facts Necessary To Support Further Inquiry

Substantial grounds for difference of opinion regarding this controlling question of law stem
from case law cited in ·the SAPD's filings regarding this issue including the Ex Parte Notice of

Possible Conflict of Interest, the Response to State's Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD

Attached to the Motion for Reconsideration filed concurrently with this Motion is the affidavit of
Nicole Owens, one of Mr. Hall's attorneys at the SAPD. In her affidavit Ms. Owens makes the
assertion that the SAPD does not have conflict of interest in its representation of Mr. Hall. This is
the first time the SAPD has spoken on the matter.
3
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Conflict and the Reply to Memorandum in Support of State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible
SAPD Conflict, which are incorporated here by reference.
SAPD
Arguably, by informing the Court that the SAPD had hired Mr. Benjamin to determine whether
a conflict of interest existed, the SAPD raised a specter of conflict. However, the motivation

of Possible
behind informing the Court of the SAPD actions in the June 28, 2010, Ex Parte Notice ofPossible
Conflict of Interest (hereinafter "Ex Parte Notice") under seal, was to inform the Court the SAPD
vis-Ii-vis Mr. Benjamin. Once Mr. Benjamin indicated a conflict of
was evaluating the conflict, vis-a-vis
interest did not exist the inquiry should have stopped. This is especially true where the Court and
the State failed to present any additional information a conflict of interest existed.
D. This Court's Order Requiring The SAPD To Pay For Conflict Counsel Where The SAPD Has
Already Paid An Independent Attorney To Conduct The Same Inquiry Now Ordered By The
Court And Despite The SAPD's Demonstrated Inability To Do So Presents A Controlling
Question Of Law As To Which There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion
This Court's Memorandum Decision and Order finding that the SAPD is obligated to pay for
the Court's appointed expert attorney is incorrect. Specifically, the SAPD has already fulfilled its
statutory obligation to provide conflict free counsel to Mr. Hall through its hiring of Dennis
Benjamin. Moreover, to order the SAPD to pay for this Court's attorney expert where the SAPD
has demonstrated it does not have the funds to do so is improper.
1.

This Court's Order Requiring The SAPD To Pay For Conflict Counsel Where The
SAPD Has Already Paid An Independent Attorney To Conduct The Same Inquiry
Now Ordered By The Court And Despite The SAPD's Demonstrated Inability To
Do So Presents A Controlling Question Of Law

The controlling question of law is whether a district court in a capital post-conviction
proceeding can validly appoint a separate court appointed expert attorney to independently review
the record and conduct investigation, at SAPD expense where the SAPD has already paid for this
service and where the SAPD has demonstrated it cannot pay for another identical inquiry. This is a
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legal question of first impression and is a substantial legal issue of great public interest. See Rudell
v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2,3-4,665 P.2d 701, 702-03 (1983).
2.

There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion Involving This Court's
Order Requiring The SAPD To Pay For Conflict Counsel Where The SAPD Has
Already Paid An Independent Attorney To Conduct The Same Inquiry Now Ordered
By The Court And Despite The SAPD's Demonstrated Inability To DQ So

Substantial grounds for difference of opinion regarding this controlling question of law stem
from case law cited in the SAPD's filings regarding this issue including the Ex Parte Notice of

Possible Conflict of Interest, the Response to State's Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD
Conflict and the Reply to Memorandum in Support of State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible
SAPD Conflict, which are incorporated here by reference.
The SAPD moves for permission to appeal this Court's order requiring it to pay for conflict
counsel to represent Mr. Hall. The SAPD's statutory obligation to "arrange for counsel for indigent
defendants to be compensated out of the budget of the state appellate public defender[,]" is
triggered by a conflict of interest or any other reason which renders the SAPD unable to carry out
its statutory duties. Because the SAPD cannot pay for conflict counsel due to budgetary limits
which stem from the Idaho Legislature's
Legislature'S failure to allocate sufficient funds to the SAPD, and
because a finding of conflict has not been made, resolution of this issue is necessary to advance

Mr. Hall's underlying post-conviction case.
1.

This Court's Order Exceeds Its Jurisdiction

This Court ordered the SAPD to pay for conflict counsel of the Court's choosing to
investigate and report to the Court about the existence of a conflict. Despite being informed by the
SAPD it had no budgetary resources to pay for Court appointed conflict counsel, this Court
disregarded the information and nevertheless ordered the SAPD to pay for conflict counsel to
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represent Mr. Hall. In so doing, this Court has effectively defeated the legislature's
legislature'S intent in
creating the SAPD and the capital crimes defense fund, and has exceeded its jurisdiction.
In March of 1998, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted Idaho Criminal Rule 44.3, which sets
forth the qualifications for appointed counsel in capital cases. I.C.R. 44.3. That same year, the
Idaho Legislature created the capital crimes defense fund and the SAPD. See Hon. George R.
Reinhardt III, Recent Developments in the Law Applicable to Capital Cases and Criminal Appeals
by Indigents, 42 Advocate 7 (June 1999); Idaho Code § 19-869(1). The legislature codified its

intent in creating both the capital crimes defense fund and the SAPD. With respect to the capital
crimes defense fund:
The establishment of a capital crimes defense fund by the counties of the state for
the purpose of funding the costs of criminal defense in cases where the penalty of
death is a legal possibility is hereby authorized. . .. Membership in the fund shall
be voluntary, as determined by resolution of the board of county commissioners
of the respective counties of the state.

The services of the state appellate public defender as provided in section 19-870,
Idaho Code, shall be available only to those counties participating in the fund.
I.e. § 19-863A(1),(5). Similarly, with respect to the SAPD:
The legislature recognizes that the cost of legal representation of indigent
defendants upon the appeal of their criminal convictions, particularly convictions
for first-degree murder, is an extraordinary burden on the counties of this state. In
order to reduce this burden, provide competent counsel but avoid paying high
hourly rates to independent counsel to represent indigent defendants in appellate
proceedings, the legislature hereby creates the office of the state appellate public
defender.
Idaho Code § 19-868. While the establishment of criteria for the appointment of defense counsel to
represent indigent defendants in capital cases, along with the creation of the SAPD and the capital
crimes defense fund, helped to alleviate the financial burdens faced by counties struggling to pay
for the prosecution and defense of both capital and complex criminal cases, these same acts also had
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the effect of consolidating appellate and post-conviction indigent defense representation in a single
office of the SAPD.
When the legislature created the SAPD office, it categorized the office as a department of
self-governing agencies within the executive branch, with the State Appellate Public Defender
being appointed by the Governor, on the advice and consent of the Senate. I.C. §19-869(1)-(2). The
legislature also identified the powers and duties of the SAPD and his or her office, including but not
limited to the representation of indigent capital defendants in post-conviction relief proceedings in
the district court, and on direct appeal. See I.C. § 19-870(a),(d) In addition to these duties, the
legislature vested the SAPD with the power to "contract with private attorneys to provide
representation on a case-by-case basis when such contracts would conserve budgetary resources,"
I.C. § 19-870(3), and to "arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to be compensated out of the
budget of the state appellate public defender[,]" in circumstances where the SAPD is "unable to
carry out the duties required in this act because of a conflict of interest or any other reason[.]" I.C.
I. C.
§ 19-871.
Pursuant to these provisions, it is within the power of the SAPD to decide who it will
contract with to provide legal representation to indigent clients when the SAPD is unable to do so.
The SAPD's power and ability to contract with outside counsel is dependent on having sufficient
funds to so contract. See Appendix A (Affidavit of Josh Tewalt, p.2,

~

16 ("That all state contracts

must contain a clause that indicates that any contract is subject to sufficient appropriation from the
Legislature[.]"); p.3,

~

21 ("That any contract currently initiated by the SAPD would not have the

guarantee of sufficient Legislative General Fund Appropriations[.]").
Appropriations [.]").

The SAPD's budget is

wholly dependent upon an annual appropriation of funding from the Idaho State Legislature. See
IDAHO CaNST.,
CONST., art. VII, § 13 ("No money shall be drawn from the treasurer, but in pursuance of
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appropriations made by law."). "An appropriation in this state is authority of the Legislature given
at the proper time and in legal form to the proper officers to apply a specified sum from a
designated fund out of the treasury for a specified object or demand against the state." Blaine
County Inv. Co. v. Gallet, 35 Idaho 102,204 P. 1066, 1067 (Idaho 1922).

Alternatively, if this Court's Memorandum Decision and Order is construed to be a claim
against the state, such a claim must be examined by the Board of Examiners, which consists of the
governor, secretary of state and attorney general. See IDAHO CaNST.
CONST. art. IV, § 18. The Idaho
Constitution prohibits any claim against the state being "passed upon by the legislature without first
having been considered and acted upon by said board." Id. In interpreting the role of the Board of
Examiners in relationship to the legislature, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the Board of
Examiners "must determine whether the claim is in proper form, properly certified by the state
auditor, and within the scope of the enactment providing the appropriation and payable therefrom."
Jewett v. Williams, 84 Idaho 93, 114, 369 P.2d 590, 603 (1962).

If there is no legislative

appropriation to pay "the item for which a claim has been submitted, then the board of examiners
may recommend or refuse to recommend that it be submitted to the succeeding session of the
legislature for payment." Id. In contrast, if the claim amount is "fixed or settled by lawful contract,
or by authority of the department of a state agency, or other person authorized by law to fix the
same, the board exercises only a ministerial function in examining and approving the claim for
charge ability
payment after having determined that the claim is proper as to form, certification and chargeability
against the appropriation." Id.
Because there is no appropriation from which to draw to fulfill this Court's Memorandum
Decision and Order, the Court's order constitutes a claim which must be submitted to the Board of
Examiners, which then may determine whether to refuse the claim or recommend that it be
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submitted to the 2012 legislature for payment. In either event, there is no appropriation available
that would permit the SAPD to negotiate the compensation for counsel, and no appropriation for
conflict counsel to be compensated out of the budget of the SAPD.
As a result of the absence of an appropriation by the legislature to fund the district court's
order, the court's order is in excess of its jurisdiction and is an attempt to defeat the legislative
intent in creating both the SAPD office and the capital crimes defense fund. See cf In re: State v.

District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 143 Idaho 695, 152 P.3d 566 (2007) (State was
required to pay costs/fees of special master appointed by the district court in her discretion, where
§ 12-118 provides that when the State is a party and costs are awarded against it, a
Idaho Code §12-118
warrant must be drawn against the general funds to pay such costs, but the district court cannot
identify the source of funding for such costs and cannot issue a writ of execution for the payment to
ensure such payment).
11.

The District Court Rests Its Authority to Identify and Select "Conflict Counsel" for
Mr. Hall on An Erroneous Application ofIdaho Code § 19-871

In establishing a procedure to appoint "conflict counsel," this Court erroneously relied upon
Idaho Code § 19-871 for its authority to order the SAPD to compensate "conflict counsel" from the
SAPD budget. Specifically, because there is not a conflict in Mr. Hall's case and because Mr.
Roark is an expert attorney appointed by the Court to conduct its inquiry and report to the Court
regarding whether a conflict exists, Idaho Code § 19-871 does not require the SAPD to pay for Mr.
Roark.

§§19-4904 and 19
19When an indigent petitioner files a post-conviction petition, Idaho Code §§
860 require the county to bear the cost of expenses in that post-conviction case.

Moreover,

pursuant to Idaho Code §19-871
§ 19-871 (d), the SAPD has statutory responsibility to represent capital
clients in post-conviction, and concomitantly to pay for the costs incurred as part of that
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representation. However, the cost of Mr. Roark's services will not be a cost incurred by the SAPD,
and instead is a cost incurred by this Court by procuring Mr. Roark's services. When the SAPD
incurs a cost, it does so pursuant to contractual agreement between the SAPD and the expert. No
such arrangement or contract exists between the SAPD and Mr. Roark.
Idaho Code §§19-871
19-871 provides as follows:
Should the state appellate public defender be unable to carry out the duties required
in this act because of a conflict of interest or any other reason, the state appellate
public defender shall arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to be compensated
out of the budget of the state appellate public defender.
Comparatively, Idaho Code §§19-860(b)
19-860(b) states:
If a court before whom a person appears upon a formal charge assigns an attorney
other than a public defender to represent a needy person, the appropriate district
court, upon application, shall prescribe a reasonable rate of compensation for his
services and shall determine the direct expenses necessary to representation for
which he should be reimbursed. The county shall pay the attorney the amounts so
prescribed. The attorney shall be compensated for his services with regard to the
complexity of the issues, the time involved, and other relevant considerations.
In this case, this Court has selected an attorney other than the public defender and in
defining the scope of representation, "determined the direct expenses necessary to representation."
Thus, pursuant to I.C. 19-860(b) Ada County, not the SAPD, is responsible for the remuneration for
Mr. Roark's services. Additionally, pursuant to I.C. §19-871, no determination was made by the
SAPD that it was unable to carry out the duties required in the Act.

The SAPD's statutory

obligation to "arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to be compensated out of the budget of
the state appellate public defender[,]" is triggered by the SAPD's inability to carry out its duties.
Absent an inability to carry out its duties, the SAPD has no obligation to pay for alternate counsel.
Here, the order requiring the SAPD to pay for conflict counsel of this Court's choosing is premised
on the Court's erroneous conclusion that an additional attorney is necessary to determine if a
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conflict exists. Therefore, the Court's conclusion is misplaced and the SAPD is not obligated to
pay for Mr. Roark's appointment and services.
CONCLUSION

This case presents a controlling question of law as to which there are substantial grounds for
difference of opinion. Allowing an immediate appeal will materially advance the orderly resolution
of this litigation under the special procedures for unitary appellate review of criminal and postconviction proceedings required in capital cases and will provide guidance in this and future cases.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF

Mr. Hall respectfully requests that this Court grant permission to appeal from this Court's
post-conviction Memorandum Decision and Order appointing Keith Roark as independent conflict
counsel at the SAPD expense and then stay these post-conviction proceedings pending resolution of
the appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court.

Respectfully submitted this 10th day of January, 2011.

IAN H. THOMSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

~A:~~~C
~A\1~C .

NICOLE OWENS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL, as indicated below:

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI - J BLOCK
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JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702
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U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
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_ _ Hand Delivery

Z

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

S:;SMITH=
~
~SMlrn=~~

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
IHT/es

MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL

20
001480

•

•

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
IAN THOMSON
Deputy, Capital Litigation Unit
I.S.B. # 5888
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. SPOT 0500308
AFFIDAVIT OF
JOSHTEWALT

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) ss
County of Ada.
)
Josh Tewalt, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am employed by the State of Idaho, Division of Financial
Financia1 Management
(hereinafter, DFM);

2.

That I have been employed with DFM since June, 2008;

3.

I have been the financial analyst for the Office of the State Appellate
Public Defender (hereinafter, SAPD) since 2009;

4.

I am currently the financial analyst for the SAPD;

5.

That I am familiar with the codes, regulations and other rules that govern
the financial dealings of state agencies;

6.

That I am familiar with the SAPD's FY2011 actual budget and the
SAPD's FY2012 budget;
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7.

FY2011 began on July 1, 2010 and will end on
That the budget year for FY20ll
June 30, 2011;

8.

That the SAPD's FY2011
FY20ll budget was $1,954,800, which was a 10.25%
reduction as compared with the FY2010 budget; That from the Operating
expenses, the SAPD hires contract attorneys to handle conflict cases and overflow
cases when the SAPD caseload is too high for the Appellate Unit attorneys;

9.

FY2011, the SAPD had only $85,000 for non-capital conflict
That in FY20ll,
contracts;
That this amount was insufficient and so for FY20 11, the SAPD is

10.

seeking, and the Governor has approved, a supplemental appropriation in the
amount of $86,500 to cover shortfalls in those existing contracts;
11.

That the Legislature has not yet approved the Supplemental Request;

12.

That the $86,500 supplemental was requested for, and is specifically
designated, for existing contract shortfalls in the Appellate Unit, as outlined
above;

13.

That because of the budget shortfalls, and because of fixed costs in the
operating expenses, for example, rent, telephone and data lines, the SAPD has
scheduled three (3) furlough days to date during Fiscal Year 2011;

14.

Any additional furlough dates have not yet been ruled out;

15.

FY2011 Supplemental
That the SAPD requested an $180,500.00 FY20ll
onAppropriation to be used in capital cases, and requested this amount as an on
going request for the SAPD budget, but that request was not approved by the
Governor and therefore it is unlikely that it would be funded by the Joint Finance
and Appropriations Committee of the Legislature;

16.

That all state contracts must contain a clause that indicates that any
contract is subject to sufficient appropriation from the Legislature;

17.

That any remaining money in personnel cannot be "moved" to cover
operating expenses without the permission ofDFM and David Fulkerson, (State
Financial Officer);
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18.

That currently, the SAPD would not be pennitted to move any remaining
personnel money into operating because any unspent money would have to be
reverted to the State to help offset any budget shortfalls for FY20 11;

19.

That the SAPD does not have the legal authority to "carryover" personnel
money from one fiscal year to another; any unspent personnel money, absent
consent from DFM to move to cover operating expenses, must be reverted to the
General Fund at the end of the FY20 11 Budget Year;

20.

That any contract currently initiated by the SAPD would not have the
guarantee of sufficient Legislative General Fund Appropriations;
Thus, the SAPD has no money in the FY2011 budget to cover an

21.

additional contract for conflict services in Erick Hall v. State ofIdaho;
ofIdaho;
22.

That the SAPD's FY2012 budget recommendation is $2,040,200;

23.

That the FY2012 budget recommendation is broken down as follows:
$1,613,700 in personnel costs, $426,500 for operating costs, and $0.00 for capital
outlay;

24.

That the FY2012 operating expense must cover fixed costs like rent
(approximately $78,000 for FY2012), data and telephone lines (approximately
$20,000), and legal research ($34,000);

25.

That given those fixed expenses, the SAPD has only $123,000 to cover all
other operating expenses not listed above;

26.

That until the final FY2012 is approved by the Joint Finance and
Appropriation Committee, the SAPD does not know the amount of the FY2012
Appropriation except that it will not exceed the above numbers and could, in fact,
be less than the above numbers;

27.

That in light of the above, DFM would recommend against entering any
additional contracts for legal services in FY2012, as such contracts may not be
sufficiently funded and there is no mechanism to assure the contract is sufficiently
funded;

28.

Further, your affiant sayeth naught.

DATED this 10th day of January, 2011.

TEWALT
AFFIDAVIT OF JOSH TEWALT
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to

•
e me this

Ie) ~day of <;~-O,2010.
2010.

otaI)1PUbliC
~
otaI)'PUbliC for aho
Residing at
~/f~dk~
My commission expires

c#

~

~

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /C?ft, day of January, 2010, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: ".{/./ fhdJ(':,,:J f ~~Jt<:£...e.JI'J.,r-l

T-/'_~_

EVAN SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843

JAN 10 2011
CHRISTOPHER O.
D. RICH. Clerk
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IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712

OR,GINAL
OR,SINAL

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Case No. CV PC 080 3085
MOTION FOR COURT TO
TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE

(CAPITAL CASE)

COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, through his counsel at the State
Appellate Public Defender, and moves this Court to take judicial notice of items identified in Mr.
Hall's Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order (herein "Motion to Reconsider").
In this motion, Mr. Hall specifically sets forth the items for which he asks this Court to take
judicial notice.
Applicable Law
Rule 201 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence governs judicial notice in the context of
adjudicative facts. Such facts are defined as follows:
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A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in
that it is either (1) generally known with the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
LR.E. 201 (a}-(b). This definition is broad but not exhaustive of all matters which a court may
judicially notice. See, e.g., Pern v. Stocks, 93 Idaho 866, 870, 477 P.2d 108, 112 (1970)
(Population of a town "is an appropriate subject for judicial notice, being a matter of common
knowledge generally known in the area where the court was sitting."); City of
Lewiston v. Frary,
ofLewiston
91 Idaho 322, 420 P.2d 805 (1966) ("Facts within common knowledge are not mentioned in the
Dudicial notice] statute, yet universally such facts are judicially noticed by the courts."); cf

of Rule 201 of
Kurtis A. Kemper, J.D., What Constitutes "Adjudicative Facts" Within Meaning ofRule
of Adjudicative Facts, 150 A.L.R. FED.
Federal Rules of Evidence Concerning Judicial Notice ofAdjudicative
543 (1998) (observing that judicial notice rule applies only to adjudicative facts, which are
generally identified as the facts of a particular case, in contrast to legislative facts, which are

generally described as established truths, facts, or pronouncements that do not change from case
to case and are applied universally).
Idaho Code § 9-101 also provides a non-exhaustive list of facts which courts judicially

notice:
1.

The true signification of all English words and phrases, and of legal
expressions.

2.

Whatever is established by law.

3.

Public and private official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of this state and of the United States.

4.

The seals of all the courts of this state and of the United States.
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5.

The accession to office and the official signatures and seals of office of the
principal officers of government in the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of this state and of the United States.

6.

The existence, title, national flag, and seal of every state or sovereign
recognized by the executive power of the United States.

7.

The seals of courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and of notaries
public.

8.

The laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions
and political history of the world. In all these cases the court may resort
for its aid to appropriate books or documents of reference.

Id.
When a request for judicial notice involves "records, exhibits or transcripts from the court
file in the same or a separate case, the party shall identify the specific documents or items for
which the judicial notice is requested or shall proffer to the court and serve on all partaies [sic]
copies of such documents or items," a court must judicially notice these items so long as a
request is made and the court is supplied with the necessary information. See I.R.E. 201(d).
Accordingly, Mr. Hall requests that this Court take judicial notice of the following record
items:
1. Shannon Romero has served as co-counsel on Abdullah v. State, post-conviction
case number SPOT 0500308 since the summer of2007;
2. Nicole Owens has served as co-counsel on Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case
number SPOT 0500308, since the last week in July, 2007;
3. Nicole Owens has served as co-counsel on the instant case since January 8, 2008'
4. Shannon Romero briefly served as co-counsel on the instant case from April 2010
until July 2010.
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5. Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case nwnber SPOT 0500308, Order Re: SAPD
Involvement With Trial And Pretrial, filed on August 17, 2009 (attached as
exhibit A);
6.

Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case nwnber SPOT 0500308, Memorandwn
Re: SAPD Involvement With Trial And Pre-Trial, filed on August 31, 2009
(attached as exhibit B);

7.

Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case nwnber SPOT 0500308, Response To
Court Order Inquiring Into The Pretrial And Trial Involvement Of The SAPD
With Trial Counsel, filed on September 1,2009 (attached as exhibit C);

8. Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case nwnber SPOT 0500308, Order re: Conflict
Counsel, filed on September 15,2009 (attached as exhibit D);
9. Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case nwnber SPOT 0500308, Motion For
Permission To Appeal filed on September 24,2009 (attached hereto as exhibit E);
10. Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case nwnber SPOT 0500308, Order Appointing
Keith Roark, filed October 15,2009 (attached as exhibit F);
11. Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case nwnber SPOT 0500308, Amended Motion
for Permission to Appeal and Memorandwn in Support Thereof, filed on October
23,2009 (attached as exhibit G);
12. Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case nwnber SPOT 0500308, Order re: Waiver
Hearing, filed on March 1, 2010 (attached as exhibit H);
13. Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case nwnber SPOT 0500308, Order re:
Appointment of Conflict Counsel, filed on April 30, 2010 (attached as exhibit I);
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14. Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case nwnber SPOT 0500308, Order Finding

Abdullah Knowingly and Voluntarily Waived the Conflict, filed on May 7, 2010
(attached as exhibit J); and
15. Payne v. State, post-conviction case nwnber CV PC 201011137, State's Motion

for Inquiry Into Possible Conflict with the State Appellate Public Defender, filed
on August 17,2010 (attached as exhibit K).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we ask this Court to take judicial notice of the items
identified herein as A-K, which are submitted in support of Mr. Hall's Motion to Reconsider.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 10th day of January, 2011.

Ian H. Thomson
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

~

I

('

,0

''''-j/~/~l\
\'-j:\j~l\ ,\J(

1

U

\

,

Nicole Owens
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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2
3
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,

5
Petitioner,

6
7

CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-00308
vs.
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13

14

15
16
17
18
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20
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22

THE STATE OF IDAHO

ORDER RE: SAPD INVOLVEMENT
W1TH TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
WlTH

Res ondent.
]n
In reviewing the material filed in support of the Final Amended Petition, including various
e-mails attached to the Toryanskis' depositions, it has come to the Court's attention that the State
Appellate Public Defender's Office may have been providing advice and support to the trial
counsel both before the trial began and during trial. It is unclear the extent of that advice. In an
abundance of caution, the Court orders both parties to address the following:
1.

the potential impact of this involvement,

2.

whether this creates a conflict of interest, 1

3.

the extent of that involvement, and

4.

whether it makes the members of the State Appellate Public Defender's Office
potential witnesses.

Both parties shall simultaneously address the above issues and support their positions with
citation to legal authority no later September 1,2009.

23

IT IS SO ORDERED.

24

th
17th
Dated this 17
day of August 2009.

25
26

~e.~'---_

27

Cheri C. Copsey
District Judge

28

29
30
31
~')

I The Supreme Court has presumed prejudice when counsel labors under an actual conflict of interest. See Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,100 S.Ct. 1708,64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980).
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,
Petitioner,
vs.
VS.

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV PC 2005 21802
MEMORANDUM RE: SAPD
INVOLVEMENT WITH
TRIAL AND PRE·TRIAL

-------------)
--------------------------------------------)
COMES NOW, Shawna Dunn, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and provides the following memorandum regarding the
SAPD's involvement with trial and pretrial.
The Court has instructed the parties to address:

(1)
( 1) the potential impact of [the] involvement [of the SAPD during the trial],
(2) whether this creates a conflict

MEMORANDUM RE: SAPD INVOLVEMENT IN TRIAL AND PRETRIAL
(ABDULLAH), Page
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(3) the extent of that involvement, and
(4) whether it makes the members of the State Appellate Public Defender's Office
potential witnesses.
Taking issue #3 first, the State is at a disadvantage in determining the extent of the
SAPO's involvement during trial.

The State must rely on other sources for this

infonnation. The extent of the contact between the SAPD's office and trial counsel was
discussed at Mrs. Toryanski's deposition. (KT's depo, pg. 226, In. 1 - pg.240, In. 10) The
State also 'previously asked the SAPD for infonnation about their contact with trial

counsel. In response, the SAPO provided the State documents attached as Exhibit # 1.
The State relied on this accounting and an accompanying assurance from Mr.
Mr, Ackley that
no conflict existed, and chose to take no further action. The State chose this course
based, in part
based
part,t on an understanding of case law which indicates that the defense may be in
l

the best position to foresee a conflict.
An attorney representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the
best position professionally and ethically to detennine when a conflict
of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a triaJ.
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U,S,
U.S. 335,347
335 t 347 (1980) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
interest. again, the State has relied on Mr.
As for whether there is a conflict of interest,
Ackley's assurance that there was no actual conflict. Areas where conflict could be seen
as existing are if the SAPO attorney staff are potential witnesses or if their advice led to

what they are now claiming is reversible error. The September 15,2004, email from Kim
Toryanslci's thoughts
Toryanski may give the reader pause. This email touches on Mrs. Toryanski's
on a number of issues included as claims in the final petition, including the health of the
attorney-client relationship, ongoing discussions about whether Mr. Abdullah should
bargain. Each of those issues has
testify and whether the petitioner would take a plea bargain,
been discussed by Mrs. Toryanski in the deposition and she will be available to conunent
on them further. If Mrs. Toryanski's comments are seen to deviate from the mood in the
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email, the email may be used as impeachment and Mr. Ackley would have been a
potential witness to admit the email. However, that would not be necessary because Mrs.
Toryanski acknowledged foundation for the email in her deposition. (KTs depo, pg. 226,

Ins, 19-20)
Ins.
There is an appearance of conflict which also evolves out of the September 3,

2004, telephone conversation between Kim Toryanski and Molly Huskey, with Mark
Ackley present, where the SAPO suggested requesting a continuance. The defendant's
speedy trial rights are the basis for a claim for relief. It seems concerning that the same
counsel who would advise a continuance would then attack trial counsel's decision to
request continuances.

However, defense counsel requested a continuance September

2004 and their request was denied.
Next, the State will address the closely related issues of the potentia! impact of the
involvement and whether it makes the members of State Appellate Public Defender's
Office potential witnesses. Based on our current understanding of the communications
between the SAPD and trial counsel, the State does not intend to call any members of the
SAPD attorney staff. The State spoke to Mr. Ackley about this issue some time ago, and
Mr. Ackley stated he believed he could present Mr. Abdullah's case without putting
himself or other attorneys in his office in the witness chair.
Accordingly, based on the best information available to the State, the State
Appellate Public Defender attorney staff will not be called to testify at the evidentiary
hearing. The State does not know the presence OT
or extent of any waivers by Mr. Abdullah,
which may further diminish or eliminate the impact on the UPCPA proceedings,
To the extent that there may be additional communications the State is currently
unaware of, the State seeks to retain an additional opportunity for briefing.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this

004,/02:3
004./02:3

0/51' day of August, 2009.

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor

~~~
r-r£~~
S~Dunn
S
.Dunn
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
was delivered to the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane,
Boise, Idaho 83703 through the United States Mail, this ~day of August 2009,

\J10-\JltA- .f~

_334 -;) q ~S-
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Shawna Dunn
From:

[mackley@sapd.stale.id.us]
Mark Ackley [mackley@sapd.stale.id.usJ

Sent:

FrIday. May 09,200812:12 PM

To:

Shawna Dunn; Roger Bourne

Cc:

Shannon N. Romero

Subject:

State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trIal counsel and
Abdullah v. Stale:
the SAPO

Attachments: FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday; Abdullah continuance motion was denied; Penry
Abullan, Sup. Ct. No.
v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson; State v. AbUliaI'!,
31659/ formerly H0201384; 66857.pdf; 66858.pdf

Shawna,
This is my response to your request for correspondence between our office and the
T
oryanskis at the time of their representation of Azad AbduJlah. I previously agreed to
Toryanskis
look for this correspondence and disclose it since we both recognized that such
correspondence as contained in the Toryanskis files was incomplete. Thank you for your
patience.
I have located and attacbed the following:
1.

Six emails (some of which overlap) between the Toryanskis (mostly Kim
Toryanski) and our office (Molly Huskey and/or me).
a. NOTE: it appears from some of the emails that there may have been
additional correspondence. I cannot locate any additional correspondence
(although I have located summaries of a few conversations, see below).

2.

Two facsimile cover pages from Kim to Molly.
a. Both faxes, dated 12/11103 signed by Kim and sent to Molly seem to
correspond with the attached email with the string of commWlications on
12/17/03 and apparently pertain to pleadings and rulings regarding
challenges to the death penalty statute.

h~y~ not attached the following:
I have located but h~y~

1.

A summary of a telephone call on 11124/04 from Mitch Toryanski to Molly
Huskey, written by Molly. The topics of the conversation included:
a. The outcome of the trial;
b. Whether our office files post-trial motions; and
c. Mitch's retrospective assessment of the aggravation and the miti

812112009
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evidence, the new death penalty jury system, Judge Copsey's professionalism
or lack thereof, and Mr. Abdullah's truthfulness or lack thereof; as well as
Mitch'
Mi
tch' s description of their varying degrees of their confidence during the
course of the case and his hopes for Mr. Abdullah in future proceedings.
2.

A summary of a telephone call from Kim to me on 1124/05, written by me.
The topics of the conversation included:
a. Hearing on PSI;
b. Fonnal sentencing scheduling;
c. Amendments to ICR 32;
_
d. __Whether
Whether we would a_ttend the hearing; and
e. Potential challenges to the sentencing procedure.

3.

An email summary Qf aa_writt~n
ofaa telephone call on 9/03/04 from
_writt~n summM:Y of
Kim to Molly Huskey (for which I was present), written by me on March 17,
2006. I have not yet located my contemporaneous written summary. I think I
may have given my notes to Ron Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not
located my notes in the files that they left behind after they left our office in
October 2006. The topics of the conversation apparently included:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

The Court closing the courtroom;
Kline/Littlefield;
Grounds to disqualify Judge Copsey;
My thoughts regarding trial counsels' degree of confidence;
Kim's comments regarding the State's ability to prove murder;
Kim's reference to commWlications sent by them to the prosecution
regarding the prosecution's case;
g. Kim's reference to what Mr. Abdullah agreed he did and for what he would
plead guilty;
h. Referencing to problems with the State's lab
4.

An email summary 91ilwritten sununaty of an undated telephone conversation

between Mitch and me, written by me on March 17, 2006. I have not yet
located my contemporaneous written summary. I think I may have given my
notes to Ron Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not located my notes in the
files that they left behind after they left our office in October 2006. The topics
of the conversation apparently included;
a.
b.
c.
d.

8/2112009
8/21/2009

Sentencing scheduled for 1121105;
1121/05;
Residual doubt;
Scope of allocution;
Mitch's comments about statements made to them by Mr. Abdullah
Abdul1ah
regarding the events; and
001500
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e, An unclear reference which my email summary noted as follows: "One area
of investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not
sure what this references)"
I have multiple concerns about the wisdom of disclosing these documents as they differ
from the emails and the faxes to the extent they are surmnaries of correspondence, not the
correspondence themselves which tend to speak for themselves.
themselves, 1 need to further assess
whether we have an obligation to disclose these summaries, and if so, whether they could
or should be redacted, I will make a decision on Tuesday after further discussion with
my team and Molly Huskey. I would also be interested in making further inquiry of the
Toryanskis; perhaps they could check their offices again.
I sincerely invite your thoughts on this matter; indeed, that is why II took the time to

describe for you the contents of these summaries.
-Mark
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Shawna Dunn
From:

Kim W. Toryanski [kim@torysnski.com]

Sent:

1 :59 PM
Monday, September 06, 2004 1:59

io:

Mark Ackley; Molly J. Huskey

Subject: FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday
SUbJect:
M&M:
FYI -_. we'r~ moving for a continuance. The following is a copy of the
"heads up" for the judge. The judge has not responded to Pat Owen's request
that the motion be filed under seal.

K
-----Original Message----Message----
[mailto:PROWENPHCCi!agaweb.netJ
From: Patrick Owen [mailto:PROWENPHCd!agaweb.netJ
Sent: Monday, September 06, 2004 10:04 AM
To: Judge Cheri Copsey
Co: kim@toryanski.com
Subject: RE: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday

Judge Copsey:
I request that any such motion be filed under seal and that any proceedings
related to this motion be conducted in chamben.

Pat Owen
-----Original Message----Message----
From: Kim W. Toryanski [mailto:kim@to!n!l~i.com]
[mailto:kim@to!n!l~i.com]
Sent: Monday, September 06. 2004 9:59 AM
To: Patrick Owen; Judge Cheri Copsey
Subject: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday

Judge Copsey:
morning,
The defense would like to advise you and the State that on Tuesday morning.
we will be filing a motion to continue the trial. The grounds for the
motion are directly related to the State's revelation on Friday morning that
during the course of this case, a sexual relationship existed between one of
the case prosecutors and a key witness in this case, the lead homicide
detective and case officer.

Full details of the defense necessity for a continuance will be recited in
SUIlJIllary. we assert that the defendant has a
the written motion. In SUInItJ.ary.

8/21/2009
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Founeenth Amendment due process right and a Sixth Amendment right to have a
reasolUlble opportunity to investigate the temporal duration of the
relationship, whether an actual contlict
conflict of interest may have arisen by
virtue of the relationship, whether the prosecutor's ethical duties were
c~mpromised, whether the detective has violated police rules of
affected and c~mpromised,
conduct, whether evidence or witness testimony may have been tainted or
compromised in connection with the nature of the relationship, and whether .
prejudice [0 the defendant has resulted. While the integrity of the
proceedings and the proper administration of justice is paramount to all
involved, only Mr. Abdullah stakes his life on the process.

the motion to continue, we have
In evaluating the appropriateness of rhe
10.8 (duty to
referenced Guideline 10.7 (duty to investigate) and Guideline 10.8
assert legal claims) of~e ABA Guidelines for.the Appointmen! and
Perfonnance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (Rev. February, 2003).
potentiaUy ca]ls
calls into
Without lUl opportunity to investigate a matter which potentially
question all infonnation about the case, any conviction obtained may be
appeUate attack on the basis of ineffective assistance of
vulnerable to appellate
counsel. The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated that death cases are
different and deserving of
ofhigber
higher due process standards.

Kim Toryanski

8/21/2009
8/2112009
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Abdullah continuance motion was denied
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Shawna Dunn
From:

Kim W. Toryanskl [kim@toryanski.com)

Sent:

Tuesday, September 07.20043:53 PM

To:

Huskey·
Mark Ackley: Molly J. Huskey'

Subject: Abdullah continuance motion was denied

if Azad
So maybe there is one more appellate issue for you two to address ifAzad
gets convicted of fast degree, the jury fmds an aggravator, and that
mitigation does not outweigh the aggravator(s). I think Copsey wants the
"glory" of being the fust to try a death. case under the new statute.
The good news is that, in the continuance, I detailed the need to take the
Brika Klein had the affair
deposition of detective littlefield, rhe one that Erika
with. The judge granted that!!! The prosecutor objected, but it fell on
limited,
deaf em. The prosecutor asked for the scope oftbe depo to be limited.
but the judge said no !imitatOD! OD defense inquiry. I'm looking forward to
taking the depo.
judge also said she would grant more money to investigate things that
The jUdge
need to be looked into regarding my concerns about the screwups of the NMS
additional experts
lab. So I'm going to put in for IIlQre money to get some additiOnal
to advise me. and to testify. Again, nooray.

All in all, I think I'm going to call it a win. Thanks for wargaming with
me!

Jury selection begins tomorrow morning at 9:00. We're in 507. We'll go
1;00 and then adjourn for the day. Same routine through the end of
until 1:00
the week.
Will keep you posted.

Kim

8/2112009
8/21/2009
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Shawna Dunn
From:

Mark Ackley [mackley@sapd.state,id.us]

Sent:

Tllursday, September 09, 20044:17 PM

To:

kim@toryanskLcom

SubJeGt: Penry v. Johnson

Kim,
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim
specialist.
noted that there was some contention regarding questions co prospective jurors
regarding whet.her
whet-her mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by the
defense) or -whether
'whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if instructed by
the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v. Johnson,
Johnson. 532 U.S. 782, 797
(2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation at the close of the case,
case. H@re is
a relevant portion Chat my have application for you during jury selection:
~.Pen.ry
circumst;anc8s" to
~.Pen.ry I did not hold that;
that: the mere mention of "mitigating circumst:anC8s"
capital sent::encing juxy satis£1es
JUllendmAnt::. Nor does it stand
satisfies the 21qhth
2iqhth JUlIendmAnt::.

~

for
the propositioD that it ia constitutiODally sufficieot to into~
into~ the
jury that it may "coDsider n mdtigating
deci4ing the
mitigati:ng circumstances in dec:ic:ling
appropriata aentance.
8entance. Rather, the key under Penr,y ~ is that the jury
be able to ncon.ider and give ef~ecC
ef~ecC CO Ca defendant's .itigatingJ
evidenca
S.Ct.. 2934 (emphasis
evidenc. in imposing sentence."
sentCUlce." 492 u.s., at 319. 109 S.Ct.
added). See also John80~
S.Ct;. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d
John80~ v. T.xa~,
T.xa~, 509 U.S. 350, 381. 113 S.Ct:.
290 (1993) (O'CO~R.
t.o give
(O'CO~:R, J., diss8nt::ing)
dills8nt::ing) ("[A]
("lA] sencencer [must] be allowed to
full considerat.ion
consideration and full effect to mitigating circumBCanca/il" ($mphasis in
original». For it is only when t::he jury is given a "vehic~& for expressing its
'reasoned moral response' t.o
to that.
that evidence in rendering its sentencing
Ben~encing decision,"
Penry ~.
that; we can be BUre that:: the jury "has
~, 492 U.S., at 329, 109 S.Ct.. 2934, that:
t::reatad
hein[g] I and has roade a
t::reated the de£euQant as a 'unique~y individual human hein[g]'
reliable det.erminat.ion
determination t.hat.
that. death is the appx-opriate
apPX'OPriate sentence," ··1921 id., at. 319,
109 S.Ct. 2934 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
280. 304, 305, 96 S.Ct.
2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976»."
(my emphasis added)
In short, it seems that sirnpy inquiring of a prospective juror ~hether
~hether they will
"considerlJ
det@rmin@d whether they can give ic
"consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be det@rmim;ld
effect;;
effect:; if they cannot, ~hen
~hen chey should be exclUded for cause.
Mark J. Ackley
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litiga~ion
Litiga~ion uni~
uni~
mackley@sapd.state.id.us
(208) 334-2712
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Shawna Dunn
From:

[klm@toryanski.com}
Kim W. Toryanski [klm@toryanskLcom}

Sent:

Friday, September 10, 2004 6:45 AM

To:

Mark Ackley

Subject: RE: Penry v. Johnson

Yes, Mark, this helps us a lot. We have been intending to be asking the mitigation questions using the words,
"give weight and value" to mitigation evidence, and then give examples of our mitigation facts, but, as Shelley and
Kim have observed.
observed, we are forming the questions with lhe word "consider" and we need to fix that. We'll work on
correcting that today.
w!1I be a long day- we start questioning at 9:00 and will finish at 5:00, but at least t?day we get lunch.
Today w!"
Copsey even needs to be reminded that we need bathroom breaks.

I'm so glad Shelley and Kim are in the courtroom - will you be able to stop by today?
Kim
-----Original Message----
Message----from: Mark Ackley (mallto:mackley@sapd.state.ld.us]
Sent:
sent: Thursday, September
september 09, 20014:17 PM
To: kim@toryanski.com
kim@toryanskLcom
Subject:
SUbject: Penry v. Johnson

Kim,
As I noted yesterday, my co-cotlnsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday'S jury selection.
Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective
jurors regarding whether mitigating fact;s would "matter" to them (as worded by
the defense) or whethe!r they could simply • consider" mitigating facts if
instructed by the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v.
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) de!alt
de!Blt with jury inst;ructions on mitigation
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application
for you during jury selection:
npen~
npen~ I did not hold that the mere mention of "mitigating
nmitigating circumstances· to a
capital sentencing jU1Y satisfies
sat.isfillis the Eighth Amendment. Nor does it stand

for the proposition that it ia eODstitutionally
eon8~itutioDally sufficient to
inform the jury that it may "cODs1deZ""
"cODs1daZ"" mitigating ai~cWlUlta:n.ces
ai~cWlUlta:n.ces
in deciding the appropriate sentence. Rather, the key under Penry
I is that the jury be able to "consider and gi,VfJ
effecr; co
giv. efface
CO Ca
defendan't ' II JIliclgat1zagl
defendant'
JIliclgat1zag1 8v1deDce 1n
1%2 im,poS1Dg seJ:l'te.lu:e.
seJ:lte.lu:o. " 492 '0. s.,

at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis added). Se.
See also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S.
u.s.
350,381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, ~25 I.,Eld.2c1
I..Eld.2c1 290 (1993) (O'CONNOR, if., Cli:uentiny)
("[A] sentencer (must] be allowed eo give fu~l
fu~l censideration and fu~l
fu~l effect
to mitigating circumstances"
circumst.ancBs" (umphaais
(amphaais in origina1»). Fer it is only when ~he
jury is given a "vehicle for expressiD~
expressiD~ its 'reasoned mora1 r.~ponse'
r.~ponse' to that
evidence in rendering its sentencing deciaiell," penry ~, 492 U.s., at 329, 109
S.Ct. 2934, that
a
t.hat. ,we can be sure that the jury "has treated the defendant
defendant. a. II
'unique1y individual human bein[g]' and has mad.
made a reliable determination that
appropriatB sen~ence,·
i4., at 319, ~09 S.Ct. 2934
death is the appropriate
sen~ence,· --1921 14.,

8/21/2009
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(quc~ins
(quc~ins wooduon
Wooduon v.v. North
North Carolina,
Carolina, 428
428 u.S.
U.S. 290,
290, 304,
304, 305,
305, 96
96 S.Ct.
S.Ct. 297S.
297S. 49
49
L.Ed.2d 944
944 (1976»."
(1976))."
L.Ed.2d

(my emphasis
emphasis added)
added)
(roy

In
In short,
short, it
it seems
seems that
that simpy
simpy inquiring
inquiring of
of a a prospective
prospective juror
juror whether
whether they
they
will
will ~consider'
"consider* mitigation
mitigation is
is no~
not: enough.
enough. It
It must
must be
be determined
determined whe~her
whet.her they
they
CaD
CaD give
give iitt effect;
effect; if
if they
they cannot,
cannot, then
then they
they should
should be
be excluded
excluded for
for cause.
cause.
Mark J.
J. Ackley
Ackley
Mark

Idaho State
State Appellate
Appellate Public
Public Defender
Defender
Idaho
Capital Litigation
Litigation uni~
unit.
Capital

mackley@sapd.state.id.lls
mackley@sapd,state.id.us
(208) 334-2712
334-2712
(20S)

8/21/2009
8/21/2009
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ShawnaDunn
From:

Kim W. Toryanski lkim@toryenskl.com]

Sent:

15.20047:09 AM
Wednesday, September 15,20047:09

To:

Mark Ackley

SUbJect: RE: Penry v. Johnson
Mark, plea negotiations with the prosecutor's
prosecutors office have progressed and we have been told that they would
aU other 5 charges (arson,
(arson. 3 cts of attempted murder,
murder.
accept a plea to one count of first degree murder, dismiss all
child endangerment), and no aggravators will be presented at sentencing. Of course, we are going to the mat
wrestling with our dient to take the deal. UnbelievablY,
Unbelievably. he's resisting. Day by day.
day, we're putting more pressure
on him to take the deal. He contil"\ues to resist. Our attorney client relationship is being affected because of this.
He has become hostile and angry that we are encouraging a plea. His family seems to support his decision I"\ot to
taka a plea. That relationship is being affEicted too.
The deal closes the day we begin to exercise our peremptory challenges in jury selection. We expect that to
be next Tuesday or Wed. After that, the prosecution goes into overdrive to bury our client.
Other issues are erupting. One has to do with his insistence on testifying. He has been told that his attomeys will
not put him on the stand, for ethical reasons. More and more, he is reluctant to follow the advice of counsel.
The dreadful reality of the DP being imposed by this panel of prospective jurors is demonstrated daily. Even the
cc!ln impose it Where
where children were involved. Many
ones that say they are generally opposed to the DP say they lA!In
of ones that generally favor the DP seem very willing to put their beliefs into Bction
action and actually impose it if
allegations are proven in this case. We shop our mitigation in each voir dire examination, but the reality is that
none of it stacks up against the aggravator of leaving 4 kids in a house on fire.
We are consulting
conSUlting with an experienced DP defense lawyer to get ideas about how to work through this impasse.
He's a grey haired guy with familiarity with the Muslim culture. Will continue to advise you. We're close, but not
close enough. If plea negotiations fail, we have told our client to anticipate the worst at trial,
trial. based upon the
verbal statements and nonverbal demeanor of these jurors during voir dire.
Kim

----Original Message---
Message----

From: Mati< Ackley [mailto:mackley@sapd.state.id.us]
Sent: Thursday, September 09,20044:17 PM
To: klm@toryanski.com
Subject: Penry v.
v, Johnson

Kim.
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel. Kimberly Simmons. and our mitigation
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a ~ortion of yesterday's jUry selection.
Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective
jurors regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by
the defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if
instructed by the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v.
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782.
782, 797 (2001) dealt with jUry
jury instructions on mitigation
at the close of the cas@. Here is a relevant portion that my have application
for you during jury selection:

"Penry
hold. that t.he
circWIlsCanC4lIS" to !!
"Pen~ I did not hold
the mere mention of "mitigating circumscances"
a
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Nor does it stand
for the propoaition that it is constitutiona11y sufficient to
infor.m the jury that it may nconsider n mitigating circumstances
in deciding the appropriate sentence. Rather, the key under Penry
:t is t.hat
IIconsider aDd g:tve
t:.ha~ the juzy
ju;ry be able to "consider
give effect co [a
defendl!!U1C
BaDt:8DCe." 4.92 11.5.,
11. S. ,
defendl!!U1t ' s m1 t;1gat:.i;a,g}
t;1gat:.i:a.g} evidence i12 impOSJ.Dg B8Dt:eDCe."
capita.l sentencing jury slIt:isfies
slitisfies the Eighth Amendment.

at 319, 109 S.Ct.
S.Ce. 2934 (&mphasis
(emphasis added). See a180
alao Johnson v. Texas, 509 0.5.
O.S.
350, 381, 113 S.C~.
S.C~. 2658, 125 L.Ed.Jd 290 (1993) (0' CONNOR, J., dissenting)
(nrAJ
(n[AJ 8entencer [must] b. allowed to
eo give full consideration and fu11 effect
to matigating
matigllting circumstances
circumstances"n (emphasiz
(emphasis in original». For it is only when the
jury is givau
dvebicle for expressing its 'reasoned moral response' to that
givQQ a "vehicle
evidence in rendering its sentencing decision," Penry I.
I, 492 ~.S.,
~.S., ~t 329, 109
S.Ct. 2934, that we olin be Sure that: the jury "has treated the defendant as a
'uniquely individua1 human bein[g], and has mad.
made a reliable dete~nation
dete~nation that
death is the appropriate sentenoe,n •• 1921 id., lit 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934
(qu~ing
~.S. 280,
2BO, 304, 30~, 96 S.Ce.
S.Ct. 2978, 49
(qu~ing Woodson v. NOrth
North Carolina,
carolina, 428 ~.S_
L.Ed.2d 944 (1976».°

(my emphasis added)
In short, it seems thac simpy inqu~r~ng
inqu~r~ng of a prospective juror whether they
will ~consider·
~consider· mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they
can give it .f£.~ti
.f£.~ti if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause.
Mark J. Ackley
Idaho State Appellace Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
mackley@sapd.scate.id.us
334-27l2
(208) 334-2712
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Shawna Dunn
From:

Mitch Toryanski [mitch@toryanskl.com]

Sent:

Thursday, March 10,200512:23 PM

To:

Mark Ackley

Subject: State v. Abullah, Sup. Ct. No. 316591
SUbJect:
31659/ formerly H0201384

Mark:
This is to follow up on Kim's phone call message to you earlier this week.

On March 4, the Judge approved our motion to withdraw as counsel from the
case and directed that your office file a written notice of substitution.
Yesterday, we received in the mail a-copy of a letter from the clerk of the
Supreme Court advising the clerk of the Ada COUDty Court that Repon on
Imposition of Death Penalty has been filed and ordering preparation of the
reporter's transcript and clerks record.

Mitch
Mitchell E. Toryanski
(including attachments if any) is intended only for the
This transmission (inclnding
use of the addressee and may contain information that is privileged,
under the Electronic Communication
confidential, and exempt from disclosure Wlder
Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. Sections 2510-2521 and protected by attorney/client
recipient. or the
or other privileges. If you are not the intended recipient,
me employee
Dr agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient,
you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of
strictly prohibited. Attorney/client or work product
this communication is snicrly
of this message.lfyoll have
privileges are not waived by the transmission afthis
received this conununication in elTor, please notify me immediately via
-0655. Thank you.
841-0655.
e-mail at info@toryanskicom or by telephone at (208) 84]
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Shawna Dunn
From:

Mark Ackley [mackley@sapd.state.id.us)

Sent:

Wednesday, May 14,20089:26 AM

To:

Shawna Dunn

Subject: RE: Abdullah v. State:
Slate: SPOT050030a - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and the
SAPO

Shawna,
Below is an electronic note written by Molly Huskey regarding a call that she received
from Mitch Tory~~i.
Tory~~i. This is th~ note that I summarized in an email to you last week.
It appears the note was written on the day of the call, November 24, 2004. I have not
changed the note in any way, thus the typos. I believe we have now disclosed every
communication, or note referencing a communication, with the Toryanskis prior to our
appointment as Mr. Abdullah's counsel. I may very well send you a formal discovery
disclosure attaching each of the communications that I've already sent to you infonnally
and in piece-meal fashion. If
lfyou
you have any questions, then please let me know.

Mark
MJH

11124/04
11/24/04

MJH: Telephone Call from Mitch Toryanski.
Called re: outcome oftrial. wanted to know if we filed post trial motions
like motion for new trial. TOld him we didn't do that. Told me that
Azhad was a good person and the good things he had done far outweighed
the aggravators. for example, when Azhad was a young man, his father
had been imprisoned. Azhad led his family over the mountains into
Turkey to freedom. He was on the board of his church. he was
affectionate with his children.
This new system gives too much power to the prosecutor because there is
no way a jury is going to acquit after hearing all the evidence. He said of
course with a first degree murder, people will find utter disregard. He said
some of the jurors even wanted to find HAC,
Said Copsey's demeanor made her impssible to work with. She was
demeaning and belittled the attorneys. He really thinks she needs to be
trained in professionalism.
He said client didn't tell him the truth· they still don't know what really
happened. This put them at a huge disadvantage when trying to prepare
the case. HE says they were much more optimistic re: the possible
outcome earlier in the trial and the longer it went on, the more they knew
the client was telling lies to them.
Hopes we can get the client some relief.
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Shawna Dunn
From:

Mark Ackley [meckley@sapd.state.id.us]

Sent:

Friday, May 09,20083:41 PM

To:

Shawna Dunn

Subject: Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and the

SAPO

Shawna,

thoughts. I guess I'm not sure what I expected,
Thank you for calling, and sharing your thoughts,
but upon further reflection, it was unreasonable to expect my swnmary of conversations
willligliten
lighten your
not to raise a few eyebrows. Hopefully-the notes in their entiretY will
concerns if not alleviate them completely.
Below is the 1124/05
1/24/05 note of my conversation with Kim Toryanski. - Mark
MJA

1124/05
1/24/05

MIA: TIC with Kim Toryanski
KT called:
1. Hearing is still scheduled today for 3 p.m. - purpose solely to discuss
PSI and where the source of disagreements may lie
2. Sentencing hearing will be rescheduled, likely 2 weeks out
3. Q whether any 3ll1endments pending re ICR 32 - I told KT that I was
not aware of any at this time
4. I told KT that we would go to the hearing, but may only stay briefly if
they are going through 5000 pages of PSI. Our purpose is primarily to
provide support for Azad. KT said that if we leave before the conclusion
of the hearing then she will pass this on to Azad and also tell him that he is
scheduled
scheduJed for a call with us tomorrow.
S. KT and I talked briefly about challenges
chaUenges to the sentencing procedure. I
refered her to the Stover case for the non-capital charges. I asked her
whether she has considered any constitutional arguments that would
mandate giving the judge sentencing discretion to downwardly depart
from. death. She said that she had not but has referred to the jury verdicts
as recommendations which has upset the judge in the past. I mentioned the
possibility of crafting a separation of powers argument, that the legislature
cannot completely divest a district court judge of its sentencing
discretion. I told her that such a challenge and others might be further
considered prior to sentencing.
sentencing~
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ShawnaDunn
From:

Mark Ackley [mackley@sapd.state.id.us]

Sent:

Friday, May 09, 20084:36 PM

To:

Shawna Dunn

Subject:
SUbJect: Abdullah v. State:
Slate: SPOT0500308 disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and the
4

SAPD
Shawna,
The below email was written in response to an interoffice email from Michael Shaw, our
oUI'investigator.
investigator.
At the time, I was not assigned to represent Azad. Instead, Azad was being represented by Ron Coulter
and Kimberly Simmons. In the course of his file review, Michael wanted to know, among other things
(which is why I did not include his initial email inquiry below], whether I had notes from any
conversations with the Toryanskis during their representation. When I prepared the below email, I
referenced my notes contained on a legal pad. I have searched for those notes and my legal pad but I
have not located them to date. Michael indicates that he did not take my file as I had suggested in my
email.
Because I don't want to adjust the electronic content at all, I am giving you the email in its entirety,
including a conversation that I had with Joan Fisher from a different date which I had apparently noted
somewhere in the same legal pad. I thought about redacting that reference, and just summarizing it, but
on second thought I figured that would only raise more eyebrows. My note also includes references to
visits I had with Azad after our office began representing him. To refresh your memory, I represented
Azad briefly before Ron Coulter was hired. Once he was hired, Mony
Molly reassigned cases to adjust for
national workload. standards. As a result, I think I was off Azad's case pretty quickly and did not come
back until October 2006.
Although it looks like I might have arguably given some suggestions to counsel, I think you'll agree that
those suggestions are not implicated by Azad's claims, but 1 suppose that could be a matter of
interpretation. You will notice a reference below to the "El-Contrani (sic)" case; that reference is to
State v. Al-Kotrani.
Al-Kotrani, 141 Idaho 66.
66, 106 P.3d 392 (2005), and pertains to a potential motion to disqualify
Judge Copsey. I don't think the grounds for disqua1ification
disqualification are noted in the opinion, but the following
was written in the Appellant's Brief, "The district court further found that Dr.
Dr, Sanford's conclusions
were not credible because Dr. Sanford relied on Mr. AI-Kotrani's family's representations and "self
"selfserving reports,"
reports." The district court noted that Dr. Sanford did speak with one non-relative, a former
employer, Mr. Abdul Muhammad, who testified that he could only given Mr. Al-Kotrani one instruction
at a time as Mr. Al-Kotrani would get confused if more than one instruction was given. Further, Mr, Al
AlKotrani bad
had the tendency to "slack off' if not under constant supervision. The district court dismissed
Mr. Muhammad's testimony, noting that the "Iraqi community is very close." (Tr., p.39, L.24 - pAD,
p.4D,
L.24; R.,
R, p.79.) . , . Accordingly, Mr, AI-Kotrani asserts that the district court erred in ruling that
Dr, Sanford's conclusion that Mr. AI-Kotrani is incompetent to stand trial was not credible because it
took into consideration information obtained from Mr. AI-Kotrani's family. The district court further
erred in failing to consider information
infOlmation obtained from Mr. Muhammad because he is ofthe same
nationality of Mr. AI-Kotrani and its erroneous conclusion that Mr. Muhammad's statements were not
significant." Of course, trial counsel never moved to disqualify the judge, and we have not raised any
claims based on their failure to do so.
clisclosing them unless my
I will discuss disclosing Molly's email notes on Tuesday. I anticipate disclosing
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decision to disclose my own notes to you is questioned.

- Mark
From; Mark Ackley

Sent:
sent: Friday, March 17,2006 10:47 AM
To: Michael Shaw
Cc: Kimberly Simmons; Ronaldo A. Coulter; Paula Swensen; Barbara D. Thomas; Guadalupe Ayala
Subject: RE: Abdullah file clean up

Michael, I will go through my emails. I will forward any that are relevant. Perhaps you take my file and
then share or give to Ron or Kimberly. It includes some notes from IMSI visits with AA that I am pretty
certain were not placed in Prolaw.
Prelaw. Below I have summarized most of my handwritten notes from
conversations wi~h, or in refe!ence to,
to. trial counsf?1.
From legal pad

1.

2.

8/21/2009
812112009

12/17103
12/17/03 TC with Joan Fisher about the Abdullah case noting that she is concerned about
everything being adequately preserved
9103104
9/03/04 TC conversation with Kim T. with Molly (extensive notes on legal pad)

•

Discussion re the Court closing the courtroom; they did not object to closed
proceedings. Judge made them file a motion to continue under seal. Should have
objected. [It looks like I suggested - "move to unseal the motion.
motion, right to public trial"
trial'1

•

Discussion about Erica Kline and Detective Whitfield

•

Quotes attributed to Kim T. including. UNow more than ever...
ever ... 1could kick [Copsey]
off."
off. u I indicated that we would send the EI-Contrani (sic) opinion with Copsey's
[racist] remarks. rrhis is in reference to the Iraqi client case that Eric F. handled (AI
(AIKotrani) which we then faxed to them [this has been confirmed by Sara] [It is not
indicated. but I believe I suggested a motion to DO]

•

My thoughts reflected, "confidence sounds like L. Dunlap" [NOTE: this is a reference
to the Jimmie Thomas case where Lynn Dunlap told Jimmie they would obtain an
acquittal]; quote attributed to Kim T. "we've been seeing things" (bizarre things) since
the beginning of the case

•

Kim thought the State would have troUble
trouble proving murder.
murder, referring to the State's
case as an attempt to "bootstrap the murder" - I asked her why they could not prove
felony murder and Kim T did not have a good answer [NOTE: I was quite worried
about Kim's confidence]

•

Reference to ''weekly love letters" they [I believe "they"
"they" is a reference to trial
counsel] sent to the prosecution to show them how their case sucks

•

what he did, she [Angela] poured the
Referencing AA, noting that he will plead to What
gasoline, would plead to conspiracy to arson

•

References to problems with the State's lab. They still need an expert to attack the
lab. Many things they are stili trying to get. [It appears I may have suggested a
motion to continue]
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3.

Undated TC conversation with Mitch Toryanski (date can be approximated post jury verdict
for death sentence, but prior to formal sentencing by judge)
•
•
•
•

•

8/21/2009
8/2112009

Sentencing scheduled for 1/21/05
judge said the law was
They (trial counsel?) scratched residual doubt because the jUdge
well-settled (not mitigation)
Judge limited the scope of AA allocution
They were never told what happened; AA was never straight [NOTE: I believe this
was in response to a question I always ask trial counsel, specifically, -did the client
ever confess to you."]
One area of investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not
sure what this references]

001517

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
II
I
I

EXHIBIT C

001518

.

"

'

"

~
~

.

"

'

_ _ _ _ _ _•

"

~

h
h

~

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

.

,
, .

¥)<"L.

MOLLY 1.
J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. # 4843
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MARK 1.
J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. # 5888
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

IN THE DISTRI£T COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH,

Petitioner,
v.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-003080
(formerly SPOT0500308)
RESPONSE TO COURT
ORDER INQUIRING INTO
THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD
WITH TRIAL COUNSEL
(CAPITAL CASE)

Petitioner Azad Haji Abdullah, through his counsel at the Office of the State
Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), hereby provides this response to the Court's August
17, 2009 Order. In the order, this Court directed the parties to address the following
issues: (1) the potential impact of any pretrial and trial involvement the SAPD had with
trial counsel; (2) whether the SAPD's past involvement creates a current a conflict of
interest; (3) the extent of the SAPD's involvement; and (4) whether the SAPD's pretrial
and trial involvement with trial counsel makes members of the SAPD potential witnesses.
Each issue identified by the Court will be evaluated in light of the following summary of
the relevant law governing conflicts of interests.
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
1
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL
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I.

RELEVANT LAW
A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free representation.
See State v. Severson, _

P.3d _,2009 WL 1492659 *4 (Idaho Supreme Court May

29, 2009), citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981); State v. Lovelace, 140
Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 285 (2003), citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932); see
alsa State v. Cook, 144 Idaho-784, 171 P.3d 1282 (Ct. App. 2007). Although Idaho-

appellate courts have recognized a statutory right to post-conviction counsel with respect
to non-frivolous claims, our courts have yet to recognize a constitutionally grounded right
to appointed counsel in post-conviction proceedings. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho
789, 793, 102 P.2d 1108, 1112 (2004); Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629,
632 (Ct.App. 2006); see also I.C. §19-852(b); I.C. §19-4904. In the absence of a
constitutional right to post-conviction counsel, Idaho appellate courts nevertheless
recognize a petitioner's constitutional right to conflict-free representation with respect to
post-conviction counsel. See Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 289-290, 17 P.3d 230, 233
233234 (2000) ("Because these facts do not identify a conflict other than the one related to
the trial, they also fail to support the claim of ineffectiveness of appellate/post-conviction
counsel as a result of a conflict of interest." (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S 335, 347
(1980))).
The salient issue in conflict of interest cases is whether the interests of counsel
conflict with his or her client's interests, thereby compromising counsel's duty of loyalty.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 692 (1984) (recognizing that counsel laboring

under an actual conflict of interest breaches the duty of loyalty to his or her client, which
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL
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is "perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties."). "An 'actual conflict,' for Sixth
Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's
performance." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 n.5 (2002).
In Idaho, counsel has a duty to "act with commitment and dedication to the
interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." (Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.3 (commentary).)

Consistent with counsel's duty of

zealous- advoeacy, counsel has an ethical -duty not to represent a client if that
representation "will be materially limited by a lawyer's responsibilities to another client,
lawyer...." LR.P.C.
a former client or a third person or by the personal interests of the lawyer...."
1.7(a)(2).! Trial courts generally rely on defense counsel's good faith and good judgment
to determine, both professionally and ethically, whether a conflict of interest exists or
will likely develop in the course of trial. Cuyler, 466 U.S. at 347 ("[T]rial courts
necessarily rely in large measure upon the good faith and good judgment of defense
counsel.").
Based on established conflict of interest rules and precedent, even if one attorney
in the SAPD office were found to labor under a conflict of interest based on prior contact
with trial counsel, that conflict cannot be imputed to the entire SAPD office. See
Severson, 2009 WL 1492659 at *7-8 (pursuant to Rules of Professional Conduct

governing conflicts of interest, public defender offices are different from private law
firms, and conflict of one public defender cannot be imputed to public defender office).
Rather, whether an individual public defender's conflict should be imputed to an entire
! Other potential conflicts of interest not implicated here or by the Court's order include
those outlined in Rule 1.8 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, and generally
involve financial, property, or business interests. See I.R.P.C. 1.8.
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL
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public defender office is analyzed on a case-by-case basis, in light of whether the
circumstances demonstrate a potential conflict of interest and a significant likelihood of
prejudice to the client. Id. at *7. Only if the facts demonstrate both a potential conflict of
interest and a significant likelihood of prejudice will a conflict be imputed from an
individual public defender to an entire public defender's office. Id. Even if such a
conflict exists, however, a client can waive the conflict through informed consent. Id. at
*6.

In addition to potential and actual conflicts of interest arising from a lawyer's
active representation of competing interests, a conflict may arise where a lawyer must act
as an advocate in a trial in which the lawyer "is [also] likely to be a necessary witness."
See I.R.P.c. 3.7 (emphasis added). This Rule generally prohibits a lawyer from acting as

both an advocate and witness in the same proceeding unless: (1) the lawyer's testimony
involves an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony goes to the nature and value of legal
services provided in the case; or (3) disqualification would work substantial hardship on
the client. I.R.P.C.3.7(a).
II.

THE SAPD'S MINIMAL PRETRIAL, TRIAL AND POST-TRIAL CONTACT WITH
THE TORYANSKIS DOES NOT CREATE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST
There is nothing about the SAPD's unsolicited and minimal pretrial, trial and
post-trial contact with the Toryanskis that would give rise to a potential or actual conflict
of interest between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD. In addition to the infrequency of such
contact, most (if not all) contact was initiated by the Toryanskis. The SAPD's limited
responses included referring trial counsel to well-established case law and directing
counsel to follow existing legal standards. Significantly, the limited advice given to trial
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
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counsel by the SAPD is not the basis of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
raised by Mr. Abdullah.
Most notably, during her deposition, Ms. Toryanski testified about the limited
nature and scope of her discussions with Mr. Ackley during the course of representing
Mr. Abdullah.
[MR. ACKLEY]. Okay. I will go on with the similar questions that I
asked with the other attorneys even though they may seem silly. I'm
sorry. But did you ever pay me at aU to, like, help represent you in
this case?
[MS. TORY
ANSKI]. No, no, no.
TORYANSKI].
Q. Okay. Did you ever ask me to talk to Azad?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Did you ever give me any discovery?
A. No.

Q. Okay. Are there any other attorneys that you recall speaking to at all
about this case? We have gone through Chuck Peterson, Dennis
Benjamin, Teresa Hampton, David Leroy, David Nevin, Joan Fisher, and
myself.

Q. . . . I'm trying to draw a distinction between, like, casual
conversations, running into the hall, popping an idea off of someone
versus like, "Let's sit down and really strategize and give me some advice
how to proceed." So with those two things in mind, where would you put
Dennis Benjamin?
A. Oh, he's at the top.
Q. Okay. And that was primarily limited to the death penalty motions?
A. That's correct.
Q. And Chuck Peterson?
A. Chuck. Where on the spectrum?
Q. In terms of someone that you relied upon to assist you In your
representation of Azad.
A. I didn't rely on Chuck at all.
Q. Okay. That's fine. I'm just trying to go through. Teresa Hampton?
A. She helped in the way that I have already described.
jury selection?
ofjury
Q. SO in the limited fashion of
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INVOL
VEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL
INVOLVEMENT
5

001523

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

A. And talking to a client about a possible plea, about the plea that had
been offered.
Q. David Leroy?
A. Same as Teresa Hampton.
Q. David Nevin?
A. Slightly more. He's slightly before Chuck Peterson on the scale, but
David didn't help.
Q. Okay. Joan Fisher?
A. Where is she on the scale?
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Way at the bottom.
Q. Myself?
A. - At the bottom.
Q. I'm not taking it personally. I'm just trying to -- okay.
A. I don't even know if you are really on - I mean, we'd talked, but I
never really felt that you even were in on the chart.
Q. As far as you're aware, did I know anything about the case other
than what you were conveying to me in your conversation?

A. No.
(Addendum A, p.232, Ls.l-12;
Ls.1-12; p.237, Ls.20-24; p.238, L.13 - p.240, L.IO (emphasis
added).) Thus, trial counsels' discussions with the SAPD and its counsel were minimal at
best. To the extent any legal advice was even arguably conveyed, it was necessarily
limited given the SAPD's lack of knowledge and involvement in the case. (Addendum A,
p.232, Ls.7-12 ("Q. Okay. Did you ever ask me to talk to Azad? A. No. Q. Okay. Did
you ever give me any discovery? A. No."); p.240, Ls.7-10 ("Q. As far as you're aware,
did I know anything about the case other than what you were conveying to me in your
conversation? A. No.").) Further, Ms. Toryanski indicated that she did not rely on any
advice from the SAPD in the course of representing Mr. Abdullah. See generally
Addendum A.

Similarly, Mr. Abdullah has not alleged any claim of ineffective
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assistance of counsel that would be inconsistent with any advice arguably given by the
SAPD or its counsel. 2
A. The Minimal Unsolicited Contact Between The SAPD And The Toryanskis Is
Insufficient To Give Rise To A Potential Or Actual Conflict Of Interest
No pretrial, trial or post-trial contact between the SAPD and the Toryanskis gives
rise to a potential or actual conflict of interest between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD.
Such contacts were minimal, and do not form the basis of any claims that Mr. Abdullah
has raised regarding the ineffective assistance of his counsel. The Toryanskis contacted
the SAPD office on a handful of occasions during their pretrial, trial, and post-trial
representation of Mr. Abdullah. The majority of this contact occurred via email, and was
initiated by the Toryanskis.

(See Emails from Mark Ackley to Shawna Dunn, with

attached documents, containing actual emails exchanged between the Toryanskis and the
SAPD, as well as summaries of other contacts between the Toryanskis and the SAPD,
attached hereto as Addendum B.) Exhibits to Kim Toryanski's deposition include emails
between the SAPD office and Kim Toryanski, and are generally representative of the
limited contact between the SAPD and trial counsel. (See Addendum A.)
I. September 9, 2004 Email - Deposition Exhibit 9
During her deposition, Kim Toryanski acknowledged that Mr. Ackley's email to
her, dated September 9, 2004, was "probably responding to me even though the e-mail
starts with a communication from you, apparently." (Addendum 3, p.227, Ls.2-17 &

Even if this were the case, which it is not, then it would still not, in and of itself, create a
conflict of interest. Trial counsels' decisions and performance are at issue; in short,
advice or comments from outside lawyers did not and could not relieve trial counsel from
their independent, personal and professional obligations under the Sixth Amendment.
2
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Exhibit 9.)

In that email,
email.Mr.
Mr. Ackley informed Ms. Toryanski that it had come to his

attention that she and her co-counsel, Mitch Toryanski, were asking prospective jurors
questions about mitigating evidence and in doing so, were asking the legally incorrect
question. (Addendum 3, p.227, L.14 - p.228, L.16 & Exhibit 9.) Mr. Ackley directed
Ms. Toryanski to relevant case law for the governing legal standard in questioning
prospective jurors about mitigating evidence, which Ms. Toryanski acknowledged she
and Mr. Toryanski were applying incorrectly duringjury selection. (Addendum 3, p.227,
L.14 - p.228, L.18 & Exhibit 9.) During her deposition, Ms. Toryanski did not dispute
the authenticity or authorship of this email. (Addendum 3, p.227, L.2 -p.228,L.18.)
2. September 15, 2004 Email - Deposition Exhibit 10
On September 15, 2004, Ms. Toryanski sent an email to Mr. Ackley in which she
discussed the following issues: (1) plea negotiations in Mr. Abdullah's case and her belief
that a plea offer had been made; (2) Mr. Abdullah's insistence on testifying despite being
informed that counsel would not put him on the stand; (3) conflicts between trial counsel
and Mr. Abdullah due to Mr. Abdullah's refusal to plead guilty despite trial counsel
putting tremendous pressure on him to do so; (4) conflicts between trial counsel and
Mr. Abdullah and his increasing unwillingness to follow trial counsels' advice; and (5)
Ms. Toryanski's feelings about the prospective jury panel and their inclination to impose
the death penalty in Mr. Abdullah's case. (Addendum 3, Exhibit 10.)

During her

deposition, Ms. Toryanski did not dispute the authenticity or authorship of this email, and
did not deny that it contained her feelings about Mr. Abdullah and his case at the time it
was written. (Addendum 3, p.230, L.ID - p.231, L.25.)
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3. Other Communications
Toryanski
Ms. T
oryanski also discussed other emails and telephone conversations that she
and Mr. Toryanski had with the SAPD through Mr. Ackley and Molly Huskey.
(Addendum 3, p.232, L.13- p.237, L.19.) Ms. Toryanski identified the following issues
as having been discussed in those emails and conversations: (1) the affair between the
prosecutor and the lead detective; (2) whether to move to recuse Judge Copsey;
(3) Ms. Toryanski's inclination to request a continuance; and (4) issues arising postverdict, but prior to judicial sentencing on the non-death eligible offenses. (Addendum 3,
p.232, L.B
L.13 - p.237, L.l9.)
L.19.)
Beyond these communications identified by Ms. Toryanski, the Toryanskis also
faxed orders to Molly Huskey and requested advice as to whether permissive appeals
from this Court's adverse rulings would be appropriate, and further faxed motions and
memoranda challenging the constitutionality of the then new death penalty statute, which
trial counsel had filed with this Court. (See Addendum B.) There were a handful of
additional communications initiated by the Toryanskis with the SAPD, involving
primarily procedural matters post-jury verdict.
The State, through Shawna Dunn and Roger Bourne, was provided with copies of
written communications between the Toryanskis and the SAPD, in addition to summaries
of verbal communications initiated by the Toryanskis with the SAPD.

(See Addendum

B.) This information was provided by the SAPD to Ms. Dunn and Mr. Bourne via email
over a month before depositions of Kim and Mitch Toryanski were conducted. Ms. Dunn
was present for both depositions but declined to question either of the Toryanskis
regarding their contact with the SAPD office. (See Addendum 3, passim; Addendum 9
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
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(Deposition of Mitch Toryanski), passim.) In addition, the State has failed to raise any
concerns about a potential conflict between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah based on these
contacts. To the contrary, it is undersigned counsels' understanding that the State
evaluated this information and decided that no conflict between the SAPD and

Mr. Abdullah existed. 3 This understanding is bolstered by the fact that the State has not
filed a motion regarding a potential conflict of interest, and presumably would have done
so if the commtmications
commmrications between the SAPD and trial counsel had raised the specter of a conflict, potential or actual.
Given the nature of the contact between the SAPD and the Toryanskis, and the
fact that the Toryanskis have not contested the content and nature of the contacts with the
SAPD, it is difficult to see how a conflict of interest between the SAPD and
Mr. Abdullah could arise as a result of these communications and contacts. The SAPD
provided a receptive ear for trial counsels' concerns and frustrations during their
representation of Mr. Abdullah, which involved a minimal amount of interaction. The
SAPD gave limited advice to trial counsel, based both on observations of counsels'
failure to follow established legal standards and on trial counsels' statements to the
SAPD regarding aspects of their representation of Mr. Abdullah. The SAPD remained
The Court ordered simultaneous briefing from the parties. Mr. Abdullah expects the
State to concur with his analysis. However, in the event the State alleges the existence of
a conflict in its briefing to this Court, such an allegation should be reviewed with extreme
cautions. See e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153,163 (1988) ("[T]he Government
may seek to 'manufacture' a conflict in order to prevent a defendant from having a
courts...
particularly able defense counsel at his side; [accordingly] trial courts
... must take it into
consideration along with all of the other factors which inform" a decision involving an
alleged conflict of interest.); Chapman Engineers v. Natural Gas Sales Co., 766 F.Supp.
949,954 (D.Kan. 1991) ("Motions to disqualify should be reviewed with extreme caution
for they can be misused as a technique [] of harassment.") (internal quotations omitted).
Accordingly, Mr. Abdullah reserves the right to respond to the State's briefing if the State
alleges a disqualifying conflict of interest.
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
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cognizant of the potential for a conflict of interest that could possibly arise if the SAPD
were to provide in-depth, frequent and detailed advice to trial counsel throughout their
representation of Mr. Abdullah, and therefore, did not engage in any such involvement in
Mr. Abdullah's case.

There is nothing about the contacts between trial counsel and the SAPD,
particularly when viewed in light of the Final Petition, that gives rise to the inference that
the SAPD's interests, or those- of Mr. Ackley or Ms. Huskey, conflict with
Mr. Abdullah's interests, or in any way compromise the SAPD's, Mr. Ackley's and/or
Ms. Huskey's duty of loyalty to Mr. Abdullah. To the contrary, the SAPD's efforts,
through Mr. Ackley and Ms. Huskey, to direct trial counsel to follow existing standards
and to raise relevant legal issues is consistent with Mr. Abdullah's interest in receiving a
fair trial. Moreover, nothing about the contact between the SAPD, through Mr. Ackley
and Ms. Huskey, and trial counsel, implicates the SAPD's commitment and dedication to
the interests of Mr. Abdullah and zealous advocacy on his behalf, or materially limits the
SAPD's representation of Mr. Abdullah. 4
Under these circumstances, given the nature of the limited and primarily
unsolicited contact between the SAPD and trial counsel, there is no inference of a
potential or actual conflict of interest between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah arising from
such contact. This is particularly true where trial counsel has not disputed the nature and

Notably, the SAPD has previously conducted an internal evaluation of whether a
potential or actual conflict of interest exists between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah, given
the SAPD's limited pretrial, trial, and post-trial contact with trial counsel. The SAPD's
internal evaluation, conducted in light of prevailing standards of practice and professional
conduct, resulted in the conclusion that no conflict of interest, potential or actual, exists.
4
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content of their contacts with the SAPD, Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey,5 and the State
has not alleged any concerns about such contacts. Simply put, the pretrial, trial and posttrial contact between trial counsel and the SAPD has not, does not, and cannot create
conflicting interests between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD. To the contrary, the nature
and content of contact between trial counsel and the SAPD supports Mr. Abdullah's
claims that trial counsel were ineffective. Thus, there is no conflict of interest between
Mr. Abdullah and the -SAPD based on contacts the SAPD had with trial counsel pretrial,

during trial, and post-verdict.

Perhaps the more important question is whether the

SAPD's pretrial, trial and post-trial contact with trial counsel renders Mr. Ackley and/or
Ms. Huskey necessary witnesses at an evidentiary hearing, thereby creating a potential
conflict of interest.
B. The SAPD's Pretrial, Trial And Post-Trial Contact With Trial Counsel Does Not

Constitute A Conflict Of Interest Between The SAPD And Mr. Abdullah, Even If
That Contact Renders Mr. Ackley And/Or Ms. Huskey Potential Witnesses At An
Evidentiary Hearing
The limited pretrial, trial and post-trial contact between the SAPD and trial
counsel does not render Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey likely witnesses at an evidentiary
hearing, and thus does not constitute a conflict of interest or require disqualification of
the SAPD. Even assuming the limited contact between Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey
and trial counsel renders either or both likely necessary witnesses on Mr. Abdullah's
behalf at an evidentiary hearing, such status does not create a conflict of interest between
the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah.
55Indeed,
Indeed, it would be extremely troubling if trial counsel were able to create a conflict of
interest with appellate and/or post-conviction counsel by initiating unsolicited contact
with counsel and/or by disclosing information to such counsel which was otherWise
protected by the attorney-client privilege.
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In relevant part, Rule 3.7 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct precludes an
attorney from acting as an "advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
I.R.P.C. 3.7(a) (Emphasis added.) Despite this prohibition, Rule 3.7
necessary witness." l.R.P.C.
recognizes three exceptions to the advocate-witness rule: (1) the lawyer's testimony
involves an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony goes to the nature and value of legal
services provided in the case; or (3) disqualification would work substantial hardship on
I.R.P.C. 3.i(a). The purpose-of the advocate-witness rule is to prevent the trier
the client. l.R.P.C.
of fact from being "confused or misled by a lawyer serving as both advocate and
witness[,]" and to ensure that opposing counsel will not suffer prejudice resulting from
the lawyer's dual role before the jury. I.R.P.C.
l.R.P.C. 3.7, commentary,-r,-r 2,3.
1. The Advocate-Witness Rule Is Not Implicated In Proceedings Before
Judge

A

Where, as here, the testimony of Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey would occur at a
hearing before a judge, rather than a trial before a jury, the possibility of confusion of
roles and prejudice to opposing counsel is non-existent. Moreover, Rule 3.7 explicitly
prohibits a lawyer from assuming a dual-role at trial, but does not prevent a lawyer from

pretrial participation in a case as both an advocate and witness. See, e.g., Roberts v. State,
840 So.2d 962, 970 (Fla.2002) (holding that the purpose of advocate-witness rule, i.e., to
prevent prejudice to opposing counsel and/or avoid a conflict of interest, was not
implicated where the prosecutor was called as a rebuttal witness by the petitioner in a
post-conviction evidentiary hearing before ajudge); see also State v. Van Dyck, 827 A.2d
192, 195 (N.H. 2003) ("Unlike a jury, a judge is unlikely to confuse the roles of advocate
and witness or to deem an attorney credible simply because he is an attorney."); cf

Dimartino v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 66 P.3d 945,946 (Nev. 2003) (adopting the
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majority approach which does not require pretrial disqualification of an attorney who
may be called as a witness at trial). As a result, I.R.P.C. 3.7 is not implicated where
testimony from attorneys at the SAPD, if offered, would not occur at a jury trial, but
would take place before ajudge acting as a fact-finder.
2. Mr. Ackley And/Or Ms. Huskey Are Not Likely To Be Necessary Witnesses
Even assuming I.R.P.C. 3.7 is implicated at a proceeding where a judge is the
trier of fact rather than a jury, Rule 1.7 only applies if the lawyer is "likely- to be -a

necessary witness." I.R.P.C. 3.7(a). At this point, Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are
only implicated as potential witnesses in the event that trial counsel deny making
statements to Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey which are relevant to Mr. Abdullah's postconviction claims for relief.
coAs previously noted, Ms. Toryanski has already acknowledged that she and co
counsel had a limited number of communications with the SAPD during the course of
their representation of Mr. Abdullah. With respect to the September 15, 2004 email sent
by Ms. Toryanski to Mr. Ackley, Ms. Toryanski acknowledged writing the email and
admitted that it contained her feelings and thoughts at that time, both about Mr. Abdullah
and his case. (Addendum 3, p.228, L.19 - p.231, L.25.) If Ms. Toryanski recants her
deposition testimony, such recantation would possibly render Mr. Ackley a necessary
witness

if the recantation involves testimony relevant to one of Mr. Abdullah's claims for

post-conviction relief. However, the possibility of a need for the testimony of counsel,
however, is insufficient to meet the necessity or likely to be a "necessary witness"
standard of Rule 3.7. See World Youth Day, Inc. v. Famous Artists, 866 F.Supp. 1297,
1302 (D.Colo. 1994); Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268, 1272 (Colo. 2005) ("[O]pposing
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counsel cannot be disqualified on the basis of speculation or conjecture, and
disqualification can occur only after facts have been alleged that demonstrate a potential
violation of the Rule"); Van Dyck, 827 A.2d at 194 (witness is only necessary ifhis or her
testimony is relevant, material and cannot be obtained elsewhere); Bradford v. State, 734
So.2d 364, 369 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) ("The necessity standard requires more than
mere speculation that counsel will be required to testify."). A lawyer is a necessary
witness "ifhis orhertestimonyis relevant, material and unobtainable elsewhere." World
Youth Day, 866 F.Supp. at 1302. Where it is not clear whether an advocate's testimony

will be necessary, a court may delay ruling on a motion to disqualify until it can
determine whether another witness can testify. Id.
The necessity for Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey to testify hinges on a sequence
of events unlikely to come to fruition. First, trial counsel must testify contrary to their
written and/or verbal communications with Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey.6 Second, the
verbal and/or written communications with the SAPD must be relevant. 7

Third,

Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey must be the only source for the relevant information.
Where, as here, there is a fair amount of evidence, including documents and deposition
testimony, confirming trial counsels' statements, the testimony of Mr. Ackley and/or
Ms. Huskey would likely not be the only source for the relevant information. See
Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268, 1274 (Colo. 2005) (necessity requires consideration of

6 Of course, if trial counsel offer testimony consistent with their verbal and written
communications with the SAPD, then there would be no need or occasion for Mr. Ackley
and/or Ms. Huskey to testify.
7 Because the relevance of testimony from Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey cannot be
determined until trial counsel testify and until this Court determines that the testimony
involves a genuine issue of material fact, the relevance inquiry cannot be adequately
addressed.
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the nature of the testimony, weight of the testimony in resolving the disputed issues, and
the availability of other witnesses or documentary evidence which might establish the
relevant issues); State v. Schmitt, 102 P.3d 856, 859 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) ("To
demonstrate compelling circumstances [that would justify disqualification], a party must
show that the attorney will provide material evidence unobtainable elsewhere."); Utley v.
of Dover, 101 S.W.3d 191, 202 (Ark. 2003) (declining to disqualify lawyer where
City ofDover,
moving party failed t<r demonstrate lawyer's testimony could not be gained from other
sources); Harter v. Plains Ins. Co., 579 N.W.2d 625, 632 (S.D. 1998) (lawyer not a
necessary witness where documentary evidence on subject of lawyer's intended
testimony admitted into evidence at trial). As a result, Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey
would not be necessary witnesses because the evidence gained from their testimony could
be obtained from other sources.
3. Disqualification Of The SAPD Would Cause Substantial Hardship To
Mr. Abdullah
Finally, assuming that Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey would otherwise be
necessary witnesses, such status would not necessarily disqualify the SAPD from
representing Mr. Abdullah if such "disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial
hardship on the client." I.R.P.C 3.7(a)(3). Even if a lawyer will act as both an advocate
and witness in the same proceeding, and this dual role may prejudice opposing counsel,
"in determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be given to
the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client."

I.R.P.C. 3.7, cmt.

~4.

Thus,

substantial hardship involves consideration of inter alia the length of the attorney's
representation of the client, closeness of the trial to the request to disqualify, the amount
and type of legal work already conducted by counsel, the financial burden of retaining
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new counsel, and the client's right to choice of counsel. 8 Nat 'I Union Fire Ins. Co. v. L.E.
I.E.

Myers Co. Group, 937 F.Supp. 279, 280-281 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (substantial hardship
where law firm represented client for twelve years, case was a month away from trial,
counsel had done significant amount of substantive work on case, client would be denied
choice of counsel and client would suffer financial burden); D.J. Inv. Group, L.L.
I. I. C. v.

DAEIWestbrook, L.L.c.,
DAE/Westbrook,
I. I. c., 113 P.3d 1022, 1023-1024 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (substantial
hardship existed where case had been pending for 3 years, parties litigated numerous
complex legal issues, nearly all witnesses had been disposed, and parties had exchanged
written discovery).
Here, the SAPD has represented Mr. Abdullah SInce
smce 2005. Specifically,
Mr. Ackley has personally represented Mr. Abdullah since late 2006 and Ms. Huskey has
been the SAPD during the entirety of Mr. Abdullah's post-conviction case. Mr. Ackley is
lead counsel for Mr. Abdullah and is on the Idaho Supreme Court's roster of capital

The importance of the attorney-client relationship is sacrosanct in American
jurisprudence. It is fundamental, that once the attorney client relationship is formed, "a
distinct set of constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attorneyattorney
client relationship takes effect." Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290 n.3 (1988)(citing
(1988)(citing
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159,176 (1985)). The constitutional safeguards include the
Sixth Amendment guarantee that the accused has the right to rely on counsel and
"imposes on the State an affirmative obligation to respect and preserve the accused's
choice to seek [that] assistance." Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171. Once appointed counsel
has established an attorney-client relationship with an indigent defendant, that
relationship is no less inviolate than if counsel had been retained. See Morris v.
Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 22-23 & n. 5 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in result)
("considerations that may preclude recognition of an indigent defendant's right to choose
his own counsel ... should not preclude recognition of an indigent defendant's interest in
continued representation by an appointed attorney with whom he has developed a
relationship of trust and confidence"); Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216, 222 (Tex.
Cr.App. 1989)("Once counsel has been validly appointed to represent an indigent
defendant and the parties enter into an attorney-client relationship it is no less inviolate
than if counsel is retained.").
8
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defense counsel. After extensive litigation and review of an extraordinary number of
documents, Mr. Abdullah's case is finally proceeding to an evidentiary hearing which, in
the world of post-conviction, is the functional equivalent of a trial. The amount of time
that new counsel would need not only to get up to speed in Mr. Abdullah's case, but also
to establish a meaningful and trusting relationship with Mr. Abdullah, while difficult to
assess is obviously great.
-speeifically, would result
Because disqualification of the SAPD and Mr. Ackley -specifically,
in a substantial hardship to Mr. Abdullah, Rule 3.7 does not require disqualification even
assuming Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are necessary witnesses. If Mr. Ackley and/or
Ms. Huskey are likely, necessary witnesses and the court concludes no substantial
hardship would result from disqualifying the SAPD office, based on established conflict
of interest rules and precedent, even if some attorneys in the SAPD office are found to
labor under a conflict of interest because they are necessary witnesses, that conflict
cannot be imputed to the entire SAPD office. See Severson, 2009 WL 1492659 at *7-8
(pursuant to Rules of Professional Conduct governing conflicts of interest, public
defender offices are different from private law firms, and conflict of one public defender
cannot be imputed to public defender office). Rather, whether an individual public
defender's conflict should be imputed to an entire public defender office is analyzed on a
case-by-case basis, in light of whether the circumstances demonstrate a potential conflict
of interest and a significant likelihood of prejudice. Id. at *7.

Only if the facts

demonstrate both a potential conflict of interest as well as a significant likelihood of
prejudice will a conflict be imputed from one public defender to an entire public
defender's office. Id.
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Here, as previously analyzed, there is neither an actual nor a potential conflict of
interest arising from the SAPD's contact with trial counsel. Even assuming a potential
conflict based on that contact, and presuming Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are
necessary witnesses based on that contact, there is no significant likelihood of prejudice
which would justify imputing the conflict to entire SAPD office. Any testimony that
would be offered by Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey regarding their pretrial, trial or posttrial contact with trial counsel would serve only to support Mr. Abdullah's claims-. The
only possible "significant likelihood of prejudice" would be if this Court were
predisposed to disregard the testimony of Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey, simply because
they are attorneys for Mr. Abdullah.

This possibility aside, there is no significant

likelihood of prejudice that would justify disqualifying the entire SAPD office.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the SAPD's pretrial, trial and post-verdict contact
with trial counsel does not create a conflict of interest and does not render Mr. Ackley
and/or Ms. Huskey necessary witnesses at Mr. Abdullah's evidentiary hearing. Assuming

arguendo Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are necessary witnesses, disqualification of the
SAPD would result in a substantial hardship to Mr. Abdullah. Finally, even if this Court
were to conclude that no substantial hardship would result from the disqualification of
Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey, there is no significant likelihood of prejudice that would
justify disqualifying the entire SAPD office.
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RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this 1st
RESPECTFULLY
day of September, 2009.

\J kll!.LO
kll!..LO .
\l
NICdiE OWENS
Co-counsel for Mr. Abdullah
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have, on this 1st day of September, 2009, served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING
INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL
COUNSEL as indicated below:

SHAWNADUNN
ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ill
ID 83702
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH
INMATE #76321
IMSI - J BLOCK
POBOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

_ _ U.S. Mail
- - Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
-X Hand Delivery

x

U.S. Mail
- - Statehouse Mail
- - Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

Administrative Assistant
Capital Litigation Unit
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I
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Q.
BY MR. ACKLEY:
Beyond Joan Fisher and
I
the other attorneys that you spoke to in varying
I
degrees in this case, did you also contact me on
occasion?
I
A.
Yeah, because you and I had met at a
conference, I think. Litigating for Life, maybe?
I
And also Dennis Benjamin was referring to you. - I
I
was just reminded of that in an e-mail that you
had shown me as an exhibit here.
I mean, Dennis,
I
he would call you guys M and M, Molly and Mark.
II
You know, "What do Molly and Mark say?"
Q.
Okay. And I am going to show you
I
what's been marked as Petitioner's Exhibit 9 and
10? Sorry about the coloring on that.
II
A.
That's okay. These are e-mails.
Exhibit 9 is dated -- this is e-mails from me to
II
you.
Exhibit 9 is dated September 10, 2004. This
I
was after the jury selection had commenced.
Exhibit 10 is also an e-mail from me to you, and
I
it's dated September 15th, 2004, five days later.
Q.
And the first one, what was the date on
I
that, again? I'm sorry.
A.
September -- 9 is September. Exhibit 9
I
is September 10.
I
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11
11

12
13

14
14
15
16
16

17
18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25
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That was after jury selection?
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A.
Had begun.
I
Q.
Okay. And were there questions? Was
I
there a discussion, then, about jury selection
there?
II
A.
Let's see. Maybe this is an e-mail
from you to me in which I respond because of, "As
II
I noted yesterday." YOu're probably responding to
I
me even though the e-mail starts with a
communication from you, apparently.
I
Q.
Yeah, there are multiple e-mails
actually reflected in that document; is that
I
right?
A.
Uh-huh.
I
Q.
So just start with the earliest one.
I
A.
Okay. Which is September 9.
Q.
Okay.
II
A.
Then you're writing to me. You're
I
telling me that Kimberly Simmons and the
mitigation specialist, Shelley Hill observed a
I
portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim noted
that there was some contention regarding questions
II
to prospective jurors regarding whether mitigating
I
facts would matter to them, as worded by the
defense, or whether they could just simply
I
consider mitigating facts if instructed by the
I __
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1I
1I
1I
1I
1I
1I
II
I
II
I
1I
I
I
I
I

1

court as worded by the judge.

2

versus Johnson dealt with jury instructions on

3

mitigation at close of the case.

4

relevant portion that may have application for you

5

during jury selection.

6
7

The case of Penry
There is a

-And then you recited -

Q.

-- some of the language from the Penry

A.

Yes.

cases?

8

helps us a lot.

9

And then I say, Yes, Mark this
And we've been intending to ask

10

the mitigation questions using the words weight -
--

11
11

give weight and value to mitigation evidence and

12

then give examples of our mitigation facts.

13

as Shelley and Kim have observed, we are forming

14
14

the questions with the word consider, and we need

15

to fix that.

16

It will be a long day.

17

Q.

But

We'll work on correcting that today.

Okay.

So those string of e-mails have

to deal with jury selection type questions?

18

A.

19

Oh, yes.

And then the September 15th

20

one, just like you've indicated -- oh, it's again

21

responding to that same e-mail about the

22

observations, plea negotiations with the

23

prosecutor's office have progressed and we were

24

told that they would accept them -- Oh, okay.

25

Q.

Could you continue reading that?
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A.
One count of first degree murder,
I
dismiss all other five charges, arson, three
I
counts of attempted murder, child endangerment
with no aggravators. And there were aggravators
I
that were presented at sentencing.
Of course, we
are going to the mat
I
Q.
Could you slow down for the court
I
reporter?
A.
I forgot about
Oh, okay.
You're here.
I
that.
MR. ACKLEY:
Do we need to start over on
I
that?
I
THE REPORTER:
Yeah, when you say could
continue reading that.
II
THE WITNESS:
Dismiss all other five
charges, parentheses, arson, three counts of
II
attempted murder, child endangerment. And no
I
aggravators will be presented at sentencing. Of
course, we are going to the mat wrestling with our
II
client to take the deal.
Unbelievably he's
II
resisting.
Day by day we're putting more pressure
on him to take the deal.
He continues to resist.
I
Our attorney/client relationship is being affected
because of this.
He has become hostile and angry
I
that we are encouraging a plea.
His family seems
II """""'=:==~",::m~_=~
.•~
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to support his decision not to take a plea. That
II
relationship is being affected too.
Want me to read the whole thing?
I
Q.
BY MR. ACKLEY: Yes, please.
II
A.
The deal closes the day we begin to
exercise our peremptory challenges ln Jury
II
selection. We expect -that to be next Tuesday or
I
Wednesday. After that the prosecution goes into
overdrive to bury our client.
I
Q.
Does that seem to be an accurate
reflection of how you were feeling at the time?
II
What's the date on that one? September lOth?
I
A.
15th.
Q.
15th. So jury selection began,
I
think, on the 7th, and my notes reflect that the
record says that the state's case-in-chief started
II
on the 27th.
So basically there is 20 days. Not
all those dates, obviously, were jury selection,
I
1
1
1

2

33
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4

5

6

6

7

88

9

10

11

11

12
13
13

14

I

15

16
16
17

18

1I
II
I
I
I
I

19

but there is a 20-day span there.

20

halfway through at that point?

You are about

21

21

A.

Yep.

22

Q.

SO at that point, at least at that

23

time, you felt like your attorney/client

24

relationship was suffering because of these

25

discussions about the plea bargain?
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A.
am writing that that's how
feel.
II
Q.
Okay. So is it fair say -mean,
obviously the passage of time does affect people's
I
memory. Would you supplement your testimony
II
earlier today about the relationship in light of
your e-mail?
II
A.
Well,
just -- Azad wasn't doing what
I
thought was In his own best interest.
Q.
And he was becoming hostile with you?
I
A.
think he was angry that we kept
wanting to -- you know, keep revisiting the same
II
thing. And -- but ...
I
Q.
And you were increasing pressure on him
to take the deal?
I
A.
Well, by just continuing to ask him and
have different approaches to it. But
just felt
II
so strongly that this was in his best interest.
And
fretted that that young man would get the
I
death penalty.
I
Q.
But
am just trying to establish
whether that seems to be consistent with how you
I
felt at that time back then.
I
A.
Oh, yes.
Oh, yeah.
mean, he didn't
like the fact that, you know,
guess we kept
I
coming back with it.
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Q.
Okay.
I will go on with the similar
II
questions that I asked with the other attorneys
even though they may seem silly.
I'm sorry. But
I
did you ever pay me at all to, like, help
I :
represent you In this case?
A
No, no
A..
no,, no.
II
Q.
Okay. Did you ever ask me to talk to
I
Azad?
A.
No.
I
Q.
Okay. Did you ever give me any
discovery?
II
A.
No.
Q.
Beyond these two contacts, can you
I
think of any other significant contacts that you
I
had with me during the course of your entire
representation?
II
A.
I think we had some e-mails. There was
I
more e-mails. There is a little bit more e-mail
because I -- you and Molly and I talked on the
I
phone about the relationship with the prosecutor,
Erika Klein, had had with Littlefield. And I
II
really appreciated the time you took to talk with
I
me because you validated my concerns. And I
really wasn't getting that from a lot of defense
I
counsel. Because I had asked Chuck what he
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thought, Chuck Peterson.
He bounced down to my
I
office and I mentioned it to him. And Teresa, you
know sort of -- Teresa Hampton, she was aware of
I
it.
I didn't get the perception from talking to
I
others that other defense counsel thought it was
as big a deal as I thought it was. But you and
I
Molly saw -- seemed to see something that had a
definite impact on the integrity of the case. And
I
that was valuable to me in moving forward, how I
I
decided to move forward.
Q.
Do you recall whether it was a matter,
II
like, saying that there was definitely an impact
I
or something that should be investigated?
A.
Something that should be investigated.
I
Q.
Do you recall whether you informed us
that the judge had given you leave to depose
II
them
I
A.
Yes.
Q.
-- and do the further investigation?
I
A.
Yes.
Q.
Didn't this, also -- I don't know if
II
this is reflected in the telephone conversation or
I
not, but do you recall the judge ever saying, "I
-am going to look at personnel files now" -
I
A.
Yes.
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"of all the police officers"?
I
A.
Yes.
Q.
And ln your memory, do you recall
I
whether it was reflected on the record or
II
otherwise pretty much implicit that the judge was
going to look at these personnel files of all
II
o£ficers-because of this issue with Erika Klein
I
and Todd Littlefield had come forward?
A.
Yes.
I
Q.
Did those go kind of hand in hand?
A.
Yes.
II
Q.
And you said other e-mails between us,
but then you went directly to that telephone call.
I
So that would have been a telephone conversation
I
as opposed to e-mail correspondence, the
discussion you just referenced about Todd
II
Littlefield and Erika Klein affair?
I
A.
Right.
Q.
Do you recall, has the state or the
I
prosecution shown any kind of summary of that
conversation at all?
I
A.
I think I saw an exhibit on that,
I
maybe.
I think so.
Q.
But something that kind of outlined the
I
topics of discussion?
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A.
Yeah.
I
Okay. All right. And beyond those
Q.
I
three contacts, do you recall any other
significant contacts during the scope of your
II
representation?
A.
Well, just, it may be part of those
I
contacts, or it might be, you know, something
I
additional, additional e-mail.
I can't remember,
but recusing the judge was an issue that was
I
discussed.
Okay.
I
A.
And I wasn't -- I was not inclined to
I
move to recuse the judge.
But there was a
just
a discussion of the pros and cons of that. And I
II
think there was e-mail about that because I think
that I had let you know I was leaning towards
II
moving for a continuance. But I hadn't prepared
I
anything yet.
Q.
Can you remember whether an e-mail
I
exists or not impacted by the fact that you had
I
apparently seen some sort of summary?
A.
Yes, it could. Which is one of the
I
reasons why I have tried not to look at all these
affidavits because I don't want to be colored by
I
those kinds of things.
I _~.,__~~_w
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Q.
But the state provided you kind of
I
these e-mails or documents?
A.
They are just exhibits that are part of
I
the petition, or something, that I have seen. One
I
or two.
I mean, I have worked with Shawna, and I
think there may have been something, I think so,
II
in just an exhibit to an affidavit that has been
I
prepared.
I can't remember.
Q.
Do you have that, what was given to
I
you?
A.
No, huh-uh. But I do have what was
II
these exhibits (indicating). And there are
I
attachments in here. But mostly it's the
affidavits.
I ::
Q.
SO you saw these exhibits, as you've
described them, as attached to some sort of
II
affidavit?
I
A.
I can't remember what they were
attached to or -- it was just -
-- they were
I
numbered.
I looked at it, and I recall that we
had had a conversation.
I
Q.
Okay. And beyond that, do you recall
I
any other contact with me?
Not during all this. We talked at the
A.
I
end, I think, during the spring before Azad was
II . .
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sentenced on the other charges.
I think you and
I
Kimberly had come to the courtroom.
I think we
may have chatted then.
You came to the courtroom
I
a couple times, I remember that.
I remember there
I
was a motion -- or excuse me -- an order, a
lengthy order that we had been handed by the
I
-judge's courtroom deputy, deputy clerk.
It was
lengthy, and was concerning something that had
I
been argued quite a while ago.
And we just had
I
recently gotten it, and I remember we had thought
that that was interesting, the timing of it.
But
II
that's all I can really remember.
I
Q.
SO most of the contact was either
during this as reflected here, or later after he's
I
already been sentenced to death?
A.
Yes, I believe.
I
Q.
But before sentenced on the other
I
non-capital charges by the judge?
A.
Yeah, I think so.
I
Q.
Okay.
Are there any other attorneys
that you recall speaking to at all about this
I
case? We have gone through Chuck Peterson, Dennis
I
Benjamin, Teresa Hampton, David Leroy, David
Nevin, Joan Fisher, and myself.
I
A.
Consulting with, you mean?
I11....r::I:=_::l'Z,~~:;:::·.~"""V~=~
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Mark Ackley
From:

[kim@toryanski.comJ
Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanski.com]

Sent:

FrJday, September 10, 2004 6:45 AM

To:

Mark Ackley

Subject: RE: Penry v. Johnson
Yes. Mark, this helps us a Jot. We have been intending to be asking the mitigation questions using the words,
facts. but, as Shelley and
"give weight and value" to mitigation evidence, and then give examples of our mitigation facts,
that. We'll work on
Kim have observed, we are forming the questions with the word "consider" and we need:to fix that
correcting that today.

5:00, but at leasftoday we ,get lunch~
Today will be a fong day- we start questioning at 9:00 and will finish af 5:00.
Copsey even needs to be .reminded that we need bathroom breaks.
I'm
"m so glad Shelley and Kim are in the courtroom -- will you be able to stop by today?
Kim
Message--------Original Message---
From: Mark Ackley [mailto:mackley@sapd.state.id.us]
[mailto:mackley@sapd,state,id,us]
Sent: Thursday, September 09, 20044:17 PM
sent:
To: kim@toryanskLcom
Subject: Penry v. Johnson

Kim,
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection.
Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective
jurors regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by
the defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if
judge), The case of Penry v.
instructed by the Court (as worded by the judge).
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application
for you during jury selection:

"Penry I did n·;:,t hold that the mere mention of "mitigating .cii.rcumstances" to a
capi t.a.l s-sn ten,c:ing
ten.c:ing j !,l.rY'
\.l.rY' satisfies the Eigh.th Amendlnen t.
t;. Nor does i t stand

for the proposition that i t is oonstitutionally suffioient to
inform the jury that it may "oonsider" mitigating oiroumstanoes
in deoiding the appropriate sentenoe. Rather, the key under Penry
I is that the jury be able to "oonsider and give effect to [a
mitigating1 evidence in imposing sentence."
sentence. rr 492 u.s.,
U.S.,
defendant's mitigating]

ll.TELEGAL·
II.TELEGAL·

Ir1r___
~

I

~~

::J:
%_0

at.
',Texas, ·509 u.s.
at.. 3:t9, 109 S.C.t. 2934 (emphasis added). See also Johnson 'v_ ·.Texas,
U.S.
35::),3EH, J.l3 S..
S .. Ct.. :2658, 125 L .. Ed.2d 290 {1993) (O'CONNOR, J_, dissenting)
a110,,,eo to give :full consideration :and full effect
(" [h) sentencex' LlI",ust.]
LlI',uat.] be a110,"eo
t;(.\ mitigatin.;; ci.r~i.'"c':i!stances"
ci.r~i."co:i!stanceslt (ampha.sis inorigi:nal)}. For 'it :ii...
:ii...5 only when the
j\:t.::y.i.s
gi"·..,n a "vehicle £or expressin.g it$ 'reasoned IT.ora'l
j\:l.::y.i.s gi"'en
IT.ora·l %lSsponse'
%lesponse' to· that
sV';i.de.nce in re~derin9
IF ·492 u.
U. S.,
S. I :at 328, 109
s"·;;.de.nce
re~derin9 its sentencing deci.s.:Lon,"
dec:i.s.:Lon," Penry I,
8. Ct. '293.~,
'293.~., t.."hat ·i<
'i<7 e C<-:trL be sure that the jury "has treat.ed ·,the
..the defendant as a
'urtj.quel"1' inai-....
indi-...:i.dual
idual human bein [~TJ'
[~TJ' and. has made a reliable oeterm:ination
oeterm-ination that
o~at;h
J,.::1 the appropriate :.sentence," **1921 i.d., at 319, 109
o~at;h lor:;'
l09 S .. ·.Ct. 2934

~Z

~

9/2008
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(.::.t'llOting Woocison v. North Carolina, 428 U.:S. 280, 304, 305,
30.5, B6 S.Ct. 2978, 49
L.Ed_2d 944 (1976).u
L.Ed.2d

(my emphasis added)
inqu~r~ng of a prospective juror whether they
In short, it seems that simpy inqu~r~ng
"consider"f l mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they
will "consider
oan give it effecti if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause.

Mark J. Ackley
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
mackley@sapd.state.id.us
(208) 334-2712

6/19/2008

001554

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I

Page 1 of2

Mark Ackley
From:

[kim@toryanski.com]
Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanskLcom]

Sent:

Wednesday, $eptember 15,20047:09 AM

To:

Mark Ackley

Subject: RE: Penry v. Johnson
Mark, plea negotiations
negotIations with the prosecutor's office have progressed and we have been 'told that.they would
(arson,3.ets ,of attempted murder,
accept a plea to one count of first degree murder, dismiss all other 5 charges (ar5On,3.ets
child .endangerment), and no aggravators will be presented at sentencing. Of course, wsare going to the mat
wrestling with our client to :take the deal. Unbelievably, he's resisting. Day by day, we're putting more pressure
on him to take the deal. He continues to resist. Our attorney Client relationship is being affected because of this.
plea. HIs family
fa miry seems to Si:ipport.hls
Si:ipport.nls decision not to
He has become hostile and angry thatwe are encouraging a .,Iea.
take a plea. That relationship Is being affected too.
The deal closes the day we begin to exercise our peremptory challenges in jUry
jury selection. We expect that to
be next Tuesday or Wed ..After that, the prosecution goes into overdrive to bury our client.
Other issues are erupting. One has to do with his insistence on testifying. He has been ltold that his attorneys Will
tbe advice of counsel.
not put him on the stand, for ethical reasons. More and more, he is reluctant to follow the
The dreadful reality of the DP being imposed by this panel of prospective jurors is demonstrated daily. Even the
ones that say they are generally opposed to the DP say they can impose it where children were involved. Many
of ones that generally favor the DP seem very willing to put their beliefs into action and :actually
actually impose it ifjf
allegations are proven in this case. We shop our mitigation in each voir dire examination, but the reality is that
none of it stacks up against the aggravator of leaving 4 kids in a house on fire.
We are consulting with an experienced DP defense lawyer to get ideas about how to work
wo.r'k through this impasse.
He's a grey haired guy with familiarity with the Muslim culture. Will continue to advise you_ We're close. but not
close enough. If plea negotiations fail.
fail, we have told our client to anticipate the worst atbial,
atbial. based upon the
verbal statements and nonverbal demeanor of these jurors during voir dire.
Kim

-----Original Message----
Message----From: Mark Ackley [mallto:mackley@sapd.state.ld,us]
[mallto:mackley@sapd.state.ld.us]
Sent: Thursday, September
september 09, 20044:17 PM
To; kim@toryanskl.com
Subject: Penry v. Johnson

Kim,
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection.
Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective
jurors regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by
the defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if
instructed by the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v.
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application
for you during jury selection:
".Penry I did not cold that the mera mention of "mitigat:i..ng ciroumstanoes"
ciroumsc.aIloes" t.o a

__....
_...",,/2008
_
~/2008

001555

I
I
I
·1

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Page 2 of2

ju.ry s'atisfies the Eight.h AInenrlment.
A:menr.lment. Nor does it stand
capital. sent.encji:ng jl.1.ry
for the proposition that it is constitutionally sufficient to
inform. the jury that it may "consider" mitigating circumstances
in deciding the appropriate sentence. Rather, the key under Penry
I is that the jury be able to. "consider. and give effect to {a
defendant's mitigating] evidence in imposing sentence." 492 U.S.,

at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis added). See also Johr.scn ·v. 'TGOxas, 509 U.S .
.350,381,
.350, .381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993) (O'CONNOR.! ;;r., dissenting)
allo,",'eci .to give full consideration'and
considerati.on·and full effect
( .. [A] sentencoe.r [must] be allo'-"sd
m:i.t.i<,1ating c.irc.umstances" (emphasis
(e!!lphasis in original)}. For .it ·,i·s or~ly when the
t.o m:i.t.i<;rating
U~7y is qi '.rem
',;em a "vehicle for e>:pressing :i.
ts 'reasoned !.Uc·ral
ruc·ral .r.esponse'
j U~7Y
its
.r.esponse I to that
r"vi.,:;'ence
r"vi.·:i.ence in ::::ender'ing its seni::encing decisi.on," Pel''I1:y
Pel''I1:Y I ,492 lU.
Ttl. S., at 328, 109
S.Ct-. 2934, tha.t W~J can be sure that the jury "has treated. :the defendant as a
'ul'd.q-~~ely individ'.lal human bein[g] 1 and has madE!
mad,,! a .:·:aliable :detElrminat~on
:detE!rlll.inat~on that
'un.i.q-~~ely·
ue<:lth
aP1?ropl~iate sentence," **1921 id., at 319, 109 -lLCt:. 293'4
de;;;~th is the aP1?ropl~iate
(q-uot~ing ~"oodso.n
~.yoodso.n 'IJ.
v. North Carolina., 428 V.:S. 280, 304, 305, :96
:9.6 S.Ct. 2978, 49
(q-uot:ing
LEd.2d 944 (1876».n

(my emphasis added)
In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they
will "consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they
t effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause.
can give i
it
Mark J. Ackley
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
mackley@sapd.state.id.us
(208) 334-2712

6/19/2008
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Mark Ackley
From:

Sent:

Mark Ackley
Friday, May 09,200812:12 PM
'Shawna Dunn'; Roger Bourne
Shannon N. Romero
Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and
the SAPD
FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday; Abdullah continuance motion was denied; Penry
v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson; State v. Abullah, Sup. Ct. No.
316591
31659/ formerly H0201384; 66857.pdf; 66858.pdf

I
I
I Shawna,
I This is my response to your
for correspondence between our office and the Toryanskis
at the time of their representation of Azad Abdullah. I previously agreed to look for this
and disclose it since we both recognized that such correspondence as contained
I correspondence
in the Toryanskis files was incomplete. Thank you for your patience.
I I have located and attached the following:
Six emails (some of which overlap) between the Toryanskis (mostly Kim Toryanski)
I 1. and
our office (Molly Huskey and/or me).
I
a. NOTE: it appears from some of the emails that there may have been additional
correspondence. I cannot locate any additional correspondence (although I have
located summaries of a few conversations, see below).
I
I 2. Two facsimile cover pages from Kim to Molly.
a. Both faxes, dated 12111103
12/11/03 signed by Kim and sent to Molly seem to correspond
12117/03 and
with the attached email with the string of communications on 12/17/03
I
apparently pertain to pleadings and rulings regarding challenges to the death
penalty statute.
I
I I have located but have not attached the following:
I 1. A summary of a telephone call on 11124/04
11/24/04 from Mitch Toryanski to Molly Huskey,
written by Molly. The topics of the conversation included:
I
a. The outcome of the trial;
b. Whether our office files post-trial motions; and
I
c. Mitch's retrospective assessment of the aggravation and the mitigation evidence,
the new death penalty jury system, Judge Copsey's professionalism or lack thereof,
I
and Mr. Abdullah's truthfulness or lack thereof; as well as Mitch's description of
I
To:

Cc:
SUbject:
Subject:

Attachments:

r~qu~st
r~qu~st

1
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their varying degrees of their confidence during the course of the case and his
hopes for Mr. Abdullah in future proceedings.
2.

A summary of a telephone call from Kim to me on 1/24/05, written by me. The topics
of the conversation included:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

3.

Hearing on PSI;
Formal sentencing scheduling;
Amendments to ICR 32;
Whether we would attend the hearing; and
Potential challenges to the sentencing procedure.

An email summary ofa written summary of a telephone call on 9/03/04 from Kim to
Molly Huskey (for which I was present), written by me on March 17,2006. I have
not yet located my contemporaneous written summary. I think I may have given my
notes to Ron Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not located my notes in the files
that they left behind after they left our office in October 2006. The topics of the
conversation apparently included:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

The Court closing the courtroom;
Kline/Littlefield;
Grounds to disqualifY Judge Copsey;
My thoughts regarding trial counsels' degree of confidence;
Kim's comments regarding the State's ability to prove murder;
Kim's reference to communications sent by them to the prosecution regarding the
prosecution's case;
g. Kim's reference to what Mr. Abdullah agreed he did and for what he would plead
guilty;
h. Referencing to problems with the State's lab
4.

An email summary of a written summary of an undated telephone conversation
between Mitch and me, written by me on March 17, 2006. I have not yet located my
contemporaneous written summary. I think I may have given my notes to Ron
Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not located my notes in the files that they left
behind after they left our office in October 2006. The topics of the conversation
apparently included:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Sentencing scheduled for 1/21/05;
1/21105;
Residual doubt;
Scope of allocution;
Mitch's comments about statements made to them by Mr. Abdullah regarding the
events; and

2
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I
e. An unclear reference which my email summary noted as follows: "One area of
I
investigation - still suspects something in their system D\JOTE: I am not sure what
this references]"
I I have multiple concerns about the wisdom of disclosing these documents as they differ from
the emails and the faxes to the extent they are summaries of correspondence, not the
I correspondence themselves which tend to speak for themselves. I need to further assess
whether we have an obligation to disclose these summaries, and if so, whether they could or
should be redacted. I will make a decision on Tuesday after further discussion with my team
I and
Molly Huskey. I would also be interested in making further inquiry of the Toryanskis;
I perhaps they could check their offices again.
I

I sincerely invite your thoughts on this matter; indeed, that is why I took the ti~ to describe for
you the contents of these summaries
summaries..

.-Mark

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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Shannon N. Romero
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanski.comJ
:59 PM
Monday, September 06, 2004 1
1:59
Mark Ackley; Molly J. Huskey
FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday

I
I
I

FYI -- we're moving for a continuance. The following is a copy of the
"heads up" for the judge. The judge has not responded to Pat Owen's request
that the motion be filed under seal.

I
I

-----Original Message----
Message----From: Patrick Owen [mailto:PROWENPH@adaweb.net]
Sent: Monday, September 06,200410:04 AM
To: Judge Cheri Copsey
Cc: kim@toryanski.com
Subject: RE: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday

I
I
I

M&M:

Judge Copsey:
I request that any such motion be filed under seal and that any proceedings
related to this motion be conducted in chambers.
Pat Owen
Message----
-----Original Message----From: Kim W. Toryanski [mailto:kim@toryanskLcom]
Sent: Monday, September 06,20049:59 AM
To: Patrick Owen; Judge Cheri Copsey
Subject: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday

I
I
I

Judge Copsey:

I
I

The defense would like to advise you and the State that on Tuesday morning,
we will be filing a motion to continue the trial. The grounds for the
motion are directly related to the State's revelation on Friday morning that
during the course of this case, a sexual relationship existed between one of
the case prosecutors and a key witness in this case, the lead homicide
detective and case officer.

I
I
I

Full details of the defense necessity for a continuance will be recited in
the written motion. In summary, we assert that the defendant has a
Fourteenth Amendment due process right and a Sixth Amendment right to have a
reasonable opportunity to investigate the temporal duration of the
relationship, whether an actual conflict of interest may have arisen by
virtue of the relationship, whether the prosecutor's ethical duties were
affected and compromised, whether the detective has violated police rules of
conduct, whether evidence or witness testimony may have been tainted or
1
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compromised in connection with the nature of the relationship, and whether
prejudice to the defendant has resulted. While the integrity of the
justice is paramount to all
proceedings and the proper administration of
ofjustice
involved, only Mr. Abdullah stakes his life on the process.

In evaluating the appropriateness of the motion to continue, we have
referenced Guideline 10.7 (duty to investigate) and Guideline 10.8 (duty to
assert legal claims) of the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and
Perfonnance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (Rev. February, 2003).
Without an opportunity to investigate a matter which potentially calls into
question all infonnation about the case, any conviction obtained may be
vulnerable to appellate attack on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated that death cases are
different and deserving of higher due process standards.
Kim Toryanski

2
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Shannon N. Romero
From:
Sent:

To:
Subject:
SUbject:

Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanski.com]
[kim@toryanskLcom]
Tuesday, September 07,20043:53 PM
Mark Ackley; Molly J. Huskey
Abdullah continuance motion was denied

So maybe there is one more appellate issue for you two to address if Azad
gets convicted of first degree, the jury finds an aggravator, and that
mitigation does not outweigh the aggravator(s). I think Copsey wants the
"glory" of being the first to try a death case under the new statute.

The good news is that, in the continuance, I detailed the need to take the
. deposition of detective littlefield,
Iittlefteld, the one that Erika Klein had the affair
with. The judge granted that!!! The prosecutor objected, but it fell on
deaf ears. The prosecutor asked for the scope of the depo to be limited,
but the judge said no limitatons on defense inquiry. I'm looking forward to
taking the depo.
The judge also said she would grant more money to investigate things that
need to be looked into regarding my concerns about the screwups of the NMS
lab. So I'm going to put in for more money to get some additional experts
to advise me, and to testify. Again, hooray.
All in all, I think I'm going to call it a win. Thanks for wargaming with
me!
Jury selection begins tomorrow morning at 9:00. We're in 507. We'll go
until 11:00
:00 and then adjourn for the day. Same routine through the end of
the week.
Will keep you posted.
Kim
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Shannon N. Romero
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

Mark Ackley
Thursday, September 09, 2004 4: 17 PM
kim@toryanskLcom
Penry v. Johnson

Kim,
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation specialist,
Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim noted that there was
some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors regarding whether mitigating
facts would "matter" to them (as worded by the defense) or whether they could simply
"consider" mitigating facts if instructed by the Court (as worded by the judge). The case
of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application for you
during jury selection:

\\Penry I did not hold that the mere mention of "mitigating circumstances" to a capital
"Penry
sentencing jury satisfies the Eighth Amendment. Nor does it stand for the

IproPosition that it is constitutionally sufficient to inform the jury that
it may "consider" mitigating circumstances in deciding the appropriate
sentence. Rather, the key under Penry I is that the jury be able to
I "consider and give effect to [a defendant's mitigating] evidence in
imposing sentence. " 492 u.s., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis added). See also
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993) (O'CONNOR,
J., dissenting) (" [AJ sentencer [must] be allowed to give full consideration and full
effect to mitigating circumstances" (emphasis in original». For i t is only when the jury
is given a "vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned moral response' to that evidence in
rendering its sentencing decision," Penry 1,492
I, 492 U.S., at 328,109 S.Ct. 2934, that we
can be sure that the jury "has treated the defendant as a 'uniquely individual human
bein[g]' and has made a reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence,"
**1921 id., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304,
1305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976».ff

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

(my emphasis added)
In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will
"consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they can give it
effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause.
Mark J. Ackley
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
mackley@sapd.state.id.us
(208) 334-2712
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Shannon N. Romero
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanski.com]
Friday, September 10, 20046:45 AM
Mark Ackley
RE: Penry v. Johnson

Yes, Mark, this helps us a lot. We have been intending to be asking the mitigation questions using the words, "give
weight and value" to mitigation evidence, and then give examples of our mitigation facts, but, as Shelley and Kim have
observed, we are forming the questions with the word "consider" and we need to fix that. We'll work on correcting that
today.
Today will be a long day-- we start questioning at 9:00 and will finish at 5:00, but at least today we get lunch. Copsey
even needs to be reminded that we need bathroom breaks.

l'm
rm so glad Shelley and Kim are in the courtroom -- will ¥ou be able to stop _by today?

IKim
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-----Original Message----Message----
From: Mark Ackley [mailto:mackley@sapd.state.id.us]
Sent: Thursday, September 09, 20044:17 PM
To: kim@toryanskLcom
Subject: Penry v. Johnson
Kim,
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim
noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors
regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by the
defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if instructed by
the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797
(2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation at the close of the case. Here is
a relevant portion that my have application for you during jury selection:

"Penry I did not hold that the mere mention of "mitigating circumstances" to a
capital sentencing jury satisfies the Eighth Amendment. Nor does it stand for

the proposition that it is constitutionally sufficient to inform the
jury that it may "consider" mitigating circumstances in deciding the
appropriate sentence. Rather, the key under Penry I is that the jury
be able to "consider and give effect to fa defendant's mitigating]
evidence in imposing sentence.
sentence." 492 U.S., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis
II

added). See also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d
290 (1993) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) ("[A] sentencer [must] be allowed to give
full consideration and full effect to mitigating circumstances" (emphasis in
original». For i t is only when the jury is given a "vehicle for expressing its
'reasoned moral response' to that evidence in rendering its sentencing decision,"
Penry I, 492 U.S., at 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, that we can be sure that the jury "has
treated the defendant as a 'uniquely individual human bein[g]' and has made a
reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence," **1921 id., at 319,
109 S.Ct. 2934 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 305, 96 S.Ct.
2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976»."
(my emphasis added)
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In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will
"consider"N mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they can give it
"consider
effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause.
Mark J. Ackley
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
mackley@sapd.state.id.us
(208) 334-2712
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Shannon N. Romero
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanski.com]
[kim@toryanskLcom]
Wednesday, September 15, 2004 7:09 AM
Mark Ackley
RE: Penry v. Johnson

Mark, plea negotiations with the prosecutor's office have progressed and we have been told that they would accept a plea
to one count of first degree murder, dismiss all other 5 charges (arson, 3 cts of attempted murder, child endangerment),
and no aggravators will be presented at sentencing. Of course, we are going to the mat wrestling with our client to take
the deal. Unbelievably, he's resisting. Day by day, we're putting more pressure on him to take the deal. He continues to
resist. Our attorney client relationship is being affected because of this. He has become hostile and angry that we are
encouraging a plea. His family seems to support his decision not to take a plea. That relationship is being affected too.
The deal closes the day we begin to exercise our peremptory challenges in jury selection. We expect that to be next
Tuesday or Wed. After that, th~ prosecution goes into. overdrive to bury our client.
.
Other
ather issues are erupting. One has to do with his insistence on testifying. He has been told that his attorneys will not put
him on the stand, for ethical reasons. More and more, he is reluctant to follow the advice of counsel.
The dreadful reality of the DP being imposed by this panel of prospective jurors is demonstrated daily. Even the ones that
say they are generally opposed to the DP say they can impose it where children were involved. Many of ones that
generally favor the DP seem very willing to put their beliefs into action and actually impose it if allegations are proven in
this case. We shop our mitigation in each voir dire examination, but the reality is that none of it stacks up against the
aggravator of leaving 4 kids in a house on fire.
We are consulting with an experienced DP defense lawyer to get ideas about how to work through this impasse. He's a
grey haired guy with familiarity with the Muslim culture. Will continue to advise you. We're close, but not close enough.
If plea negotiations fail, we have told our client to anticipate the worst at trial, based upon the verbal statements and
nonverbal demeanor of these jurors during voir dire.

IKim

IKim
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-----Orig inal
ina' Message----Message----
From: Mark Ackley [mailto:mackley@sapd.state.id.us]
Sent: Thursday, September 09, 20044:17 PM
To: kim@toryanski.com
Subject: Penry v. Johnson
Kim,
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's
yesterday'S jury selection. Kim
noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors
regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by the
defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if instructed by
the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797
(2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation at the close of the case. Here is
a relevant portion that my have application for you during jury selection:

"Penry I did not hold that the mere mention of "mitigating circumstances" to a
capital sentencing jury satisfies the Eighth Amendment. Nor does it stand for

the proposition that it
i t is constitutionally sufficient to infor.m the
jury that it
i t may "consider" mitigating circumstances in deciding the
appropriate sentence. Rather, the key under Penry I is that the jury
1
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be able to "consider and give effect to [a defendant 's mitigating]
evidence in imposing sentence." 492 U.S., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis
added). See also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d
290 (1993) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) ("[A] sentencer [must] be allowed to give
full consideration and full effect to mitigating circumstances" (emphasis in
original». For i t is only when the jury is given a "vehicle for expressing its
'reasoned moral response' to that evidence in rendering its sentencing decision,"
Penry I, 492 U.S., at 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, that we can be sure that the jury "has
treated the defendant as a 'uniquely individual human bein[g]' and has made a
reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence," **1921 id., at 319,
109 S.Ct. 2934 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 305, 96 S.Ct.
2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976».ff
(my emphasis added)
In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will
"consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they can give it
effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause.
Mark J. Ackley
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
mackley@sapd.state.id.us
(208)

334-2712
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Shannon N. Romero
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

Mitch Toryanski [mitch@toryanski.comj
[mitch@toryanskLcom]
Thursday, March 10, 2005 12:23 PM
Mark Ackley
State v. Abullah, Sup. Ct. No. 31659/ formerly H0201384

Mark:
This is to follow up on Kim's phone call message to you earlier this week.
On March 4, the Judge approved our motion to withdraw as counsel from the
case and directed that your office file a written notice of substitution.
Yesterday, we received in the mail a copy of a letter from the clerk of the
Supreme Court advising the clerk of the Ada County Court that Report on
Imposition of Death Penalty has been filed and ordering preparation of the
reporter's_transcript
rec?rd....
reporter's_
transcript and clerks rec?rd
Mitch
Mitchell E. Toryanski
This transmission (including attachments if any) is intended only for the
use of the addressee and may contain information that is privileged,
confidential, and exempt from disclosure under the Electronic Communication
Privacy Act, 18 U.S.c. Sections 2510-2521 and protected by attorney/client
or other privileges. If you are not the intended recipient, or the employee
or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient,
you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of
this communication is strictly prohibited. Attorney/client or work product
privileges are not waived by the transmission ofthis message. If you have
received this communication in error, please notify me immediately via
e-mail at info@toryanski.com or by telephone at (208) 841-0655. Thank you.

I
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I
I Shawna,
I Thank you for calling, and sharing your thoughts. I guess I'm not sure what I expected, but
upon further reflection, it was unreasonable to expect my summary of conversations not to raise
I a few eyebrows. Hopefully the notes in their entirety will lighten your concerns ifnot alleviate
Mark Ackley

Mark Ackley
Friday, May 09, 2008 3:41 PM
'Shawna Dunn'
Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and
the SAPO

From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

them completely.

I Below is the 1/24/05 note of my conversation with Kim Toryanski. - Mark
1124/05
1/24/05

MJA: TIC with Kim Toryanski
KT called:
1. Hearing is still scheduled today for 3 p.m. - purpose solely to discuss
PSI and where the source of disagreements may lie
2. Sentencing hearing will be rescheduled, likely 2 weeks out
3. Q whether any amendments pending re ICR 32 - I told KT that I was
not aware of any at this time
4. I told KT that we would go to the hearing, but may only stay briefly if
they are going through 5000 pages of PSI. Our purpose is primarily to
provide support for Azad. KT said that if we leave before the
conclusion of the hearing then she will pass this on to Azad and also tell
him that he is scheduled for a call with us tomorrow.
5. KT and I talked briefly about challenges to the sentencing procedure.
I refered her to the Stover case for the non-capital charges. I asked her
whether she has considered any constitutional arguments that would
mandate giving the judge sentencing discretion to downwardly depart
from death. She said that she had not but has referred to the jury
verdicts as recommendations which has upset the judge in the past. I
mentioned the possibility of crafting a separation of powers argument,
that the legislature cannot completely divest a district court judge of its
sentencing discretion. I told her that such a challenge and others might
be further considered rior to sentencing.

I
I

1

001572

I
I

Mark Ackley
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

1I
1

Mark Ackley
Friday, May 09, 20084:36 PM
'Shawna Dunn'
Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and
the SAPO

Shawna,

I
1
I
I

The below email was written in response to an interoffice email from Michael Shaw, our investigator. At the
time, I was not assigned to represent Azad. Instead, Azad was being represented by Ron Coulter and Kimberly
Simmons. In the course of his file review, Michael wanted to know, among other things [which is why I did not
include his initial email inquiry below], whether I had notes from any conversations with the Toryanskis during
their representation. When I prepared the below email, I referenced my notes- contained on a legal pad. I have
searched for those notes and my legal pad but I have not located them to date. Michael indicates that he did not
take my file as I had suggested in my email.

1
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I

Because I don't want to adjust the electronic content at all, I am giving you the email in its entirety, including a
conversation that I had with Joan Fisher from a different date which I had apparently noted somewhere in the
same legal pad. I thought about redacting that reference, and just summarizing it, but on second thought I
figured that would only raise more eyebrows. My note also includes references to visits I had with Azad after
our office began representing him. To refresh your memory, I represented Azad briefly before Ron Coulter was
hired. Once he was hired, Molly reassigned cases to adjust for national workload standards. As a result, I think
I was off Azad's case pretty quickly and did not come back until October 2006.

Although it looks like I might have arguably given some suggestions to counsel, I think you'll agree that those
suggestions are not implicated by Azad' s claims, but I suppose that could be a matter of interpretation. You
will notice a reference below to the "EI-Contrani (sic)" case; that reference is to State v. Al-Kotrani,
AI-Katrani, 141 Idaho
66, 106 P.3d 392 (2005), and pertains to a potential motion to disqualify Judge Copsey. I don't think the
grounds for disqualification are noted in the opinion, but the following was written in the Appellant's Brief,
"The district court further found that Dr. Sanford's conclusions were not credible because Dr. Sanford relied on
Mr. AI-Kotrani's family'S
family's representations and "self-serving reports." The district court noted that Dr. Sanford
did speak with one non-relative, a former employer, Mr. Abdul Muhammad, who testified that he could only
given Mr. AI-Kotrani one instruction at a time as Mr. AI-Kotrani would get confused if more than one
instruction was given. Further, Mr. AI-Kotrani had the tendency to "slack oft" if not under constant
super;,ision. The district court dism~ssed Mr. Muhammad'.s testimony, noting t~at the "Iraqi com~~ity is very
pAO, L.24, R., p.79.) ... Accordmgly, Mr. AI-Kotrani asserts that the dIstnct court
close. (Tr., p.39, L.24 - p.40,
erred in ruling that Dr. Sanford's conclusion that Mr. AI-Kotrani is incompetent to stand trial was not credible
because it took into consideration information obtained from Mr. AI-Kotrani's family. The district court further
erred in failing to consider information obtained from Mr. Muhammad because he is of the same nationality of
Mr. AI-Kotrani and its erroneous conclusion that Mr. Muhammad's statements were not significant." Of
course, trial counsel never moved to disqualify the judge, and we have not raised any claims based on their
failure to do so.

I will discuss disclosing Molly's email notes on Tuesday. I anticipate disclosing them unless my decision to
disclose my own notes to you is questioned.

1I

Mark
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From: Mark Ackley

Sent: Friday, March 17,2006 10:47 AM
To: Michael Shaw
Cc: Kimberly Simmons; Ronaldo A. Coulter; Paula Swensen; Barbara D. Thomas; Guadalupe Ayala

Subject: RE: Abdullah file clean up
Michael, I will go through my emails. I will forward any that are relevant. Perhaps you take my file and then
share or give to Ron or Kimberly. It includes some notes from IMSI visits with AA that I am pretty certain were
not placed in Prolaw. Below I have summarized most of my handwritten notes from conversations with, or in
reference to, trial counsel.
From legal pad

1.

2.

3.

12/17/03 TC with Joan Fisher about the Abdullah case noting that she is concerned about
everything being adequately preserved
9103104 TC conversation with Kim T. with Molly (extensive notes on legal pad}

••

Discussion re the Court closing the courtroom; they did not object to closed proceedings.
Judge made them file a motion to continue under seal. Should have objected. [It looks like I
suggested -- "move to unseal the motion, right to public trial"]

••

Discussion about Erica Kline and Detective Whitfield

••

Quotes attributed to Kim 1.
T. including, "Now more than ever...
ever ... 1 could kick [Copsey] off." I
indicated that we would send the EI-Contrani (sic) opinion with Copsey's [racist] remarks.
[This is in reference to the Iraqi client case that Eric F. handled (AI-Kotrani) which we then
faxed to them [this has been confirmed by Sara] [It is not indicated, but I believe I suggested
a motion to DQ]

••

My thoughts reflected, ':confidence sounds like L. Dunlap" [NOTE: this is a reference to the
Jimmie Thomas case where Lynn Dunlap told Jimmie they would obtain an acquittal]; quote
attributed to Kim 1.
T. "we've been seeing things" (bizarre things) since the beginning of the
case

••

Kim thought the State would have trouble proving murder, referring to the State's case as
an attempt to "bootstrap the murder" - I asked her why they could not prove felony murder
and Kim T did not have a good answer [NOTE: I was quite worried about Kim's confidence]

••

Reference to "weekly love letters" they [I believe "they" is a reference to trial counsel] sent
to the prosecution to show them how their case sucks

••

Referencing AA, noting that he will plead to what he did, she [Angela] poured the gasoline,
would plead to conspiracy to arson

••

References to problems with the State's lab. They still need an expert to attack the lab.
Many things they are still trying to get. [It appears I may have suggested a motion to
continue]

Undated TC conversation with Mitch Toryanski (date can be approximated post jury verdict for
death sentence, but prior to formal sentencing by judge)
jUdge)

••
••

Sentencing scheduled for 1/21/05
They (trial counsel?) scratched residual doubt because the judge said the law was wellwell
settled (not mitigation)
2
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•
•

•

Judge limited the scope of AA allocution
They were never told what happened; AA was never straight [NOTE: I believe this was in
response to a question I always ask trial counsel, specifically, "did the client ever confess to
you."]
One area of investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not sure
what this references]
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Mark Ackley
Mark Ackley
Wednesday, May 14, 20089:26 AM
'Shawna Dunn'
RE: Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel
and the SAPD

From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

I
I Shawna,
I Below is an electronic note written by Molly Huskey regarding a call that she received from
Mitch Toryanksi. This is the note that I summarized in an email to you last week. It appears
I the note was written on the day of the call, November 24, 2004. I have not changed the note in
. any way, thus-the typos~ I believe we have now disclosed every communicatio~
communicatio~ or note

referencing a communication, with the Toryanskis prior to our appointment as Mr. Abdullah's
counsel. I may very well send you a formal discovery disclosure attaching each of the
communications that I've already sent to you informally and in piece-meal fashion. If you have
any questions, then please let me know.

I
I
I Mark
MJH

11124/04
11/24/04

MJH: Telephone Call from Mitch Toryanski.
Called re: outcome of trial. wanted to know if we filed post trial
motions like motion for new trial. TOld him we didn't do that. Told me
that Azhad was a good person and the good things he had done far
outweighed the aggravators. for example, when Azhad was a young
man, his father had been imprisoned. Azhad led his family over the
mountains into Turkey to freedom. He was on the board of his church,
he was affectionate with his children.
This new system gives too much power to the prosecutor because there
is no way ajury is going to acquit after hearing all the evidence. He
said of course with a first degree murder, people will find utter
disregard. He said some of the jurors even wanted to find HAC.
Said Copsey's demeanor made her impssible to work with. She was
demeaning and belittled the attorneys. He really thinks she needs to be
trained in professionalism.
He said client didn't tell him the truth - they still don't know what really
happened. This put them at a huge disadvantage when trying to prepare
the case. HE says they were much more optimistic re: the possible
outcome earlier in the trial and the longer it went on, the more they
knew the client was telling lies to them.
Hopes we can get the client some relief.

I
I
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AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,

-~'I .-."

20i09
2d0i 09.'

'i'

Petitioner,
vs.
ORDER RE: C01\TfLICT COUNSEL

THE STATE OF IDAHO
Respondent.

In reviewing the material filed in support of the Final Amended Petition, including various

e-mails attached to the Toryanskis' depositions, it came to the Court's attention that several of the
State Appellate Public Defender's Office attorneys, including Molly Husky, the State Appellate
Public Defender, Mark Ackley, Chief of the Capital Litigation Unit, and Kimberly Simmons,
provided advice to Mr. Abdullah's privately retained trial counsel before trial began, during jury
voir dire, during trial and post trial.]
trial. l

The record establishes that the State Appellate Public

Defender's Office advised trial counsel on several matters, including advising trial counsel to seek
a continuance of the trial (which they did) and suggesting specific voir dire approaches. Both of
these areas are the subject of Mr. Abdullah's post-conviction claims. The full extent of the State
Appellate Public Defender's Office's involvement and what advice was given was unclear.
Therefore, concerned about the apparent conflict of interest, the Court ordered counsel to address
the implications and extent of this involvement.
Both the State and the State Appellate Public Defender's Office responded and provided
the Court with additional evidence.
Based on the following and having fully considered those responses, the Court finds that
the State Appellate Public Defender's Office has a conflict in its representation of Mr. Abdullah

I The Court notes that Ms. Sinunons and Mr. Ackley specifically represented to the Court in the original Petition that
they had no involvement in the trial of this matter. It was on this representation that the Court found good cause to
allow the State Appellate Public Defender's Office more than three years to finalize the post-conviction petition. This
is why the Court was unaware of the conflict.
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1

in post-conviction proceedings. (This order does not affect the State Appellate Public Defender's

2

Office's representation of Mr. Abdullah in the appeal of his underlying conviction.) Therefore,

4

the Court shall hold a hearing to determine whether Mr. Abdullah waives this conflict both as to
this post-conviction proceeding and in any subsequent proceedings.
ANALYSIS

6

In examining whether the appropriate procedural safeguards are in place in a case where

7

the defendant is facing the death penalty, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held

9

that "death is different." In his concurrence, Justice Stevens wrote:

12

In the 12 years since Furman . .. every Member of this Court has written or joined
at least one opinion endorsing the proposition that because of its severity and
irrevocability, the death penalty is qualitatively different from any other
punishment, and hence must be accompanied by unique safeguards to ensure that it
is a justified response to a given offense.

13

Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984). The constitutional reason that "death is different"

14

is the application of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruelty" to a degree that varies from

15

its application in most other criminal cases. Because this is a capital case and Mr. Abdullah is

16

literally fighting for his life, this Court must ensure that Mr. Abdullah's rights are protected. As

17

Justice O'Connor noted in a concurrence, it would be cruel and unusual punishment to execute a

18

defendant without providing "extraordinary measures to ensure that the prisoner ... is afforded

19

process that will guarantee, as much as .is humanly possible, that the sentence was not imposed

20

out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982).

21

Therefore, this Court's responsibility is heightened.

10
11

22

24

Every defendant has the right be represented by conflict-free counsel. 2 Wood v. Georgia,
450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981). In order to ensure a defendant receives conflict-free counsel, a trial
court has an affirmative duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever it knows or "reasonably
should know that a particular conflict may exist." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980);

26

see also State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278, 285 (2003). This duty with respect to

27

indigent defendants is far more imperative than the judge's duty to investigate the possibility of a

28

29

Siale v. Severson, --- P.3d ----, 2009 WL 1492659 (Idaho, 2009). While rehearing
2 This was recently reaffinned in Slale
was denied, Severson has not yet been released for publication and cannot be cited.

31
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1 conflict that arises when retained counsel represents either multiple or successive defendants. It is
2

true that in a situation of retained counsel, "[u]nless the trial court knows or reasonably should

3

know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry." Mickens v. Taylor,

4

535 U.S. 162, 184 (2002) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980)). When, as was

5

true in Mickens, the judge is not merely reviewing the pennissibility of the defendant's choice of

6

counsel, but is responsible for making the choice herself, and when she knows or should know

7

that a conflict does exist, the duty to make a thorough inquiry is manifest and unqualified. Id

8
9

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court squarely held that when a record discloses the
"possibility of a conflict" between the interests of the defendant and the interests of the party

10

paying their counsel's fees, the Constitution imposes a duty of inquiry on the state-court judge

11

even when no objection was made. Id at 185 (citing Wood, 450 U.S. at 267, 272). The Court,

12

therefore, has an ongoing obligation to inquire into potential conflicts of interest about which it

13

knows or reasonably should have known. Id This obligation is even more important where the

14

criminal defendant is facing the death penalty, and Mr. Abdullah is.

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

In order to satisfy the inquiry requirement, a trial court's examination of the potential
conflict must be thorough and searching and should be conducted on the record. See State v.
Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259, 77 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct.App. 2003); Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314,

Cir.l991). The Court is entitled to rely on factual representations made by counsel and
1320 (8 th Cir.1991).
may inquire further into the facts, though it "is under no original or continuing obligation to do
so." Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895, 897 (9 th Cir. 1967). The Court ordered counsel to
respond to the Court's questions in writing. Both responded and attached relevant portions of the
record that reflect the evidence. In reaching a decision, the Court relied on the State Appellate
Public Defender's Office's factual representations.

However, the determination of whether a

conflict exists is for the Court to decide and not for counsel.
Once a court conducts an inquiry, it must detennine whether a conflict actually exists.
Lopez. 139 Idaho at 259, 77 P.3d at 127. If the court concludes defense counsel does have a

conflict, it must obtain a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver from the defendant or give the
defendant an opportunity to acquire new counsel. Id.
Id If, on the other hand, the court concludes
that a conflict of interest does not exist, the representation may continue without a waiver. See id
id.

31
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1

While the State Appellate Public Defender's Office addresses the conflict created by their

2

role as witnesses in both advising trial counsel and observing the trial, the more significant

3

conflict includes a colorable claim that they refrained from asserting viable ineffective assistance

4

of counsel claims that may implicate advice they gave to Mr. Abdullah's retained trial counsel. 3

5

An actual conflict is defined by its effect on counsel, not by whether there is a "mere theoretical

6

division of loyalties." Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171, 172 n. 5 (emphasis added). "[T]he evil [of

7

conflict-ridden counsel] is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, ...

8

[making it] difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney's representation

9
10

of a client." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-491 (1978) (emphasis added).
In this case, on a successive post-conviction petition or in a federal habeas action, Mr.

11

Abdullah has a "colorable claim" that the State Appellate Public Defender's Office has an actual

12

conflict of interest and, therefore, cannot represent him in this action. That colorable claim exists

13

because attorneys in the State Appellate Public Defender's Office advised Mr. Abdullah's

14

retained trial counsel, sat in on the trial and are witness even if they are not called in the

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

post-conviction case. More significantly, should Mr. Abdullah so chose, he could claim the State
Appellate Public Defender's Office post-conviction attorneys may have foregone viable
ineffective assistance of counsel claims because such claims may implicate advice the attorneys
gave to Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel.
The Court finds, therefore, the State Appellate Public Defender attorneys have a conflict
of interest and that if the issue were asserted in later proceedings the court would have to have an
evidentiary proceeding to detennine the effect the conflict may have had on their representation. 4

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
~')

J By analogy, when a petitioner is represented on post-conviction relief by his trial counsel, the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel may be raised in a successive petition absent a clear and voluntary waiver. See Commonwealth
v. Via, 316 A.2d 895 (Pa. 1974). Absent a showing that the petitioner was specifically advised of the hazards of
being represented by trial counsel at the post-conviction hearing and that the petitioner consented to such an
arrangement, a successive post-conviction application, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, is not barred.
See Carter v. State, 362 S.E.2d 20, 21 (S.C. 1987). In fact, in South Carolina as a result of this case, courts are
instructed to advise a petitioner who wishes to waive this conflict that "the dual representation will result in the
waiver of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." Id
fd at 22. The petitioner is then required to state on the
record whether he wishes to proceed, thereby waiving the issue. fd
Id
4 The Court is not making any determination regarding the validity of such claim if made by Mr. Abdullah in a
subsequent proceeding. However, clearly Mr. Abdullah could make that claim in subsequent proceedings and if he
were to assert that claim, the court would be required to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the conflict
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11 Furthennore, the Court finds that this conflict affects the entire office because at least three
2

members of the officer, Molly Husky, Mark Ackley and Kimberly Simmons, met with and

33
4

advised Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel pre-trial, during jury selection, during trial and post-trial.

55
6

Molly Husky is the State Appellate Public Defender and the office supervisor. Mark Ackley
heads the Capital Litigation Unit and supervises that unit. Mr. Abdullah would have a colorable
claim that any attorney working for Ms. Husky or being supervised by Mark Ackley would also

7 have a conflict because he could claim they did not pursue claims that may implicate Ms.
8 Husky's, Mr. Ackley's or Ms. Simmons' advice. Therefore, the Court finds that the entire State
99 Appellate Public Defender's Office is conflicted for the purpose of this post-conviction
10

proceeding.

11
12

waiver must be a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver or the Court must give him an

13

opportunity to acquire new counsel. Lopez, 139 Idaho at 259, 77 P.3d at 127. Mr. Abdullah is

14

indigent and is entitled to conflict free counsel at public expense.

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
28

While Mr. Abdullah may waive this conflict, only he may waive the conflict and that

When an indigent defendant is unable to retain his own lawyer, the trial judge's
appointment of counsel is itself a critical stage of a criminal trial. At that point in the proceeding,
by definition, the defendant has no lawyer to protect his interests and must rely entirely on the
judge. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 184. For that reason it is "the solemn duty of a ... judge before
whom a defendant appears without counsel to make a thorough inquiry and to take all steps
necessary to insure the fullest protection of this constitutional right at every stage of the
Moltke v. Gillies,
Gillies. 332 U.S. 708, 722 (1948)). If the Court had
proceedings." /d. (quoting Von Mottke

been aware of the conflict, the Court would have ordered the appointment of death qualified
private counsel at public expense at the outset of these proceedings.
Therefore, this Court has an obligation to hold a hearing to explain the implications of
waiving these conflicts and how that would not only affect Mr. Abdullah's right to assert claims
in this post-conviction proceeding but would affect his ability to pursue claims associated with the
State Appellate Public Defender's Office's involvement with his private trial counsel in further

29
30
30

adversely affected his post-conviction counsel's performance. See Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 874 (9 th Cir.
2006); Karis v. Calderon. 283 F.3d 1117, 1126-27 (9 th Cir. 2002).

31
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1 proceedings, including any federal habeas actions or successive post-conviction proceedings. It
2

may even affect his ability to challenge this Court's actions regarding these conflicts.
The Court hereby schedules a hearing for September 25, 2009, at 10:00 a.m. to detennine

3
4

whether Mr. Abdullah can knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive these conflicts, whether

5

the Court should appoint conflict counsel to advise him regarding this waiver, or whether the

6

Court should order the State Appellate Public Defender's Office to provide Mr. Abdullah death

7

qualified private counsel to represent him in these post-conviction proceedings at public expense.

8

5

IT IS SO ORDERED.

9
10

Dated this 15th day of September 2009.

11

~'e~

12

Cheri C. Copsey
District Judge

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
~?

A trial court may appoint substitute counsel for an indigent defendant upon a showing of good cause. State v. Nath.
Nath,
137 Idaho 712, 714-15, 52 P.3d
P .3d 857, 859-60 (2002). Whether substitute counsel should be provided is a decision that
lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. [d.
Id. at 715,
52 PJd at 860. The trial court's decision will only be regarded as an abuse of discretion if it violated the defendant's
right to counsel. [d.
Id.
S
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this

I~ day of September 2009, I served a true and correct copy of

the within instrument to:

GREG H. BOWER
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
ROGER BOURNE
SHAWNADUNN
INTERDEPT. MAIL

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
MARK 1. ACKLEY
SHANNON N. ROMERO
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
BOISE, IDAHO 83703

AZAD ABDULLAH
#76321
IMSI-J BLOCK
P.O. BOX 51
BOISE, IDAHO 83707
J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the Distr' ct Court

26

30

~?

~?

ORDER RE: CONFLICT COUNSEL
CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-00308

7

001584

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
II
I
I

EXHIBIT E

001585

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

i\.;,-.______
i\.;,_______
___
A.ilii~~
A.ilii~~

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. #6330
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. #5888
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. #7679
Capital Litigation Unit
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
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C'EPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,
Petitioner,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-21802
(fonnerly SPOT0500308)

MOTION FOR PERMISSION
TO APPEAL

(Capital Case)

The Petitioner, AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, by and through his attorneys, Mark Ackley,
Shannon Romero and Nicole Owens of the State Appellate Public Defender's Office (SAPD),
hereby moves this Honorable Court for pennission to appeal, pursuant to I.A.R. 12(c),
12(c), from the
Order Re: Conflict Counsel, filed September 15,2009.

MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL

1
001586

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

ARGUMENT
Pennissive Appeal From This Court's Order Finding A Conflict In The SAPD's Representation Of
Mr. Abdullah Presents A Controlling Question Of Law As To Which There Are Substantial
Grounds For Differences Of Opinion And In Which An Immediate Appeal May Materially
Advance The Orderly Resolution Of These Post-Conviction Proceedings
A.

Introduction
On August 17,2009, the Court issued an order directing the parties to address the following

issues: (l) the potential impact of any pretrial and trial involvement the SAPD had with trial
counsel; (2) whether the SAPD's past involvement creates a current a conflict of interest; (3) the
extent of the SAPD's involvement; and (4) whether the SAPD's pretrial and trial involvement with
trial counsel makes members of the SAPD potential witnesses. (Appendix 1.)
The State filed its Memorandum Re: SAPD Involvement With Trial And Pre-Trial on
August 31, 2009, and the SAPD filed its Response To Court Order Inquiring Into The Pretrial And
Trial Involvement Of The SAPD With Trial Counsel on September 1, 2009, attached hereto as
Appendices 2 and 3. In these pleadings, both parties explained why they did not believe the SAPD
had a conflict of interest. Nevertheless, on September 15,2009, this Court entered an order finding
that the SAPD has a conflict in its representation of Mr. Abdullah. (Order Re: Conflict Counsel,
attached hereto as Appendix 4.) Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule (I.A.R.) 12, Mr. Abdullah moves
this Court for pennission to appeal the Court's order finding a conflict of interest which is
necessary to preclude an unwarranted inquiry of Mr. Abdullah and to prevent any additional
interference with the attorney-client relationship.
Pursuant to I.A.R. 12, a request for pennission to appeal must be made to the district court
prior to filing a motion for pennissive appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. Pennission for an
interlocutory appeal may be granted by the district court where there is "a controlling question of
law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate
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appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation."
I.A.R. 12(a).

B.

Pennissive Appeal From This Court's Order Finding A Conflict In The SAPD's
Representation Of Mr. Abdullah Presents A Controlling Question Of Law As To Which
There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion
1.

Pennissive Appeal From This Court's Finding The SAPD Has A Conflict In Its
Representation Of Mr. Abdullah Involves A Controlling Question Of Law

This Court found the SAPD has a conflict of interest based on its pretrial and trial contact
with trial counsel. (See Appendix 4.) The controlling question of law then is whether a district
court in capital post-conviction proceedings can find an actual conflict of interest based solely on
post-conviction counsels' limited contact with trial counsel during the underlying proceedings,
where the court cannot identify the specific scope and nature of the conflict, and where both parties
agree no conflict of interest exists. (See Appendix 4.) This is a legal question of first impression
and is a substantial legal issue of great public interest. See Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2, 665 P.2d
701 (1983).

2.

There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion Involving This
Court's Order Re: Conflict Counsel

Substantial grounds for difference of opinion regarding this controlling question of law stem
from case law cited in the SAPD's response to the Court's inquiry. Mr. Abdullah incorporates by
reference his Response To Court Order Inquiring Into The Pretrial And Trial Involvement Of The
SAPD With Trial Counsel (herein Response). (See Appendix 3.)
In concluding no conflict of interest exists between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah, the SAPD

--relied on a Sixth Amendment analysis adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Severson, --
P.3d ---, 2009 WL 1492659 (Idaho 2009) and set for in numerous U.S. Supreme Court decisions.
"The Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes a correlative right to representation free from
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conflicts of interest." Lewis v. Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2004). In several cases in which
the Supreme Court has defined the right to conflict-free counsel, the defense attorney actively and
concurrently represented conflicting interests. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166-167, (2002);
see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (attorney representing co-defendants); Cuyler
v. Sullivan 446 U.S. 335, 337-38 (1990) (same). In such cases, the Court created a distinction

between an actual conflict of interest, which adversely affects counsels' performance, and a mere
~Qnf1ict. of
theoretical one. See Mickens, 535 U.s. at171-172. ("{AJnactual
("{Alnactual G-Qnf1ict.

in~(est Ime~sl
Ime~sl
in~(est

precisely a conflict that affected counsel's performance-as opposed to a mere theoretical division of
loyalties.") Id. at 171.

Specifically, it must be established the defendant's counsel actively

represents conflicting interests to establish an actual conflict of interest. See Dunlap v. State, 141
Idaho 50, 62 106 P.3d 376, 388 (2004) (Dunlap Ill) (citing State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 98, 967
P.2d 702, 712 (1998)). As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:
The effective performance of counsel requires meaningful compliance with the
duty of loyalty and the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, and a breach of these
basic duties can lead to ineffective representation. More than a mere possibility of
a conflict, however, must be shown. The Sixth Amendment is implicated only
when the representation of counsel is adversely affected by an actual conflict of
interest.
United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 375 (4th Cir.1991); see also People ex rei. Woodardv. Dist.
Ct., 704 P.2d 851, 853 (Col. 1985)("[A] trial court may not disqualify counsel on the basis of

speculation or conjecture....").
conjecture .... ").
Courts generally give great weight to opinions of counsel in determining whether a conflict
exists.

As the United States Supreme Court has noted, trial courts "necessarily rely in large

measure upon the good faith and good judgment of defense counsel." Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347
(citing Holloway, 435 U.S. at 482); see also Burger, 483 U.S. at 784. Some courts, including the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held trial counsel's judgment that no conflict of interest exists
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is a sufficient basis for a court to conclude there is no conflict. United States v. Crespo de Llano,
838 F.2d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Fish, 34 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir.

1994); United States v. Haren, 952 F.2d 190, 195 (8th Cir. 1987). Consistent with its ethical
obligations, Mr. Abdullah's counsel have assessed the conflict of interest issue and are of the
opinion no conflict exists. This opinion was reached in consideration of counsels' obligations
under the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, the state and federal constitutions, the Idaho Code,
American Bar Association Guidelines fQt:
and the American.

Appointm~nt
th~ Appointm~nt

Performap.ce of Defense
and PerformaJIce

Counsel in Death Penalty Cases. Notably, the State has also researched this issue and is of the
opinion a conflict of interest does not exist.
The Court's order asserts the conflict of interest is based on the fact the SAPD advised trial
counsel on a limited number of issues and "Mr. Abdullah has a 'colorable claim' that the [SAPD]
has an actual conflict of interest and, therefore, cannot represent him in this action." (Appendix 4,
"advis[ed] trial counsel to seek and
pA, Ls. 10-12.) The Court specifically notes the SAPD "advis[ed]
continuance of the trial (which they did) and suggest[ed] specific voir dire approaches." (Appendix
4, p.l,
p.1, Ls.l 7-19.) The conflict, according to the Court, is created by a theoretical situation in which
the SAPD "may have foregone viable ineffective assistance of counsel claims because such claims

may implicate advice the attorneys gave to Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel." (Appendix 4, p.4, Ls.l6Ls.16
19.) (Emphasis added.) Despite this conclusion, the Court acknowledges that "[b]oth of these areas
are the subject of Mr. Abdullah's post-conviction claims." (Appendix 4, p.l, Ls.18-19.) Indeed, the
Court has previously stated that Mr. Abdullah, in his Final Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,
"essentially [] alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for nearly every decision made by trial
counsel in petitioner's defense." (Appendix 5, Order Granting State's Motion to Compel Discovery
and Granting Petitioner's Motion for a Protective Order, filed 2/14/08.)
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evidence to support the Court's finding the SAPD has refrained from raising theoretical
unidentified claims related to advice they may have given trial counsel.
The Court's order fails to identify the specific scope and nature of the SAPD's conflict of
interest, while asserting it arises from the limited contact with, and apparent advice given to, trial
counsel. A careful examination of the SAPD'
SAPD'ss advice and contacts with trial counsel reveals there
is no actual conflict. (See, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Targeted Inquiry, filed 9/24/09,
incorporated hereinby reference.)
Assuming arguendo there is a conflict which Mr. Abdullah is unwilling to waive, this
Court's order imputing the conflict to the entire SAPD office is contrary to controlling case law.
State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 171 P.3d 1282 (Ct. App. 2007). In Cook, the Court of Appeals

refused to impute one public defender's conflict to the entire office. [d. at 794, 171 P3d. at 1292.
1292.11
The court noted that the detennination of whether one public defender's conflict should be imputed
to the entire office should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis with the relevant inquiry being
"whether the circumstances demonstrate a potential conflict of interest and a significant likelihood
of prejudice."
prejudice." [d. at 793 (quoting State v. Bell, 447 A.2d 525, 529 (N.J. 1982». If so, there is a
arise." [d. In reaching
presumption that "both an actual conflict of interest and actual prejudice will arise."
its decision, the court reasoned that:
Automatically disqualifying a public defender where another attorney in the office
has a conflict of interest would significantly hamper the ability to provide legal
representation of indigent clients. This, together with the fact that such concurrent
representation by public defenders generally will create no incentive (economic or
otherwise) for diminished advocacy in such cases, convinces us that a per se rule
imputing conflicts of interest to affiliated public defenders is inappropriate where

I1 The Court of Appeals decision in Cook, declining to automatically impute one public defenders
conflict of interest to the entire public defender's office, was recently adopted by the Idaho
Supreme Court in State v. Severson, --- P.3d ---, 2009 WL 1492659 (Idaho 2009). Rehearing has
been denied but Severson has not yet been released for publication.

MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL

6

001591

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

there is no indication the conflict would hamper an attorney's ability to effectively
represent a client.
/d. at 794.

There is no indication that Mr. Abdullah would be prejudiced if he continued to be
represented by Ms. Romero and Ms. Owens. Both Ms. Romero and Ms. Owens are currently
serving as co-counsel on Mr. Abdullah's post-conviction case and are familiar with the issues and
claims raised in his Final Petition. Ms. Romero has been recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court
as qualified to handle capital cases at trial and in post-conviction. Neither Ms. Romero nor Ms.
Owens actually advised Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel, sat in on the trial, are witnesses in the postpost
conviction case, or in any other way participated in the underlying proceedings. If the entire SAPD
office is disqualified from representing Mr. Abdullah it will result in substantial delay and
prejudice to Mr. Abdullah. There is no indication Ms. Romero or Ms. Owens would be hampered
in their ability to effectively represent Mr. Abdullah especially given the deference Idaho Courts
generally give to public defenders offices in setting aside conflicts of interest.
In addition, finding a conflict of interest and then imputing that conflict to the entire SAPD
office will significantly hamper the SAPD's statutory directive to provide legal representation to
indigent clients given the extreme financial strain that would be placed on the SAPD if it had to
provide conflict counsel outside the office.

Similarly, finding a conflict of interest under the

circumstances of this case would place an unworkable burden on the SAPD and its staff to avoid
any contact whatsoever with attorneys handling capital cases even where such attorneys initiate the
contact and do not solicit or otherwise rely on the advice of the SAPD.
In conclusion, the Court's order finding an actual conflict between the SAPD and
)

Mr. Abdullah is based on theoretical, unidentified facts. The Court's order both deviates from
controlling case law and creates substantial grounds for differences of opinion regarding a
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controlling question of law. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo the Court's finding of an actual
conflict of interest is correct, the Court's order imputing the conflict to the entire SAPO office
deviates from controlling case law.
3.

An Immediate Aooeal May Materially Advance The Orderly Resolution Of
These Post-Conviction Proceedings

Idaho Code § 19-2719(6) mandates that "[a]ll issues relating to conviction, sentence and
post-conviction challenge ... be considered in the same appellate proceeding." I.C. § 19-2719(6).
Allowing an immediate appeal will materially advance the orderly resolution of this litigation
because Mr. Abdullah asserts the Court's ruling and anticipated inquiry will significantly damage
the existing attorney-client relationship and will substantially delay these post-conviction
proceedings. 2
The importance of the attorney-client relationship is sacrosanct in American jurisprudence.

It is fundamental, that once the attorney client relationship is formed, "a distinct set of
constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship takes
effect." Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290 n.3 (1988)(citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159,
176 (1985)). The constitutional safeguards include the Sixth Amendment guarantee that the
accused has the right to rely on counsel and "imposes on the State an affirmative obligation to
respect and preserve the accused's choice to seek [that] assistance." Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171.
Once appointed counsel has established an attorney-client relationship with an indigent defendant,
that relationship is no less inviolate than if counsel had been retained. See Morris v. Slappy, 461
U.S. 1, 22-23 & n. 5 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in result) ("[C]onsiderations that may preclude

Moreover, addressing this issue now will preserve the unitary system in death penalty cases. As
of now, the Court's order explicitly excludes finding a conflict in the SAPD's representation of Mr.
Abdullah in direct appeal. (Appendix 4, p.2.) ("This order does not affect the State Appellate Public
Defender's Office's representation of Mr. Abdullah in the appeal of his underlying conviction.") In
so doing, the Court's order bifurcates and defeats the unitary system of appeals in a capital case.
2
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recognition of an indigent defendant's right to choose his own counsel ... should not preclude
recognition of an indigent defendant's interest in continued representation by an appointed attorney
with whom he has developed a relationship of trust and confidence"); Stearnes v. Clinton, 780
S.W.2d 216, 222 (Tex. Cr.App. 1989)("Once counsel has been validly appointed to represent an
indigent defendant and the parties enter into an attorney-client relationship it is no less inviolate
than if counsel is retained.,,)3
retained.'')3 If a conflict, actual or potential, threatens to compromise either the
adequate representation of a defendant or the institutional

inter~st
inter~st

Ln rendering a just verdict, a gial_
tfial_

judge has discretion to disqualify an attorney. United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 612 (2d
Cir.1993). However, absent a conflict, or serious potential for a conflict, disqualification of
counsel violates a defendant's right to continued counsel of choice.
The SAPD has had an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Abdullah since 2005,
representing his interests in capital post-conviction proceedings before this Court. See People v.

Harlan, 54 P.3d 871,881 (Colo. 2002) (noting the fact that counsel had represented defendant over
a period of seven years in a complex capital case "weighs heavily against disqualification").
Developing a trusting relationship with a capital client is perhaps counsels' number one priority.

See 2003 American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (hereinafter "ABA Guidelines"), Guideline 10.5. ("Relationship
With The Client"). To disrupt this relationship and thrust new counsel on Mr. Abdullah would
violate Mr. Abdullah's constitutional rights and unnecessarily delay these proceedings in light of
the complexity of facts and circumstances in this case and the dearth of individuals both qualified
3 See also McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d 18, 22-23 (Alaska 1974); State v. Madrid, 468 P.2d 561
S. W .2d 194 (Ark. 1991); Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d
(Ariz. 1970); Clements v. State, 817 S.W.2d
1101, 1105-1106 (D.C. 1978); Finkelstein v. State, 574 So.2d 1164, 1167-1168 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.
1991); English v. State, 259 A.2d 822 (Md. App. 1969); People v. Johnson, 547 N.W.2d 65 (Mich.
of MR.S., 400 N.W.2d 147, 152 (Minn. Ct.App.1987); In re Civil
App. 1996); Matter of Welfare ofMR.S.,
Contempt Proceedings Concerning Richard, 373 N.W.2d 429, 432 (S.D.l985).
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and able to take this case. Beyond the preexisting relationship, present counsel have already filed a
Final Amended Petition, and are fully engaged in the process of effectively representing
Mr. Abdullah in his post-conviction proceedings.
The Court's order finding a conflict of interest unnecessarily interferes with and undermines
the relationship of trust between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah. The Court's order would disqualify
the SAPD based on the mere possibility the SAPD "may have foregone" raising potentially
unmeritoriQUS claims. Mr. AbdulWl currently has a relationship of trust with post-conviction
counsel. (Appendix 6, Second Supplemental Affidavit of Azad Haji Abdullah.) Mr. Abdullah has
"developed a strong relationship of trust with [] attorneys and the staff at the SAPD" and describes
that "SAPD staff feels to me like family, because I speak with them and see them more often than
my own family." (Appendix 6, p.2.) In fact, the Abdullah family also has a strong relationship of
trust with the SAPD. (Appendix 6, p.2.) These relationships have taken considerable time and
effort to deVelop
develop because both Mr. Abdullah's and his family'S
family's ability to trust was damaged by the
negative experience he and his family had with trial counsel. (Appendix 6, p.l.)

Thus, the

determination by the Court there is a conflict of interest, in direct contradiction of the SAPD's
assessment, interferes with and undermines the current relationship the SAPD has with
Mr. Abdullah and his family. Further more, it risks violating Mr. Abdullah's right to his continued
choice of counsel.
This post-conviction case is now in its fourth year due primarily to the complexity of the
issues and the volumes of material created in the underlying case. 4 If conflict counsel is appointed,
there will be substantial delay; substitute counsel will need to review volumes of material and

There are approximately seven thousand (7,000) pages of relevant Reporter's Transcript,
approximately 1600 pages of Clerk's Record and approximately thirty-six thousand (36,000) pages
of documentation in trial counsels' files. See also the district Court's Status Memorandum filed on
8/18/2009 attached hereto as Appendix 7.

4
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conduct a thorough investigation in order to get up to speed in Mr. Abdullah's case. The amount of
time conflict counsel would need to review the materials in the case and establish a meaningful and
trusting relationship with Mr. Abdullah is clearly substantial and would result in prejudicial delay.

Mr. Abdullah believes it is likely another court will rule there is no actual conflict of
interest and remand this case for further post-conviction proceedings following appeal. This will
cause undue and prejudicial delay in contradiction to the mandate of I.C. § 19-2719(6). Moreover,
I!ppel!l~ in Qapital cases.
this Court's order subverts the unitary system of l!Ppel!l~

C.

Conclusion
This case presents a controlling question of law as to which there are substantial grounds for

difference of opinion. Allowing an immediate appeal will materially advance the orderly resolution
postof this litigation under the special procedures for unitary appellate review of criminal and post
conviction proceedings required in capital cases.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Mr. Abdullah respectfully requests that this Court grant permission to appeal from this
Court's order finding a conflict of interest and stay these post-conviction proceedings pending
resolution of the appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court.
24th day of September, 2009.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th

N OLEOWENS
Co-counsel for Mr. Abdullah
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 24th
24th day of September, 2009, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL, as indicated below:
SHAWNADUNN
ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH
INMATE #16321
IMSI - J BLOCK
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707
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U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

U.S. Mail

X Statehouse Mail
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- - Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

L. LAMONT ANDERSON
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
700 W STATE ST, 4 TH FL
BOISE ID 83720

X
x

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
-Facsimile
-_ _ Hand Delivery
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Administrative Assistant
Capital Litigation Unit
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A

STATE APPELLATE
DFr:E,'\!f'lER
PUBLIC DFr:E,'\jf'lER

1

-'

AUG 17 2009
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk

o.J

By J. WEATHERBY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DJSTRIefJBF
DJSTRIEfJBF

2
3

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

4

AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH,

5
6
7
8

Petitioner,
CASE NO. CV-PC-200S-00308
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO

9

ORDER RE: SAPD INVOLVEMENT
WITH TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL

Res ondent.
10
11
In reviewing the material filed in support of the Final Amended Petition, including various
12 e-mails attached to the Toryanskis' depositions, it has come to the Court's attention that the State
13 Appellate Public Defender's Office may have been providing advice and support to the trial
14 counsel both before the trial began and during trial. It is unclear the extent of that advice. In an
15
abundance of caution, the Court orders both parties to address the following:
16
1.
the potential impact ofthis involvement,
17
2.
whether this creates a conflict of interest, I
18
3.
the extent of that involvement, and
19
4.
whether it makes the members of the State Appellate Public Defender's Office
20
potential witnesses.
21
Both parties shall simultaneously address the above issues and support their positions with
22 citation to legal authority no later September 1, 2009~
23
IT IS SO ORDERED.
th
24
17th
Dated this 17
day of August 2009.
25
26
~~
27
Cheri C. Copsey
~~District Judge

28
29
30

31
~?

I

The Supreme Court has presumed prejudice when counsel labors under an actual conflict of interest. See Cuyler v.

Sullivan,
Sullivan. 446 U.S. 335,
335. 100 S.Ct. 1708,64
1708.64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980).
'ORDER RE: EFFECT OF SAPD INVOLVEMENT IN TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CASE NO. CV-PC-200S-00308
CV·PC-200S-00308
1
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14
15

11 day of August 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the

within instrument to:

GREG H. BOWER
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATIORNEY
DEPUTY PROSECUTING A
TIORNEY
ATIORNEY

ROGER BOURNE
SHAWNADUNN

INTERDEPT. MAIL
MOLLY J. HUSKEY

STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
MARK J. ACKLEY
SHANNON N. ROMERO
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE _
J
BOISE.
F~J
BOISE, IDAHO 83703

16
17

J. DAVID NAVARRO

18

Clerk of the District Court

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

I

I

29
30

II

I hereby certify that on this

6

27
28

I

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

31

~?

~?

ORDER RE: EFFECT OF SAPD INVOLVEMENT IN TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CASE NO. CV-PC-200S-00308
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GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

RECE\VED
AUG 3 , 2.009

ShawnaDunD

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

APPELLA1E
STATE APPELLA1"E

rdaho State BarNo. 2127
200 West Front Street, Room
Room. 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

OEFEND~R
puauc OEFEND~R

IN mE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
AZAD HAll ABDULLAH.
Petitioner,
VS.

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)}
)

Case No. CV PC 2005 21802
MEMORANDUM RE: SAPD
INVOLVEMENT WITH
TRIAL AND PRE~TRlAL
PRE~TRlAL

)
)
)

-----------)
--------------------~--)
COMES NOW, Shawna Dunn, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and provides the following memorandum regarding the
SAPD's involvement with trial and pretrial.

The Court has instructed the parties to address:
(1) the potentia)
potential impact of [the] invoJvement
involvement [of the SAPD during the trial],

conflict
(2) whether this creates a contlict

MEMORANDUM RE: SAPD INVOLVEMENT IN TRIAL AND PRETRIAL
(ABDULLAH). Page
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(3) the extent of that involvement, and
(4) whether it makes the members of the State Appellate Public Defender's Office
potential witnesses.

Taking issue #3 first, the State is at a disadvantage in detennining the extent of the
SAPD's involvement during trial.

The State must rely on other sources for this

information. The extent of the contact between the SAPO's office and trial counsel was
In.} - pg.240,
pg.240 t In.lO) The
discussed at Mrs. Toryanski's deposition. (KT's depo, pg. 226, In.l
State also previously asked the SAPD· for information about their contact with trial
counsel. In response, the SAPO provided the State documents attached as Exhibit #1.
The State relied on this accounting and an accompanying ass~ce from

Mr. Ackley that

no conflict existed. and chose to take no further action. The State chose this course
based, in part.
part, on an understanding of case law which indicates that the defense may be in

the best position to foresee a conflict.
An attorney representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the
best position professionally and ethically to detennine when a conflict
of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial.

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,347 (1980) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
As for whether there is a conflict of interest, again, the State has relied on Mr.
Ackley's assurance that there was no actual conflict. Areas where conflict could be seen
as existing are if the SAPD attorney staff are potential witnesses or if their advice led to
what they are now claiming is reversible error. The September 15, 2004, email from Kim
Toryanski may give the reader pause. This email toucl1es on Mrs. Toryanski's thoughts
on a number of issues included as claims in the final petition, including the health of the

attorney-client relationship,
relationship. ongoing discussions about whether Mr. Abdullah should
testifY and whether the petitioner would take a plea bargain. Each of those issues has
been discussed by Mrs. Toryanski in the deposition and she will be available to conunent
on them further. If Mrs. Toryanski's comments are seen to deviate from the mood in the

MEMORANDUM RE: SAPD INVOLVEMENT
INVOLVEMENf IN TRIAL AND PRETRIAL
(ABDULLAH), Page
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email, the email may be used as impeachment and Mr. Ackley would have been a
potential witness to admit the email. However, that would not be necessary because Mrs.

Toryanski acknowledged foundation for the email in her deposition. (KT'sdepo,pg. 226,
Ins.19-20}
There is an appearance of conflict which also evolves out of the September 3,
2004, telephone conversation between Kim Toryanski and Molly Huskey, with Mark
Ackley present, where the SAPD suggested requesting a continuance. The defendant's
speedy trial rights are the basis for a claim for relief. It seems concerning that the same

counsel who would advise a continuance would then attack trial counsel's decision to
request continuances.

However, defense counsel requested a continuance September

2004 and their request was denied.
Next, the State will address the closely related issues of the potentiaJ impact of the

involvement and whether it makes the members of State Appellate Public Defender's
Office potential witnesses. Based on our current understanding of the conununications

between the SAPD and trial cOWlBel, the State does not intend to call any members of the
SAPD attorney staff. The State spoke to Mr. Ackley about this issue some time ago, and
Mr. Ackley stated he believed he could present Mr. Abdullah's case without putting
himself or other attorneys in his office in the witness chair.
Accordingly, based on the best information avaiJable to the State, the State
attomey staff will not be called to testify at the evidentiary
Appellate Public Defender attorney
hearing. The State does not know the presence or extent of any waivers by Mr. Abdullah,

proceedings.
which may further diminish or eliminate the impact on the UPCPA proceedings,
To the extent that there may be additional communications the State is currently
unaware of, the State seeks to retain an additional opportunity for briefmg.

MEMORANDUM RE: SAPD INVOLVEMENT IN TRIAL AND PRETRIAL
(ABDULLAH). Page
(ABDULLAH>,
001604

III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III

141 004/023
I4l

08/31/2009 18:25 FAX

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this

OIV

day of August, 2009.

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor

~~

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and COITect copy of the foregoing document

was delivered to the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane,
Boise, Idaho 83703 through the United States Mail, this ~day of August 2009.

\J1iA.

i4-

33,-/-;;l q ~5'"
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ShawnaDunn
'from:

Mark Ackley [mackley@sapd.state.ld.us)

Sent:

Friday. May 09, 200812:12 PM

To:

Shawna Dunn; Roger Boume

Cc:

Shannon N. Romero

Subject:
SubJect:

Abdullah V.
the SAPO

State: SPOT0S0030a· disclosure of correspondence between "trial counsel and

Attachments: F'N: Defense motion to be flied on Tuesday; Abdullah continuance motion was denied; Penry
v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson; State v. Abullah. Sup. Ct. No.
31659 I former1y H0201384; 66857.pdf; 66858.pdf

Shawna,

This is my response to your request for correspondence between our office and the
Toryanskis at the time of their representation of Azad.
Azad Abdullah. I previously agreed to
look for this correspondence and disclose it since we both recognized that such
Toryanslds files was incomplete. Thank you for your
correspondence as contained in the Toryanskis
patience.
I have located and attached the following:
1.

Six emails (some of which overlap) between the Toryanskis (mostly Kim
Toryanski) and our office (Molly Huskey andlor me).

a. NOTE: it appears from some of the emails that there may have been
additional correspondence. I cannot locate any additional correspondence
(although I have located summaries of a few conversations, see below).
2.

Two facsimile cover pages from Kim to Molly.
a. Both faxes, dated 12/11/03 signed by Kim and sent to Molly seem to
correspond with the attached email with the string of communications on
12/17/03 and apparently pertain to pleadings and rulings regarding
challenges to the death penalty statute.

I have located but ha.Y.e
h~e not attached the follOWing:
following:
1.

A sununary of a telephone calIon 11124/04
11/24/04 from Mitch Toryanski to Molly
Huskey. written by Molly. The topics of the conversation included:
a The outcome of the trial;
b. Wh~ther our office files post-trial motions; and
c. Mitch's retrospective assessment of the aggravation and the miti

8/21/2009

...
~
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evidence, the new death penalty jury system, Judge Copsey's professionalism
or lack thereof, and Mr. Abdullah's truthfulness or lack thereof; as well as
Mitch's description of their varying degrees of their confidence during the
course of the case and his hopes for Mr. Abdullah in future proceedings.
2.

a.
b.
c.
cL
e.

3.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
I
I
I

1124/05, written by me.
A surrnnary ofa telephone call from Kim to me on 1/24/05,
The topics of the conversation included:
Hearing on PSI;
Fonnal sentencing scheduling;
Amendments to IeR 32;
Whether we would attend the hearing; and
Potential challenges to the sentencing procedure.

An email summary Qf a written summary of a telephone calIon 9/03/04 from
Kim to Molly Huskey (for which I was present), written by me on March 17,
2006. I have not yet located my contemporaneous written summary. I think I
may have given my notes to Ron Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not
located my notes in the files that they left behind after they left our office in
October 2006. The topics of the conversation apparently included~
included!

a. The Court closing the courtroom;
b. K1ine/Littlefield;
Kline/Littlefield;
c. Grounds to disqualifY Judge Copsey;
d. My thoughts regarding trial counsels' degree of confidence;
e. Kim's comments regarding the State's ability to prove murder;
f. Kim's reference to communications sent by them to the prosecution
regarding the prosecution's case;
g. Kim's reference to what Mr. Abdullah agreed be did and for what he would
plead guilty;
h. Referencing to problems with the State's lab
4.

An email summary gf a written summary of an undated telephone conversation
between Mitch and me, written by me on March 17, 2006. I have not yet
located my contemporaneous written summary. I think I may have given my
notes to Ron Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not located my notes in the
files that they left behind after they left our office in October 2006. The topics
of the conversation apparently included:

a. Sentencing scheduled for 1121105;
b. Residual doubt;
c. Scope of allocution;
d. Mitch's comments about statements made to them by Mr. Abdullah
regarding the events; and
8/21/2009
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e. An unclear reference which my email summary noted as follows: "One area
of investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not
sure what this references]"
I have multiple concerns about the wisdom of disclosing these documents as they differ
from the emails and the faxes to the extent they are summaries of correspondence, not the
correspondence themselves which tend to speak for themselves. I need to further assess
whether we have an obligation to disclose these swnmaries, and if so, whether they could
or should be redacted. I will make a decision on Tuesday after further discussion with
Huskey _ I would also be interested in making further inquiry of the
my team and Molly Huskey.
Toryanskis; perhaps they could check their offices again.
I sincerely invite your thoughts on this matter; indeed, that is why I took the time to
describe for you the contents of these summaries.
-Mark

8/21/2009
8121/2009
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Shawna Dunn
From:

[kim@toryensld.comJ
Kim W. Toryenski [kim@toryensld.com]

Sent:

1:59 PM
Monday, september 06, 2004 1:59

To:

Mark Ackley; Molly J. Huskey

Subject:
SUbJect: FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday
M&M:

FY1 .- we're moving for a continuance. The following is a copy of the
''beads
''heads up" for the judge. The judge bas not responded to Pat Owen's request
that the motion be filed under seal.

K
---Original Message-
Message----QrigiDal
OWen [mailto:PROWBNPH@adaweb.net}
From: Patrick Owen
Monday. S~mber
S~mber 06,2004 10:04 AM
Sent: Monday,
To: Judge Cheri Copsey
Cc: lcim@toryanski.com
kim@toryanski.com

Subject: RE: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday

Judge Copsey:

I request that any such motion be filed
fUed under seal and that any proceedings
related to this motion be conducted in chambers.
Pat Owen
~•.Qriginal Message-
~-~.Qriginal
Message--

From: Kim W. Toryanski
(mailto:1cim@torxUlski.coml
Toryansld [Dlailto:kim@torxUlski.coml
Sent: Monday, September 06, 2004 9:59 AM
To: Patrick Owen; Judge Cheri Copsey
Subject: Defense motion to be filed on Tucsday

Judge Copsey:
The defense would like to advise you and the State that on Tuesday morning.
we will be filing a motion to continue the 1riaJ. The gro\JJlds
groUJ1l.is for the

motion are directly related to the Sta~'s revelation on Friday morning that
during the course of this ease,
ease. a soxual Ielationship existed between one of
the case prosecutors and a key witness in this case, the lead homicide
detective and case officei.'.
recited in
Fun details of the defense necessity for a continuance will be reoited
the written motion. In summary, we assert that the defendant has a
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Fourteenth Amendment due process right and a Sixth Amendment right to have a
reasonable opportunity to investigate the tempoml duration of
the
ofthe
relationship, whether an actual conflict of inteIest
interest may have arisen by
virtue of
the relationsbip, whether the prosecutors ethical duties were
ofthe
affected and cDmpromised, whether the detective has violated police rules of
conduct, whether evidenct:
evidence or witness testimony may have been tainted or
compromised in CODDt:CtioJ1
wht:ther
connectioJ1 with the nature of the rt:lationsbip,
relationship, and whether
prejudice to the defendant has resulted. While !he
the integrity of
the
ofthe
proceedinss and
justice is paramount to 8U
aU
lllld the proper adm.inisttation of
ofjustice
involved, only Mr. Abdullah stakes his life on the process.
In evaluating the appropriateDe$S of dJe motion to coIttinue.
coIttinue, we have
referenced Guideline 10.7 (duty to investigate) and GuidelIne
Guideline 10.8 (duty to
assert leSa! claims) oltho ABA (dQidcliocs
OQidcliocs tot the Appointment
AppointmC'Dt and
Perfonnance of
Defense Coun&el
ofDefense
CoUll&el in Death Penalty Cases (Rev. Febnwy, 2003).
Without 'Ill
lUl opportunity to investigate a ID4ttel"
Jn4ttel" which potentially cal15 into
question all infonnation about the case, 8lI,y conviction obtained may be
vulnerab1e
vulnerable to appellate attack on the basis of ineffective assisTance of
coUllsel
counsel The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated lbat death cues are
different and deserving of higher due process standards.

Kim Toryansld

812112009
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Shawna Dunn
From:

Kim W. Toryenskl [kim@toryanski.com)

Sent:

07,20043:53 PM
Tuesday, September 07.20043:53
Mark Ackley: Molly J. Huskey·

To:

mOlion was denied
Subject; Abdullah continuance molion

if Azad
So maybe there is one more appeUate /ssnc for you two to address ifAzad
l1ggra'Vatol', and that
gets convicted of fust degree, the jury finds an l1ggra'Vator,
mitigation does not outweigh the aggravator(s). I think Copsey 'Wants the
"glory" of being the first tD
fA) try a death case under the new statute.
The good news is that. in the continuance, I detailed the need to take the
of detective littlefield,
deposition ofdetective
Jittlefield. the: one that Erika Klein had the affair
objeoted, but it fell on
with. The judge granted that!!! The prosecutor objeoted.
of the depo to be limited.
deaf em. The prosecutor asked for rhe scope ofthe
but the judge said no limicatons on defense inquiry. rm loolcing forward to
taking the depo.
judge also said she would grant more money to investigate things that
The jUdge
need to be: looked into regarding my concerns about the screwups ofthe
of the NMS
IIIQre money
mon~y to get some additional expertS
lab. So I'm going to put in for IIIQrc
testify. Again, hooray.
to advise me, and to testifY.

All in aU, I think rm going to call it a win. Thanks for wargaming with
me!
JUly selection begins tomorrow morning at 9:00. We're in 507. We'll go
until 1I :00
tor the day. Same routine through the end of
;00 and then adjourn Cor

the week.

Will keep you posted.
Kim

812112009
8121/2009
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ShawnaDunn
From:

Mark Ackley (mackley@sapd.state,id.us]
(mackley@sapd.state.id.us]

Sent:

T11ursday, September 09. 20044:11 PM
T11ursday.

To:

kim@toryanski.com

Subject:
SubJect: Penry v. Johnson

Kim,

AS I noted yesterday, my eo-counsel. Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation
specialist, Shelley Hill, ob$erved a portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim
specialist.
noted that there was some contention regarding ques~ions
ques~ions to prospective jurors
reqarding
t;Q ~~am
I;~em (as worded by the
regarding whether mitigaeingfaces
mitigaeingfacts woul.d
wouLd "matter"
umatter" tQ
defense) or whel:her they could simply "consider- mitigating facts if instructed by
the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v. Johnson. 532 U.S. 782, 797
(2001) dealt with jury instructions on m1t1gation at the close of the case. H@re is
a relevant portion that my have application for you during jury selection:
lt
"~.Ar,Y I ~ia
·mit~gat1ng c12:C\UIIIJCanc8s
c1%~tanc.8·
a
".PeJUY
clia Dot hold that
thac ehe
c.he mere mention of ·mit,1.gat:1ng
to a.
capital.
AlMndmI!m~. lIor does i t stand for
capieal. sentencing ju;r;y satis:f~es
sat1s:f1.es the
t:he Eighth AlMDdmI!m~.

the proposition tbat
suffici~t to inform the
~bat it is oonstitutionally suffici~t
jury that i t may ·consider- udtigating
Ddtigating cireumstanaes
cireums~ana.s in deeiaing the

appropriate aeneeDae. Rather, the key under Penzy :r is that the jury
be ab1e to n~onllider
defeDdant rs "u.t:.igat;:!l2gJ
"u,t;.igat;:il2g]
n~onllider and "ive effece to Ca defeadant
evidenca
U.S., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (eD;)hD.sis
(~hasis
evidence :in
in izDs;JD_:i.ng
impoa:ing seDt;8Ilee."
sent;eIlce." 492 u.S.,
&180 Johnson v. Tex~s,
Tex~s, 509 U.S. 350, 381. 113 S.Ct.
added). See &1ao
s.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d
L.Zd.2d
290 (1993) (O·C~OR,
a8ntOZlCQr [must] be allowed
a.llowed to give
(OlC~OR, J., dissenting) (II
(II [A] a8n1:oncer
consi~eraeion and fu11
full efface
effece to mitigaeing
mieigaeing ciraumat:anaas
in
full consi~eratiQn
ciraumatanoas un (~s1s 1n
~t ia
is onl.y
on1y when the :fury
~ury ia
is given a ·vehia1e
origina1». For l.t
·vahia1e for expressing its
xespOD.se' to that
thac evidence in r~deriDg
'reasoned moral xesponse'
r~deriDg its s8ntenciaq
s8Atenciaq deoislon.
deoislon.penry %, 492 U.S., ac 329,
~uzy Dhas
329. 109 S.Ct.
s.Ct. 2934, that ~e c.n
c~ be £Ure that the ~uzy
de£eudaDt aa
ae a ·UDi.que1y in.divldual
individual hWIIIUI beiA[g]' and has IlIAd. a
treated the da£audaDt
4eeer.mi~~!on that
~bae death is the a~~XOPri&t
a~~XQPri&t• •entBDOe,U
r$liable 4eter.mi~t!on
antBDOe. u ·.1921
--1921 ~d., at 319,
s.cc. 293' (~oting
(~oting Woodson
wooason v. North Carolina.
Carolina, 428 U.S. ~80~ 3D4 r 305, 96 S_Ct.
109 S.cc.
S.Ct.
2979, 49 L.Zd.24 944 (1976»."

(my emphasis added)

In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will
·consider M mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they ean g~v.
·considerM
g~v. ic
it
effece: if ~hey
~hey cannot, then they should
shOUld be exclUded for caU$e.
effect;
Mark J. Ackley

Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
mackley@sapd.state.id.us
mackley@sapd.state.ld.us
(208) 334-2712
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Shawna Dunn
From:
Sent:

Friday. September 10, 2004 6:45 AM

Kim W. Toryanski [klm@toryanskLcom}

To:

Mark Ackley

Subject: RE: Penry v. Johnson

Yes, Mark, this helps us a lot. We have been intending to be askIng the mitigation questions using the words.
"give weight and value" to mitigation evidence. and then give examples of our mitigation facts. but. as Shelley and
~consider" and we need to fix that. We'll work on
Kim have observed. we are forming the Questions with the word "consider"
correcting that today.
day... we start questionin9 at 9;00 ~n(l will finish at 5;00, but at least today we get lunch.
Today will be a long dayCopsey even needs to be reminded that we need bathroom breaks.

I'm so glad Shelley and Kim are in the courtroom - will you be able to stop by today?

Kim

---Original MessageFrom: Mark AckleV [mallto:macldey@sapd.state.ld.us]
Sent: Thursday, September
september 09,2004 4:17 PM
To: kim@toryanski.com
Subject: Penry v. Johnson

Kim,
Kim.
Kimberly Simmons.
Simmons, and our mitigation
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel. K1mberly
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection.
Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective
fac~s would .·matter- eo ~em
~em (as worded by
jurors regarding whether mitigating fac~s
the defense) or whether they could simply ·consider· mitigating facts if
ins~ructBd by the Court;
Courc (as worded by the jUdge).
judge). The case af Penry v.
inSl;ructsd
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) dealt with jury ins~ructions
ins~ructions on mdtigation
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application
for you during
dUring jury selection:
n~eAr,Y II did not hold that the mere meneion o£ ~tigating
~tigating circumstances" to a
n~eAr,Y
Amandmeut. 1I10r doeB it stand
capital sentencing :lU2.'y
jU2:Y satisf:i.es
Ba~i.£:i.8s the E:i.Uhth Am.endmeDt.

eODst~tutional1y 8~ffieient
8~ffieient to
for the proposition that it iQ eODst~tutional1y
infor.m the jury that i t may acons1Clar"
DCODs14ar" mitigat1.ng
~t1gat~ng a:lz:'C'UJlUSbBnCeS
ai~cumatances
inform.
under Penry
in deciding the appropriate seneence. aather, the
t:he key undeZ'
:rJ: is that the jury be ab1e to "consider and
g~ve ef:Eece
ef:Eecf! to ClI
alJd g~ve
III
de£andlJJlt'lI ~c.tgatjDl11
~c.tgat1.DI11 ende.ace
ende.Dce :LZ2
:l.Z2 :J..11tf'oS1Dg
~oB1Dg seDtezlC'e
'O'.S.,
defendlJJJ:t'lI
seD~ezlC'e .. " 492 'O'.s.,

509 u.S.
ac 319 t 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphaGia added). Se. also Johnson v. Taxa.,
Texas, S09
t..Ed.2d 290 (1993) (O'CONROR.
(O'COHNOa, J., cUlI.enting)
350, .381,
~81, 113 S.Ct. :a6'58,
~658, 125 L.Ed.2d
418.enting)
(nEAl sencancer
sentancer (must] be allowed to give ful.l
fu~l effect
("[Al
£u11 consideration and fu~l
circumstancas· (.mph.sis ~ original»). For 1t 18 Qn1y when the
to mitigat1Dg circumstancBs·
ju~ is given ill nvehicle for exp3:88siug
exp3:88sing its 'realloned moral. zo••
zo••ponse' to that
ju~
evidence
Pear,v J:,
~, 492 11.S.,
U.S., at 329, 109
e.".idence in rendering 1ta
1tG seQtellcing
s~tencing dsci.ion,dlllciaiou,· Peary
s. Ct, 2934,
t:r;eated tile
defandlmt. liS D
S.
2934., that .we CaD be sul:'e t.hat the :Jury Aba. treated
~ defsndlmt.
'un1que1y indivilSual human. bein[g]' and. hall mad. a reliable detezminaticn
CSetezm1naticn that
death is the appropriate sentence,· .-1921
•• 1921 id., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934
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(qao~ing
(qao~ing

Woodson v.

No~th
No~th

290. 304, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978. 49
Carolina, 428 U.S. 290,

L.Ed.2d 944 (19 7 6»."
(my

emphasis added)

in~iring of a prospective juror whether they
In short, it seems that simpy in~iring
~considerw mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they
~considerw
OaD give i~ effect; if they cannot, then they should
shOUld be excluded for cause.
oan

will

Mark J. Ackley
Idaho

State Appellate Public Defender

Capital Litigation Unit

mackleyisapd,state.id.us
mackleyisapd.state.id.us
(208) 334-27l2

8/2112009
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Shawna Dunn
From:

Kim W. Toryanski lkim@torysnskl.com]
(kim@torysnskl.com]

Sent:

Wednesday, September 15.2004 7:09 AM

To:

Mark Ackley

Subject:
SUbJect: RE: Penry v. Johnson
Mark, plea negotiations with the prosecutor's office have progressed and we have been told that they would
murder,
accept a plea to one count of first degree murder, dismiss all other 5 charges (arson, 3 ets of attempted murder.
Child endangennent), and no aggravators will be presented at sentencing. Of course, we are going to the mat
wrestling with our client to take the deal. Unbelievably, he's resisting. Day by day. we're putting more pressure
on him to take the deal. He continues to resist. Our attorney client relationship Is being affected because of this.
He has become hostile and angry that we are encouraging a plea. His family seems to support his decision not to
take a plea. That relationship Is beIng affected too..
oLlr peremptory challenges in jury selection. We expect that to
The deal closes the day we begin to exercise our
be next Tuesday or Wed. After that, the prosecution goes into overdrive to bury our client-

has to do wtth
wHh his insistence on testifying. He has been told that his attorneys
attomeys will
Other issues are erupting. One haS
not put him on the stand, for ethical reasons. More and more, he Is reluctant to follow the advice of counsel.
The dreadful reality of the DP being Imposed
imposed by this panel of prospective jurors is demonstrated dally. Even the
ones that say they are generally opposed to the DP say they can Impose it where children
chndren were involved. Many
of ones that generally favor the DP seem very willing to put their beliefs into action and actually impose it if
allegations are proven in this case. We shop our mitigation in each voir dire examination, but the reality is that
against the aggravator of leaving 4 kids in a house on fire.
none of it stacks up agaInst
We are consultIng with an experienced DP defense lawyer to get ideas about how to work through this impasse.
He's a grey haired guy with familiarity with the Muslim culture. Will continue to advise you. We're close, but not
dose enough. If plea negotiations fail.
fail, we have told our client to antioipate the worst at trial,
trial. based upon the
verbal statements and nonverbal demeanor of these Jurors
JLlrors during voir dire.

Kim

--Original
Message--
--or1glnal Message--From: Mark Ackley [mailto:maddey@sapd.st.ate.id.us]
[mailto:maddey@sapd,state.id.us]
Sent: Thursday, September 09, 2004 4:17 PM

To: k1m@toryanski.com
k1m@toryansk.i.com
Subject: PEnry v. Johnson

Kim,
Kim.
~ co-counsel. Kimber1y Simmons,
Simmons. and our mitigation
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection.
Kim noted ehat there was some contention regardin9 questions to prospective
jurors regarding whecher mitigating faoes would Gmatter p to them (as worded by
the defense) or whether they could simply "consider b mitigating facts if
instructed by the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v.
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782. 797 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation
at" the close of tne case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application
at·
for you during jury selection:

AS I noeed yesterday,

~P~
~p~

r

did DOe hold that

~he

mere maneioQ of

n~tigat~~
n~tigat~~ ~i:~umstancesa
~i:~umstancesa

to a

8/21/2009
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seZl.tenc;i.ng jury satisfies the :eighth
Eighth Ame~&llent.
Ame~&nent.
capi tal sen.tenc;i.ng

.1 t stand
Nor does 1t
s~and
for the pro»oaition that it is constitueiona11y sufficient to
cirCWDlltaDC8S
inform the jury that it May Dconsider lt mitigating CirCWlUlioaDc8s
app~opriate sentence. Rather, ~he key under Penry
in deciding the app~opriate
that. the j~ be able to "consider 4I2d g:l.ve
:t is t:hat.
give effect eo Ill.
de£S12c!lzuJt'9 m:l.t:l.gatmg1
ev:i.dezJce .:1.11 impoS:J.Dg BEIZlt:e.Dc:e." 49l
de£sJ2c!lluJt'.
m:l.t:l.gatmg] ev:tdezJce
49Z u.s.,
at
add84). See a1ao
a~ 319, 109 S.Ce. 2934 (emphasis adde4).
a18Q Johnson v. Texas, 509 u.s.
11.3 S.Ct.
S.Ct • .2658,
350. 381, 113
2658, 125 t..Bd.2d
~.Bd.2d 290 (1993) (O'CONNOR, J., diss8nt:ing)
dissen~in~)
CRCAl sentencer
allowed to give full Qonsideratioll
("CAl
sentence%' [must} be al10vad
Clons1.deration aDd fu11
£\111 effect
to mitigating'
mit.:LgatinQ' circumstances
circumstances"n (empha.i.
(eaphaSli. in
in. original».
o:riginal». For it
it: is only
on.ly wben tbe
ju%y
mor~ response'
response" to that
ju:ry is givea a ·vehicle ~or expressing its
ies "reaaone4
"reaBone4 mor~
santencing decision," Peury %, &92 U.S •• at 328, 109
evidence in rendering its ssntencing
S.Ct.
that ehe jury alias treated the defendant
S. Ct. 2934, t.hat we ean
can be Sure tha't
de£endaDt as a
inaividua~ human bein[g]'
bein[g]" and he..
he. made a re1ia.ble
re1iable 4ete:cminat:ion
4eter.mination that
'uniquely inciividua~
thaT.
ap'pro~iate sentence,"
santenee,n -.1921 id., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934
deaeh 1s the ap'pro~iate
u.s.- 280, 304, 305, 96 S.Ct.
(quoting Woodson V. North Carolina, 428 U.S.s.ce. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976».
(1976».(my

emphasis added)

In short. it seems thac simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they
~consider~ mitiga~1on
mitiga~1on is not enough. It must be determined whether they
will ~consider~
g~VG ~t .~~.ct;
.~~.ct; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause.
can g~VG

Mark J. Ackley
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
mackley@sapd.scate.1d.us
mackley@sapd.state.id.us
(2081 334-n12
334-2712
(2061
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Shawna Dunn
From: Mitch Toryanskl {mitCh@toryansld.com]
sent:
Thursday, March 10,2005 12:23 PM
To:
Mark Ackley
Subject: State v. Abullah. Sup. Ct. No. 316591
SubJect:
31659/ fonnerly H0201384

Mark:
This is to follow up on Kim's phone call mCSBage to you earlier this week.
On March 4, the Judge approved our motion to withdraw as eounsel from the
case and directed that your office file a written notice of substitution.
Yesterday, we received in the mail a copy ofa letter from the clerk oftlie
of the Ada County Court that Report on
Supreme Court advising the clerk ofthe
of lhe
Imposition of Death Penalty has been filed aud
aDd ordering preparation oflhe
reporter's transcript and clerks record.

Mitch
Mitchell E. TOI}'lUl$ki

This transmlBsion (including anachments if any) is intended only for the
use of the addressee and may contain infoIIOation
woxmation that is privileged,
Elec;uomc COnumlnication
COlDllDlnication
confidential. and exempt from disclosure under the Ele<;tronic
confidential,
Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. Sections
SectioWl251O-2521
2510-2521 and
aDd protected by attomey/client
attorney/client
or other privilegcs.
privileges. If you are not the intended recipient, or the employee
or agent responsible for delivering the message TO the intended recipiCDl,
you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of
this communication is strictly prohibited.
prohibited Attorney/client or wolk product
privileges are not waived by the transmission
ttan&misslon of this message. If you have
receive.d this conununication in error, please notify me immediatcly
immediately via
e-mail at info@toryanski.com or by telephone at (208) 841-0655. Thank you.
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ShawnaDunn
From:

Mark Ackley [mackley@sapd.state.id.us)

Sent:

Wednesday, May 14,20089:26 AM

To:

Shawna Dunn

Subject: RE: Abdullah v. Slate: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and the
SAPO

Shawna,
Below is an electronic note written by Molly Huskey regarding a call that she received
Toryankgi This ia
from Mitch Toryanksi
i.a the note that I liummarized
liumIllarized in an email to you last week.
It appears the note was written on the day of the call, November 24,2004. I have not
changed the note in any way, thus the typos. I believe we have now disclosed every
communication, or note referencing a communication, with the Toryanskis prior to our
appointment as Mr. Abdullah's counsel. I may very well send you a fonnal discovery
rYe already sent to you infonnally
disclosure attaching each of the commWlications that rye
and in piece-meal fashion. If you have any questions, then please let me know.
Mark
MJH

11124104

MJH: Telephone Call from Mitch Toryanski.
Called re: outcome oftrial. wanted to know ifwe
if we filed post trial motions
like motion for new trial. TOld him we didn't do that. Told me that
Azhad was a good person and the good things he had done far outweighed
aggravators. for example, when Amad was a young man, his father
the aggra'Vators.
had been imprisoned. Azhad led his family over the mountains into
Turkey to freedom. He was on the board ofhis
oflds church~
church~ he was
affectionate with his children.
This new system gives too much power to the prosecutor because there is
jwy is going to acquit after hearing all the evidence. He said of
no way a jUl)'
CQUl'Se with a first degree murder, people will find utter disregard. He said
CQutSe
some of the jurors even wanted to find HAC.
Said Copsey's demeanor made her impssible to work with. She was
demeaning and belittled the attorneys. He really thinks she needs to be
trained in professionalism.
didn~ tell him the truth - they still don"t
He said client didn't
don't know what really
happened. This put them at a huge disadvantage when trying to prepare
the case. HE says they were much more optimistic re: the possible
outcome earlier in the trial and the longer it went on, the more they knew
the client was telling lies to them.
Hopes we can get the client some relief.

812112009
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Shawna Dunn
From~

Marl< Ackley (maekley@sepd.state.id.us]
(maekley@sepc!.8tate.id.us]

Sent:

Friday, May 09, 2008 3:41 PM

To:

Shawna Dunn

Subject: Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 • disclosure of correspondence between hial counsel and the

SAPO
Shawna,

Thank you for calling, and sharing your thoughts.
thoughts, I guess I'm not sure what I expected,
reflectiQn~ it was unreasonable to expect_my
expect_ my s~ of conversations
but upon further refleetiQn~
not to raise a few eyebrows. Hopefully the notes in their entirety will lighten your
concerns if not alleviate them completely.
Toryanski. - Mark
Below is the 1124/05 note of my conversation with Kim Toryanski,
MJA
MIA

l/24/0S
1/24/05

MJA: TIC with Kim Toryanski
MIA:
KT called:

I. Hearing is still scheduled today for 3 p.m. - purpose solely to discuss
1.
PSI and where the source of disagreements may lie
2. Sentencing hearing will be rescheduled, likely 2 weeks out
3. Q whether any amendments pending re ICR 32·
32  I told KT that I was
not aware of any at this time
4. I told KT that we would go to the hearing, but may only stay briefly if
they are going through 5000 pages of PSI. Our purpose is primarily to
provide support for Azad. KT said that if we leave before the conclusion
of the hearing then she will pass this on to Azad and also tell him that he is
scheduled for a call with us tomorrow.

S.
5. KT and I talked briefly about challenges to the sentencing procedure. I
refered her to the Stover case for the non-capital
non-eapital charges. I asked her
whether she has considered any constitutional arguments that would
mandate giving the judge sentencing discretion to downwardly depart
from death. She said that she had not but has referred to the jury verdicts
as recommendations which has upset the judge in the past I mentioned the
of powers argument, that the legislature
possibility of crafting a separation ofpowers
cannot completeJy divest a district court judge of its sentencing
discretion. I told her that such a challenge and others might be further
considered mior
unor to sentencing.
sentencin~.
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ShawnaDunn
From:

Mark Ackley [mackJey@sapd.state.id.us]

Sont:

Friday. May 09, 20084:36 PM

To:

Shawna Dunn

State: SPOT0500308 • disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and the
SLlbJect: Abdullah v. Slate:

SAPO

Shawna,

The below email was written in response to an interoffice email from Michael Shaw, our investigator.
At the tim~ I was not assigned to represent Azad. Instead, Azad was being represented by Ron Coulter
Sirrunons. In the course of his file review, Michael wanted to know, am.ong
thingsand Kimberly Sirmnons.
among other things
[which is why I did not include his initial email inquiry below], whether I had notes from any
conversations with the Toryanskis during their representation. When I prepared the below email, I
referenced my notes contained on a legal pad. I have searched for those notes and my legal pad but I
flle as I had suggested in my
have not located them to date. Michael indicates that he did not take my fIle
email.

Because I don't want to adjust the electronic content at all, I am giving you the email in its entirety,
including a conversation that I had with Joan Fisher from a different date which I had apparently noted
reference,t and just summarizing i4
it, but
somewhere in the same legal pad. I thought about redacting that reference
on second thought I figured that would only raise more eyebrows. My note also includes references to
visits had with Azad after our office began representing him. To refresh your memory, I represented
Azad briefly before Ron Coulter was hired. Once he was hired, Molly reassigned cases to adjust for
result. I think I was off Azad's case pretty quickly and did not come
national workload standards. As a result,
back until October 2006.

Althougb it looks 1i1ce
Although
lilce I might have arguably given some suggestions to counsel, I tbink you'U agree that
A2ad' s claims, but I suppose that could be a matter of
those suggestions are not implicated by .A2ad'
"E1-Confl'ani (sic)" case; that reference is to
interpretation. You will notice a reference below to the "E1-ConfI'ani
State v. AI-Kotrani, 141 Idaho 66, 106 P.3d 392 (2005), and pertains to a potential motion to disqualify
Judge Copsey. r don't think the grounds for disqualification are noted in the opinion, but the following
was written in the Appellant's Brief" "The distriot court further found that Dr. Sanford's conclusions
"selfwere not credible because Dr. Sanford relied on Mr. AI-Kotrani's family's representations and "self
serving reports:' The district court noted that Dr. Sanford did speak with one non-relative, a fonner
emp loyer, Mr. Abdul Muhammad,
Muhammad., who testified that he
be could only given Mr. Al·Kotrani one instmction
employer,
AI-Kon-ani would get confused if more than one instruction was given. Further, Mr. AI
AI·
at a time as Mr. AI-Kotrani
Kotrani had the tendency to "slack ofF' if not wtder constant supervision. The district court dismissed
Muhammad·s testimony, noting that the "Iraqi community is very close."
closs-" (Tr.,
(Tr•• p.39, L.24 - p.40_
p.40,
Mr. Muhammad's
L.24; R.
R.,t p.79.) ... Accordingly, Mr. Al-Kotrani asserts that the district court erred in ruling that
Dr. Sanford's conclusion that Mr. Al-Kotrani is incompetent to stand trial w~ not credible because it
took into consideration infonnation obtained from Mr. Al-Kotrani's family. The distriot court further
of the same
erred in failing to cOl15ider information obtained from Mr. Muhammad because he is ofthe
nationality of Mr. AI-Kotrani and its erroneous conclusion that Mr. Muhammad's statements were not
Of course, trial counsel never moved to disqualify the judget
judge, and we have not raised any
significant." Ofcourse,
claims based on their failure to do so.

I will discuss disclosing Molly's email notes on Tuesday. I anticipate disclosing them unless my
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decision to disclose my own notes to you is questioned.
-Mark
from: Mark Ackley

Sent:
sent: Friday, March 17, 2006 10:47 AM
To= Michael Shaw
Cc: Kimberly Simmons; Renaldo A. Coulter; Paula Swensen; Barbara D. Thomas; Guadalupe Ayala
SUbject: RE: Abdullah file dean up

Michael, I will go through my emails. I will forward any that are relevant. Perhaps you take my file and
IMBI visits with AA that I am pretty
then share or give to Ron or Kimberly. It Includes some notes from IMSI
Prolaw. Below I have summarized most of my handWritten
handwritten notes from
certain were not placed in Prelaw.
conversations with, or in.refe!ence to. trial COunselL
From legal pad

1.

2.

12/17/03 TC with Joan Fisher about the Abdullah case noting that she is concerned about
everything being adequately preserved

9103104 TC conversation with Kim T. with Molly (extensive notes on legal pad)
•

"
"

Discussion re the Court closing the courtroom; they did not object to closed
proceedings. Judge
JUdge made them file a motion to continue under seal. Should have
-move to unseal the motion, right to public bial1
objected. [It loeks like I suggested - "move
Discussion about Erica Kline and Detective Whitfield
Quotes attributed to Kim T. including.
inoluding. "Now more than ever..
ever ....!1could kick [Copsey]
off."
off.- I indicated that we would send the EI-Contranf (sio) opinion with Copsey's
[racist] remarks. rrhis is in reference to the Iraqi client case that Eric F. handled (Al(AJ
Kotranl) which we then faxed to them [this has been conflrmed
confirmed by Sara]
sara] (It is not

Indicated. but I believe I suggested a motion to DO]

•

My thoughts reflected, "confidence sounds like L, Dunlap· [NOTE: this is a reference
to the Jimmie Thomas case where lynn Dunlap told Jimmie they WOUld
wOUld obtain an
acquittal]; quote attrtbuted to Kim T. nwe've been seeing things·
things" (bizarre things) since
the beginning of the case

•

Kim thought the State would have trouble proving murder, referring to the State's
case as an attempt to "bootstrap the murder" - I asked her why they could not prove
felony murder and Kim T did not have a good answer [NOTE: I was quite worried
about Kim's confidence]

•

Reference to "weekly love letters" they [I believe "they"
"they" is a reference to trial
counsell
counsel) sent to the prosecution to show them how their case suoks

•

Referencing AA,
AA. noting that he will plead to what he did, she [Angela] poured the
gasoline, would plead to conspiracy to arson

•

References to problems with the State's lab. They still need an expert to attack the
lab. Many things they are stili trying to get. [It appears I may have suggested a

motion to continue]

8/21/2009
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3.

Undated TC conversation with Mitch Toryanski (date can be approximated post jury verdict
for death sentence, but prior to formal sentencing by judge)

•
•
•
•

•

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

~

Sentencing scheduled for 1/21/05
They (trial counsel?) scratched residual doubt because the jUdge
judge said the law was
well-settled (not mitigation)
Judge limited the scope of AA allocution
They were never told what happened; AA was never straight [NOTE: I believe this
was in response to a Question I always ask trial counsel, specifically, -did the client
you.,
ever confess to you.'
One area of investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not
sure what
What this references]
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SEP 0 t 2009

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B.
lS.B. # 4843

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By E. HOLMES
DEPUW
Di:PUW

MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. # 5888
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

IN THE DISTRICf COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlcr
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,

Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent..

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-003080
(formerly SPOTOS00308)
RESPONSE TO COURT
ORDER INQUIRING INTO
TRlAL
TIlE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
~OLVEMENTOFTHESAPD
INVOLVEMENT
OF THE SAPD
WITH TRIAL COUNSEL

(CAPITAL CASE)

Petitioner Azad Haji Abdullah, through his counsel at the Office of the State
Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), hereby provides this response to the Court's August
17, 2009 Order. In the order, this Court directed the parties to address the following
issues: (1) the potential impact of any pretrial and trial involvement the SAPD had with
trial counsel; (2) whether the SAPD's past involvement creates a current a conflict of
interest; (3) the extent of the SAPD's involvement; and (4) whether the SAPD's pretrial
and trial involvc::ment with trial counsel makes members ofthe
of the SAPD potential witnesses.
Each issue identified by the Court will be evaluated in light of the following summary of
the relevant law governing conflicts of interests.
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
1
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRlAL COUNSEL
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1.
RELEVANT LAW
A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free representation.
~ 2009 WL 1492659 *4 (Idaho Supreme Court May
See State v. Severson, _ . P.3d -----J

29, 2009), citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981); State v. Lovelace, 140
Idaho 53,60,90 P.3d 285 (2003), citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932); see

also State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 184, 171 P.3d 128-2 (Ct. App. 2007). Although- Idaho
appellate courts have recognized a statutory right to post-conviction counsel with respect
to non-frivolous claims, our courts have yet to recognize a constitutionally grounded right
to appointed counsel in post-conviction proceedings. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho
789,793,
102P.2d 1108, 1112(2004);Plantv.State, 143 Idaho 758, 761,152P.3d
761, 152P.3d 629,
789, 793,102P.2d
632 (ClApp.
(Ct.App. 2006); see also I.C. §19-852(b); I.C. §19-4904. In the absence of a
constitutional right to post-conviction counsel, Idaho appellate courts nevertheless
recognize a petitioner's constitutional right to conflict-free representation With respect to
post-conviction counsel. See Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 289-290, 17 P.3d 230, 233- .
234 (2000) ("Because these facts do not identify a conflict other than the one related to
the trial, they also fail to support the claim of ineffectiveness of appellate/post-conviction
counsel as a result of a conflict of interest,"
interest." (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S 335, 347
(1980))).
The salient issue in conflict of interest cases is whether the interests of counsel
conflict with his or her client's interests, thereby compromising counsel's duty ofloyalty.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 692 (1984) (recognizing that counsel laboring
under an actual conflict of interest breaches the duty of loyalty to his or her client, which

RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL
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is "perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties."). "An 'actual conflict,' for Sixth
Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's
performance." Mickens v. Tay/or,
Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 n.5 (2002).

In Idaho, counsel has a duty to "act with commitment and dedication to the
the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behal£"
behalf" (Idaho Ru1es of
interests of
ofthe
Professional Conduct, Ru1e 1.3 (commentary).)

Consistent with counsel's duty of

zealous advocacy, counsel has an ethical duty not to represent a client if that
representation ''will be materially limited by a lawyer's responsibilities to another client,
a former client or a third person or by the personal interests of the lawyer...."
lawyer...." I.R.P.C.
1.7(a)(2).'
1.7(a)(2).1 Trial courts generally rely on defense counsel's good faith and good judgment
to detennine, both professionally and ethically, whether a conflict of interest exists or

will likely develop in the course of trial. Cuyler, 466 U.S. at· 347 ("[TJrial courts
necessarily rely in large measure upon the good faith and good judgment of defense
..counseL").
counseL").
Based on established conflict of interest rules and precedent, even if orie attorney
in the SAPD office were found to labor under a conflict of interest based on prior contact
with trial counsel, that conflict cannot be imputed to the entire SAPD office. See
Severson, 2009 WL 1492659 at *7-8 (pursuant to Rules of Professional Conduct

governing conflicts of interest, public defender offices are different from private law
firms, and conflict of one public defender cannot be imputed to public defender office).
Rather, whether an individual public defender's conflict should be imputed to an entire
I Other potential conflicts of interest not implicated here or by the Court's order include
those outlined in Ruie 1.8 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, and generally
involve financial, property, or business interests. See 1.R.P.C.
I.R.P.C. 1.8.

RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL
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public defender office is analyzed on a case-by-case basis, in light of whether the
circumstances demonstrate a potential conflict of interest and a significant likelihood of
prejudice to the client. Id at *7~ Only if the facts demonstrate both a potential conflict of
interest and a significant likelihood of prejudice will a conflict be imputed from an
individual public defender to an entire public defender's office. Id Even if such a
conflict exists, however, a client can waive the conflict through informed consent.Idat
*6.
In addition to potential and actual conflicts of interest arising from a lawyer's

active representation of competing interests, a conflict may arise where a lawyer must act
as an advocate in a trial in which the lawyer "is [also] likely to be a necessary witness."

See LR.P.C. 3.7 (emphasis added). This Rule generally prohibits a lawyer from acting as
both an advocate and witness in the same proceeding unless: (1) the lawyer's testimony
involves an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony goes to the nature and value of legal
services provided in the case; or (3) disqualification would work substantial hardship on
the client. LR.P.C.3.7(a).

II.
TIlE SAPD'S MINIMAL PRETRIAL. TRIAL AND POST-TRIAL CONTACT WITH
TIIE TORY
ANSKIS DOES NOT CREATE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST
TORYANSKIS
There is nothing about the SAPD's unsolicited and minimal pretrial, trial and
post-trial contact with the Toryanskis that would give rise to a potential or actual conflict
of interest between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD. In addition to the infrequency of such
contact, most (if not all) contact was initiated by the Toryanskis. The SAPD's limited
responses included referring trial counsel to well-established case law and directing
counsel to follow existing legal standards. Significantly, the limited advice given to trial
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
INVOLVEMENT OF TIlE SAPD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL
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counsel by the SAPD is not the basis of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
raised by Mr. Abdullah.
Most notably, during her deposition, Ms. Toryanski testified about the limited

nature and scope of her discussions with Mr. Ackley during the course of representing

Mr. Abdullah.
[MR. ACKLEY]. Okay. I will go on with the similar questions that I
rm
asked with the other attorneys even though they may seem silly. I'm
sorry. But did you ever pay me at aU to, like, help represent you in
this case?
TORYANSKl]. No, no, no.
[MS. TORYANSKl].
Q. Okay. Did you ever ask me to talk to Azad?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Did you ever give me any discovery?
A. No.

Q. Okay. Are there any other attorneys that you recall speaking to at all
about this case? We have gone through Chuck Peterson, Dennis
Benjamin, Teresa Hampton, David Leroy, David Nevin, Joan Fisher, and
tnysel£
.
myself.

Q.
. . I'm trying to draw a distinction between, like, casual
. conversations, running into the hall, popping an idea off of someone
versus like, "Let's sit down and really 8t;rategize
strategize and give me some advice
how to proceed." So with those two things in niind, where would you put
Oennis Benjamin?
A. Oh, he's at the top.
Q. Okay. And that was primarily limited to the death penalty motions?
A. That's correct.
.
Q. And Chuck Peterson?
A. Chuck. Where on the spectrum?
Q. In terms of someone that you relied upon to assist you in your
representation of Azad.
A. I didn't rely on Chuck at all.
Q. Okay. That's fine. I'm just trying to go through. Teresa Hampton?
A. She helped in the way that I have already described.
ofjury selection?
Q. SO in the limited fashion ofjury

RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO TIlE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL
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A. And talking to a client about a possible plea, about the plea that had
been offered.
Q. David Leroy?
A. Same as Teresa Hampton.
Q. David Nevin?
A. Slightly more. He's slightly before Chuck Peterson on the scale, but
David didn't help.
Q. Okay. Joan Fisher?
A. Where is she on the scale?
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Way at the bottom.
Q. Myself?
A. At the bottom.
Q. I'm not taking it personally. rmjust trying to -- okay.
A. I don't even know if you are really on - I mean, we'd talked, but I
never really felt that you even were in on the chart.
Q. As far as you're aware, did I know anything about the case other
than what you were conveying to me in your conversation?
A. No.
L.13 - p.240, L.lO
L.10 (emphasis
(Addendum A, p.232, Ls.1-12; p.237, Ls.20-24; p.238, L.B
added).) Thus, trial counsels' discussions with the SAPD and its counsel were minimal at
best. To the extent any legal advice was even arguably conveyed, it was necessarily
limited given the SAPD's lack of knowledge and involvement in the case. (Addendum A,
p.232, Ls.7-12 ("Q. Okay. Did you ever ask me to talk to Azad? A. No. Q. Okay. Did
you ever give me any discovery? A. No."); p.240, Ls.7-10 ("Q. As far as you're aware,
did I know anything about the case other than what you were conveying to me in your
conversation? A. No.").) Further, Ms. Toryanski indicated that she did not rely on any
advice from the SAPD in the course of representing Mr. Abdullah. See generally
Addendum A.

Similarly, Mr. Abdullah has not alleged any claim of ineffective

RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING
INQU1RING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL
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cOl.UlSe1 that would be inconsistent with any advice arguably given by the
assistance of cOl.UlSel
SAPO or its counsel.2
SAPD

A. The Minimal Unsolicited Contact Between The SAPD And The Toryanskis Is
Insufficient To Give Rise To A Potential Or Actual Conflict Of Interest
SAPO and the Toryanskis
Toryanslcis gives
No pretria4 trial or post-trial contact between the SAPD

rise to a potential or actual conflict of interest between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD.
Such contacts were minimal, and do not form the basis of any claims that Mr. Abdullah
has raised regarding the ineffective assistance of his counsel. The Toryanskis contacted

the SAPD office on a handful of occasions during their pretrial, trial, and post-trial
representation of Mr.

Abdullah~
AbdulIah~

The majority of this contact occurred via email, and was

DUDIl, with
initiated by the Toryanskis. (See Emails from Mark Ackley to Shawna Dunn,

attached documents, containing actual emails exchanged between the Toryanskis and the
SAPD,
SAPO, as well as summaries of other contacts between the Toryanskis and the SAPD,
attached hereto as Addendum B.) Exhibits to Kim Toryanski's deposition include emails
between the SAPD office and Kim Toryanski,
ToryansIci, and are generally representative of the
limited contact between the SAPD and trial counsel. (See Addendum A.)
1. September 9, 2004 Email- Deposition Exhibit 9
During her deposition, Kim Toryanski acknowledged that Mr. Ackley's email to

her, dated September 9, 2004, was

'~robably
'~robably

responding to me even though the e-mail

starts with a communication from you, apparently."
apparently." (Addendum 3, p.227, Ls.2-17 &

Even ifthis
if this were the case, which it is not, then it would still not, in and of itself, create a
conflict of interest. Trial counsels' decisions and performance are at issue; in short,
advice or comments from outside lawyers did not and could not relieve trial counsel from
their independent, personal and professional obligations under the Sixth Amendment.
2

RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO TIlE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
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Exhibit 9.)

email.Mr.
In that email,
Mr. Ackley infonned Ms. Toryanski that it had come to his

attention that she and her co-counsel, Mitch Toryanski, were asking prospective jurors
questions about mitigating evidence and in doing so, were asking the legally incorrect
question. (Addendum 3, p.227.
pol27. L.14 - p.228, L.16 & Exhibit 9.) Mr. Ackley directed
ToryansIci to relevant case .law
Jaw for the governing legal standard in questioning
Ms. Toryanski
prospective jurors about mitigating evidence.
evidence, which Ms. Toryanski acknowledged she
p.227.
and Mr. Toryanski were applying incorrectly dmingjwy selection. (Addendum 3, p.227,
deposition. Ms. Toryanski did not dispute
L.14 - pol28,
p.228, L.I8 & Exhibit 9.) During her deposition,
L.2 - p.228.L.I8.)
3. p.227, Lol
the authenticity or authorship of this email. (Addendum 3,
2. September 15, 2004 Email- De,position Exhibit 10

On September 15, 2004, Ms. Toryanski sent an email to Mr. Ackley in which she
discussed the following issues: (1) plea negotiations in Mr. Abdullah's case and her belief
that aa plea offer had been made; (2) Mr. Abdullah's insistence on testifying despite being
informed that counsel would not put him on the stand; (3) conflicts between trial counsel
and Mr. Abdullah due to Mr. Abdullah's refusal to plead guilty despite trial counsel
putting tremendous pressure on him to do so; (4) conflicts between trial counsel and
Mr. Abdullah and his increasing unwillingness to follow trial counsels' advice; and (5)
Ms. Toryans]ci's
Toryanski's feelings about the prospective jury panel and their inclination to impose
the death penalty in Mr. Abdullah's case. (Addendum 3, Exhibit 10.)

During her

deposition.
deposition, Ms. Toryanski did not dispute the authenticity or authorship of this email, and
did not deny that it contained her feelings about Mr. Abdullah and his case at the time it

was written. (Addendum 3, p.230, L.IO -p.23t,
-p.231, L.25.)
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3. Other Commwrications
Toryanslci also discussed other emails and telephone conversations that she
Ms. Toryanski

and Mr. Toryanski had with the SAPO through Mr. Ackley and Molly Huskey.
L.l3- p.237, L.19.) Ms. Toryanski identified the following issues
(Addendum 3, p.232, L.13-

as having been discussed in those emails and conversations: (1) the affair between the
prosecutor and the lead detective;. (2) whether to move to recuse Judge Copsey;
(3) Ms. Toryanski's inclination to request a continuance; and (4) issues arising post- .

verdict, but prior to judicial sentencing on the non-death eligible offenses. (Addendum 3,
L.13 -p.237, L.l9.)
L.19.)
p.232, L.t3

Beyond these communications identified by Ms. Toryanski, the Toryanskis also
faxed. orders to Molly Huskey and requested advice as to whether permissive appeals
from this Court's adverse rulings would be appropriate, and further faxed motions and
memoranda challenging the constitutionality ofthe
of the then new death penalty statute, which
trial counsel had filed with this Court. (See Addendum

~.)

There were a handful of

additional communications initiated by the Toryanskis with the SAPO, involving
primarily procedural matters post-jury verdict.
The State, through Shawna Dunn and Roger Bourne, was provided with copies of

written communications between the Toryanskis and the SAPO, in addition to summaries
of verbal communications initiated by the Toryanskis with the SAPO.

(See Addendum

B.) This infonnation was provided by the SAPO to Ms. Dunn and Mr. Bourne via email

over a month before depositions of Kim and Mitch Toryanski were conducted. Ms. Dunn .
was present for both depositions but declined to question either of the Toryanskis
regarding their contact with the SAPD office. (See Addendum 3, passim; Addendum 9
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
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(Deposition of Mitch Toryanski), passim.) In addition, the State has failed to raise any
concerns about a potential conflict between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah based on these
contacts. To the contrary, it is undersigned counsels' understanding that the State
evaluated this information and decided that no conflict between the SAPD and

Mr. Abdullah existed 3 1ms
lbis understanding is bolstered by the fact that the State has not
filed a motion regarding a potential conflict of interest, and presumably would have done
so if the communications between the SAPD and trial counsel·had
counsel· had raised the specter of a
conflict, potential or actual.
Given the nature of the contact between the SAPD and the Toryanskis, and the
fact that the Toryanskis have not contested the content and nature of the contacts with the
SAPD, it is difficult to see how a conflict of interest between the SAPD and

Mr. Abdullah could arise as a result of these communications and contacts. The SAPD
provided a receptive ear for trial counsels' concerns and frustrations during their
representation of Mr. Abdullah, which involved a minimal amount of interaction. The
SAPD gave limited advice to trial counsel, based both on observations of counsels'
failure to follow established legal standards and on trial cOWlSels' statements to the
SAPD regarding aspects of their representation of Mr. Abdullah. The SAPD remained
The Court ordered simultaneous briefing from the parties. Mr. Abdullah expects the
State to concur with his analysis. However, in the event the State alleges the existence of
a conflict in its briefing to this Co1lI"4
Court, such an allegation should be reviewed with extreme
("[T]be Government
cautions. See e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988) ("[T]he
may seek to 'manufacture' a conflict in order to prevent a defendant from having a
particularly able defense counsel at his side; [accordingly] trial courts...
courts ... must take it into
consideration along with all of the other factors which inform" a decision involving an
alleged conflict of interest.); Chapman Engineers v. Natural Gas Sales Co., 766 F.Supp.
949,954 (D.Kan. 1991) ("Motions to disqualify should be reviewed with extreme caution
for they can be misused as a technique 0 of harassment.") (internal quotations omitted).
if the State
Accordingly, Mr. Abdullah reserves the right to respond to the State's briefing ifthe
alleges a disqualifying conflict of interest.
3
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cognizant of the potential for a conflict of interest that could possibly arise if the SAPD
were to provide in-depth, frequent and detailed advice to trial counsel throughout their
representation of Mr. Abdullah, and therefore, did not engage in any such involvement in

Mr. Abdullah's case.
There is nothing about the contacts between trial counsel and the SAPD,
particularly when viewed in light of the Final Petition, that gives rise to the inference that
the SAPD'sinterests, or those of Mr. Ackley or Ms. Huskey, conflict with

Mr. Abdullah's interests, or in any way compromise the SAPD's, Mr. Ackley's and/or
Ms. Huskey's duty of loyalty to Mr. Abdullah. To the contrary, the SAPD's efforts,
through Mr. Ackley and Ms. Huskey, to direct trial counsel to follow existing standards

and to raise relevant legal issues is consistent with Mr. Abdullah's interest in receiving a
fair trial. Moreover, nothing about the contact between the SAPD, through Mr. Ackley
and Ms. Huskey, and trial counsel, implicates the SAPD's commitment 8I;ld dedication to
the interests of Mr. Abdullah and zealous advocacy on his behalf, or materially limits the
Abdullah. 4
SAPD's representation of Mr. AbduUah.
Under these circumstances, given the nature of the limited and primarily
unsolicited contact between the SAPD and trial counsel, there is no inference of a
potential or actual conflict of interest between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah arising from
such contact. This is particularly true where trial counsel has not disputed the nature and

4 Notably, the SAPD has previously conducted an internal evaluation of whether a
potential or actual conflict of interest exists between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah, given
the SAPD's limited pretrial, trial, and post-trial contact with trial counsel. The SAPD's
internal evaluation, conducted in light of prevailing standards of practice and professional
conduct, resulted in the conclusion that no conflict of interest, potential or actual, exists.

TIffi PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO mE
11
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITII TRIAL COUNSEL

001636

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

content of their contacts with the SAPD, Mr. Ackley andlor Ms. Huskey,S and the State

has not alleged any concerns about such contacts. Simply put, the pretrial, trial and posttrial contact between trial counsel and the SAPD has not, does not, and cannot create
conflicting interests between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD. To the contrary, the nature
co\U1Sel and the SAPO supports Mr. Abdullah's
and content of contact between trial co\ll1Sel
claims that trial counsel were ineffective. Thus, there is no conflict of interest between
hact-with trial counsel pretrial,
Mr. Abdullah and the SAPO based on contacts the SAPO hactwith
during trial, and post-verdict.

Perhaps the more important question is whether the

SAPD's pretrial, trial and post-trial contact with trial counsel renders Mr. Ackley andlor
Ms. Huskey necessary witnesses at an evidentiary hearing, thereby creating a potential
conflict of interest.
B. The SAPD's Pretrial, Trial And Post-Trial Contact With Trial Counsel Does Not
Constitute A Conflict Of Interest Between The SAPO And Mr. Abdullah,
Abdullah. Even If
AndiOr Ms. Huskey Potential Witnesses At An
That Contact Renders Mr. Ackley And/Or
Evidentiary Hearing
.
The limited pretrial, trial and post-trial contact between the SAPD and trial
counsel does not render Mr. Ackley andlor Ms.
Ms, Huskey likely witnesses at an evidentiary
hearing, and thus does not constitute a conflict of interest or require disqualification of
andlor Ms. Huskey
the SAPD. Even assuming the limited contact between Mr. Ackley and/or
and trial counsel renders either or both likely necessary witnesses on Mr. Abdullah's
behalf at an evidentiary hearing, such status does not create a conflict of interest between
the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah.
S Indeed, it would be extremely troubling if trial coWlsel were able to create a conflict of
interest with appellate and/or post-conviction counsel by initiating unsolicited contact
with counsel andlor
and/or by disclosing information to such counsel which was otherWise
protected by the attorney-client privilege.
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In relevant part, Rule 3.7 of
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct precludes an
ofthe
attorney from acting as an "advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
necessary witness." LR.P.C. 3.7(a) (Emphasis added.) Despite this prohibition, Rule 3.7
recognizes three exceptions to the advocate-witness rule: (1) the lawyer's testimony
involves an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony goes to the nature and value of legal
services provided in the case; or (3) disqualification would work substantial hardship on
the client. LR.P.C. 3.7(a). The purpose of
the advocate-witness rule is to prevent the trier
ofthe
of fact from being "confused or misled by a lawyer serving as both advocate and
witness[,]" and to ensure that opposing counsel will not suffer prejudice resulting from
the lawyer's dual role before the jury. I.R.P.C. 3.7, commentary

m2,3.

1. The Advocate-Witness Rule Is Not Implicated In Proceedings Before A
Judge
Where, as here, the testimony of Mr. Ackley and/or
andlor Ms. Huskey would occur at a
hearing before a judge, rather than a trial before a jury, the possibility of confusion of
roles and prejudice to opposing counsel is non-existent. Moreover, Rule 3.7 explicitly
prohibits a lawyer from assuming a dual-role at trial, but does not prevent a lawyer from
pretrial participation in a case as both an advocate and witness. See, e.g., Roberts v. State,

840 SO.2d 962, 970 (Fla.2002) (holding that the purpose of advocate-witness rule, i.e., to
prevent prejudice to opposing counsel andlor
and/or avoid a conflict of interest, was not
implicated where the prosecutor was called as a rebuttal witness by the petitioner in a
post-conviction
Dyck, 827 A.2d
post-convietion evidentiary hearing before a judge); see also State v. Van Dyek,
192, 195 (N.H. 2003) ("Unlike ajury, ajudge
a judge is unlikely to confuse the roles of advocate
and witness or to deem an attorney credible simply because he is an attorney.'');
attorney."); cf.
Dimartino v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 66 P.3d 945,946
945.946 (Nev. 2003) (adopting the
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majority approach which does not require pretrial disqualification of an attorney who
may be called as a witness at trial). As a result, 1.R.P.C. 3.7 is not implicated where
testimony from attorneys at the SAPD, if offered, would not occur at a jury trial, but
would take place before a judge acting as a fact-finder.
AndiOr Ms. Huskey Are Not Likely To Be Necessary Witnesses
2. Mr. Ackley And/Or
Even assuming I.R.P.C. 3.7 is implicated at a proceeding where a judge is the

trier of fact rather than a jury, Rule 3.7 only applies if the lawyer is "likely to be

II

I.R.P.C. 3.7(a). At this point, Mr. Ackley and/or
andlor Ms. Huskey are
necessary witness." I.RP.C.
only implicated as potential witnesses in the event that trial counsel deny making
and/or Ms. Huskey which are relevant to Mr. Abdullah's poststatements to Mr. Ackley andlor
conviction claims for relief.
As previously noted, Ms. Toryanski has already acknowledged that she and cocounsel had a limited number of communications with the SAPD during the course of
their representation of Mr. Abdullah. With respect to the September 15,2004 email sent
by Ms. Toryanski to Mr. Ackley, Ms. Toryanski acknowledged writing the email and
admitted that it contained her feelings and thoughts at that time, both about Mr. Abdullah
and his case. (Addendum 3, p.228, L.19 - p.231, L.25.) If Ms. Toryanski recants her
. deposition testimony, such recantation would possibly render Mr. Ackley a necessary
fOf
witness if the recantation involves testimony relevant to one of Mr. Abdullah's claims for
post-conviction relief. However, the possibility of a need for the testimony of counsel,
however, is insufficient to meet the necessity or likely to be a ''necessary witness"
standard of Rule 3.7. See World Youth Day, Inc. v. Famous Artists, 866 F.Supp. 1297,
1302 (D.Colo. 1994); Fognan(v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268, 1272 (Colo. 2005) ("[O]pposing
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
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counsel cannot be disqualified on the basis of speculation or conjecture, and
disqualification can occur only after facts have been alleged that demonstrate a potential
violation of the Rule''); Van Dyck. 827 A.2d at 194 (witness is only necessary ifhis or her
testimony is relevant, material and cannot be obtained elsewhere); Bradford v. State, 734
So.2d 364, 369 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (''The necessity standard requires more than
mere speculation that counsel will be required to testify."). A lawyer is a necessary
witness ''if
"if his or her testimony is relevant, material and unobtainable elsewhere." .World

Youth Day, 866 F.Supp. at 1302. Where it is not clear whether an advocate's testimony
will be necessary, a court may delay ruling on a motion to disqualify until it can
determine whether another witness can testify. Id
The necessity for Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey to testify hinges on a sequence
of events unlikely to come to fruition. First, trial counsel must testify contrary to their

written and/or verbal communications with Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey.6 Second, the
verbal and/or written communications with the SAPD must be relevant. 7

Third,

Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey must be the only source for the relevant information.
Wh.ere, as here, there is a fair amount of evidence, including documents and deposition
confirming trial counsels' statements, the testimony of Mr. Ackley and/or
-testimony, confinning
Ms. Huskey would likely not be the only source for the relevant information. See

Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268, 1274 (Colo. 2005) (necessity requires consideration of
Of course, if trial cOWlSel ·offer testimony consistent with their verbal and written
communications with the SAPD, then there would be no need or occasion for Mr. Ackley
and/or Ms. Huskey to testify.
6

Because the relevance of testimony from Mr.- Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey cannot be
-determined until trial -counsel testify and until this Court detennines that the testimony
involves a genuine issue of material fact, the relevance inquiry cannot be adequately
addressed.
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
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the nature of the testimony, weight of the testimony in resolving the disputed issues, and
the availability of other witnesses or documentary evidence which might establish the

ct. App. 2004) ("To
relevant issues); State v. Schmitt, 102 P.3d 856, 859 (Wash. Ct.
demonstrate compelling circumstances [that would justify disqualification], a party must
show that the attorney will provide material evidence unobtainable elsewhere.'');
elsewhere."); Utley v.

City of Dover, 101 S.W.3d 191,202 (Ark. 2003) (declining to disqualify lawyer where
moving party faired to demonstrate lawyer's teStimony could not be gained from other
sources); Harter v. Plains Ins. Co., 579 N.W.2d 625, 632 (S.D. 1998) Oawyer not a
necessary witness where documentary evidence on subject of lawyer's intended
testimony admitted into evidence at trial). As a result, Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey
would not be necessary witnesses because the evidence gained from their testimony could
be obtained from other sources.

3. Disqualification Of The SAPD Would Cause Substantial Hardship To
Mr. Abdullah
Finally, assuming that Mr. Ackley and/or Ms..
Ms .. Huskey would otherwise be
necessary witnesses, such status would not necessarily disqualify the SAPD from
representing Mr. Abdullah if such "disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial
client." I.R.P.C 3.7(a)(3). Even if a lawyer will act as both an advocate
hardship on the client."
and witness in the. same proceeding, and this dual role may prejudice opposing counsel,
"in detennining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must 1:?e
l:?e given to
client."
the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client."

I.R.P.C. 3.7, cmt.

',4.4.

Thus,

substantial hardship involves consideration of inter alia the length of the attorney's
representation of the client, closeness of the trial to the request to disqualify, the amount
and type of legal work already conducted by counsel, the financial burden of retaining
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new counsel, and the client's right to choice of counsel. 8 Nat 'I Union Fire Ins. Co. v. L.E.

Myers Co. Group, 937 F.Supp. 279, 280-281 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (substantial hardship
where law finn represented client for twelve years, case was a month away from trial,
counsel bad done significant amount of substantive work on case, client would be denied
choice of counsel and client would suffer financial burden); D.J. Inv. Group, L.L.C. v.

DAElWestbrook,
DAE/Westbrook, L.L.C., 113 P.3d 1022, 1023-1024 (Utah Ct. App. 200S) (substantial
hardship existed where case had been pending for 3 years, parties litigated nmnerous
complex legal issues, nearly all witnesses had been disposed, and parties had exchanged
written discovery).
Here, the SAPD has represented Mr. Abdullah since 2005. Specifically,
Mr. Ackley has personally represented Mr. Abdullah since late 2006 and Ms. Huskey has
been the SAPD during the entirety of Mr. Abdullah's post-conviction case. Mr. Ackley is
lead counsel for Mr. Abdullah and is on the Idaho Supreme Court's roster of capital

The importance of the attorney-client relationship is sacrosanct in American
jurisprudence. It is fundamental, that once the attorney client relationship is formed, "a
distinct set of constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attomey
attomeyclient relationship takes effect." Patterson v. illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290 n.3 {l988)(citing
(1988)(citing
include the
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)). The constitutional safeguards
safeguardsinc1ude
Sixth Amendment guarantee that the accused has the right to rely on counsel and
"imposes on the State an affinnative obligation to respect and preserve the accused's
''imposes
choice to seek [that] assistance." Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171. Once appointed counsel
has established an attorney-client relationship with an indigent defendant, that
..relationship
relationship is no less inviolate than if counsel bad been retained. See Morris v.
Slappy, . 461 U.S. 1, 22-23 & n. 5 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in result)
("considerations that may preclude recognition of an indigent defendant's right to choose
his own counsel ... should not preclude recognition of an indigent defendant's interest in
continued representation by an appointed attorney with whom he has developed a
re1ationslJip of trust and confidence"); Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216, 222 (rex.
relationsPip
Cr.App. 1989X"Once counsel has been validly appointed to represent an indigent
defendant and the parties enter into an attorney-client relationship it is ·no less inviolate
than if counsel is retained.").
8
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defense counsel. After extensive litigation and review of an extraordinary number of
documents
..Mr. Abdullah's case is finally proceeding to an evidentiary hearing which, in
documents..Mr.
the world of post-conviction,
post-eonviction, is the functional'
functional" equivalent of a trial. The amount of time
that new counsel would need not only to get up to speed in Mr. Abdullah's case, but also
to establish a meaningful and trusting relationship with Mr. Abdullah, while difficult to
assess is obviously great.
Because disqualification of the SAPD and Mr. Ackley specifically, would result
in a substantial hardship to Mr. Abdullah, Rule 3.7 does not require disqualification even
assuming Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are necessary witnesses. If Mr. Ackley and/or
Ms. Huskey are likely, necessary witnesses and the court concludes no substantial
hardship would result from disqualifying the SAPD office, based on established conflict
of interest rules and precedent, even if some attorneys in the SAPD office are found to
labor under a conflict of interest because they are necessary witnesses, that conflict
cannot be imputed to the entire SAPD office. See Severson, 2009 WL 1492659 at *7-8
(pursuant to Rules of Professional Conduct governing conflicts of interest, public
defender offices are different from private law firms, and conflict of one public defender
cannot be imputed to public defender office). Rather, whether an individual public
,.defender's
defender's conflict should be imputed to an entire public defender office is analyzed on a
case-by-case basis, in light of whether the circumstances demonstrate a potential conflict
of interest and a significant likelihood of prejudice. [d.
Id. at *7.

Only if the facts

demonstrate both a potential conflict of interest as well as a significant likelihood of
prejudice will a conflict be imputed from one public defender to an entire public
defender's office. Id.

RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
18
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL
001643

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Here, as previously analyzed, there is neither an actual nor a potential conflict of
interest arising from the SAPO's contact with trial counsel. Even assuming a potential
conflict based on that contact, and presuming Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are
necessary witnesses based on that contact, there is no significant likelihood of prejudice
which would justify imputing the conflict to entire SAPO office. Any testimony that

postwould be offered by Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey regarding their pretrial, trial or post
trial contact with trial counsel wotild selVe only to support Mr. Abdullah's claims. The
only possible "significant likelihood of prejudice" would be if this Court were
predisposed to disregard the testimony of Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey, simply because
they are attorneys for Mr. Abdullah.

This possibility aside, there is no significant

likelihood of prejudice that would justify disqualifying the entire SAPO office.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the SAPO's pretrial, trial and post-verdict contact
with trial counsel does not create a conflict of interest and does not render Mr. Ackley
and/or Ms. Huskey necessary Witnesses at Mr. Abdullah's evidentiary hearing. Assuming

arguendo Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are necessary witnesses, disqualification of the
SAPO would result in a substantial- hardship to Mr. Abdullah. Finally, even if this Court
were to conclude that no substantial hardship would result from the disqualification of
Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey, there is no significant likelihood of prejudice that would
justify disql,la1ifying
disql,Ullifying the entire SAPD office.
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September, 2009.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of September.

U XilLLO·
NICdiE OWENS
Co-counsel
Co-eounsel for Mr. Abdullah
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have, on this 1st day of SePtember, 2009, served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING
INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL INVOLVEMENT OF TIlE SAPD WITH 1RIAL
COUNSEL as indicated below:
SHAWNADUNN
ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUIlE 3191
BOISE ill
ID 83702

u.s. Mail
_ _ Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery

AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH

~U.S.Mail
-.L..U.S. Mail

INMATE #76321
IMSI - J BLOCK

Statehouse Mail
_ _ Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

PO BOX51
BOISE ill
ID 83707

~
Administrative Assistant

Capital Litigation Unit
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Abdullah v. State of Idaho

Kim W. Toryanski

6/19/2008

Page 226 ~1

Q.

1

BY MR. ACKLEY:

Beyond Joan Fisher and

2

the other attorneys that you spoke to in varying

3

degrees in this case, did you also contact me on

4

occasion?
Yeah, because you and II had met at a

A.

5

conference,

7

And also Dennis Benjamin was referring to you.

8

was just reminded of that in an e-mail that you

9

had shown me as an exhibit here. I mean, Dennis,
he would call you guys M and M, Molly and Mark.

10

I

think.

Litigating for Life, maybe?

6

I

11

You know, "What do Molly and Mark say?"

12

Okay. And I am going to show you
what's been marked as Petitioner's Exhibit 9 and

13

14

Q•

10?

15

That's okay.

i

These are e-mails.

16

Exhibit 9 is dated -- this is e-mails from me to

17

you.

~8

was after the jury selection had commenced.
Exhibit 10 is also an e-mail from me to you, and·

19
20

23
24

25

Exhibit 9 is dated September 10, 2004.

This

it's dated September 15th, 2004, five days later.

21
22

i

~

Sorry about the coloring on that.
A.

I

Q.

And the first one, what was the date on

that, again?

.

A.

I'm sorry.

.

J.s September.
September -- 9 is

Exhibit 9

is
J.s September 10.
10 .
Q.

That was after jury selection?
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1

A.

Had begun.

2

Q.

Okay.

3
4

And were there questions?

Was

there a discussion, then, about jury selection

!
~

~
~

there?

~~

:I

5
6

7'
7"

A.

Let's see.

Maybe this is an e-mail

from you to me in which I respond because of, "As

S

~~

~

~

iI1
~

I noted yesterday."

You're probably responding to

!

8

me even though the e-mail starts with a

9

communication from you, apparently.

10

Q.

I

Yeah, there are multiple e-mails

11

actually reflected in that document; is that

12

right?

13

.".,,
i

A.

Uh-huh.

14

Q.

So just start with the earliest one.

15

A.

Okay.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

A.

Then you're writing to me.

F.P.

F

Which is September 9.
You're

18

telling me that Kimberly Simmons and the

19

mitigation specialist, Shelley Hill observed a

20

portion of yesterday'S
yesterday's jury selection.

21

that there was some contention regarding questions

22

to prospective jurors regarding whether mitigating

23

facts would matter to them, as worded by the

24

defense, or whether they could just simply

25

consider mitigating facts if instructed by the
Tucker and Associates., Boise, Idaho,
www.etucker.net
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~

court as worded by the judge.

2

versus Johnson dealt with jury instructions on

3

mitigation at close of the case.

4

relevant portion that may have application for you.
you .

5

during jury selection.

6

7
8
9

The case of Penry

There is a

-And then you recited -

Q.

-- some of the language from the Penry

A.

Yes.

cases?
helps us a lot.

And then I say, Yes, Mark this
And welve been intending to ask

~o

-the mitigation questions using the words weight -

1~

give weight and value to mitigation evidence and
then give examples of our mitigation facts. But

12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21

..
I

Iii

I
i
~

I

as Shelley and Kim have observed, we are forming
the questions with the word consider, and we need I
to fix that. Weill
WeIll work on correcting that today.
It will be a long day.
Q.

Okay.

So those string of e-mails have

to deal with jury selection type questions?
A.

Oh, yes.

And then the September 15th

one, just like youlve
you've indicated -
-- oh, it's again
responding to that same e-mail about the

22

observations, plea negotiations with the

23

prosecutor's office have progressed anq we were

24

told that they would accept them -
-- Oh, okay.

25

j

Q.

Could you continue reading that?

Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho, (208) 345-3704
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1

A.

2

dismiss all other five charges, arson, three

3

counts of attempted murder, child endangerment

4

with no aggravators.

5

that were presented at sentencing.

6

are going to the mat

Q.

7
8

10

A.

14
15

Of course, we

Could you slow down for the court

Ii
~

Oh, okay.

You're here.

I forgot about:
about :

that.

11
12

And there were aggravators

reporter?

9

13

One count of first degree murder,

MR. ACKLEY:

Do we need to start over on

that?
THE REPORTER:

Yeah, when you say could

continue reading that.
THE WITNESS:

Dismiss all other five

~6

charges, parentheses, arson, three counts of

~7

attempted murder, child endangerment.

18

aggravators will be presented at sentencing.

19

course, we are going to the mat wrestling with our

20

client to take the deal.

21

resisting.

22

on him to take the deal.

23

Our attorney/client relationship is being affected

24

because of this.

25

that we are encouraging a plea.

And no
Of

Unbelievably he's

Day by day we're putting more pressure
He continues to resist.

He has become hostile and angry
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~,
I
to support his decision not to take a plea. That
relationship is being affected too.
I
Want me to read the whole thing?
.
BY MR. ACKLEY: Yes, please.
Q.
I
.
The deal closes the day we begin to
A.
~
exercise our peremptory challenges in jury
I
selection. We expect that to be next Tuesday or
I
Wednesday. After that the prosecution goes into
overdrive to bury our client.
I
Q.
Does that seem to be an accurate
reflection of how you were feeling at the time?
I
What's the date on that one? September 10th?
A.
15th.
I
Q.
15th. So jury selection began,
I
think, on the 7th, and my notes reflect that the
record says that the state's case-in-chief started
I
on the 27th.
So basically there is 20 days. Not
all those dates, obviously, were jury selection,
I
but there is a 20-day span there. You are about
halfway through at that point?
I
A.
Yep.
I
Q.
SO at that point, at least at that
time, you felt like your attorney/client
I
relationship was suffering because of these
discussions about the plea bargain?
I
I .. Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho, (208) 345-3704
www.etucker.net
I
230 ~~
Page 230

~

1

[

~
~~

2

~i~

~
~

3

~

4

~

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

I

15

16

17
18

19

20

21

22

23
24

25

106e858f-eb42-42fO-851c-95ad003921e8
106e858f-eb42-42fO-851e-95ad003921e8

001652

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Abdullah v. State of Idaho

6/19/2008

Kim W. Toryanski
Page 231

1l.

A.

I am writing that that's how I feel.

2

Q.

Okay.

So is it fair say -- I mean,

3

obviously the passage of time does affect people's

4

memory.

5

earlier today about the relationship in light of

6

your e-mail?
A.

7

8

wasn~t
wasn~t

10

Q.

And he was becoming hostile with you?

A.

I think he was angry that we kept

12

thing.

And -- but ...
Q.
Q.

And you were increasing pressure on him

A.

Well, by just continuing to ask him and

have different approaches to it.

17

so strongly that this was in his best interest.

18

And I fretted that that young man would get the

19

death penalty.

20

Q.

But I just felt

But I am just trying to establish

21

whether that seems to be consistent with how you

22

felt at that time back then.
A.

I
i=

to take the deal?

16

23

,

doing what

wanting to -- you know, keep revisiting the same

lS

i

~

,

l.l.
11

l.4
14

~

~;

I thought was in his own best interest.

9

13

~

~

Would you supplement your testimony

Well, I just --Azad

!

Oh, yes.

Oh, yeah.

I mean, he didn l t

24

like the fact that, you know, I guess we kept

25

coming back with it.
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1

Q.

Okay.

I will go on with the similar

2

questions that I asked with the other attorneys

3

even though they may seem silly.

4

did you ever pay me at all to, like, help

5

represent you in this case?

6

A.

No, no, no.

7

Q.

Okay.

A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

8

9

10
11
12
13

I'm sorry.

But

Did you ever ask me to talk to

Azad?
Did you ever give me any

discovery?
A.

Q.

No.

.,

Beyond these two contacts, can you

i

14

think of any other significant contacts that you

15

had with me during the course of your entire

16

representation?

17

A.

I think we had some e-mails.

There was

18

more e-mails.

19

because I -- you and Molly and I talked on the

20

phone about the relationship with the prosecutor,

21

Erika Klein, had had with Littlefield.

22

really appreciated the time you took to talk with

23

me because you validated my concerns.

24

really wasn't getting that from a lot of defense

25
25

counsel.

There is a little bit more e-mail

And I
And I

Because I had asked Chuck what he
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1

thought, Chuck Peterson.

He bounced down to my

~

And Teresa, you 1~

2

office and I mentioned it to him.

3

know sort of -- Teresa Hampton, she was aware of

4

it.

5

others that other defense counsel thought it was

6

as big a deal as I

7

Molly saw -- seemed to see something that had a

I

~

i
~

i

didn't get the perception from talking to
thought it was.

But you and

i.
;

5

8

definite impact on the integrity of the case.

9

that was valuable to me in moving forward, how I

10

And

decided to move forward.

11

Q.

Do you recall whether it was a matter,

12

like, saying that there was definitely an impact

13

or something that should be investigated?

14

A.

Something that should be investigated.

15 .

Q.

Do you recall whether you informed us

16

that the judge had given you leave to depose

17

them

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

--

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Didnlt
donlt know if
Didn't this, also -- I don't

and do the further investigation?

22

this is reflected in the telephone conversation or

23

If I
not, but do you recall the judge ever saying, "I

24

am going to look at personnel files now"
now n -
--

25

A.

Yes.
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1

Q.

-- "of all the police officers"?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

And in your memory,
memory do you recall
I

4

whether it was reflected on the record or

5

otherwise pretty much implicit that the judge was

6

going to look at these personnel files of all

7

officers because of this issue with Erika Klein

8

and Todd Littlefield had come forward?

9

10

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did those go kind of hand in hand?

~

I•
§

II

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

And you said other e-mails between us,

~~

i

13

but then you went directly to that telephone call. -

14

So that would have been a telephone conversation

15

as opposed to e-mail correspondence, the

16

discussion you just referenced about Todd

17

Littlefield and Erika Klein affair?

18

A.

Right.

19

Q.

Do you recall, has the state or the

20

prosecution shown any kind of summary of that

21

conversation at all?"
all?

22

23
24

25
25

A.
maybe.

I think I saw an exhibit on that,
I think so.

Q.

But something that kind of outlined the

topics of discussion?

Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho,
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I
A.
Yeah.
Q.
Okay. All right. And beyond those
I
I
three contacts, do you recall any other
significant contacts during the scope of your
I
representation?
I
A.
Well, just, it may be part of those
contacts, or it might be, you know, something
I
additional, additional e-mail.
can't remember,
but recusing the judge was an issue that was
I
discussed.
.
Okay.
Q.
I
I
A.
And
wasn't -was not inclined to
~
I
move to recuse the judge. But there was a
just I
I~
a discussion of the pros and cons of that. And
j
I
think
think there was e-mail about that because
was leaning towards
that
had let you know
I
hadn't prepared
moving for a continuance. But
anything yet.
I
Q.
Can you remember whether an e-mail
I
exists or not impacted by the fact that you had
apparently seen some sort of summary?
I
A.
Yes, it could. Which is one of the
reasons why I have tried not to look at all these
I
affidavits because I don't want to be colored by
those kinds of things.
I
I Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho, (208) 345-3704
www.etucker.net
I
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.
~

~

2

But the state provided you kind of

Q.

these e-mails or documents?

tha t are part of .
They are just exhibits that

A.

3

~

the petition, or something, that I have seen.

5

or two.

6

think there may have been something, I think so,

7

in just an exhibit to an affidavit that has been

8

prepared.

9

10
11

I mean, I have worked with Shawna, and I

Q.

Do you have that, what was given to

A.

No, huh-uh.

But I do have what was

13

attachments in here.

14

affidavits.
Q.

And there are

But mostly it's the

SO you saw these exhibits, as you've

16

described them, as attached to some sort of

17

affidavit?
A.

I can't remember what they were

19

att"ached to or -- it was just -
-- they were
attached

20

numbered.

21

had had a conversation.

22

23
24

25

!

you?
these exhibits (indicating).

15

i

I can't remember.

12

18

One ~

4

Q•

I looked at it, and I recall that we
Okay.

And beyond that, do you recall

any other contact with me?
A.

Not during all this.

We talked at the

end, I think, during the spring before Azad was
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1

sentenced on the other charges.

2

Kimberly had come to the courtroom.

3

may have chatted then.

4

a couple times, II remember that.

5

was a motion -- or excuse me -- an order, a

6

lengthy order that we had been handed by the

7

judge's
jUdge's courtroom deputy, deputy clerk.

8

lengthy, and was concerning something that had

9

been argued quite a while ago.

I think you and
II

think we

You came to the courtroom
II

~
n
,~

I

It was

And we just had

that that was interesting, the timing of it.

12

that's all I can really remember.

But

So most of the contact was either

14

during this as reflected here, or later after he's

15

already been sentenced to death?

16

A.

Yes, I believe.

17

Q.

But before sentenced on the other

non-capital charges by the judge?

19

A.

Yeah, I think so.

20

Q.

Okay.

Are there any other attorneys

21

that you recall speaking to at all about this

22

case?

23

Benjamin,.Teresa Hampton, David Leroy, David

24

Nevin, Joan Fisher, and myself.

25

~

~

11

18

~

~

recently gotten it, and II remember we had thought

Q.

!~

;

there,I
remember there

10

13

,.<
~

We have gone through Chuck Peterson, Dennis

A.

Consulting with, you mean?
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Mark Ackley
From:
.. Sent:
To:

Kim W. Toryansl<i
Toryans1<i [kim@toryanski.comj
[kim@toryanski.com]
Frjday.,
.September 10, 2004 6:45 AM
Frjday.•.September
Mark Ackley

SUbJect: RE: Penry v. Johnson
Subject:

Yes, Mark, this helps us a Jot We have been intending to be asking the mitigation que9lWns using the words,
"give weight and value" to mitigation evidence, and then give examples of our mitigation facts, but, as Shelley and
Kim bave observed, we are forming the questions with the word "consider" and we need to 1ix that We'll work on
correcting that today.
Today will be a long day- we start questioning at 9:00 and wiIlfiraish at 5:00,
5;00, but at leasUoday we get lunch.
Copsey even needs to be rsminded that we need bathroom breaks.
I'm so glad Shelley and Kim are In the courtroom - will you be able to stop by today?
Kim
---Original Message-Message-
From: Mark Ackley [mallto:mackley@sapd.state.id.us]
Sent: Thursday, September
september 09,20044:17 PM
To: kim@toryanskl.com
SUbject: Penry v. Johnson

Kim,
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation
specialist.
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection.
Kim noted that there was some content~on
content~on regarding questions to prospective
jurors regard~ng
regard~ng whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by
the defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if
instructed by the Court (as worded by the jUdge).
judge). The case of Penry v.
Johnson, 532 O.S. 782, 797 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application
for you during jury selection:
l'E'en.t;Y
"udtigating .eiirCU2lJ.Stanoes"
.eii:rCU2lJ.Stanoes" to a
l\E'en.r;y I d.1.d not hol.d
ho.1.d that the IIISre
IIlQre mention of "mi.tigating
oapitaJ.
jury satisfies the Ei.ghth
it stand
oapita.J. senten.eing j\.1%1"
Eighth Amendment. Nor does i1:

tha1: ~t
j,1: is consti1:utionaJ.l.y
for the proposition that
oonstitutio~1y suffioient 1:0
to
inform the jury that
t may "oonsider"
mi.tiqatinq oiroums1:ances
oiroumstances
tha1: i
i1:
"consider" mi.1:igating
:in deciding 'the appropriate sentenoe. Rather, the key under Penry
penry
I is that the jury be a1l1e
to "consider
nconsider and give effect;
effect 1;0 [a
Ca
aP1e 1:0
defendant; ', s m:L t:!gat:.1.ngJ
t:!gat:.1.ng] ev:!denoe :Ln imposing sentence. " 4192 u.
defendant
U. s. ,
at 319, IDS S.C~.
a~so Johnsonv~
Johnsonv~ ~8,
~8, 509 U.S.
s.c~. 2934 (emphasi.s
(emphasis added). See a~so
35e,
(O'CONNOR.• >3_, d:i.ssenting)
350, .:361, :1.13
::1.13 s_Ct. 2658, 125 L.li:d.2d
L.lild.2d 290 .(1993) (O'CONNOR.,
(r.
ful.l effect
(" CAl sentencer [sust] be sJ.loweQ
sJ.lowed to give £ull conl'ideration :and
and fuJ.l
mi. tigating oi.ro-..uastancas"
oi.ro-..uastancas ll (laIIIphasis in .original}). For 'it
to lid.
-it :is onJ.y when the
ju:y is given a "voehiol.e
mora~ :z:esponse' to· that
"voehioJ..e for expressing itG 'reasol).Qd mora~
evidence
Penl:Y I, -492 U.S., :at
8videBce .in
:in renderiug :Lts sentencing decision," PenJ:Y
at 328, 109
S.Ct.
5.Ct. '2934, thai; we can ba sure that the jury "has treated i:ha defendant as a
'uniquel.l' :i11.Ciivid-.la~
m.a.cle a rel;iabl.e
rel;i.abl.e Osteraci.nati.on
Osteraci.natl.on that
:i.~vido.1a~ hUll!ar.
hU1l!ar. beinrq]' and has macle
death 13 !:he
I< **1921 id., at 319, 109 S.,Ct. 2934
the appropriate :sentenoe,
:sentenoe,"
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U.:S. 280, 304, 3QS
30.5 J 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49
(quoting Woodson v. 1-1orth
North Carolina, 428 U.S.
L. Ed. 2d 944

(1916). II
(1916)."

(my emphasis added)
inqu~rl.ng of a prospective juror whether they
they·.
In short, it seems that simpy inqu~r1ng
will "consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they
can give it effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause.

Mark J. Ackley
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
mackley@sapd.state.id.us
(208) 334-2712
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From:

Kim W. Toryansk/
Toryanskl [kim@toryanski.com]

Sent:

Wednesday, $eptember 15, 20047:09 AM
Wednesday.

To:

Mark Ackley

Subject:
SUbJect: RE: Penry v. Johnson

Mark. plea negotiations wtth the prosecutor's office have progressed and we have been laid that ihey would
accept
a plea to one count 01 first degree murder,
(arson. :3 moOf attempted murder,
accept'S
murder. dismiss all other 5 charges (arson,
.endangerment), and no aggravators wlll be presented at sentencing. Of course, we are go10g
child .endangerment).
90109 to the mat
wrestling with our client to take the deal. Unbelievably, he's resisting. Day by day, we're putting more pressure
on 111m to tak.e the deal. He continues to resist. Our attorney clIent relationship is bein.9
bein,9 affected
;affected because of this.
He has
plea.. HIs fartiny
fartiJly seems.to
seems 10 Sld.Pport
Sld,pport his decision not to
l1as become hostile and ang/)'
angl)' that we are encouraging a plea..
take a plea. That relatJonsWp
relatlonsWp Is being a!Jecled too.
The deal closes the day we begIn to exercise our peremptory challenges in jul)'
ju/)' selection. We expect that to
be next Tuesday or Wed. After that,
that. the prosecution goes Into overdrive to bury our client.
Other issues are erupting. One has to do with his Insistence on testifying. He has been told that his attorneys Will
not put him on the stand,
stand. for ethical reasons. More and more, he is reluctant to follow the advice of counsel.
The dreadful reality of the 'DP
DP being Imposed
imposed by this panel of prospective jurors is demcmstrated daily. Even the
lnvolved. Many
ones that say they are generally opposed to the DP say they can impose It where children were 1nvolved.
of ones that generally favor the DP seem very willing to put their beliefs Into action and actually impose it if
allegations are proven in this case. We shop our mitigation in each yoir dire examination. but the reality is that
none of it stacks up .against
-against the aggravator 01 leaving 4 kids In a house on fire.
We are consulting with an experienced DP defense lawyer to get ideas about how to watk through this impasse.
.familiarity with the Muslim culture. W'l1I
He's a grey haired guy with ,familiarity
W'lil continue to advise yoo.. We're close. but not
oIose enough. If plea negotiations fail, we have told our client to antioipate the worst attrJal. based upon the
nonverbal demeanor of these jurors dUr1Dg
dur1Dg voir dire.
verbal statements and nODverbal

Kim
-Orfglnal Message-Message-
-OrfgInal
From: Mark Ackley
AcIdey [mallto:mackley@sapd.state.ld.us]
[mallto:mackley@sapd.state,Id,us]
ThUrsday, September 09, 2004 4:17 PM
Sent: Thursday,
k1m@toIyanskl,oom
To: k1m@toryanskl,oom
Subject: Penry v. Johnson

Kim,

As 1 noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation
~ecialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's·jury
~ecialist,
yesterday's'jury selection.
Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective
Whether mitigating facts would "matter"
jurors regarding whether
"mattsr R to them (as worded by
Whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if
the defense) or whether
. instructed by the Court (as worde~
worded, by the judge). The case of Penry v.
782~ 797 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782~
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application
for you during jury selection:
"PeJU:Y I did not hcld that the ltLere mention of "nlit:iiJiSt,:i.ng
"Ps.lU:Y
"llIit:ilJlSt:i.ng .ciz:oumstanoes" to a
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capital sentencing jury satisfiQs the Eigh.th Amendment. Nor does it stand
for the proposition that i t is constitutionally sufficient to
infol:ID.
info:J:m. the jury that i t may "oonsider" mitigating circumstances
in deciding the appropriate sentenoe. Rather, the key under Penry
:r is that the j.ury be .able
able to. "consider. and give e££ect to fa
derendant's m:1.tigat::i.ng]
m:i.tigat::i.ng] evidence in impos:i.ng sentence." 492 O.S.,
at 319, 109
lQ9 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis added). Sae also Johnson

'Texas., 509 U.S.
dissenting)
: ,. (A)
full consideratio.D and full effect
fA) sentsncer
sentSQcer [must] be allo,,'oo
allo"'ed .to give
give..._full
to m.it;igati.!"lg
origirlsl)}. For .i't ~·s only when the
m.i-t.;igati.!"lg circumstances" (emphasis in origir,sl)}.
jtl:::Y
moral .w:;esponse' to that
jt1:::y is given a "vehicle 'for
-for E!x:pressing
Elx:pressing j.ts 'reasoned ;:noral
evidence in resdering its sentencing decis:i.on," Penry I, 492 O.S., at 328, 109
S.Ct. 2934, that we
WQ can be sure that the jury' "has treated i:9!le defendant as a
'uniquely individual human beinIg), and has made a reliable ~ter.mination
~ter.mination that
death is the ap,propriate
'2934awropriate sentence," --1921 id., at 319, 109- !l.Ct. '2934
{quoting Woods-an
U.:8. 290, 304, 305, 96
9.6 S.Ct. 2978,
297S, 49
Woodso.n v. North Carolina, 428 u.s.
L.l:1d.2d
L.£d.2d 944 (1976»."
350, 381, 113 S.Ct. 2656, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 {1993)
·.(1993)

'V.

(O'CONNOR1~'
(O'CONNOR.t i1. I

(my emphasis added)
added>
In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they
will "consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they
can give it effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause.
Mark J. Ackley
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
mackley@sapd.state.id.us
(208) 334-2712
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I
I
I
I
I
Shawna,
I This is my response to your request for correspondence betwee1.1
betweeI.1 our office and the Toryanskis
of their representation ofAzad
of Azad Abdullah. I previously agreed to look for this
the time oftheir
I atcorrespondence
and disclose it since we both recognized that such correspondence as contained
in the Toryanskis files was incomplete. Thank you for your patience.
I I have located and attached the following:
Six emails (some of which overlap) between the Toryanskis (mostly Kim Toryanski)
I 1. and
our office (Molly Huskey and/or me).
I
a. NOTE: it appears from some of the emails that there may have been additional
correspondence. I cannot locate any additional correspondence (although I have
located summaries of a few conversations, see below).
I
2.
Two facsimile cover pages from Kim to Molly.
I
a. Both faxes, dated 12/11103 signed by Kim and sent to Molly seem to correspond
with the attached email with the string of communications on 12117/03 and
I
apparently pertain to pleadings and rulings regarding challenges to the death
penalty statute.
I I have located but have not attached the following:
I 1. A summary ofa
of a telephone calIon
calion 11124/04 from Mitch Toryanski to Molly· Huskey,
of the conversation included:
written by Molly. The topics ofthe
I
of the trial;
a. The outcome ofthe
. b. Whether our office files post-trial motions; and
of the aggravation and the mitigation evidence,
c. Mitch's retrospective assessment ofthe
I
the new death penalty jury system, Judge Copsey's professionalism or lack thereof,
and Mr. Abdullah's truthfulness or lack thereof; as well as Mitch's description of
I
I
Mark Ackley

From:

Sent:

To:

Cc:

Subject:
SUbject:

Attachments:

Mark Ackley
Friday, May 09,200812:12 PM
Friday.
'Shawna Dunn'; Roger Bourne
Shannon N. Romero
Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and
the SAPO
FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday; Abdullah continuance motion was denied; Penry
v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson; State v. Abullah, Sup. Ct. No.
316591
31659/ formerly H0201384; 66857.pdf; 66858.pdf

1
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their varying degrees of their confidence during the course of the case and his
hopes for Mr. Abdullah in future proceedings.
2.

A summary of a telephone call from Kim to me on 1/24/05,
1124/05, written by me. The topics
of the conversation included:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

3.

Hearing on PSI;
Forma! sentencing scheduling;
Formal
Amendments to ICR 32;
Whether we would attend the hearing; and
Potential challenges to the sentencing procedure.

An email summ.ary
summary of a written summary
Summary of a, telephone call on 9/03/04 from Kim to
Molly Huskey (for which I was present), written by me on March 17,2006. II have
not yet located my contemporaneous written summary. I think I may have given my
notes to Ron Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not located my notes in the files
of the
that they left behind after they left our office in October 2006. The topics ofthe
conversation apparently included:

a. The Court closing the courtroom;
Kline/Littlefield;
b. KlinelLittlefield;
c. Grounds to disqualify Judge Copsey;
d. My thoughts regarding trial counsels' degree of confidence;
.. Kim's comments regarding the State's ability to prove murder;
ee..Kim's
f. Kim's reference to communications sent by them to the prosecution regarding the
prosecution's case;
g. Kim's reference to what Mr. Abdullah agreed he did and for what he would plead
guilty;
h. Referencing to problems with the State's lab
4.

An email summary of a written summary of an undated telephone conversation
between Mitch and me, written by me on March 17, 2006. I have not yet located my
contemporaneous written summary. I think I may have given my notes to Ron
files that they left
Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not located my notes in the fues
behind after they left our office in October 2006. The topics of the conversation
apparently included:

a.
. b.
c.
d.

Sentencing scheduled for 1121105;
1/21/05;
Residual doubt;
Scope of allocution;
Mitch's comments about statements made to them by Mr. Abdullah regarding the
events; and
. .
.

2
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I
e. An unclear reference which my email summary noted as follows: "One area of
I
investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not sure what
this references]"
I I have mUltiple
multiple concerns about the wisdom of disclosing these documents as they differ from
emails and the faxes to the extent they are summaries of correspondence, not the
I the
correspondence themselves which tend to speak for themselves. I need to further assess
whether we have
obligation to disclose these summaries, and if so, whether they could or
I should be redacted. I will make a decision on Tuesday after further discussion with my team
of the Toryanskis;
and Molly Huskey. I would also be interested in making further inquiry ofthe
I perhaps they could check their offices again.
an

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I sincerely invite your thoughts on this matter;
these summaries.
you the contents of
ofthese

indee~ that

is why I tQokthe time to describe for

-Mark
-Mark

3
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Shannon N. Romero
From:
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I
I
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Sent:
To:

Subject:

Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanski.com]
1:59 PM
Monday, September 06, 2004 1:59
Mark Ackley; Molly J. Huskey
FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday

M&M:

FYI - we're moving for a continuance. The following is a copy of the
"heads up" for the judge. The judge has not responded to Pat Owen's request
that the motion be filed under seal.
K

Message----Original Message--
From: Patrick Owen [rnailto:PRQWENPH@adaweb.netl
Sent: Monday, September 06, 2004 10:04 AM
To: Judge Cheri Copsey
Cc: kim@toryanski.com
Subject: RE: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday

Judge Copsey:
I request that any such motion be filed under seal and that any proceedings
related to this motion be conducted in chambers.

Pat Owen
Message-------Original Message----
fmailto:kim@tmyanski.comJ
From: Kim W. Toryanski fmailto:kim@t01yanski.comJ
Sent: Monday, September 06,2004 9:59 AM
To: Patrick Owen; Judge Cheri Copsey
Subject: Defense motion to be fiJed on Tuesday

Copsey;
Judge Copsey:
The defense would like to advise you and the State that on Tuesday moming,
we will be flUng
tiling a motion to continue the trial. The grounds for the
motion are directly related to the State's revelation on Friday moming that
during the course of this case, a sexual relationship existed between one of
the case prosecutors and a key witness in this case, the lead homicide
detective and case officer.
Full details of the defense necessity for a continuance will be recited in
the written motion. In summary, we assert that the defendant bas a
Fourteenth Amendment due process right and a Sixth Amendment right to have a
reasonable opportunity to investigate the temporal duration oftbe
relationship, whether an actual conflict of interest may have arisen by
virtue of the relationship, whether the prosecutor's ethical duties were
rules of
affected and compromised, whether the detective has violated police roles
conduct, whether evidence or witness testimony may have been tainted or
1
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compromised in connection with the nature of the relationship, and whether
prejudice to the defendant has resulted. While the integrity of the
proceedings and the proper administration of
justice is paramount to all
ofjustice
involved, only Mr. Abdullah stakes his life on the process.
In evaluating the appropriateness of
the motion to continue, we have
ofthe
lO.7 (duty to investigate) and Guideline 10.8 (duty to
referenced Guideline 10.7
assert legal claims) of the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (Rev. February, 2003).
Without an opportunity to investigate a matter which potentially calls into
question all infonnation
information about the case, any conviction obtained may be
wlnerable to appellate attack on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated that death cases are
different and deserving of
higber due process standards.
ofhigher
Kim Toryanski

2
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Shannon N. Romero

From:

Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanskLcom}
Tuesday, September 07, 20043:53 PM
Mark Ackley; Molly J. Huskey
Abdullah continuance motion was denied

I
I
I
I

So maybe there is one more appellate issue for you two to address if Azad
t!tat
gets convicted of ftrSt degree, the jury finds an aggravator, and tltat
mitigation does not outweigh the aggravator(s). I th.ink
think Copsey wants the
th.e new statute.
"glory" of being the first to try a death case under the

I
I

The good news is that, in the continuance, I detailed the need to take the
of detective littlefield, the one that Erika Klein had tho affair
deposition ofdetective
with. The judge granted that!!! The prosecutor objected, but it fell on
deaf ears. The prosecutor asked for the scope of tbe depo to be limited,
rm looking forward to
but the judge said no !imitatons on defense inquiry. I'm
taking the depo.

Sent:

To:
Subject:
SUbject:

The judge also said she would grant more money to investigate things that
need to be looked into regarding my concerns about the screwups oftbe NMS

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

II
II
,I'I
II
11-

lab. So I'm going to put in for more money to get some additional experts
to advise me, and to testify. Again, hooray.

All in all, I think I'm going to call it a win. Thanks for wargaming with
An
me!
Jury selection begins tomorrow morning at 9:00. We're in 507. We'll go
until I :00 and then adjourn for the day. Same routine through the end of
the week.

Will keep you posted.

Kim

1
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Shannon N. Romero
From:

Mark Ackley

Sent:

Thursday, September 09, 2004 4: 17 PM

To:

kim@toryanski.com
Penry v. Johnson

Subject:

Kim,
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation specialist,
Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim noted that there was
some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors regarding whether mitigating
facts would "matter" to them (as worded by the defense) or whether they could simply
"consider" mitigating facts if instructed by the Court (as worded by the judge). The case
of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application for you
during jury selection:

"Penry

d:i.d
di.d not hold that the mere mention of "mitigating circumstances" to a capital
sentencing jury satisfies the Eighth Amendment. Nor does i t stand for the
proposition that
t.hat. i t is constitutionally
constitutionall.y sufficient to inform the jury that
i t may "consider" mitigating
miti.gating circumstances i.n deciding the appropriate
sentence. Rather, the key under Penry I i.s that the jury be able to
"consider and give effect to [a
fa defendant's mitigating] evidence in
imposing sentence." 492 u.s., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis added). See also
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993) (O'CONNOR,
J., dissenting) {"
(" [A] sentencer [must] be allowed to give full consideration and full
effect to mitigating circumstances" (emphasis in or1ginal». For i t is only when the jury
is given a "vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned m.oral
moral response' to that eV1dence in
rendering its sentencing decision," Penry I, 492 U. S., at 328, 109 S.ct. 2934, that we
can be sure "that the jury "has treated the defendant as a 'uniquely
'un1quely individual human
bein[g]' and has made a rel.iab~e determination that death is the appropriate sentence,"
**1921 id., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (quoting Woodson v. North Caro~ina,
Caro~ina, 428 u.s. 280, 304,
305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976»."
I

(my emphasis added)

In short, i
t seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will
it
"consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they can give i t
effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause.
Mark J. Ackley
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation unit
mackley@sapd.state.id.us
(208) 334-2712

1
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Shannon N. Romero
[kim@toryanski.comj
Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanski.comJ
Friday, September 10,20046:45 AM
Mark Ackley
RE: Penry v. Johnson

From:
Sent:

To:
Subject:

Yes, Mark, this helps us a (ot.
words, "give
lot. We have been intending to be asking the mitigation questions using the words.
weight and value" to mitigation evidence, and then give examples of our mitigation facts, but, as Shelley and Kim have
observed, we are forming the questions with the word "consider" and we need to fix that. We'll work on correcting that
today.
Today will be a long day- we start questioning at 9:00 and will finish at 5:00, but at least today we get lunch. Copsey
even needs to be reminded that we need bathroom breaks.
rm so glad Shelley and Kim are in the courtroom -will you be able to-stop.by
to. stop. by taday1
Kim
---Original Message---Message---

From: Mark Ackley [mailto:mackley@sapd,state.id.us]
[mailto:mackley@sapd,state,id.us]
Sent:
sent: Thursday, September 09,20044:17 PM
To: kim@toryanski.com
Subject: Penry v. Johnson

Kim,
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim
noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors
regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by the
defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if instructed by
the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797
(2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation at the close of the case. Here is
a relevant portion that my have application for you during jury selection:
"Penry I did not hold that the mere mention of "mitigating circumstances" to a
satisfi.es the Eighth Amendment. Nor does it stand for
capital sentencing jury satisfl..es

the proposition that i t is constitutionally sufficient to info~
info~ the
jury that i t may "consider" mitigating circumstances in deciding the
appropriate sentence. Rather, the key under Penry I is tha~
that the jury
fa defendant rs mitigating]
be able to "consider and give ef£ect to [a
mitigating1
.iDposing sentence." 492 U. s.,
evidence in .ilIposing
S., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis
U.S. 350, 381,
added). See also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.s.
391, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d
290 (1993) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) {"[A]
{"CAl sentencer [must] be allowed to give
full oonsideration and full effect to mitigating circumstances" (emphasis in
original». For i t is only when the jury is given a "vehicle for expressing its
'reasoned moral. response' to that evidenoe .in
:in rendering its sentencing deoision,"
Penry 1,492 U.S., at 328,109 S.Ct. 2934, that we can be sure that the jury "has
treated the defendant as a 'uniquel.y
'uniqueJ.y individual.
individual human bein[g] , and has
treated.
bas made a
reJ.iable determination that death i.s
is the appropriate sentence," **1921 id., at 319,
rel.iable
v.North
109 S.Ct. 2934 (quoting Woodson v
..North CaJ:0J..ina,
Carol.:Lna, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 305, 96 S.Ct.
2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976»."
(my

emphasis added)

1
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In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will
"consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they can givQ it
effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause.
Mark J. Ackley
Idaho state Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
mackley@sapd.state.id.u5
mackley@sapd.state.id.us
(208) 334-2712
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Shannon N. Romero
From:
Sent:

To:
Subject:
SUbject:

Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanskLcom]
[kim@toryanski.com]
Wednesday, September 15, 2004 7:09 AM
Mark Ackley
RE: Penry v. Johnson

Mark, plea negotiations with the prosecutor's office have progressed and we have been told that they would accept a plea
to one count of first degree murder, dismiss all other 5 charges (arson, 3 cts of attempted murder, child endangerment),
and no aggravators will be presented at sentencing. Of course, we are going to the mat wrestling with our client to take
the deal. Unbelievably, he's resisting. Day by day, we're putting more pressure on him to take the deal. He continues to
resist. Our attorney client relationship is being affected because of this. He has become hostile and angry that we are
encouraging a plea. His family seems to support his decision not to take a plea. That relationship is being affected too.

I
I
III

The deal closes the day we begin to exercise our peremptory challenges in jury selection. We expect that to be next
Tuesday or Wed. After that, the prosecution goes into
.Qverdrive to bury our client
into.Qverdrive

I

Other issues are erupting. One has to do with his insistence on testifying. He has been told that his attorneys will not put
him on the stand, for ethical reasons. More and more, he is reluctant to follow the advice of counsel.

I

I

I
II
I

I
II
I

II
II
II
IIl
II
I
r

I1-1

The dreadful reality of the DP being imposed by this panel of prospective jurors is demonstrated daily. Even the ones that
say they are generally opposed to the DP say they can impose it where children were involved. Many of ones that
generally favor the DP seem very willing to put their beliefs into action and actually impose it if allegations are proven in
this case. We shop our mitigation in each voir dire examination, but the reality is that none of it stacks up against the
. aggravator of leaving 4 kids in a house on fire.
We are consulting with an experienced DP defense lawyer to get ideas about how to work through this impasse. He's a
grey haired guy with familiarity with the Muslim culture. Will continue to advise you. We're close, but not close enough.
If plea negotiations fail.
fail, we have told our client to anticipate the worst at trial,
trial. based upon the verbal statements and
jUrors during voir dire.
nonverbal demeanor of these jurors

Kim
Message---
-----Orlginal Message---From: Mark Ackley [mailto:mackley@sapd.state.ld.us]
september 09,2004 4:17 PM
Sent: Thursday, September

kIm@toryanski,com
To: kim@toryanski.com
SUbject: Penry v. Johnson

Kim,
noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's
yesterday'S jury selection. Kim
noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors
regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by the
defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if instructed by
jUdge). The case of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797
the Court (as worded by the judge).
(2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation at the close of the case. Here is
a relevant portion that my have application for you during jury selection:
As I

"l'enzy II did not ho1d
hold that the mere mention of "mitigating circumstances" to a
"Penzy
capital sentenoing jury satisfies the Eighth Amendment. Nor does i1:
it stand for

t:he proposition
proposi tiOD 1:ha1:
i 1:
tu1:i.ona~:Ly sufficient 1:0
the
that i
t is consti
constitutiona~1y
to inform
infor.m 1:he
the
i1:
mitigat:.ing circumstances in deciding 'the
jury 1:ha1:
that i
t may "consider" mitigating
the
appropria1:e sentence.
sent:ence. Rather,
Ra1:her, 1:he
appropriate
the key under Penry I is tha1:
that the jury
1
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be able to "consider and give erfect
derendant' s mi tigatingJ
e:ffect to {a de:fendant'
evidence in imposing sentence." 492 U.S., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis
added). See also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d
290 (1993) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) ("[A] sentencer [must] be allowed to give
full consideration and full effect to mitigating circumstances" (emphasis in
original». For i
t is only when the jury is given a "vehicle for expressing its
it
'reasoned moral response' to that evidence in rendering its sentencing decision,"
Penry I, 492 U.S., at 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, that we can be sure that the jury "has
treated the defendant as a 'uniquely individual human bein(g]'
bein(gJ' and has made a
reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence," **1921 id., at 319,
109 S.Ct. 2934 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 305, 96 S.Ct.
2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976»."
(my emphasis added)
In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will
"consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they can give it
.
effec.t; if they cannot.. tJ1en ____they
they should be excluded for cause.
Mark J. Ackley
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
rnackley@sapd.state.id.us
(208) 334-2712
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Shannon N. Romero
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
SUbject:

Mitch Toryanski [mitch@toryanskLcom]
Thursday, March 10,200512:23 PM
Mark Ackley
State v. Abullah,
Abullah. Sup. Ct. No. 31659/ formerly H0201384

Mark:
This is to follow up on Kim's phone call message to you earlier this week.
On March 4, the Judge approved our motion to withdraw as counsel from the
case and directed that your office file a written notice ofsubstitution.
of substitution.
Yesterday, we received in the mail a copy of a letter from the clerk of the
Supreme Court advising the clerk of the Ada County Court that Report on
Imposition of Death Penalty has been filed and ordering preparation ofthe
repoFter's tranSGript and clerks record.
record..
reporter's
Mitch
Mitchell E. Toryanski
This transmission (including attachments if any) is intended only for the
use of the addressee and may contain infonnation that is privileged,
confidential, and exempt from disclosure under the Electronic Communication
Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. Sections 2510-2521 and protected by attorney/client
or other privileges. If you are not the intended recipient, or the employee
or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient,
you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of
this communication is strictly prohibited. Attorney/client or work product
privileges are not waived by the transmission of this message. If you have
received this communication in error, please notify me immediately via
e-mail at info@torvanski.com or by telephone at (208) 841-0655. Thank you.
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Mark Ackley
Mark Ackley
Friday, May 09, 2008 3:41 PM
'Shawna Dunn'
Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and
theSAPD

From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

Shawna,
Thank you for calling, and sharing your thoughts. I guess I'm not sure what I expected, but
of conversations not to raise
upon further reflection, it was unreasonable to expect my summary ofconversations
if not alleviate
a few eyebrows. Hopefully the notes in their entirety will lighten your concerns ifnot
them completely.
of my conversation with Kim Toryanski. -Mark
Below is the 1124/05
1/24/05 note ofmy
MJA

1124/05
1/24/05

MJA: TIC with Kim Toryanski
KTcalled:

1. Hearing is still scheduled today for 3 p.m. - purpose solely to discuss
PSI and where the source of disagreements may lie
2. Sentencing hearing will be rescheduled. likely 2 weeks out
3. Q whether any amendments pending re ICR 32 - I told KT that I was
not aware of any at this time

4. I told KT that we would go to the hearing, but may only stay briefly if
they are going through 5000 pages of PSI. Our purpose is primarily to
provide support for Azad. KT said that if we leave before the
conclusion of the hearing then she will pass this on to Azad and also tell
him that he is scheduled for a call with us tomorrow.
S.
5. KT and I talked briefly about challenges to the sentencing procedure.
I refered her to the Stover case for the non-capital charges. I asked her
whether she has considered any constitutional arguments that would
mandate giving the judge sentencing discretion to downwardly depart
from death. She said that she had not but has referred to the jury
verdicts as recommendations which has upset the judge in the past. I
of crafting a separation ofpowers
of powers argumen4
argument,
mentioned the possibility ofcrafting
of its
that the legislature cannot completely divest a district court jUdge ofits
sentencing discretion. I told her that such a challenge and others might
be further considered prior to sentencing.
sentencin~.
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Mark Ackley
Friday, May 09, 20084:36 PM
'Shawna Dunn'
Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and
theSAPD

Shawna,

The below email was written in response to an interoffice email from Michael Shaw, our investigator. At the
time, I was not assigned to represent Azad. Instead, Azad was being represented by Ron Coulter and Kimberly
Simmons. In the course of his file review, Michael wanted to know, among other things [which is why I did not
include his initial email inquiry below], whether I had notes from any conversations with the Toryanskis during
their representation. When I prepared the below email, I referenced my notes contained on a legallegal pad. I have
searched for those notes and my legal pad but I have not located them to date. Michael indicates that he did not
take my file as I had suggested in my email.
Because I don't want to adjust the electronic content at all, r am giving you the email in its entirety, including a
conversation that r had with Joan Fisher from a different date which I had apparently noted somewhere in the
same legal pad. I thought about redacting that reference, and just summarizing it, but on second thought I
figured that would only raise more eyebrows. My note also includes references to visits I had with Azad after
our office began representing him. To refresh your memory, r represented Azad briefly before Ron Coulter was
hired. Once he was hired, Molly reassigned cases to adjust for national workload standards. As a result, I think
I was off Azad's case pretty quickly and did not come back until October 2006.
Although it looks like I might have arguably given some suggestions to counsel, I think you'll agree that those
suggestions are not implicated by Azad'sc1aims, but I suppose that could be a matter of interpretation. You
will notice a reference below to the "EI-Contrani (sic)" case; that reference is to State v. Al-Kotrani, 141 Idaho
66, 106 P.3d 392 (2005), and pertains to a potential motion to disqualify Judge Copsey. I don't think the
grounds for disqualification are noted in the opinion, but the following was written in the Appellant's Brief,
''The district court further found that Dr. Sanford's conclusions were not credible because Dr. Sanford relied on
Mr. Al-Kotrani's family's representations and "self-serving reports." The district court noted that Dr. Sanford.
did speak with one non-relative, a fonner employer, Mr. Abdul Muhammad, who testified that he could only
given Mr. Al-Kotrani one instruction at a time as Mr. AI-Kotrani would get confused if more than one
instruction was given. Further, Mr. Al-Kotrani had the tendency to "slack off' ifnot under constant .
supervision. The district court dismissed Mr. Muhammad's testimony, noting that the "Iraqi community is very
close." (Tr., p.39, L.24 - p.40, L.24; R., p.79.) ... Accordingly, Mr. Al-Kotrani asserts that the district court
erred in ruling that Dr. Sanford's conclusion that Mr. Al-Kotrani is incompetent to stand trial was not credible
because it took into consideration information obtained from Mr. Al-Kotrani's family. The district court further
erred in failing to consider information obtained from Mr. Muhammad because he is of the same nationality of
Mr. Al-Kotrani and its erroneous conclusion that Mr. Muhammad's statements were not significant." Of
course, trial counsel never moved to disqualify the judge, and we have not raised any claims based on their
. failure to do so.
I will discuss disclosing Molly's email notes on Tuesday. I anticipate disclosing them unless my decision to
disclose my own notes to you is questioned.

-Mark
1
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From: Mark
Marl< Ackley
Sent: Friday, March 17,2006 10:47 AM
To: Michael Shaw
Ronaldo A. Coulter; Paula Swensen; Barbara O. Thomas; Guadalupe Ayala
Cc: Kimberly Simmons; Ronalda
Subject: RE: Abdullah file clean up
Michael, I will go through myemails. I will forward any that are relevant. Perhaps you take my file and then
share or give to Ron or Kimberly. It includes some notes from IMSI visits with AA that I am pretty certain were
not placed in Prolaw. Below I have summarized most of my handwritten notes from conversations with, or in
reference to, trial counsel.
From legal pad

1.

2.

3.

12117/03 TC with Joan Fisher about the Abdullah case noting that she is concerned about
everything being adequately preserved
9/03/04 TC conversation with Kim T. with Mony (extensive notes on legal pad)

•

Discussion re the Court closing the courtroom; they did not object to closed proceedings.
Judge made them file a motion to continue under seal. Should have objected. [It looks like I
suggested -- "move to unseal the motion, right to public trial"]

•

Discussion about Erica Kline and Detective Whitfield

•

ever... 1 could kick [Copsey] off." I
"Now more than ever...
Quotes attributed to Kim T. including, UNow
indicated that we would send the EI-Contrani (sic) opinion with Copsey's [racist] remarks.
[This is in reference to the Iraqi client case that Eric F. handled (AI-Kotrani) which we then
faxed to them [this has been confirmed by Sara] [It is not indicated, but I believe I suggested
a motion to DO}

•

My thoughts reflected, ~confidence sounds like L. Dunlap" {NOTE: this is a reference to the
Jimmie Thomas case where Lynn Dunlap told Jimmie they would obtain an acqUittal};
acquittal}; quote
attributed to Kim T. "we've been seeing things" (bizarre things) since the beginning ofthe
case

•

Kim thought the State would have trouble proving murder, referring to the State's case as
an attempt to "bootstrap the murder" - I asked her why they could not prove felony murder
and Kim T did not have a good answer [NOTE: I was quite worried about Kim's confidence]

•

Reference to "weekly love letters· they [I believe -they" is a reference to trial counsel] sent
to the prosecution to show them how their case sucks

•

Referencing AA, noting that he will plead to what he did, she [Angela]
{Angela] poured the gasoline,
would plead to conspiracy to arson

•

References to problems with the State's lab. They still need an expert to attack the lab.
Many things they are still trying to get. [It appears I may have suggested a motion to
continue]

approXimated post jury verdict for
Undated TC conversation with Mitch Toryanski (date can be approximated
death sentence, but prior to formal sentencing by judge)
•
•

Sentencing scheduled for 1/21/05
They (trial counsel?) scratched residual doubt because the judge said the law was wellwell
settled (not mitigation)
2
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•
•
•

Judge limited the scope of AA allocution
JUdge
They were never told what happened; AA was never straight [NOTE: I believe this was in
response to a question I always ask trial counsel, specifically, "did the client ever confess to
you.U]
One area of investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not sure
what this references]
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Shawna,
I Below is an electronic note written by Molly Huskey regarding a call that she received from
Mitch Toryanksi. Ibis
lIDs is the note that I summarized in an email to you last week. It appears
note was written on the day of the call, November 24, 2004. I have not changed the note in
I the
any way, thus the typos. I believe we have now disclosed
or note
II counsel.
referencing a communication, with the Toryanskis prior to our appointment as Mr. Abdullah's
I may very well send you a fonnal discovery disclosure attaching each of the
communications that I've already sent to you informally and in piece-meal fashion. If you have
I any questions, then please let me know.
Mark
I
I
I
was
I
I
was
I
thinks
I
This
I
we
I
I
.1
Mark Ackley

From:
Sent:

To:

Subject:

Mark Ackley
Wednesday, May 14, 2008 9:26 AM
'Shawna Dunn'
RE: Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel
and theSAPD

~unication,
every ~unication,

. MJH

11124/04 MJH: Telephone Call from Mitch Toryanski
Toryanski..

flled post trial
Called re: outcome of trial. wanted to know if we fJled
motions like motion for new trial. TOld him we didn't do that. Told me
that Azhad was a good person and the good things he had done far
a yOWlg
outweighed the aggravators. for example, when Azhad
man, his father had been imprisoned. Azhad led his family over the
mountains into Turkey to :freedom.
freedom. He was on the board ofhis
of his church,
he was affectionate with his children.
This new system gives too much power to the prosecutor because there
is no way a jury is going to acquit after hearing all the evidence. He
said of course with. a first degree murder, people will find utter
ofthe
disregard. He said some of
the jurors even wanted to find HAC.
Said Copsey's demeanor made her impssible to work with. She
she needs to be
demeaning and belittled the attorneys. He really
trained in professionalism.
He said client didn't tell him the truth - they still don~
don't know what really
put them at a huge disadvantage when trying to prepare
happened.
the case. HE says they were much more optimistic re: the possible
outcome earlier in the trial and the longer it went on, the more they
knew the client was telling lies to them..
can get the client some relief.
Hopes

1
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SEP 15 2009
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By J. WEATHERBV

1

DEPUTY

IN THE DTSTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

2

3

4

.. PD ST APPELLANT

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
AZAD HAJJ ABDlillAH,
ABDlIllAH,

5

Petitioner,

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16
17

18

19

20

21

22

23
24

25

26
27

28

29
30

CV-PC-200S-00308
CASE NO. CV-PC-200S-00308

vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO

CONFUCT COUNSEL
ORDER RE: CONFliCT

Respondent.
In reviewing ·~he
'~he material filed in support of the Final Amended Petition, including various

e-mails attached to the Toryanskis' depositions, it came to the Court's attention that several of the
State Appellate Pubhc Defender's Office attorneys, including Molly Husky, the State Appellate
Public Defender, M;:1I"k
M;:1I'k Ackley, Chief of the Capita]
Capital Litigation Unit, and Kimberly Simmons,
provided advice to IVIr. Abdullah's privately retained trial counsel before trial began, during jury
voir dire, during trial and post trial.'
trial I

The record establishes that the State Appellate Public

Defender's Office advised. trial counsel on several matters, including advising trial counsel to seek
a continuance of the trial (which they did) and suggesting specific voir dire approaches. Both of
these areas are the subject of Mr. Abdullah's post-conviction claims. The full extent of the State
Appellate Public DI!!fender's Office's involvement and what advice was given was unclear.
Therefore, concerned about the apparent conflict of interest, the Court ordered counsel to address
this involvement.
the implications and l!lXtent
l;lXtent of
ofthis
Both the

Sta1:~
Stat~

and the State Appellate Public Defender's Office responded and provided

the Court with additional evidence.
Based on the following and having fully considered those responses, the Court finds that
the State Appellate Public Defender's Office has a conflict in its representation of Mr. Abdullah
J The Court notes that M~. Simmons and Mr. Ackley specifically
represented to the Court in the original Petition that
specifica1lyrepresented
they had no involvemenl: in the trial of this matter. It was on this representation that the Cowt found good cause to
allow the State Appellatl: Public Defender's Office more than three yeatS to finalize
:finalize the post-conviction petition. This
is why the Court was uru:ware
UD2ware of the conflict.

31

-:t?

ORDER RE: CONFLICT COUNSEL
CASE NO. CV-PC-200!~0308
CV-PC-200!;.o0308
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1

in post-conviction pr()ceedings. (This order does not affect the State Appellate Public Defender's

2

Office's representatien of Mr. Abdullah in the appeal of his underlying conviction.) Therefore,

3

the Court shall hold :r.:I. hearing to determine whether Mr. Abdullah waives this conflict both as to

4

this post-conviction proceeding and in any subsequent proceedings.

5

ANALYSIS

66

In examining whether the appropriate procedural safeguards are in place in a case where

77

the defendant is facin~
facin~ the death penalty, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held

88

that "death is different." In his concurrence, Justice Stevens wrote:

9
9
10
10

11
11

In the 12 yean since Funnan ... every Member of this Court has written or joined
at least one I)pinion
IJpinion endorsing the proposition that because of its severity and
irrevocability, the death penalty is qUalitatively
qualitatively different from any other
punishment, find hence must be accompanied by Wlique safeguards to ensure that it
is a justified response to a given offense.

12
13 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,468 (1984). The constitutional reason that "death is different"
14 . is the application of tile Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruelty" to a degree that varies from
15 its application in most other criminal cases. Because this is a capital case and Mr. Abdullah is

16
17
18

defendant without providing "extraordinary measures to ensure that the prisoner . . . is afforded

19

as.is
.is humanly possible, that the sentence was not imposed
process that will gwlrantee, as much as

20

prejudice, or mistake." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982).
out of whim, passion, prejudice.

21

Therefore, this Court:'
Court:'ss responsibility is heightened.
Therefore.

literally fighting for his life, this Court must ensure that Mr. Abdullah's rights are protected. As

concurrence, it would be cruel and unusual punislunent to execute a
n01:ed in a concurrence.
Justice O'Connor nOl:ed

22

Every defendant has the right be represented by conflict-free counsel? Wood v. Georgia.

23
23
24
24

450 U.S. 261, 271 (l981). In order to ensure a defendant receives conflict-free counsel, a trial
court has an affinnative duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever it knows or ''reasonably

25
25

should know that a particular conflict may exist." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980);

26
26
27

Lolo'o'dace. 140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278, 285 (2003). This duty with respect to
see also State v. Lovo'dace.
indigent defendants is far more imperative than the judge's duty to investigate the possibility of a

28
29

30

State v. SeI1erson, - P.3d -,2009 WL 1492659 adaho.2oo9). While rehearing
2 This was recently reafIinned in Slate
was denied, Severson hit! not yet been released for publication and cannot be cited.

31
~?

ORDER RE: CONFUf.:.T COUNSEL
CV-PC-1005-tJ0308
CASE NO. CV-PC-l005-tJ0308
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1

conflict that arises

2

true that in a situation of retained counsel, "[u]n1ess the trial court knows or reasonably should

3

particulftr conflict exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry." Mickens v. Tay/or,
know that a particulflr

4

535 U.S. 162, 184 (2')02) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,347 (19S0». When, as was

5

true in Mickens, the ~ udge is not merely reviewing the permissibility of the defendant's choice of

6

counsel, but is responsible for making the choice herself, and when she knows or
Of should know

7

(~"ist, the duty to make a thorough inquiry is manifest and unqualified Id.
that a conflict does (!x:ist,

8

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court squarely held that when a record discloses the

9

'"possibility of a cor.flict" between the interests of the defendant and the interests of the party

10

paying their counsel's fees, the Constitution imposes a duty of inquiry on the state-court judge

11

even when no objection was made. Id at 185 (citing Wood, 450 U.S. at 267,272). The Court,

12

therefore, has an ongoing obligation to inquire into potential conflicts of interest about which it

13

14

16

17

18

19

20
21

22

23

24

25

27

28

30

counsel represents either multiple or successive defendants. It is

knows or reasonably should have known. Id This obligation is even more important where the

criminal defendant i!: facing the death penalty, and Mr. Abdullah is.
In order to satisfy the inquiry requirement, a trial court's examination of the potential
conflict mUJ)'1
mUl:l'1 be the·rough and searching and should be conducted on the record. See State v.
Lopez, 139 Idaho 256?259, 77 P.3d 124, 127 (Q.App.
smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314,
(C.App. 2003); Smith

1320 (Sib Cir.l991).
Cir.1991). The Court is entitled to rely on factual representations made by counsel and
may inquire further i oto
o.to the facts, though it "is under no original or continuing obligation to do

so." Kaplan v. Unired States, 375 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 1967). The Court ordered counsel to
of the
respond to the Court's questions in writing. Both responded and attached relevant portions ofthe
record that reflect tlle evidence. In reaching a decision, the Court relied on the State Appellate

Public Defender's Office's factual representations. However, the determination of whether a
conflict exists is for the Court to decide and not for counsel.
Once a court conducts an inquiry, it must determine whether a conflict actually exists.
Lopez, 139 Idaho at. 259, 77 P.3d at 127. If the court concludes defense counsel does have a

conflict,
conflict. it must obulLn a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver from the defendant or give the
defendant an opportlmity to acquire new counsel. Id If, on the other hand, the court concludes

that a conflict of intE:rest does not exist, the representation may continue without a waiver. See id.

31

'l?

ORDER 0 : CONFLICT
CONFL1CT COUNSEL
CASE NO. CV-PC-200:5-00308
CV-PC-100:5-00308
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1

While the Sta.te Appellate Public Defender's Office addresses the conflict created by their

2

role as witnesses in both advising trial counsel and observing the trial, the more significant

3

conflict includes a colorable claim that they refrained from asserting viable ineffective assistance

4

of counsel claims that may implicate advice they gave to Mr. Abdullah's retained trial counsel.

5

An actual conflict is defined by its effect on counsel.
counsel, not by whether there is a ''mere theoretical

6

division of loyalties." Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171, 172 n. 5 (emphasis added). "[T]he
"[Tlhe evil [of

7

conilict-l'idden
conflict-l'idden collruiel] is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, ...

8

[making it] difficult 10 judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attomey's
attorney's representation

9

of a client." HollowclY
Hollowcly v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-491 (1978) (emphasis added).

3

10
11

Abdullah has a "colorable claim" that the State Appellate Public Defender's Office has an actual

12

conflict of interest and, therefore, cannot represent him in this action. That colorable claim exists

13

because attorneys in the State Appellate Public Defender's Office advised Mr. Abdullah's

14

15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22

In this case, on a successive post-conviction petition or in a federal habeas action, Mr.

retained trial counsel, sat in on the trial and are witness even

if they

are not called in the

post-conviction case. More significantly, should Mr. Abdullah so chose, he could claim the State
Appellate Public Defender's Office post-conviction attorneys may have foregone viable
assistanc':: of counsel claims because such claims may implicate advice the attorneys
ineffective assistanc,::
gave to Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel.
The Court tb.ds, therefore, the State Appellate Public Defender attorneys have a conflict
of interest and that if the issue were asserted in later proceedings the court would have to have an
evidentiary proceeding to determine the effect the conflict may have bad on their representation. 4
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) By analogy, when a pl:titioner is represented on post-conviction relief by his trial counsel, the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel rna)' be raised in a successive petition absent a clear and vohmtary waiver. See Commonwealth
(l)a. 1974). Absent a showing that the petitioner was specifically advised of the hazards of
v. Via, 316 A.2d 895 (1)a.
post~conviction hearing and that the petitioner consented to such an
being represented by trial counsel at the post-conviction
arrangement, a successj', e post-conviction application, alleging ineffective assistance of trial colmSel, is not barred.
State, 36~! S.E.2d 20, 21 (S.C. 1987). 10 fact, in South Carolina as a result of this case, courts are
See CtUler v. Slate,
instrUcted to advise a ~etitioner who wishes to waive this conflict that "the dual representation will result in the
instructed
waiver of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." Jd at 22. The petitioner is then required to state on the
record whether be wishe!. to proceed, thereby waiving the issue. [d.
Id.
• The Cc,wt is not roak.ng any detennination regarding the validity of such claim
claim. if made by Mr. Abdullah in a
Abdullah could make that claim in subsequent proceedings and if he
subsequent proceeding. However, clearly Mr. AbduIlah
were to assert that claim, the court would be required to bold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the coofJict
cooflict
ORDER RE: CONFLICT COUNSEL
CASE NO. CV·PC-2005-00308
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1

Furthermore, the Court fmds that this conflict affects the entire office because at least three

2

members of the officer, Molly Husky, Mark Ackley and Kimberly Simmons, met with and

3

advised Mr. Abdulla:l's trial counsel pre-trial, during jury selection, during trial and post-trial.

4

Molly Husky is the State Appellate Public Defender and the office supervisor. Mark Ackley

5

heads the Capital Litigation Unit and supervises that unit. Mr. Abdullah would have a colorable

6

claim that any attornl~y
attornl~Y working for Ms. Husky or being supervised by Mark Ackley would also

7

have a conflict bec:lUse he could claim they did not pursue claims that may implicate Ms.

8

Husky's, Mr. Ackley's or Ms. Simmons' advice. Therefore, the Court finds that the entire State

9

Appellate Public DI::fender's Office is conflicted for the purpose of this post-conviction

10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17

18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25

26
27

28
29
30

proceeding.
While Mr. Abdul1ah
Abdullah may waive this conflict, only he may waive the conflict and that
waiver must be a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver or the Court must give him an
opportunity to acquire new counsel. Lopez, 139 Idaho at 259, 77 P.3d at 127. Mr. Abdullah is
indigent and is entitkd to conflict free counsel at public
pUblic expense.
When an in:ligent defendant is unable to retain his own lawyer, the trial judge's
appointment of counsel is itself a critical stage of a criminal trial. At that point in the proceeding,
by definition, the defendant has no lawyer to protect his interests and must rely entirely on the
,\1ickens, 53:: U.S. at 184. For that reason it is "the solemn duty of a '.'
'" judge befOIe
before
judge. .\1ickens,

whom a defendant appears
ilppears without counsel to make a thorough inquiry and to take all steps
necessary to insure the fullest protection of this constitutional right at every stage of the
proceedings." [d. (ql:.oting Von Moltlce v. Gillies.
Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 722 (1948». If the Court had
been aware of the c:::mflict, the Court would have ordered the appointment of death qualified
private counsel at pul)}ic expense at the outset of these proceedings.
Therefore, this Court has an obligation to hold a hearing to explain the implications of
waiving these conflk:ts and how that would not only affect Mr. Abdullah's right to assert claims
in this post-conviction proceeding but would affect his ability to pursue claims associated with the
State Appellate Pub1 ic Defender's Office's involvement with his private trial counsel in further

adversely affected his pco:n-conviction
860, 874 (9 11t111 Cir.
pco:rt-conviction counsel's performance. See Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860.
th
2006); Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117. 1126-27 (9 Cir. 2002).

31
~?
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1

proceedings, includiJlg any federal habeas actions or successive post-conviction proceedings. It

2

may even affect his ability to challenge this Court's actions regarding these conflicts.

3

The Court hereby schedules a hearing for September 25,2009, at 10:00 a.m. to detennine

4

whether Mr. Abdulla.n can knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive these conflicts, whether

5

the Court should appoint conflict counsel to advise him regarding this waiver, or whether the

6

Court should order the State Appellate Public Defender's Office to provide Mr. Abdullah death

7

qualified private courlSel
coullSel to represent him in these post-conviction proceedings at public expense. S

8

1

IT IS SO OF/DERED.

9

Dated this 15!h
15 lh day of September 2009.

10

11

~"e

12

Cheri C. Copsey
District Judge

13

~
~

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23

24
25

26
27
28

29
30
31
~?

trial .;:ourt
\:ourt may appc,int substitute counsel for an indigent defimdant upon a showing of good cause. Stale v. Nath,
Nath.
137 ldabo 112.
112, 714-15, 52 P.3d 857,859-60 (2002). Whether substitute counsel should be provided is a decision that
lies within the sound di::~etion
di::~etion of the trial court and will be reViewed on appeal for an abuse ofdiscretion.ld at 715,
52 P.3d at 860. The triE.I court's decision win only be regarded as an abuse of discretion if it violated the defendant's
right to counset.ld
counset./d
SA
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OR Eo
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

c E \ \} E O
1008

fEB \ 5
'.)alJ."fE
EU.1-'TE

AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH,
Petitioner,
vs,
vs.

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Respondent.
------------)
---------------------------)

s"A.u.~~f\
s"A.u.~~f\
puaL\v"~
puaL\v"~
Case No. SP-OT 05-00308
ORDER GRANTING STATE'S
MOTION TO COMPEL
DISCOVERY AND
GRANTING PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER

The petitioner has filed an Amended Petition for Post Conviction relief that
includes a wide variety of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Essentially,
the petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for nearly every decision
made by trial counsel in the petitioner's defense. The Court is infonned that trial
counsel, Kim and Mitch Toryanski, and the Ada County Public Defenders Office,
who defended the petitioner before the Toryanski's, have both turned their files
over to the State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD). The SAPO has been granted
permission to conduct depositions of the Toryanski's and August Cahill and Ami!
Myshin of the public defenders office who represented the petitioner. The State
has moved to compel discovery requiring the SAPD to provide copies of all of .'
trial counsel's files in preparation for the depositions and so the State can properly
ORDF.R GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEl. DISCOVRRY
AND GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
(ABDULLAH) PAGE 1
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..
respond to the petition for post conviction relief. The petitioner has moved for a
protective order for those files to include attorney client privilege materials and
work product.
The State's motion to compel and the petitioner's motion for protective
order came on regularly for hearing on December 18, 2007. After argument, and
the Court being fully informed, the Court orders as follows.
1. The State's Motion to compel is granted. In light of the number and
variety of the petitioner's claims, trial counsels' files in their entirety are
fairly subject to discovery by the State. Such an order is consistent with
the doctrine of fairness and completeness and with the persuasive
authority of Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003). The
Court has been advised that the State and the petitioner have agreed that
any documents provided to trial counsel by the State need not be
duplicated by the SAPD as part of the discovery process. Other than
those duplicate items, all items in trial counsel's files are subject to
discovery to the State unless the pertinent claim in the petition is
abandoned.
2. Such discovery however is limited pursuant to the petitioner's motion
for protective order which is also granted in part as follows.

The

documents in trial counsel's files as well as any direct attorney client
communications will not be admissible as evidence in the State's case in
ORDER GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
AND GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
(ABDULLAH) PAGE 2
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chief in the event of a retrial or resentencing. However, in the event that
the petitioner testifies, at a retrial or resentencing or other proceeding,
statements the petitioner made to trial counselor their agents may be
used as cross examination or impeachment. Additionally, other material
which was previously the subject of the attorney client privilege or work
product privilege may be used in cross examination of the petitioner if
he testifies at retrial, resentencing or other future proceeding, , if made
relevant by the petitioner's testimony.
If the petitioner testifies in such a way that he opens the door to
impeachment with materials or conversation previously the subject of
one of the privileges and when challenged with the contents of that
impeaching document or statement disclaims it, then and only then will
extrinsic evidence of the previously privilege material be admissible for
impeachment purposes.
3. The petitioner's waiver of both his attorney client privilege and the
work product privilege was made impliedly by his filing of the petition
for post conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.
The petitioner was specifically advised on the record on December 18,
2007 that asserting ineffective assistance of counsel claims would waive
any attorney client privilege or work product privilege. His signature on
this order constitutes his express waiver of those privileges.
ORDER GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
AND GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
(ABDULLAH) PAGE 3
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4. The Courts reasoning and analysis was set out in detail on the record
during the hearing on December 18, 2007 and is hereby incorporated
into this order and adopted by reference.
For the reasons set out above, the State's motion for discovery as modified
by the parties and petitioner's motion for protective order is granted in part as
described above.
It is so ordered.
Ii,

DATED this J!i"
/!i"day
___+_ 2008.
day of_----'-_
of
~2008.

_~e.~,---_
Cheri C. Copsey
District Judge

--r---a

Mark Ackley/Shannon Romero
State Appellate Public Defender for petitioner

Azad Abdullah
Petitioner

ORDER GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
AND GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
(ABDULLAH) PAGE 4
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MOLLY 1. HUSKEY, I.S.B. # 4843
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. #5888
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. #7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,
Petitioner,

v.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. SPOT0500308

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL
AFFIDAVIT OF AZAD HAJJ
ABDULLAH
(CAPITAL CASE)

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) ss
)
County of Ada

AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, being fIrst duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. All matters set forth are based on my personal knowledge, feelings and beliefs.
2. I am the Petitioner in the above-titled matter.
3. I have been represented by the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD)
since this Court ordered the appointment of the SAPD on April 7, 2005.
4. SpecifIcally, I was represented by Kimberly Simmons and Mark Ackley from the start of
my post-conviction case in March or April of 2005 to around January of 2006, when
Ronaldo Coulter replaced Mr. Ackley as my lead counsel. I was represented by Mr.
CoUlter and Ms. Simmons until October of 2006, when both Ms. Simmons and Mr.
Coulter left the SAPD office.

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH 1
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5. Since October of 2006, I have been continuously represented by Mark Ackley, an
attorney with the SAPD, who has served as lead counsel on my case.
6. Since April of 2007, I have been continuously represented by Shannon Romero, an
attorney with the SAPD, who has served as co-counsel on my case.
7. Since September of 2007, Nicole Owens, an attorney with the SAPD, has served as
additional counsel on my case.
8. During the nearly 4 Yz
~ years that I have been represented by the SAPD, I have developed
a strong relationship of trust with my attorneys and the staff at the SAPD, including but
not limited to Michael Shaw, the SAPD investigator, and Guadalupe Ayala, the SAPD
mitigation specialist. The SAPD staff feels to me like family, because I speak with them
and see them more often than illy own family. My parents and siblings also have strong
feelings of trust and confidence in the SAPD staff. Attachment 1, incorporated herein by
reference, is a photograph of my mother with members of the SAPD staff.
9. I am aware of and have received and read a copy of this Court's order directing my
attorneys, and the State, to provide information to this Court about the potential for a
conflict of interest arising from the SAPD's pretrial, trial, and post-trial contact "with my
trial attorneys, Mitch and Kim Toryanski. (See Order RE: SAPD Involvement with Trial
and Pre-Trial, filed 8/17/09.)
10. I am aware of and have received and read both a copy of the State's Memorandum Re:
SAPD involvement with trial and pretrial, filed August 31, 2009, and the SAPD's
Response to Court Order Inquiring into the Pretrial and Trial Involvement of the SAPD
with Trial Counsel, filed September 1, 2009. I am aware that both the State and my
counsel at the SAPD have represented to the Court that they do not believe a conflict of
interest exists based on the SAPD's pretrial, trial, and post-trial contact with my trial
counsel.
11. I am aware of and have received and read the Court's Order re: Conflict Counsel, filed
September 15,2009. My attorneys at the SAPD have reviewed and explained this Order
tome.
12. I am very concerned about the Court's order, which as I understand it, concludes that my
attorneys at the SAPD have a conflict of interest with me, based on the pretrial, trial and
post-trial contact the SAPD had with my trial counsel.
13. Because of my prior negative experience with the Toryanskis, which I outlined in detail
in my affidavit and supplemental affidavit, which are attached hereto and incorporated by
reference, I am extremely concemed
concerned about the Court's order. In light of my prior
experience with the Toryanskis, it has taken a long time for me to establish a good and
trusting relationship with my current counsel, Mr. Ackley, Ms. Romero, and Ms. Owens,
and the staff at the SAPD. Up to this point, I have had tremendous faith and confidence
in the SAPD's representation of me during these post-conviction proceedings and have

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH 2
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felt that my attorneys and the SAPD staff have been concerned with looking out for my
best interests and well-being throughout their representation of me.
14. This Court's Order re: Conflict Counsel causes me great concern, stress, and terrifies me
at the prospect of losing my attorneys and the staff at the SAPD. If my attorneys at the
SAPD are no longer allowed to represent me, I am also concerned about how much
longer this will delay my case, how long it will take me to establish a trusting relationship
with new lawyers if the SAPD can no longer represent me, and how allowing new
attorneys to represent me at this point will impact my post-conviction claims.

18 dayof~~009.
dayof~~009.

DATEDthis

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ,,/;&','6&'- day of ~
~ ,2009.

..........
........ 'I,'1,

,'

~.,
~"
....... I"~

. v..,l

,~

L
L

..••

~~~. ~\')A
~\)A (JPI;
UPI;' "'4!

~
~".

=*:

.........

..

.4 ###
~ ~~ #

•• -r~
or ~

N07'-1h
\~\•..
·r~ . • '

./*1
.
/*i
...
······o . .

::. . ......
•
..
..••

v!/
\;..\\ LItle

•.. r.II.
til.

~7~...
~7~...

.,.........

.,.. .>:..
...

~?? ..
Op ID~~
ID~~ ,I........
"'" OJ:

',

$

~

Residing at
~
at~_~...,....--.:......:..;:'-=:-_----r+-r",....-....,...,
My
db""" \\ d"
dMy commis-s7'"""io--":'n-'-e~xp=:ire-s----"-ift--c-I"""I""""
commission expires
.

.

",.,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of
, 2009, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:

MELISSA RICHESON GALLEGOS
Administrative Assistant
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DEFlUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,
Petitioner,
CV-PC-2005-0030S
CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-00308
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATUS MEMORANDUM

Res ondent.

In confonnity with the intent ofLC. § 19-2719 (8),1 the Court hereby provides the Idaho
Supreme Court with a memorandum describing the status of post-conviction in this case.
(Attached is a copy of the current Register of Actions.) The Court has given this case first priority

but has found repeatedly that the time limitations set forth in I.e. § 19-2719 could not be met and
still accommodate Abdullah's constitutional rights. Therefore, the Court has extended the time
limits set forth in the statute as follows. These extensions have been at Abdullah's requests,
based on sworn testimony, and upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances which would

make it impossible to fairly consider Abdullah's claims in the time provided.
The jury trial against the defendant, Azad Haji Abdullah, commenced on September 10,
2004, with the selection of a jUlY and ended on November 18,
IS, 2004, on an Indictment, filed
November 15,2002. The underlying case took more than two (2) months to try and several years
of complex litigation. The Court entered judgment on March 4, 2005.

Abdul1~'s
Abdull~'s case

involves

complex legal and factual matters.
Abdullah timely filed his original Post-Conviction Petition on April 15, 2005, and under
oath the Petitioner, Azad Abdullah, testified that he needed substantially more time to investigate

his claims and to prepare an Amended Petition. The State answered on May 12,2005, and the
heJd a status conference on June 29,2005.
Court held

I

The Court notes that there is no procedure for compliance with this statute.

STATUS MEMORANDUM
CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-00308
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5

At that status conference, the parties all agreed that both parties needed substantially more
time to properly investigate potential post-conviction claims and both requested the Court to issue
a scheduling order allowing Abdullah to file an Amended Petition on July 14,2006 with the State
responding in September 29, 2006. The Court found good cause to grant their requests and issued
a scheduling order on June 30, 2005, incorporating those requests.

6

On January 13, 2006, Abdullah again moved the Court for an extension oftime supporting

7

that request with an Affidavit from Kimberly Simmons, State Appellate Public Defender's Office,

8

stating good cause for another extension. The Court held a hearing on january 20, 2006, found

17

~?

good cause to grant the extension and issued a scheduling order ordering any Amended Petition to
be filed by January 19, 2007, with the State answering within ninety (90) days.

On December 20, 2007, Abdullah again moved the Court for an extension of time
supporting that request with an Affidavit from Mark Ackley, State Appellate Public Defender's
Office, stating good cause for a six (6) month extension. The Court held a hearing on December
21, 2006, found good cause for the extension and granted the request. The Court ordered any
Amended Petition to be filed no later than July 19,2007, with the State answering within ninety
(90) days.
Abdullah filed his Amended Petition on July 19, 2007. Due to concerns. about juror
privacy the Court allowed Abdullah to withdraw that Amended Petition and to file an Amended
Petition that protected juror privacy. The Court held a number of status conferences subsequent
to this filing.
The State answered the Amended Petition and moved for summary disposition on April
10,2008.
On August 29, 2008, Abdullah filed his Final Amended Petition and on September 26,
2008, moved to supplement his Final Amended Petition. The State moved to strike portions of
the Final Amended Petition. The State answered the Final Amended Petition and moved for
summary disposition on March 31, 2009. Abdullah moved for an extension of time to allow his
response and supported his motion with an Affidavit from Mark Ackley, State Appellate Public
Defender's Office, stating good cause.

The Court granted his Motion.

On June 15, 2009,

Abdullah responded to the State's Motions and requested an evidentiary hearing. The Court held

STATUS MEMORANDUM
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11 a hearing on June 19, 2009, and ruled that an evidentiary hearing was necessary as to a number of
2 the claims. The Court requested the parties to get together and try to narrow the subject matter for
33 the evidentiary hearing because the parties indicated that they might need six (6) weeks. The
4

Court tentatively scheduled that hearing to begin in October.

55

7, 2009.
2009, and based on that hearing moved the
The Court held a hearing on August 7.

6

evidentiary hearing to begin February 2010. The Court scheduled an omnibus hearing to address

4,2009. The Court anticipates the parties may want to brief issues
77 any final issues on December 4.2009.
8 subsequent to the evidentiary hearing.
9
9
10

11
11
12

Based on the above and the schedule evidentiary hearing,
hearing. it is anticipated that the Court
1.2010.
will be able to rule on the pending Final Amended Petition no later than June 1,2010.
Ih
Dated this 18
IS 1h
day of August 2009.
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c~o~~-District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this li day of August 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the
within instroment to:

6
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10
11

14

17

GREG H. BOWER
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING AITORNEY
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
ROGER BOURNE
SHAWNA
SHAWN
A DUNN
INTERDEPT. MAIL

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
MARK J. ACKLEY
SHANNON N. ROMERO
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
BOISE, IDAHO 83703

IDAHO SUPREME COURT

18

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District
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Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

I

Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

I
' tte

Code

User

4/1512005

NEWC

CCCARUHA

New Case Filed

Cheri C. Copsey

CCCARUHA

Petition For Post Conviction Relief
Rel/ef

Cheri C. Copsey

CERT

CCCARUHA

Certificate Of Mailing

Cheri C. Copsey

122/2005
12/2005

NOTC

CCMONGKJ

Notice Of Filing

Cheri C. Copsey

RSPS

CCMONGKJ

Answ To Petn
Relf{bowerlst)
Pelo For Post Convctn Relf{bower/st)

Cheri C. Copsey

6/1712005

HRSC

CCGftOSPS

Cheri C. Copsey

I

Hearing Schedulect- (06129/2005) Cheri C.
Copsey

ORTR

CCGROSPS

Order To Transport (6129/05 @ 11 :00)

Cheri C. Copsey

6/2912005

HRHD

CCGROSPS

Hearing Held

Cheri C. Copsey

tO/2005
to/2005
11712005
/1712005

ORDR

CCGROSPS

Scheduling Order

Cheri C. Copsey

STIP

CCTHIEBJ

Stipulation For Release Of Jury Questlonnair
Questionnair

Cheri C. Copsey

1/21/2005

ORDR

DCANDEML

Order Granting Stip
Slip For Release Of Question

Cheri C. Copsey

122/2005

MOTN

CCTHIEBJ

Motion For Access To Computer For Reviewing

Cheri C. Copsey

OPPO

CCMARTLG

Qualified Non Opposition Molo
Motn Permit Access

Cheri C. Copsey

CONT

CCMARTLG

Audio/visual Equip Review Evidence

Cheri C. Copsey

[112005

MOTN

CCTHIEBJ

Motion For Scheduling Order

CheriC. Copsey

HRSC

CCMARTLG

Hearing Scheduled - Molo
Motn Sched Ordr

Cheri C. Copsey

/2212005

ORDR

CCGROSPS

Order Granting In Part Mtn To Permit Access to
AudioNldio Equipment

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCGROSPS

Mtn for Extension of Time to File Amended
Petition for PC Relief

Cheri C. Copsey

NOTC

CCGROSPS

Notice of Hearing (1/20/06 @ 1:00)

Cheri C. Copsey

MOrN

CCGROSPS

Motion for Petitioner Access to GJ Transcripts

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

CCGROSPS

Order Granting Motion for Ext. of Time to File
Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief

Cheri C. Copsey

HRHD

CCGROSPS

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on

Cheri C. Copsey

I

1211/2005
l14/2005

13/2006

1012006

I
I

Judge
JUdge

(01120/2006) Cheri C. Copsey

0112012006 01 :00 PM: Hearing Held Motn
Schad Ordr
HRSC

CCGROSPS

Hearing Scheduled (Status 05/02/200701:30
PM)

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Motion for Preparation of Transcripts

Cheri C. Copsey

OPPO

CCMARTLG

Cheri C. Copsey

1

Opposition to Motion to Release Grand Jury
Transcripts

4/ 2006
/

RSPN

CCTHIEBJ

Response To State's Opposition
OppOSition To Motion To
Release Of Grand Jury Transcripts

Cheri C. Copsey

4/20/2006

NOTH

CCHARRAK

Notice Of Hearing (5/15/06 @ 3:00pm)

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

1/

2006
1/2006
12006
/2006

,

,1/2006
11/2006

HRSC

CCHARRAK

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
05/15/2006 03:00 PM)

4/2812006
4/28/2006

ORTR

CCGROSPS

Order To Transport (5/15/06 @ 3:00 p.m.)

I
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User: DCCOPSCC

CV-PC-2005-21802 Current Judge:
Case: CV-PC-2005-21802
JUdge: Cheri C. Cppsey
Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

I

Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Code

User

HRHD

CCGROSPS

19/2006

ORDR

CCGROSPS

110/2006

MOTN

CCGROSPS

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
05115/2006 03:00 PM: Hearing Held
05/15/2006
Order Granting Petitioner Access to and
Possession of Grand Jury Transcripts with
Limitations
limitations
Motion for Status Conference

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

late

5/15/2006

Judge
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey

10/23/2006
1012312006

ORTR

CCGROSPS

Order To Transport (10/25106
(10125106 @ 4:3O--P.-M.}

t2212006

ORDR

CCGROSPS

HRVC

DCANDEML

Order Granting Motion for Extension of Time to
File An Amended Petition for Post Conviction
Relief
Hearing result for Status held on 05/0212007
01 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated

7/19/2007

PETN

DCELLlSJ

Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Cheri C. Copsey

rO/2007

ORDR

TCWEAT.IB
TCWEAT.JB

Cheri C. Copsey

816/2007

HRSC

DCANDEML

Order Permitting Withdraw! of Petitioner's
Petitlon for Post-Conviction Relief
Amended Petition
Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/09/2007 02:30
PM)

r

2OO7

Cheri C. Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey

I
I

ORDR

DCANDEML

Order to Transport (8/9 @ 2:30)

Cheri C. Copsey

PETN

TCWEAT.IB

Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Cheri C. Copsey

HRHD

TCWEATJB

Cheri C. Copsey

8/1712007

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Hearing result for Status held on 08/09/2007
02:30 PM: Hearing Held
Privilege
Motion For Waiver Of Atty/Client PriVilege

127/2007

NOTC

TCWEATJB

8/28/2007

ORDR

15/2007

8/9/2007

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

TCWEATJB

Non-Objection to State's
Notice of Conditional Non-Cbjection
Motion for Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
Order for Waiver of Attorney/Client Privilege

MOTN

DCANDEML

Motion for Discovery

Cheri C. Copsey

MEMO

DCANDEML

Memorandum of law In Support of Motion for
Discovery

Cheri C. Copsey

112/2007

MOTN

CCEARWD

Cheri C. Copsey

9/19/2007

MEMO

DCANDEML

Motion for Order Requiring Preservation of All
Physical and Documentary Evidence
EVidence
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Preserve
Evidence

NOTH

DCANDEML

Notice Of Hearing (10/11/07 @ 2:30)

Cheri C. Copsey

HRSC

DCANDEML

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
10/11/200702:30 PM)

Cheri C. Copsey

OBJT

CCMARTLG

State's Objection To The Motn For Discovery

Cheri C. Copsey

MEMO

CCMARTLG

State's Memorandum In Support of the State's
Motn For Discovery
Objection to The Malo

Cheri C. Copsey

1/10/2007

ORTR

DCANDEML

Order To Transport (10/11/07 @ 2:30)

Cheri C. Copsey

(11/2007

HRHD

TCWEATJB

Hearing result for Discovery Motion held on
10/111200702:30 PM: Hearing Held

Cheri C. Copsey

/26/2007

MOTN

DCANDEML

(3) Motion Directing Shipment of Evidence to
Petitioner's Expert

Cheri C. Copsey

I
126/2007

I

Cheri C. Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey
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ROA Report
Case: CV-PC-2005-21802 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey
Azad Haji Abdullah.
Idaho. Defendant
Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho,

I

Hajj Abdullah.
Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho.
Idaho, Defendant
Azad Haji

Lte

Code

User

10/26/2007

MOTN

DCANDEML

Motion to Permit Release of Evidence to
Petitioner's Expert

Cheri C. Copsey

NOTC

DCANDEML

Notice of Discovery Status

Cheri C. Copsey

OBJT

CCWRIGRM

States Objection to Motions Directing Shipment of Cheri C. Copsey
Evidence to Petitioner's Expert

1/14/2007

ORDR

DCANDEML

Order Permitting Petititoner's Counsel to Depose Cheri C. Copsey
Erika
Klein
ErikaKJein

t4/2007
15/2007

MOTN

TCWEATJB

Motion for Waiver of Altomey-Cllent
Attomey-Cllent Privilege

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order for Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege

Cheri C. Copsey

f1712007

MOTN

DCANDEML

Motion for Preparation of Transcripts

Cheri C. Copsey

NOTC

DCANDEML

Notice of Hearing (12113)

Cheri C. Copsey

HRSC

DCANDEML

Hearing
HearIng Scheduled (Motion 12113/200702:00
PM)

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Motion
Mollon for Discovery

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Motion
MotIon To Compel

Cheri C. Copsey

BREF

CCMARTLG

Brief In Support Of Motn To Compel

Cheri C. Copsey

NOTH

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Hearing (12-13-07 @ 2 pm)

Cheri C. Copsey

RSPN

CCTOONAL

Response to Discovery

Cheri C. Copsey

CONT

TCWEATJB

Hearing result for Motion held on 1211312007
Cheri C. Copsey
02:00 PM: Continued To Compel And Motn For
Discovery

HRSC

TCWEAT.IB

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 121181200709:00
Compel/Discovery Issues
AM) Motion to CompeVDlscovery

Cheri C. Copsey

Lte

1/9/2007

1u11/2007

I
~1312007
~1312007
1812007

Judge

I
I

HRHD

TCWEATJB

Hearing result for Motion held on 12118/2007
09:00 AM: Hearing Held MotIon
Motion to
Compel/Discovery Issues

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order Permitting Petitioner's Counsel to Depose
Tod
T
od Littlefield

Cheri C. Copsey

1/21/2007

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order Directing the Preparation of Transcripts

Cheri C. Copsey

NOFG

TCWEATJB

Notice Of Filing

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order re: Juror Contact

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

TCWEAT.IB

Order to Transport (2/14/08 at 11 AM)

Cheri C. Copsey

HRSC

TCWEATJB

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled

Cheri C. Copsey

1/31/2007
2/2008

0211412008 11 :00 AM) hearing re juror contact
l3/2008

RSPS

CCMARTlG

Response To Order Re Juror Contact

Cheri C. Copsey

(812008

MEMO

CCDWONCP

Memorandum in Support of Order Limiting Jury
Contact

Cheri C. Copsey

722/2008

MOTN

DCTYLENI

PrOVide Trial Documents
Motion to Provide

Cheri C. Copsey

124/2008

MOTN

TCWEATJB

Motion for Partial Summary Disposition &
Memorandum in Support Thereof

Cheri C. Copsey

1/25/2008

RSPS

CCCHILER

Response to Motion for Partial Summary
Cheri C. Copsey
Disposition and Memorandum in Support Thereof

I
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I
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User: DCCOPSCC

ROA Report
Case: CV-PC-2005-21802 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey
Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs Stale Of Idaho, Defendant

Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

late

Code

User

1/3112008
1/31/2008

RSPN

TCWEATJB

MEMO

TCWEATJB

211312008
2/1312008

REPL

TCWI;ATJB

Reply to Response to Motion for Partial Summary Cheri C. Copsey
Disposition & Memorandum in Support

114/2008
11412008

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order Granting State's Motion to Compel
Discovery and Granting Petitioner's Motion for
Protective Order

Cheri C. Copsey

HRHD

TCWEATJB

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on

Cheri C. Copsey

I
I

1
1

Judge
Ex Parte Supplemental Response to Order Re:
Juror Contact
Document sealed
Memorandum in Response to State's
Memorandum In Support of Order Limiting Juror
Contact

Cheri C. Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey

0211412008 11:00 AM: Hearing Held hearing re
juror contact

/25/2008
1/25/2008
12712008

MOTN

CCPRICDL

Motion to Vacate Depositions

HRSC

TCWEATJB

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel
04111/2008 02:00 PM) Motion to Vacate
Depositions

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

1128/2008

NOHG

CCBOYIDR

Notice Of Hearing (4-11-08 @ 2:00pm) Motion to Cheri C. Copsey
Vacate Depositions and Motion to Compel

/8/2008
1/8/2008
110/2008

1

ORDR

DCDANSEL

Order to Transport (April 11, 2008 at 2:00 p.m.)

ANSW

CCAMESLC

Answer to Amended Petition for Post conviction
Cheri C. Copsey
Relief and Motion for Summary Disposition (Dunn
for State of 10)

1/11/2008

HRHD

TCWEATJB

Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on

Cheri C. Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey

04/1.112008 02:00 PM: Hearing Held Motion to
Vacate Depositions

117/2008
t7/2008
11212008
'11212008

PROS

PRPERRRA

Prosecutor assigned Shawna Dunn

Cheri C. Copsey

PROS

PRPERRRA

Prosecutor assigned ROGER BOURNE

Cheri C. Copsey

il29/2008

MISC

DCDANSEL

Final Amended Peititon for Post-Convlction
Relief

Cheri C. Copsey

126/2008
111/26/2008

MOTN

DCDANSEL

Motion for Court to Take JUdicial NOtice

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

DCDANSEL

Renewed and Supplemental Motion for Discovery Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

DCDANSEL

Motion to Supplement Final Amended Petition for Cheri C. Copsey
Post Conviction Relief Addenda With Original
Affidavits

MOTN

DCDANSEL

MOtion to Compel Discovery from Trial Counsel
(Kim Toryanski)

Cheri C. Copsey

.1/1212008
.1/1212008

OBJT

CCWATSCL

State's Objection to the Renewed and
Supplemental Motion for Discovery

Cheri C. Copsey

1/17/2008
1111/17/2008

OBJT

CCWATSCL

Objection to Motion to Compel Discovery from
Trial Counsel

Cheri C. Copsey

11125/2008

OBJE

MCBIEHKJ

Objection to Motion for Court to Take Judicial
Notice

Cheri C. Copsey

12115/2008

NOTC

TCWEATJB

Notice of Hearing

Cheri C. Copsey

rOO8
1
I

1
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1

Date: 8/18/2009

Fourth Judicia' District Court· Ada County

lme: 10:04 AM

ROA Report

ge 50f6

User: DCCOPSCC

Case: CV-PC-2005-21802 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey
Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

1

Azad Haji Abduliah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

late

Code

User

(1512008

HRSC

TCWEATJB

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/16/200902:00
PM)

Cheri C. Copsey

18/2008

CONT

TCWEATJB

Hearing Reset (Motion 01/09/200902:00 PM)

Cheri C. Copsey

TCWEATJB

Order to Transport

Cheri C. Copsey

REPL

TCWEATJB

Reply to State's Objection to Motion to Compel
Discovery from Trial Counsel (Kim Toryanskl)

Cheri C. Copsey

REPL

TCWEAT.IB
TCWEAT.lB

Reply to State's Objection to Motion for Court to - Cheri C. Copsey
Take Judicial Notice

'n12009

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Motion to Strike

Cheri C. Copsey

,9/2009
19/2009

DCHH

TCWEATJB

Cheri C. Copsey

1

Hearing result for Motion held on 01/09/2009
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Madsen
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Under 100 Pages

HRSC

TCWEATJB

Hearing Scheduled (Status 06/191200902:00
PM)

Cheri C. Copsey

16/2009

Judge

/2 9
1:/2009
OO
7/2009

E

NOTC

TCWEATJB

Notice of Redactions Made to Prior Findings

Cheri C. Copsey

RESP

CCTOWNRD

Response To Court

Cheri C. Copsey

3/612009

NOTC

DCDANSEL

Notice of Clarification of the Record, Limited
Request for Discovery, and Motion for the Court
and the Parties to Rely on the Record

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order Denying Petitioner's Motion to Compel
Discovery from Trial Counsel (Kim Toryanski)

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part
Petitioner's Motion for Court to Take Judicial
Notice

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order Regarding Petitioner's Renewed and
Supplemental Motion for Discovery

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCLYKEAL

Motion for Summary Disposition (Dunn for State
of Idaho)

Cheri C. Copsey

ANSW

CCLYKEAL

Answer to Amended Petition for Post Conviction Cheri C. Copsey
Relief and Brief in support of Motion for Summary
Disposition

MOTN

CCRANDJD

Motion for 14 day Exentsion

Cheri C. Copsey

AFFD

CCRANDJO
CCRANDJD

Affidavit of Mark JAckley

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order Granting Motion For 14-Day Extension To
File Response To The State's Motion For
Summary Disposition

Cheri C. Copsey

TCWEATJB

Order to Transport

Cheri C. Copsey

1
1
1
1

3/17/2009

3/31/2009

1114/2009
tO/2009

1/1212009
11512009

MISC

DCDANSEL

Response to the State's Motion for Summary
Disposition

Cheri C. Copsey

1/1612009

MISC

DCDANSEL

Response to Motion to Strike (Juror's Affidavit
from the Record)

Cheri C. Copsey

6/18/2009

NOTC

TCWEATJB

Notice of Filing Table of Contents and Index of
Addenda to Response to the State's Motion for
Summary Disposition

Cheri C. Copsey

1
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User: DCCOPSCC

Case: CV-PC-2005-21802 Current JUdge:
Judge: Cheri C. Copsey

"ge 6 of6

Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

I

Azad Haji Abdullah. Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho. Defendant
Code

User

NOTC

TCWEATJB

Notice of Supplemental Authority

Cheri C. Copsey

NOTC

TCWEATJB

Notice of FIling Original Verfication Page

Cheri C. Copsey

6/19/2009

DCHH

TCWEATJB

Hearing result for Status held on 06/1912009
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Madsen
Number of TranSCript
Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Under 100 Pages

Cheri C. Copsey

12612009
126/2009

MOTN

DCDANSEl

Motion for More Time to Contact Witnesses for
Evidentiary Hearing

Cheri C. Copsey

MEMO

OCDANSEl
DCDANSEl

Memorandum in Support of Motion for More Time Cheri C. Copsey
to Contact Witneses for Evidentiary Hearing

1612009
16/2009

OROR

DCDANSEl

Order Re: Evidentiary
EVidentiary Hearing

Cheri C. Copsey

718/2009
7/8/2009

STIP

MCBIEHKJ

Stipulation for Extension of Time

Cheri C. Copsey

1912009
19/2009

HRSC

TCWEATJB

Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/0712009 01 :30
PM)

Cheri C. Copsey

7121/2009

TRLD

TCWEATJB

Transcript Lodged: 06-19-09

Cheri C. Copsey

TCWEATJB

Order to Transport

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

TCWEATJB

Motion For Preparation Of Transcripts

Cheri C. Copsey

REQU

TCWEATJB

Request For Status Of Pending Motion For Partial Cheri C. Copsey
Summary Disposition And Discovery Motions

'/30/2009

STIP

CCHOlMEE

Stipulation Re: Claims

Cheri C. Copsey

~4/2009
~4/2009

ORDR

TCWEATJB

TranSCripts
Order Directing The Preparation Of Transcripts

Cheri C. Copsey

1'6/2009
81712009

MOTN

TCWEATJB

Motion For Preparation Of Transcripts

Cheri C. Copsey

MISC

TCWEATJB

Miscellaneous: 54 Documents Unsealed

Cheri C. Copsey

MISC

TCWEATJB

Miscellaneous: 65 Documents Unsealed

Cheri C. Copsey

MISC

TCWEATJB

Miscellaneous: 4 Documents Unsealed

Cheri C. Copsey

DCHH

TCWEATJB

Hearing result for Status held on 08/0712009
01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Madsen
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Under 100 Pages

Cheri C. Copsey

HRSC

TCWEATJB

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
12/04/200901 :30 PM) Omnibus Hearing

Cheri C. Copsey

MISC
MiSC

TCWEATJB

Proposed Agenda Items For Status Conference

Cheri C. Copsey

1,11/2009

ORDR

DCDANSEL

Standing Order Directing the Preparation of
Transcripts of All Post Conviction Hearings
TranSCripts

Cheri C. Copsey

1/17/2009

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order Re: SAPO Involvement With Trial And
Pre-Trial

Cheri C. Copsey

6/18/2009

I
I

Judge

-

1

28/2009

2912009

I
I
I

I
I
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J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
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By J. WEATHERBY

1

24
25
26

1 27

OEPUTY

IN TIlE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
TIlE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

AZAD HAJI ABDlJLLAH,

Petitioner,
CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-00308

vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

ORDER APPOINTING KEITH ROARK

Respondent.

In reviewing the material filed in support of the Final Amended Petition, including various
e-mails attached to the Toryanskis' depositions, it came to the Court's attention that several of the
State Appellate Pub:lic Defender's Office attorneys, including Molly Husky, the State Appellate
Public Defender, Mark Ackley, Chief of the Capital Litigation Unit, and Kimberly Simmons,
provided advice to :Mr.
Ncr. Abdullah's privately retained trial counsel before trial began, during jury
voir dire, during trial and post trial.)

The record establishes that the State Appellate Public

Defender's Office advised trial counsel on several matters, including advising them to seek a
continuance of the trial (which they did) and suggesting specific voir dire approaches. Both of
these areas are the subject of Mr. Abdullah's post-conviction claims. The full extent of the State
Appellate Public Defender's Office's involvement and what advice was given was unclear.
Therefore, concernecj about the apparent conflict of interest, the Court ordered counsel to address
the implications and extent ofthis involvement.
Both the State and the State Appellate Public Defender's Office responded and provided
the Court with additional evidence. Based on those responses, the Court found that the State
Appellate Public Defender's Office had a conflict of interest in its representation of Mr. Abdullah

28

1 29

30

1 The Court notes that Ms. Simmons and Mr. Ackley specifical1y
specifically represented to the Court in the original Petition that
they had no involvement in the trial of this matter. It was on this representation that the Court found good cause to

1 31

1

~')

ORDER APPOINTING KEITH ROARK
CASE NO. CV-PC-1005-00308
CV-PC-l005-00308

1
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FOURTH DISTRICT COURT

->

PD ST APPELLANT

I4i 002/004

1

in post-conviction proceedings as outlined in its September 15,2009, order. The law is clear that

2

once a court concludes defense counsel does have a conflict, it must obtain a knowing, intelligent

:3
4
:5
6
~
8
:9

including federal habeas or successive post-conviction actions. Mr. Roark is private counsel

10

qualified to represent indigent defendants at trial, in post-conviction and in appellate death penalty

11
12

cases, having been c·ertified by the Idaho Supreme Court. It does not appear that Mr. Roark has

and voluntary waiver from the defendant or give the defendant an opportunity to acquire new
counsel.

See State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259, 77 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct.App. 2003).2 Mr.

Abdullah is indigent and is entitled to conflict free counsel at public expense.
In order to ensure that Mr. Abdullah knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waives this

7

conflict, the Court hereby appoints R. Keith Roark to independently advise Mr. Abdullah about
the conflict and its potential effect on this post-conviction case, as well as any future proceedings,

had any prior involvement in Mr. Abdullah's representation.

13

As part of this appointment, the Court authorizes Mr. Roark to conduct a thorough and

14

searching review of the State Appellate Public Defender's pre-trial, trial and pre-sentence

15

it:; appointment to represent Mr. Abdullah on appeal and on post-conviction. If
involvement up to it3

16
17

he needs to take depositions, he may do so. Furthermore, the Court hereby forwards copies of the
relevant materials provided to the Court including the following:

18
19

1) State Appellate Public Defender's Office Motion and Memorandum for
Targeted Inquiry filed 9-25-09;

20

2) Order re: Conflict Counsel filed 9-15-09;

21

3) Response to Court Order Inquiring into the Pretrial and Trial Involvement
of the SAPD with Trial Counsel filed 9-1-09;

22

4) Memorandum Re: SAPD Involvement with Trial and Pre Trial filed 8-318-31
09; and

23
24

5) Order Re: SAPD Involvement With Trial And Pre-Trial filed 8-17-09.

25

Following a thorough review of the record and any investigation he deems necessary, he

26
27

shall meet with and advise Mr. Abdullah regarding the conflict and any decision to waive the

28
28
29
29

allow the State AppeUab;:
AppeUat.;: Public Defender's Office more than three years to finalize the post-conviction petition. This
of the conflict.
is why the Court was unaware ofthe

30
:~

2 This was recently reafftrrned
reafftnned in State v. Severson, - P.3d ----, 2009 WL 1492659 (Idaho, 2009). While rehearing
denied, Sevenon
Severson ha,.o,
has not yet been released for publication and cannol
cannot be cited.
I was denied.

31
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conflict. Once he is satisfied that Mr. Abdullah understands his rights and is capable of making a
knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision, Mr. Roark should schedule a hearing before this
Court.

IT IS SO OltDERED.
Dated this 15th day of October 2009.

9
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3
4
5

I hereby certi fy that on this

ti day of October 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the

within instrument to:

6
7
8

9
10

GREG H. BOWER
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
DEPUTY PROSEClJTING ATTORNEY
ROGER BOURNE
SHAWNADUNN
INTERDEPT. MAIL

11
12
13
14

15
16

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
MARK J. ACKLEY
SHANNON N. ROMERO
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
BOISE, IDAHO 837()3
83703

17
AZAD ABDULLAH
#76321
19 IMSI-J BLOCK
20 P.O. BOX 51
. BOISE, IDAHO 83707

18

21
J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the Dis .ct
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24
25
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27
28
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30
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843

J DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
•

~TIMORE
By eARL.Y ~TIMORE
DEPUTY

MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. #6330
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. #5888
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. #7679
Capital Litigation Unit
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CV-PC-2005-21802
CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-21802
(fonnerly SPOT0500308)
AMENDED MOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL

(Capital Case)

The Petitioner, AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, by and through his attorneys, Mark Ackley,
Shannon Romero and Nicole Owens of the State Appellate Public Defender's Office (hereinafter
"SAPD"), hereby moves this Honorable Court for pennission to appeal, pursuant to I.A.R. 12(c),
12(c),
from the Order Re: Conflict Counsel, filed September 15, 2009, and the Order Appointing Keith
Roark, filed October 15, 2009. (Order re: Conflict Counsel, attached hereto as Appendix 4; Order
Appointing Keith Roark, attached hereto as Appendix 8.) Mr. Abdullah moved for pennission to
appeal this Court's Order re: Conflict Counsel on September 24, 2009, but this Court has not yet
addressed that motion. This Amended Motion for Pennission to Appeal incorporates that prior
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motion for permission to appeal, and includes the additional request for permission to appeal the
Court's Order Appointing Keith Roark.
ARGUMENT

1.
This Court's Orders Finding A Conflict In The SAPD's Representation Of Mr. Abdullah And
Appointing Keith Roark Present A Controlling Question Of Law As To Which There Are
Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion And In Which An Immediate Appeal May
Materially Advance The Orderly Resolution Of These Post-Conviction Proceedings
A.

Introduction
On August 17,2009, the Court issued an order directing the parties to address the following

issues: (1) the potential impact of any pretrial and trial involvement the SAPD had with trial
counsel; (2) whether the SAPD's past involvement creates a current a conflict of interest; (3) the
extent of the SAPD's involvement; and (4) whether the SAPD's pretrial and trial involvement with
trial counsel makes members of the SAPD potential witnesses. (Appendix 1.)
The State filed its Memorandum Re: SAPD Involvement With Trial And Pre-Trial on
August 31, 2009, and the SAPD filed its Response To Court Order Inquiring Into The Pretrial And
Trial Involvement Of The SAPD With Trial Counsel on September 1,2009. (State's Memorandum
Re: SAPD Involvement With Trial And Pretrial, attached hereto as Appendix 2; SAPD's Response
To Court Order Inquiring Into The Pretrial And Trial Involvement Of The SAPD With Trial
Counsel, attached hereto as Appendix 3.) In these pleadings, both parties explained why they did
not believe the SAPD had a conflict of interest. Nevertheless, on September 15, 2009, the Court
disagreed with the opinions of both parties and entered its order finding that the SAPD has a
conflict in its representation of Mr. Abdullah. (See Appendix 4.) The Court found that a conflict
exists because the SAPD "may have foregone viable ineffective assistance of counsel claims
because such claims may implicate advice the attorneys gave to Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel."
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(Appendix 4, p.4, Ls.16-l9
Ls.16-19 (emphasis added).)

The Court further scheduled a hearing for

September 25, 2009, for the stated purpose of determining "whether Mr. Abdullah can knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily waive these conflicts, whether the Court should appoint conflict
counsel to advise him regarding this waiver, or whether the Court should order the State Appellate
Public Defender's Office to provide Mr. Abdullah death qualified private counsel to represent him
in these post-conviction proceedings at public expense." (Appendix 4, p.6 (emphasis in original).)
2009, Mr. Abdullah moved this Court for ,l2ermissiQn
Qn;ier
On.September 24~ 2009.
J2ermissiQn to appeal the On;ler
Re: Conflict Counsel pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule (LA.R.) 12. That same day, Mr. Abdullah
filed an unrelated motion to disqualify this Court from presiding over Mr. Abdullah's postconviction case. Presumably due to the filing of the motion to disqualify, the Court entered an
order vacating the hearing scheduled for September 25, 2009. (Order to Rescind Transport Order,
attached hereto as Appendix 13.i
l3.i On September 25, 2009, Mr. Abdullah filed a motion for a
targeted inquiry, supported by a memorandum, further demonstrating the lack of a conflict of
interest and specifically requesting this Court to inter alia identify the purported conflict of interest.
(Motion for a Targeted Inquiry and Memorandum in Support of Motion for a Targeted Inquiry,
attached hereto as Appendix 9.)
Counsel for Mr. Abdullah sought to schedule a hearing for his motion to disqualify, as well
the motion for permission to appeal inter alia, but was allowed only to notice a hearing on the
motion to disqualify. (See Email exchange between Judge Copsey's Court Clerk, John Weatherby,
the prosecutor, and members of the SAPD office, attached hereto as Appendix 10); see also Local
Rules of the District Court and Magistrate Division for the Fourth Judicial District, Rule 2.1 ("To
schedule or re-schedule any court hearing or proceeding, counsel must contact the clerk of the

See LR.C.P. 40(d)(5) ("Upon the filing of a motion for disqualification, the presiding judge shall
be without authority to act further in such action except to grant or deny such motion for
disqualification. ").
disqualification.").
I
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presiding judge for a date and time certain."). Accordingly, a hearing was scheduled for October
15, 2009, for the sole purpose of addressing Mr. Abdullah's motion to disqualify. (See Azad Haji
Abdullah ROA Case Number CV-PC-2005-21802 (formerly SPOT0500308), attached hereto as
Appendix 11.) On October 15, 2009, this Court heard argument solely on the motion to disqualify.
However, at the conclusion of argument, the Court not only denied the motion to disqualify but also
summarily ordered the appointment of Keith Roark to "independently advise Mr. Abdullah about
the conflict and its potential effect on this post-conviction case; as weHas- any future proceedings,
including federal habeas or successive post-conviction actions." (Appendix 8, p.2.) The Court
noted that it had not found that the SAPD had rendered any deficient or incompetent advice to Mr.
Abdullah's trial counsel, but believed appointment of conflict counsel was necessary to protect Mr.
Abdullah's Sixth Amendment rights. 2 The Court indicated that the post-conviction proceedings
would be suspended until resolution of the conflict issue, placing no time limitation on such
resolution.

The Court did not invite any input or response from either party regarding its

determination to appoint Mr. Roark and indefinitely suspend the post-conviction proceedings. 3 The
Court did not rule upon the request for a targeted inquiry, but nevertheless forwarded the motion
and memorandum to Keith Roark for his review. (See Appendix 8, p.2.)
Therefore, pursuant to I.A.R. 12, Mr. Abdullah moves this Court for permission to appeal
the order finding a conflict of interest and the order appointing Keith Roark (Appendices 4 & 8),
A copy of the transcript from the October 15, 2009 hearing is not yet transcribed; accordingly,
undersigned counsel is relying on their best recollection of the hearing, and will defer to the official
transcript of the hearing should it be inconsistent with anything stated herein. A standing order
requiring the preparation of transcripts from all hearings in Mr. Abdullah's post-conviction case is
in effect and the transcript should be available soon.
2

The Court made its ruling from the bench and then immediately departed the courtroom without
providing the parties any opportunity, or at most a meaningful opportunity, to respond. Since the
Court departed without comment, this will not be reflected in the official transcript. Counsel for
Mr. Abdullah invites the Court and the State to comment on this if either the Court or the State
believes this is not a fair and accurate reflection of what transpired at the conclusion of the hearing.
3
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which is necessary to preclude an unwarranted inquiry of Mr. Abdullah, to prevent any additional
interference with the attorney-client relationship, to prevent unnecessary delay, to prevent the
abrogation of the legislature's intent in creating the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender,
and to prevent the unnecessary expenditure of scarce financial resources.
B.

This Court's Orders Finding A Conflict In The SAPD's Representation Of Mr.
Abdullah And Appointing Keith Roark Present A Controlling Question Of Law As To
Which There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion
~ 12,. a request for permissi~tQappeal
be_made. to the district court
pursuant 10 LA..R.-12,.
permissiOll-tQappeal must beJuade

prior to filing a motion for permissive appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. Permission for an

interlocutory appeal may be granted by the district court where there is "a controlling question of
law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate
appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation."

I.A.R. 12(a).
1.

This Court's Finding The SAPD Has A Conflict In Its Representation Of Mr.
Abdullah And Its Order Appointing Keith Roark Involve A Controlling Question
Of Law

This Court found the SAPD has a conflict of interest based on the SAPD's limited contact
with trial counsel during the course of trial counsels' representation of Mr. Abdullah, and as a
result, has appointed Keith Roark to independently review and advise Mr. Abdullah regarding the
purported conflict of interest. (See Appendix 4; Appendix 8.) The controlling question of law is
whether a district court in a capital post-conviction proceeding can validly find a conflict of

interest, suspend post-conviction proceedings, and appoint separate counsel based solely on postconviction counsels' limited contact with, and "advice" to, trial counsel during the underlying

criminal proceedings, where the district court cannot identify the specific scope and nature of the
conflict, cannot identify any prejUdice
prejudice to the petitioner arising from the alleged conflict, and where
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both parties agree that no conflict exists. (See Appendix 4; Appendix 8.) This is a legal question of

Rudell v. Todd, 105
first impression and is a substantial legal issue of great public interest. See Budell
Idaho 2,3-4,665 P.2d 701, 702-03 (1983).
2.

There Are Substantial· Grounds For Differences Of Opinion Involving This
Oflnterest And Appointing Keith Roark
Court's Orders Finding A Conflict OfInterest
1.

There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion Involving This
Court's Order Finding A Conflict Oflnterest
OfInterest

·ofupinion regarding this-controlling question of law stem
. SUbstantial grounds for difference ·ofupinionregarding
from case law cited in the SAPD's response to the Court's inquiry, which is incorporated here by
reference. (See Appendix 3.) In concluding no conflict of interest exists between the SAPD and
Mr. Abdullah, the SAPD relied on a Sixth Amendment analysis adopted by the Idaho Supreme

Court in State v. Severson, _

Idaho _ , 215 P.3d 414 (2009), and set forth in numerous U.S.

Supreme Court decisions. "The Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes a correlative right to
representation free from conflicts of interest." Lewis v. Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2004).
In several cases in which the Supreme Court has defined the right to conflict-free counsel, the
defense attorney actively and concurrently represented conflicting interests. Mickens v. Taylor, 535
U.S. 162, 166-167 (2002); see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (attorney
representing co-defendants); Cuyler v. Sullivan 446 U.S. 335, 337-38 (1990) (same). In such cases,
the Court created a distinction between an actual conflict of interest, which adversely affects
counsels' performance, and a mere theoretical one. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171-172 ("[A]n actual
conflict of interest [means] precisely a conflict that affected counsel's performance-as opposed to a
mere theoretical division of loyalties.").

Specifically, it must be established the defendant's

counsel actively represents conflicting interests to establish an actual conflict of interest. See

AMENDED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL
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Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 62 106 P.3d 376,388 (2004) (Dunlap III) (citing State v. Wood, 132

Idaho 88, 98, 967 P.2d 702, 712 (1998)). As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:
The effective performance of counsel requires meaningful compliance with the
duty of loyalty and the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, and a breach of these
basic duties can lead to ineffective representation. More than a mere possibility of
a conflict, however, must be shown. The Sixth Amendment is implicated only
when the representation of counsel is adversely affected by an actual conflict of
interest.
United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 375 (4th Cir.l991);
Cir.1991); see also People ex reI. Woodardv. Dist.
Ct., 704 P.2d 851, 853 (Col. 1985) ("[A] trial court may not disqualify counsel on the basis of

speculation or conjecture
.... ").
conjecture....").
Courts generally give great weight to opinions of counsel in determining whether a conflict
exists.

As the United States Supreme Court has noted, trial courts "necessarily rely in large

measure upon the good faith and good judgment of defense counsel." Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347
(citing Holloway, 435 U.S. at 482); see also Burger, 483 U.S. at 784. Some courts, including the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held trial counsel's judgment that no conflict of interest exists
is a sufficient basis for a court to conclude there is no conflict. United States v. Crespo de Llano,
838 F.2d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Fish, 34 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir.
1994); United States v. Haren, 952 F.2d 190, 195 (8th Cir. 1987). Consistent with its ethical

obligations, Mr. Abdullah's counsel assessed the alleged conflict of interest issue and concluded
that no conflict exists. This opinion was reached in consideration of counsels' obligations under
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, the state and federal constitutions, the Idaho Code, and
the American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (hereinafter ABA Guidelines). Notably, the State also researched
this issue and was of the opinion a conflict of interest does not exist. (See Appendix 2.)
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This Court's Order finds the conflict of interest is based on the fact the SAPD purportedly
advised trial counsel on a limited number of issues. Because of this "advice," the Court concludes
that "Mr. Abdullah has a 'colorable claim' that the [SAPD] has an actual conflict of interest and,
therefore, cannot represent him in this action." (Appendix 4, p.4, Ls. 10-12.) The Court specifically
noted that the SAPD "advis[ed] trial counsel to seek a continuance of the trial (which they did) and
suggest[ed] specific voir dire approaches." (Appendix 4, p.l, Ls.17-19.) The conflict, according to
this Court, is created by a theoretical situation in which the 8APD "may have foregone viable
ineffective assistance of counsel claims because such claims may implicate advice the attorneys
gave to Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel." (Appendix 4, pA,
p.4, Ls.16-19 (emphasis added).) Despite this
conclusion, the Court acknowledges that "[b]oth of these areas are the subject of Mr. Abdullah's
post-conviction claims." (Appendix 4, p.l, Ls.18-19.) Indeed, the Court has previously stated that
Mr. Abdullah, in his Final Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, "essentially [] alleges ineffective
assistance of counsel for nearly every decision made by trial counsel in petitioner's defense."
(Order Granting State's Motion to Compel Discovery and Granting Petitioner's Motion for a
Protective Order, filed 2114/08,
2/14/08, attached hereto as Appendix 5.) Moreover, the Court fails to
identify a single claim that was not raised by the SAPD on Mr. Abdullah's behalf, and even
acknowledges that it will not address the merits of any allegedly foregone claim. (Appendix 4, p.4
n.4 ("The Court is not making a determination regarding the validity of such claim if made by Mr.
Abdullah in a subsequent proceeding.").) In other words, the Court's conflict analysis apparently
extends to situations in which the SAPD has foregone raising entirely frivolous post-conviction
claims on Mr. Abdullah's behalf. There is simply no evidence to support the Court's finding the
SAPD has refrained from raising any legitimate claims due to advice they may have given trial
counsel. In short, the Court's order .fails to identify the specific scope and nature of the SAPD's
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conflict of interest, and at most identifies a vague and theoretical conflict supported by nothing in
the record other than pure conjecture. A careful examination of the SAPD's advice and its contacts
with trial counsel reveals there is no conflict. (See Appendix 9, incorporated here by reference.)
11.

There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion Involving This
Oflnterest To The Entire SAPD Office
Court's Order Imputing The Conflict OfInterest

Assuming arguendo there is a conflict which Mr. Abdullah is unwilling to waive, this
Court's order imputing the conflict to the entire SAPD office is contrary to controlling case law.
State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 171 P.3d 1282 (Ct. App. 2007). In Cook, the Court of Appeals

refused to impute one public defender's conflict to the entire office. Id. at 794, 171 P.3d at 1292.4
The court noted that the determination of whether one public defender's conflict should be imputed
to the entire office should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, with the relevant inquiry being
"whether the circumstances demonstrate a potential conflict of interest and a significant likelihood
of prejudice." Id. at 793 (quoting State v. Bell, 447 A.2d 525, 529 (N.J. 1982)). If so, there is a
presumption that "both an actual conflict of interest and actual prejudice will arise." Id. In reaching
its decision, the court reasoned that:
Automatically disqualifying a public defender where another attorney in the office
has a conflict of interest would significantly hamper the ability to provide legal
representation of indigent clients. This, together with the fact that such concurrent
representation by public defenders generally will create no incentive (economic or
otherwise) for diminished advocacy in such cases, convinces us that a per se rule
imputing conflicts of interest to affiliated public defenders is inappropriate where
there is no indication the conflict would hamper an attorney's ability to effectively
represent a client.
Id. at 794, 171 P.3d at 1292.

There is no indication that Mr. Abdullah would be prejudiced if he continued to be
represented by Ms. Romero and Ms. Owens. Both Ms. Romero and Ms. Owens are currently
The Court of Appeals decision in Cook, declining to automatically impute one public defender's
conflict of interest to the entire public defender's office, was recently adopted by the Idaho
Supreme Court in State v. Severson, _ Idaho _,215 P.3d 414, 426-27 (2009).
4
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serving as co-counsel on Mr. Abdullah's post-conviction case and are familiar with the issues and
claims raised in his Final Petition. Ms. Romero has been recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court
as qualified to handle capital cases at trial and in post-conviction. Neither Ms. Romero nor Ms.
Owens actually advised Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel, sat in on the trial, are witnesses in the postconviction case, or in any other way participated in the underlying proceedings. Thus, this Court's
order imputing the alleged conflict to the entire SAPD office is contrary to the Idaho Supreme
Court's opinion in Severson, addressing this very point. s Severson, _

Idaho at _,215 P.3d-at

426-427.
This Court's apparent disqualification of the entire SAPD office and appointment of Keith
Roark to evaluate the alleged conflict of interest ignores Severson and presumes Ms. Romero and
Ms. Owens will not act in accordance with ethical rules which require them to exercise independent
judgment and act in the best interests of Mr. Abdullah, irrespective of any advice Ms. Huskey or
Mr. Ackley may have provided to trial counsel. See Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 5.2(a) ("A
lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the
direction of another person."). This Court has no basis for finding that either Ms. Romero or Ms.
Owens would be hampered in their ability to effectively represent Mr. Abdullah, especially given
the deference Idaho Courts generally give to public defender offices in setting aside conflicts of
interest and the deference generally given lawyers in the performance of their constitutional and
ethical obligations. See, e.g., U.S v. Cronic, 466 US 648, 658 & n.23 (1984) ("Whenever we are
5 This Court's apparent reluctance to cite to Severson or rely on it as controlling authority
apparently stems from its erroneous belief that a case is not final until released for official
publication. See Appendix 4, p.2 n.2; Appendix 8, p.2, n.2. In fact, an opinion becomes final
twenty one (21) days after the last of the following events: the announcement of the opinion
through the filing of the opinion; the announcement of the opinion on rehearing; or, the
announcement of a modified opinion without a rehearing. See Idaho Appellate Rule 38(a)-(b).
Severson was announced on May 29, 2009, and the rehearing was denied on August 24, 2009.
Thus, Severson became final on September 14,2009.

AMENDED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL

001728
10

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

asked to consider a charge that counsel has failed to discharge his professional responsibilities, we
conscious of his duties to his clients and that he sought
start with a presumption that he was conscIous
conscientiously to discharge those duties."); Ex parte Stevens, 676 So.2d 1307, 1315 (Ala. 1996),
overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Henry, 770 So.2d 76 (Ala. 2000) ("This Court will
presume, until it is proven otherwise in the appropriate forum, that an attorney at all times acts in an
ethical manner and upholds the oath of the profession."); DCH Health Services Corp. v. Waite, 95
CaLAppAth
CaLApp.4th

829~

presumptjon that,
834 (Cal. CLApp. 2002) ("[T]he court should start with the presumption

unless proven otherwise, lawyers will behave in an ethical manner.").
In appointing Keith Roark, this Court detennined that, contrary to the SAPD's and the
State's analysis, the SAPD has an actual conflict of interest in its representation of Mr. Abdullah,
and that Mr. Abdullah must knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive the conflict in order for
any attorney at the SAPD to continue representing him. (Appendix 4; Appendix 8.) The Court's
finding of a conflict requiring the appointment of Keith Roark as independent counsel subverts the
legislative intent of having a State Appellate Public Defender office, causes unnecessary delay, and
interferes with the attorney-client relationship between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah.
The SAPD necessarily has some degree of contact with trial counsel in nearly every capital
case in Idaho. Such contact would not necessarily involve the same type of contacts that occurred
in Mr. Abdullah's case. However, in cases where an SAPD's fonner client has been granted a
resentencing or retrial after years of representation by the SAPD, the contact would presumably
involve at least the transfer of some infonnation to trial counsel. See, e.g., State v. Payne, 146 Idaho
548, 199 P.3d 123 (2008); Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 106 P.3d 376 (2004); State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 90 P.3d 278 (2003); State v. Fetterly, 137 Idaho 729, 52 P.3d 874 (2002). Under
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such circumstances, the SAPD has a professional obligation to facilitate successor counsels'
representation of their fonner client; such obligation includes:
A. maintaining the records of the case in a manner that will infonn successor counsel

of all significant developments relevant to the litigation;
B. providing the client's files, as well as infonnation regarding all aspects of the
representation, to successor counsel;
C. sharing potential further areas of legal and factual research with successor
counsel; and
D. cooperating with such professionally appropriate legal strategies as may be
chosen by successor counsel.
ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.13. The criminal justice system, in its entirety, and especially the
capital defense bar, benefits when the SAPD follows its professional obligations to cooperate with
successor counsel. However, the Court's analysis creates an incentive for the SAPD to stonewall,
or otherwise ignore, successor counsel even if making reasonable requests for assistance. Indeed, if
limited contact is all that is required to create a conflict of interest, then SAPD attorneys cannot
teach or participate in continuing legal education (C.L.E.) seminars because anything said by an
attorney with the SAPO could arguably fonn the basis for a conflict of interest in any case where
the C.L.E. topic(s) become relevant. Application of such an analysis conflicts with the SAPD's
of justice in Idaho. See I.R.P.C. Preamble: A Lawyer's
ethical obligation to contribute to the quality ofjustice

Responsibilities,

~

1 ("A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients,

an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice."). As stated in the professional rules:

As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal
system, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal
profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate
knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in
reform of the law and work to strengthen legal education. In addition, a lawyer
should further the public's understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and
the justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on
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popular participation and support to maintain their authority. A lawyer should be
mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that the poor,
and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance.
Therefore, all lawyers should devote professional time and resources and use civic
influence to ensure equal access to our system ofjustice
of justice for all those who because of
economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel. A
lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should
help the bar regulate itself in the public interest.
LR.P.C. Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities, ~ 6 (emphasis added).
As the Court likely recognizes, the SAPD, and its attorneys, provide continuing legal
education to lawyers throughout the state. Indeed, it is a matter of record in this case that SAPD
attorneys have been called upon to instruct Idaho attorneys regarding various aspects of capital
litigation in Idaho. (See, e.g., Affidavit of Mark 1. Ackley in Support of Motion for Extension of
Time for Filing an Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed December 20, 2006, attached
hereto as Appendix 12 (noting participation as instructor in Idaho capital jury sentencing CLE).)
This Court's analysis for assessing and finding conflicts of interest, if adopted by other courts,
would effectively prohibit the SAPD from contributing to the integrity of Idaho's criminal justice
system by providing continued legal education to Idaho lawyers.
Mr. Abdullah requests this Court to consider the following hypothetical involving the very
real issues in the Payne case. As this Court is presumably aware, in State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548,
199 P.3d 123 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court considered inadmissible
victim impact evidence when sentencing Mr. Payne to death. The Idaho Supreme Court found that
the error was attributable to the district court's ignorance ofthe relevant law as set forth in Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). The district court's error has caused a delay of approximately

seven to eight years, has caused additional suffering by Mr. Payne's victims, and has accounted for
an untold cost to Idaho taxpayers. That error, however, was attributable not only to the district
court, but also to trial counsel who failed to object to the evidence prior to its admission. In fact,
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the SAPD raised a related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel which the Idaho Supreme
Court recognized as mooted by its finding of reversible judicial error. See Payne, 146 Idaho at 575,
199 P.3d at 150.
Hypothetically, if Mr. Payne's trial counsel had placed a simple phone call to the SAPD
seven or eight years ago and inquired about the law governing victim impact statements, then the
SAPD would have informed trial counsel of the holding in Payne v. Tennessee. Mr. Payne's trial
counsel would -then presumably have informed the district court- of the controlling law, and the
district court, in tum, would not have admitted or considered the inadmissible evidence. Ifthis had
occurred, then Mr. Payne's case would presumably be in federal habeas corpus proceedings, as
postopposed to state resentencing proceedings, with the prospect of additional state capital post
conviction and appellate proceedings if Mr. Payne is resentenced to death.
Mr. Abdullah requests consideration of the ramifications of the district court's ruling in Mr.
Abdullah's case as applied to the Payne hypothetical. If the SAPD had indeed received that phone
call from Mr. Payne's trial lawyers seven or eight years ago, then the SAPD would have faced the
untenable situation of creating a conflict of interest, i.e., by informing trial counsel of controlling
precedent and thus preventing constitutional error, or avoiding a conflict of interest, i.e., by
ignoring trial counsels' request and thus virtually assuring constitutional error. In short, the Court's
analysis and conclusion creates an incentive for the SAPD to disregard a known violation of a
criminal defendant's constitutional rights and thus contribute to monumental waste of judicial and
taxpayer resources.
If the Court's order finding a conflict is correct, that having limited pretrial, trial or post
posttrial contact with trial counsel in a capital case is sufficient to constitute a conflict of interest, then,
as noted above, the SAPD could have a conflict in nearly every single capital case for which it is
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appointed. This places an unworkable burden on the SAPD and its staff to avoid any contact
whatsoever with attorneys handling capital cases, even where such attorneys initiate the contact and
do not solicit or otherwise rely on the advice of the SAPD, as was the situation in Mr. Abdullah's
case. Moreover, the finding of a conflict which is imputed to the entire SAPD office significantly
hampers the SAPD's statutory directive to provide legal representation to indigent clients.
The Court's order fails to consider the critical role that public defender offices, like the
SAPD,. play in the criminal justice system. As stated by the Supreme Court of Minnesota:
The judge, district attorney, and public defender are parts of a courtroom
triumvirate. Each has a function which is essential to the working of the triumvirate.
Each has a function which is essential to the working of the system. The public
defender's role is that of an adversary to the prosecutor-not an adversary of the
system but an integral part of it. ... [S]ociety reaps the benefit from a smoother
functioning criminal justice system.
Dziubak v. Matt,
Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771,777 (Minn. 1993) (quoting Stephen L. Millich, Public Defender

Malpractice Liability in California, 11 Whittier L.Rev. 535, 537-38 (1989)). The State ofIdaho
ofldaho has
determined that the best way to provide qualified counsel to capital defendants in post-conviction
and appellate proceedings is through the creation of the SAPD.
In conclusion, the Court's order finding an actual conflict between the SAPD and
Mr. Abdullah and appointing Mr. Roark to evaluate the conflict and to advise Mr. Abdullah
accordingly is based on theoretical, unidentified facts.

The Court's order both deviates from

controlling case law and creates substantial grounds for differences of opinion regarding a
controlling question of law. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo the Court's finding of an actual
conflict of interest is correct, the Court's order imputing the conflict to the entire SAPD office
deviates from controlling case law.
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3.

An Immediate Appeal May Materially Advance The Orderly Resolution Of
These Post-Conviction Proceedings

Idaho Code § 19-2719(6) mandates that "[a]ll issues relating to conviction, sentence and
post-conviction challenge ... be considered in the same appellate proceeding." Id. Allowing an
immediate appeal will materially advance the orderly resolution of this litigation because this
Court's finding of a conflict and the appointment of Mr. Roark to conduct an inquiry into that
conflict, will substantially delay these post-conviction proceedings, will substantially undermine
the unitary system of appeal in death penalty cases, and will significantly damage the existing
attorney-client relationship.
1.

Allowing An Immediate Appeal Will Materially Advice The Orderly
Resolution Of This Litigation By Preventing Substantial Delay In The
Underlying Post-Conviction Proceedings

This post-conviction case is now in its fourth year due primarily to the complexity of the
issues and the volumes of material created in the underlying case. 6 The appointment ofMr. Roark
creates substantial delay in these proceedings. Mr. Roark will need to review volumes of material
and conduct a thorough investigation just to become acquainted with the facts of Mr. Abdullah's
underlying case and the proceedings thus far. The amount of time Mr. Roark will need to review
the materials in the case and establish a meaningful and trusting relationship with Mr. Abdullah is
clearly substantial and will result in prejudicial delay. Presumably recognizing this, the Court
placed no time limitation on Mr. Roark's investigation. Thus, the post-conviction proceedings have
been indefinitely suspended by the Court's order. Mr. Abdullah believes it is likely, based in part
on the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in Severson, the Idaho Supreme Court will rule there is no
actual conflict of interest and remand this case for further post-conviction proceedings following
There are approximately seven thousand (7,000) pages of relevant Reporter's Transcript,
approximately 1600 pages of Clerk's Record and approximately thirty-six thousand (36,000) pages
of documentation in trial counsels' files. (See Status Memorandum, filed 8/18/2009, attached hereto
as Appendix 7.)
6
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appeal. Cf Us. v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 348 U.S. 140, 151-52 (2006) (holding that a district court's
erroneous deprivation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice is not subject to
harmless error analysis).

This will cause undue and prejudicial delay in contradiction to the

legislative intent and mandates of I.C. § 19-2719, including but not limited to, the requirement that
"[a]ll issues relating to conviction, sentence and post-conviction challenge shall be considered in
the same appellate proceeding." See I.e. § 19-2719(6).
11.

Allowing An Immediate Appeal Will Preserve The Unitary System Of
Appeals In Capital Cases

This Court's order potentially subverts the unitary system of appeals in capital cases. See
I.e. § 19-2719(6). Specifically, the Court's order explicitly excludes a finding of a conflict of
interest in the SAPD's representation of Mr. Abdullah on direct appeal. (Appendix 4, p.2 ("This
order does not affect the State Appellate Public Defender's Office's representation ofMr. Abdullah
in the appeal of his underlying conviction.").) As a result, assuming arguendo that Mr. Abdullah
declines to waive the purported conflict of interest, conflict counsel will be appointed to represent
Mr. Abdullah in post-conviction proceedings, while the SAPD will continue to represent Mr.
Abdullah on direct appeal. Once the post-conviction proceedings are resolved, the SAPD will then
file a direct appeal from Mr. Abdullah's underlying conviction and sentence, while conflict counsel
will presumably file an appeal related to the post-conviction case. Thus, this Court's order has the
potential to bifurcate the appellate and post-conviction proceedings in Mr. Abdullah's capital case,
in direct contravention of the Idaho Legislature's intent to have a unitary system of appeals in
capital cases. See I.C. § 19-2719 (6) ("In the event the defendant desires to appeal from any postconviction order entered pursuant to this section, his appeal must be part of any appeal taken from
the conviction or sentence.

All issues relating to conviction, sentence and post-conviction
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challenge shall be considered in the same appellate proceeding."). Accordingly, addressing this
issue now will preserve the unitary system in death penalty cases.
lll.

Allowing An Immediate Appeal Will Preserve The Existing Attorney-Client
Relationship Between The SAPD And Mr. Abdullah

The SAPD has had an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Abdullah since 2005, zealously
representing his interests in capital post-conviction proceedings before this Court.

The

development and maintenance of a meaningful attorney-client relationship with Mr. Abdullah is
one of the SAPD's highest priorities. See ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.5(A) ("Counsel at all
stages of the case should make every appropriate effort to establish a relationship of trust with the
client, and should maintain close contact with the client."); see also ABA Guidelines, Commentary
0.5 (noting that cultural and language barriers in conjunction with the depression
to Guideline II0.5
associated with the isolation of death row present obvious hurdles when attempting to establish a
relationship of trust with a condemned individual). At the present time, the SAPD's relationship
with Mr. Abdullah is strong. (Appendix 6, Second Supplemental Affidavit of Azad Haji Abdullah,
p.2 (describing "a strong relationship of trust" with the SAPD and characterizing the SAPD and its
staff "like family, because I speak with them and see them more often than my own family.").) In
fact, the SAPD also has a strong relationship of trust with Mr. Abdullah's family. (Appendix 6,
p.2.) These relationships have taken considerable time and effort to develop, not only because Mr.
Abdullah faces the stress of living on death row, and not only because of the obvious cultural and
language barriers that exist, but also because both Mr. Abdullah's and his family's ability to trust
was so damaged by the negative experience he and his family had with trial counsel. (Appendix 6,
p.l.) Indeed, the Court need not look beyond the record in the underlying criminal case itselfto see
the negative consequences of a breakdown in trust between a capital client and his counsel. (See,
e.g., Tr. Vol. VIII, p.438, L. 19 - p.439, L.lO ("THE DEFENDANT: Can I make a statement?
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THE COURT: ... This is not the time for statements. .'".. Are you going to testify? THE
DEFENDANT: I just don't feel I have been treated fairly somehow, not anything as far as
legal advice or anything, but I have been advised, I think, wrongly -- THE COURT: I don't
want you to -- just wait. I don't want you to tell me here in court any advice because when you do
that, it is a waiver of the attorney/client privilege. You can -- I don't want you to tell me what
advice you have been given.") (emphasis added); see also, Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of
CQuflJelif) Capital Cases: The Evolvirzg S/andardof Cgre, 1993 U. ILL. L

~v.

3.23,

33~

(1993)

("Often, capital defendants have had bad prior experiences with appointed attorneys, leading them
to view such attorneys as 'part of the system' rather than advocates who will represent their
interests.... A capital defendant who experiences, or previously has experienced, these kinds of
interests....
judgments understandably will be reluctant to trust his attorney.") (footnotes omitted).)
The attorney-client relationship is sacrosanct in American jurisprudence. It is fundamental,
that once the attorney-client relationship is formed, "a distinct set of constitutional safeguards
aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship takes effect." Patterson v.
Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290 n.3 (1988) (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)). The

constitutional safeguards include the Sixth Amendment guarantee that the accused has the right to
rely on counsel and "imposes on the State an affirmative obligation to respect and preserve the
accused's choice to seek [that] assistance." Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171. Once appointed counsel has
established an attorney-client relationship with an indigent defendant, that relationship is no less
inviolate than if counsel had been retained. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1,I, 22-23 & n.5 (1983)
(Brennan, J., concurring in result) ("[C]onsiderations that may preclude recognition of an indigent
defendant's right to choose his own counsel ... should not preclude recognition of an indigent
defendant's interest in continued representation by an appointed attorney with whom he has
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developed a relationship of trust and confidence"); People v. Harlan, 54 P.3d 871, 881 (Colo.
2002) (noting the fact that counsel had represented defendant over a period of seven years in a
complex capital case "weighs heavily against disqualification"); Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d
216, 222 (Tex.Cr.App. 1989) ("Once counsel has been validly appointed to represent an indigent
defendant and the parties enter into an attorney-client relationship it is no less inviolate than if
counsel is retained.").
The Court's orders finding a conflict of interest and appointing Mr. Roark tmdermine the --attorney-client relationship between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD. Where the SAPD, and the State
for that matter, has asserted that there is no conflict of interest, the Court's order finding a conflict
without regard for the SAPD's assessment sends a message to Mr. Abdullah that the SAPD's
advice and guidance cannot be trusted.

For the Court to force substitute counsel upon Mr.

Abdullah for the purpose of investigating Mr. Abdullah's lawyers, further undermines that
relationship. Mr. Abdullah recognizes that if a conflict truly threatens to compromise either the
adequate representation of a defendant or the institutional interest in rendering a just verdict, a trial
judge has a duty to conduct an inquiry and discretion to appoint separate counsel if necessary. See

State

V.

Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259, 77 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct. App. 2003) (noting that the district court

"appointed separate counsel, a public defender, to inquire into the conflict, determine if it was
subject to waiver, and to advise Lopez thereon.")

However, because appointment of separate

counsel constitutes an interference with an established and on-going attorney-client relationship,
"[m]easures
"[m ]easures of this kind could be justified, if at all, only upon a substantial showing of necessity.
Nothing in the record indicates the existence at trial of a potential conflict between [Mr. Abdullah]
and [his] attorneys warranting interference with the [] established attorney-client relationships."

Knix v. State, 922 P.2d 913,919 n.7 (Alaska App. 1996).
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Without making any additional findings or inquiry from Mr. Abdullah or his counsel, the
Court appointed Mr. Roark.

Moreover, the Court has preemptively authorized Mr. Roark to

conduct depositions of Mr. Abdullah's lawyers. The Court's order appears to be based on the
unwarranted assumption that the SAPD has acted neither with candor nor in good faith in response
to the Court's initial inquiry regarding the purported conflict of interest, in violation of the SAPD' s
ethical obligations. Deposing Mr. Abdullah's lawyers will inevitably and unnecessarily reveal
confidential infonnation covered by the attorney-client privilege and the work prodllct doctrin.e.
Such an extreme intrusion into the current, on-going attorney-client relationship, without
justification, cannot be countenanced.
Undersigned counsel can conceive of no inquiry at depositions that would not infringe upon
the work product privilege, as well as the attorney-client privilege.

An inquiry into why

undersigned counsel did or did not raise particular claims involves questions which inevitably
reveal work product as well as confidential attorney-client communications. Less extreme and
intrusive methods of investigating the purported conflict of interest can be had through a review of
the pleadings that have been filed in this case and are already part of the public record.
Undersigned counsel objects to this Court's order prospectively granting depositions and reserves
the right to object to such depositions if requested. Even in cases where trial courts have deemed it
appropriate to appoint independent counsel to advise a party regarding his or her right to conflict
conflictfree counsel, undersigned counsel can find no cases authorizing or ordering depositions of counsel
for the purpose of evaluating a conflict. See Lopez, 139 Idaho at 259, 77 P.3d at 127 (noting that the
district court appointed separate counsel to discuss the conflict issue and its implications with the
defendant, without reference to any court-authorized depositions of trial counsel); see also, e.g.,
Yepes v. Yates, 2009 WL 837649, *24 (C.D. Cal. March 27, 2009) (noting that the trial court
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appointed independent counsel to detennine whether a conflict of interest existed between the
Petitioner and one of his attorneys; independent counsel infonned the court that a potential conflict

existed between Petitioner and his lawyer, but Petitioner waived the conflict); People v. Jones, 91
P.3d 939, 941-42 (Cal. 2004) (noting that the court appointed independent counsel to advise
defendant of right to conflict-free counsel after being advised by trial counsel of a potential conflict
of interest and handling alleged conflict through a series of in camera hearings); People v.

902..;03 (Cal.20()-2) (noting that ihe trial court appointed independent
McDermott, 51 P.3d 874, 902.;03
counsel to consult with defendant and "in defendant's presence, Attorney Hill told the trial court he
had met with defendant for an hour and half, 50 minutes of which were spent discussing the subject
of the potential conflict of interest presented by Defense Counsel['s] prior representation of Randy

Howard in a different case.").
Absent a conflict, or serious potential for a conflict, the Court's interference with the
attorney-client relationship violates Mr. Abdullah's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment,
his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and unnecessarily delays these
proceedings based on the mere possibility the SAPD "may have foregone" raising potentially
meritorious claims.
C.

Conclusion
This case presents a controlling question of law as to which there are substantial grounds for

difference of opinion. Allowing an immediate appeal will materially advance the orderly resolution
of this litigation under the special procedures for unitary appellate review of criminal and post
post-

conviction proceedings required in capital cases.
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REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Mr. Abdullah respectfully requests that this Court grant permission to appeal from this
Court's orders finding a conflict of interest and appointing Keith Roark, and that these postconviction proceedings be stayed pending resolution of the appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court.
RESPECTFULLY
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED
SUBMITIED this 23 cd day of October, 2009.

;Zf£~~

Lead Counsel for Mr.

dullah

,. Co-rrounseLfor M . Abdullah

\~O
NICOLE OWENS
Co-counsel for Mr. Abdullah
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 23 rd day of October, 2009, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL, as
indicated below:
SHAWNADUNN
BOURl\TE
ROGER BOUlU\TE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
-
Facsimile
----,~
~ Hand Delivery

AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH
INMATE #76321
IMSI - J BLOCK
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

-.X- U.S. Mail
-  Statehouse Mail
- - Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

L. LAMONT ANDERSON
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
700 W STATE ST, 4 TH FL
BOISE ID 83720

U.S. Mail
Statehouse
Mail
- Facsimile
-_ _ Hand Delivery

-

----,~

x

-

Administrative Assistant
Capital Litigation Unit
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J. DAVID
NAVARRO, Clerk
BV J. WEATHERBY

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIef'5F
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,

Petitioner,
CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-00308
CV -PC-2005-00308
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO

ORDER RE: SAPD INVOLVEMENT
WITH TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL

Res ondent.
In reviewing the material filed in support of the Final Amended Petition, including various

e-mails attached to the Toryanskis' depositions, it has come to the Court's attention that the State
Appellate Public Defender's Office may have been providing advice and support to the trial
counsel both before the trial began and during trial. It is unclear the extent of that advice. In an
abundance of caution, the Court orders both parties to address the following:
1.

the potential impact of this involvement,

2.

whether this creates a conflict of interest, I

3.

the extent of that involvement, and

4.

whether it makes the members of the State Appellate Public Defender's Office
potential witnesses.

Both parties shall simultaneously address the above issues and support their positions with
citation to legal authority no later September 1, 2009.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 17th
17th day of August 2009.

25

26

31

':I.?

~~--

Cheri C. Copsey
District Judge

I The Supreme Court has presumed prejudice when counsel labors under an actual conflict of interest. See Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708,64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980).
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GREG H. BOWER
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
ROGER BOURNE
SHAWNADUNN
INTERDEPT. MAIL
MOLL
Y 1.
MOLLY
J. HUSKEY
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
MARK J. ACKLEY
SHANNON N. ROMERO
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
J
LANE._
BOISE, IDAHO 83703
F~J
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J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
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~001/023

16:24 FAX

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

RECE\VED
RECE1VED

Shawnaa Dunn
Shawn

AUG 31 2009

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
[daho State Bar No. 2127
200 West Front Str~ Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

c-f\-~
"'-f\-~ l\.'poELLA1'E
/\.'poELLAl'E
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'

ER

PUBUC DEFENDER
DEFEND

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH.

Petitioner,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)

Case No. CV PC 2005 21802
MEMORANDUM RE: SAPD
INVOLVEMENT WITH
PRE·TRIAL
TRIAL AND PRE·TRIAL

)
)

)

------------)
--------------------------)
COMES NOW, Shawna Dunn, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and provides the following memorandum regarding the
SAPD's involvement with trial and pretrial.

The Court has instructed the parties to address:
potential impact of [the] involvement [of the SAPD during the trial],
(1) the potentia]
(2) whether this creates a conflict

MEMORANDUM RE: SAPD INVOLVEMENT IN TRIAL AND PRETRIAL
(ABDULLAH), Page
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(3) the extent of that involvement, and
(4) whether it makes the members of the State Appellate Public Defender's Office
potential witnesses.
Taking issue #3 flI'St, the State is at a disadvantage in detennining the extent of the
SAPD's involvement during trial.

The State must rely on other sources for this

infonnation. The extent of the contact between the SAPD's office and trial counsel was
discussed at Mrs. Toryl!DSki's deposition. (KT's depo.'
depo.. _~g. _22_~,__ln.1
__ln.1 - pg.240, 1n.IO)
1n.1O) The
State also previously asked the SAPD for information about their contact with trial
counsel. In response, the SAPD provided the State documents attached as Exhibit #l.
#1.

The State relied on this accounting and an accompanying a5s~ce from Mr. Ackley that
no conflict existed, and chose to take no further action. The State chose this course
based, in part, on an understanding of case law which indicates that the defense may be in
the best position to foresee a conflict.
An attorney representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the
best position professionally and ethically to detennine when a conflict
of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial,

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U,S.
U.S. 335,347 (1980) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
As for whether there is a conflict of interest, again, the State has relied on Mr.
Ackley's assurance that there was no actual conflict. Areas where conflict could be seen
as existing are if the SAPD attorney staff are potential witnesses or if their advice led to

what they are now claiming is reversible error,
error. The September 15, 2004, email from Kim
Toryanski may give the reader pause. This email touches on Mrs. Toryanski's thoughts
on a number of issues included as claims in the final petition, including the health of the
attorney-client relationship, ongoing discussions about whether Mr. Abdullah should
testify and whether the petitioner would take a plea bargain. Each of those issues has
been discussed by Mrs. Toryanslci
Toryanski in the deposition and she will be available to conunent

on them further. If Mrs. Toryanski's comments are seen to deviate from the mood in the

l\fEMORANDUM RE: SAPD INVOLVEMENT IN TRIAL AND PRETRIAL
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email, the email may be used as impeachment and Mr. Ackley would have been a
potential witness to admit the email. However, that would not be necessary because Mrs.
Toryanski acknowledged foundation for the email in her deposition. (KT's depo, pg. 226,

Ins. 19-20)
There is an appearance of conflict which also evolves out of the September 3,
2004, telephone conversation between Kim Toryanski and Molly Huskey, with Mark
Ackley present, where the SAPD suggested requesting a continuance. The defendant's
speedy trial rights are the basis for a cbllm for relief. It seems concerniilg
concerning that the same
counsel who would advise a continuance would then attack trial counsel's
counse] ,s decision to
request continuances.

However, defense counsel requested a continuance September

2004 and their request was denied.
Next, the State will address the closely related issues of the potential impact of the
Appel1ate Public Defender's
involvement and whether it makes the members of State Appellate
Office potential witnesses. Based on our current understanding of the conununications
between the SAPD and trial cOWlSel,
cOW18el, the State does not intend to call any members of the
SAPD attorney staff. The State spoke to Mr. Ackley about this issue some time ago, and
Mr. Ackley stated he believed he could present Mr. Abdullah's case without putting
himself or other attorneys in his office in the witness chair.
Accordingly, based on the best infonnation available to the State, the State
Appellate Public Defender attorney staff will not be called to testify at the evidentiary
hearing. The State does not know the presence or extent of any waivers by Mr. Abdullah,
which may further diminish or eliminate the impact on the UPCPA proceedings.
To the extent that there may be additional communications the State is currently
unaware of, the State seeks to retain an additional opportunity for briefing.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this

004/023

e;fir
e;tirday of August, 2009.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor

~~
1"s~~
S
a Drum
aDmm

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
was delivered to the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane,
Boise, Idaho 83703 through the United States Mail, this ~ay of August 2009.

\J1tA.

-f4-

- 33cJ
33~ -;;2. q ~~
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ShawnaDunn
"From:
'from:

Mark Ackley [mackley@sapd.state.id.us]

Sent:
To:

09.200812:12 PM
Friday. May 09.200812;12

Cc:
Subject:
SUbJect:

Shawna Dunn; Roger Boume

Shannon N. Romero
Abdullall v. Stals:
Stats: SPOT050030a •- disclosure of correspondence between trIal counsel and
Abdullah
the SAPO

PN: Defense motion to be flied on Tuesday;
Attachments: F'N:
TUesday; Abdullah continuance mot/on
motion was denied; Penry
v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson: RE: Penry v. Johnson; State v. Abullah. Sup. Ct. No.
31659 I formerly H0201384; 66857.pdf; 66858.pdf

Shawna,
This is my response to your request for correspondence between our office and the
Toryanskis at the time of their representation of Azad Abdullah. I previously agreed to
look for this correspondence and disclose it since we both recognized that such
correspondence as contained in the Toryanskis files was incomplete. Thank you for your
patience.
I have located and attached the following:
1.

Six emails (some of which overlap) between the Toryanskis (mostly Kim
andlor me).
Toryanski) and our office (Molly Huskey and/or
a.. NOTE: it appears from some of the emails that there may have been
additional correspondence. I cannot locate any additional correspondence
(although I have located summaries of a few conversations, see below).

2.

Two facsimile cover pages from Kim to Molly.

a. Both faxes, dated 12/11/03 signed by Kim and sent to Molly seem to
correspond with the attached email with the string of communications on
12/17/03 and apparently pertain to pleadings and rulings regarding
challenges to the death penalty statute.

I have located but have not attached the following:
I.

11124104 from Mitch Toryanski to Molly
A summary of a telephone calIon 11/24/04
Huskey. written by Molly. The topics of the conversation included:
Huskey,

aa. The outcome of the trial;
b. Wh~theT
Wh~theT our office files post-trial motions; and
c. Mitch's retrospective assessment of the aggravation and the miti ..
8/21/2009

• 4 •
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I
I

evidence, the new death penalty jury system, Judge Copsey's professionalism
or lack thereof, and Mr. Abdullah's truthfulness or lack thereof; as well as
Mitch·s description of their varying degrees of their confidence during the
Mitch's
course of the case and his hopes for Mr. Abdullah in future proceedings.

,
,
,

2.

II
II

3.

II
II
II
II
II
II

A surrunary of a telephone call from Kim to me on 1124/05,
1/24/05, written by me.
The topics of the conversation included:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Hearing on PSI;
Fonnal sentencing scheduling;
Amendments to ICR 32;
Whether we would attend the hearing; and
Potential challenges to the sentencing procedure.

An email summary Qf a written summary of a telephone calIon 9/03/04 from
Kim to Molly Huskey (for which I was present), written by me on March 17,
2006. I have not yet located my contemporaneous written summary. I think I
may have given my notes to Ron Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not
located my notes in the files that they left behind after they left our office in
October 2006. The topics of the conversation apparently included:

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

The Court closing the courtroom;
Kline/Littlefield;
K.1ine/Littlefleld;
Grounds to disqualifY Judge Copsey;
My thoughts regarding trial counsels' degree of confidence;
Kim's comments regarding the State's ability to prove murder;
Kim's reference to commWlications sent by them to the prosecution
regarding the prosecution's case;
g. Kim's reference to what Mr. Abdullah agreed be did and for what he would
plead guilty;
h. Referencing to problems with the State's lab
4.

'1
I
I
I
I

@ 006/023

An email summary {)f
SU1l11l1alY of an undated telephone conversation
9f DDo written Stl1l1ll1a11'
between Mitch and me, written by me on March 17,2006. I have not yet
located my contemporaneous written summary. I think I may have given my
notes to Ron Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not located my notes in the
files that they left behind after they left our office in October 2006. The topics
of the conversation apparently included:
a.
b.
c.
d.

1/21/05;
Sentencing scheduled for 1/21105;
Residual doubt;
Scope of allocution;
Mitch's comments about statements made to them by Mr. Abdullah
regarding the events; and

8121/2009
8/21/2009
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e. An unclear reference which my email summary noted as follows: "One area
of investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not
sure what this references]"

I have multiple concerns about the wisdom of disclosing these documents as they differ
from the emails and the faxes to the extent they are summaries of correspondence, not the
correspondence themselves which tend to speak for themselves. I need to further assess
whether we have an obligation to disclose these summaries, and if so, whether they could
or should be redacted. I will make a decision on Tuesday after further discussion with
my team and Molly Huskey.
Huskey _ I would also be interested in making further inquiry of the
Toryanskis; perhaps they could check their offices again.

II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
I
I
I

I sincerely invite your thoughts on tms matter; indeed, that is why I took the time to
describe for you the contents of these summaries.
-Mark

8/21/2009
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Shawna Dunn
F.-om:

Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryenski.com]

Sent:
To:

Monday, September 06, 2004 1:59 PM
Mark Ackley; Molly J. Huskey

Subject:
SUbJect: FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday
M&M:
FYI -- we're moving for a continuance. The following is a copy of the
''beads up" for the judge. The judge has not responded to Pat Owen's request
tbat tIle motion be filed under seal
that

K
Message-----Original Message-
From: Patrick Owen [mailto:PROWENPH@adaweb.netJ
Sent: Monday, September 06,2004 10:04 AM
To: Judge Cheri Copsey
Ce: kim@toryanski.com
Cc:
Subject: RE: Dofense motion to be filed on Tuesday

Judge Copsey:

I request that any such motion be filed under seal and that any proceedings
related to this motion be conducted in chambers.
Pat Owen
~--Original
~.-Original Message-
Message--

[mailto:kim@torx'lIski.coml
From: Kim W. Toryansld [znailto:kim@torx'!lski.comJ
Seot: Monday, September 06, 2004 9:59 AM
Sent:
To: Patrick Owen; Judge Cheri Copsey
Subject: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday

Judge Copsey:
mommg,
The defense would like to advise you and the State that on 1'ucsday morning.
we will be filing a motion [0 continue the trial. The grounds for the
motion are directly related to the State's revelation on Friday morning that
during the course of this case, a sexual relatiombip existed between one of

the case prosecutors and a key witness in this case, the lead homicide
detective and case officer.
Full details of the defense necessity for a continuance will be recited in
summary, we assert that the defendant has a
the written motion. In Sl1IJDlJ.ary,

8/21/2009

001754

I
I
I
I

,
,
,
II

II
II
II
II
II
II
rl
I
I
I
I
-

08/31/2009 16:26 FAX

FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday

~

009/023

Page 2 of2

Fourteenth Amendment due process right and a Sixth Amendment right to have a
of the
reasonable opportunity to investigate the temporal duration ofthe
relationship, whether an actual conflict of interest may have arisen by
the relationsbip, wbecher the prosecutox's
virtue of tile
proseculox's ethical duties were
rules of
affected and compromised, whether the detective has violated police roles
witness testimony may have been tainted or
conduct, whether evidence or wibless
compromised in <;onneetion with the nature of the n:lationship. and whether
prejudice to the defendant has resulted. While the integrity of the
and the proper adminislIation
adminisll'ation ofjustice
of justice is paramOWlt
patamOWlt to all
proceedings lIJld
involved. only Mr. Abdullah stakes his life on the process.
involved,
In evaluating the appropriateness of the motion to continue. we have
investigate) and Guideline 10.8
10.8 (duty to
referenced Guideline 10.7 (duty to inveStigate)
cnt
assert legal claims) of the ABA O\Iidelinc3 for the-Appointm
88sert
and
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (Rev. February, 2003).
Perfonnance of
ofDefense
potemiaUy Call5 into
Without an opportunity to investigate a matter whicb potentially
qu~stion all infonnation about the case, any conviction obtained may be
appellacc attack on the basis of ineffective assistance of
vulnerable to appellate
counsel. The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated that death cases are
different and deserving of higher due process standards.

Kim Toryansld.

8/2112009
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ShawnaDunn
From!
From:

Kim W. Toryanskl [kim@toryanski.comJ
[kim@toryanski.com]

Sant:
Sent:

Tuesday. September 07,20043:53 PM

To:

Mark Ackley; Molly J. Huskey
Huskey·.

Subject: Abdullah continuance motion was denied

So maybe there is one more appellate issue
Issue for you two to address if Azad
gets convicted of first degree, the jury finds IlD
llD aggravator, and that
mitigation does not outweigh the aggravator(s). I think Copsey wants the
"glory" ofbeinS the
tbe first fA> by a death case under- the new STAtute.
The good news is that, in the continuance, I detailed the need to take the
deposition of detective littlefield, the one that Erika Klein had the affair
with. The judge granted that!!! The prosecutor objeoted,
objeoted. but it fell 011
deaf em. The prosecutor asked for the scope of the depo to be limited,
but the judge said no limitatODS on defense inqui1'y. I'm looking forward to
taking the depo.

The judge also said she would grant mOre
mare money to investigate things that
need to be looked into regarding my concerns
concems about the screwups of the NMS
lab. So I'm going to put in for more money to get SOme additional experts
to advise me, and to testify. Agam, hooray.
AU in all, I think I'm going to call it a win. Thanks for wargaming with
me!
tnoming at 9:00. We're in 507. We'll go
JUI)' selection begins tomorrow lnonling
until 1;00
1:00 and then adjourn for the day. Same routine through the end of
the week.

Will keep you posted.
Kim

fl
II
I
I
I
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Shawna Dunn
From:

Mark Ackley [mackley@sapd.state.id.us]

Sent:

Thursday. September 09, 2004 4:17 PM

To:

kim@toryanski.com

Subject: Penry v. Johnson

Kim,
As I noted yesterday, my eo-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury
jUry selection. Kim
noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors
rega.~ng whethez:
whetheZ: mi.ti.gat.i.ng..
mi.t.i.gat..i.ng.. facts WQuJ.q
WQ\.\J.o. "It\l;ll;t;er"
"1t\l;l1;t;er" to them (as worded by the
rega.~ng
defense)
defense> or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if instructed by

the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797
(2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation at the close of the case. Here is
a relevant portion that my have application for you during jury selection:
"'l'e.ruy
"'.Pe.ruy I did 'Dot
not hold tbae ehe mere meneion of -mitigat1ng o1rc:umseances·
o1rc:umseancas lt to a
Amendme:al:.. Nor does i t stand for
capital sentencing juxy satis£ies the Eighth Amendme:af=..
suff~~1~t to intor.m the
the proposition tbat it i6 Qonstitutionally suff~~1~t
de~iaing the
jury that it may ·consider n mitigating circumstances in de~iaing
Rat:her, the key under Penr,y
Pexu:y r is that e.he
appropriate aeneenee. Rather,
the jury
"conaider and aive effece
be able to "con.ider
e£fecc to Ca
fa defendant's .1tigatingJ
evidence in izrz,posing sentence."
seJ:lteDce." 492 U.S.,
u.s., at 319, 1.09 s.ce. 2934 (emphasis

TaXAz, 509 U.S. 350, 381, 113 S.Ct.
s.et. 2658,125 L.Ed.2d
added). See also Johnson v. TeXAz,
1CONNOR, J., dissenting) (IIrAl
290 (1993) (0
(O-CONNOR,
("rA] Ben~enc:er
Ben~enc:er [lmiat]
[mIlat] be allowed to give
mieigating circumstanceS
circumstances nQ (emphasis in
full oonsideraeion and fu11 effect to mielgating
original». For ~t is on1y when the jury is given & ·v.hia~e Eor expressing its
render~ ies seDt:.encing
deciSion."
'reasoned mora1 response' to ehae
thae evidence in render~
se:a!=.encing decision."
%, 492 U.S., at 329, 1.09 S.Ct.
~u:y Rhas
Penry %.
s.et. 2934, th.t we CaU be sure that the ~u:y
t%'8Ated
ae£enaant: All a 'uniQ;UtllJ.y
'uniQ:UtlIJ.y i:a.cliviclual h1UlllU1 bq;Ul
t%'8A1:ed the Qe£enaant:
bCl;U1 [0]' and has JIlAde a
r$liable dete~nation
dete~nation that death is the appropriate santenca,u
s8Dtence,u **1921 id.,
id •• at 319,
s.Ct. 293~
293~ (~oting
(~oting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 r 304
304~r 305,
30S, 96 S.Ct.
1.09 S.Ct.
2978.49 L.EQ.2d 944 (1976»."
2978,49
(my

emphasis added>

In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror Whether they will
~considerN mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they can give it
~considerN
effece; if ehey cannot, then they should
shOUld be exclUded for cause.
Mark J. Ackley

Appellate Public Defender
Idaho State ApPellate
Capital Litigation unit
mackley@sapd.seaee.1d.us
mackley@sapd.seate.1d.us
(206) 334-2712
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ShawnaDunn
From:

Kim W. Toryanski [klm@torysnski.comJ

Sent:

Friday. September 10, 2004 6:45 AM
FrIday.

To!
To:

Mark Ackley

Subject: RE: Penry v. Johnson
Yes. Mark. this helps us a lot. We have been intending to be asking the mitigation questions using the words.
facts, but. as Shelley and
"give weight and value to mitigation evidence. and then give examples of our mitigation facts.
the word ~consider"
~consider" and we need to fix that. We'll work on
Kim have observed. we are forming the Questions with !he
correcting that today.
H

w.. gettunch..
Today will be a long day- we start questioning at 9:00 and wJttiinish at 5:00, but at Ieest today we-get.tunch..
Copsey even needs to be reminded that we need bathroom breaks.
I'm so glad Shelley and Kim are in the courtroom - will you be able to stop by today?
Kim
·----original

Message-Message-

[mallto;macldey@sapd.state.ld.us]
From: Mark Ackley [mallto;mackley@sapd.stal:e.ld.us]
Sent:
sent: Thursday, September
september 09,20044:17 PM
To: kim@toryanski.com
SUbject: Penry v. Johnson
Kim,
Kim.

As 1 noted yesterday, my co-counsel.
co-counsel, K1mberly
Kimberly Simmons. and our mitigation
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection.
selection,
Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective
jurors regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter"
-matter- to chern (as worded by
the defense) or whether they could simply
9imply ·consider" mitigating facts if
instructed by the Court (as wo~ded
wo~ded by the judge). The case of Penry v.
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 7~7 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on nUtigation
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application
for you during jury select1on:
"E~ r did not ho1d
mere mention.
meneio~ CIt:
o~ "mitigating
~tigating circumstances"
"l"enzy
hoJ.d thae ehe 211ere
cirCUDUItances" to •a.
jury satisfiall
sat:isfialll the Jl:iqhth
:Jury
J!!iqhth Amendment. Nor does it stand

ca.pit~1 sentencing

for the proposition that it io const~tutionally
const~tutionally sufficient to
inform the jury that it
ie :may
may ·consider- mitigating
~t1gat1ng ai:cumatances
a:1.:r:~tances
in decid.~ng
decid.~ng tbe a.pp:r:op:r:iat::e
a.pp:r:op:r:iate seD~ence.
seD~ence. Rather, the key undez: Penry
effect; to £11
:I is that the jury be able to ·consider «Jld
«J1d give effece
defendant: 'II
JJ1:ic.i.gat1.ngl ev:LdeAf;e
rll JJU.c.i.gat1.ngl
ev:Ldel&C';e in ~os1Dg
~os1Dg selat:eZlce." 492 U.S.,
u.s.,

ac 319
s.et. 2934 (emchAe!s
l19 t 109 S.Ct.
(emchAais added). Se.
Sa. also Johnson v. Texa.~
Texa.~ 509 U.S.
350, ,381,
~81, 113 S.Ct. ~658.
L.~d.2d 290 (1993) (O'OO~R.
~658. 125 L.Eid.2d
(O'CO~R. ~., dissenting)
c!1iluenting)
("[A]
seneencer (must] be .11~e4
<"[Al sentencer
.11~e4 to give ~ull
~ull con8ideratiou
con8ideratioD and full effec~
effec~
to mitigae1ng circumst.nc.s·
circumst:.ncBS· (&mph••
~a
(&mph•• is ~ origina1». For i~ ~s on1y when the
jury is given a "vehicle for exp~essiag
exp~essiag its 'reasoned mo~al
mo~al r ••ponse'
••ponse' to that
evidence in rendertng ita
iee se~tencing
se~tenciDg decision,- ~enry
~enry X, 492 U.S., at 329, 109
S.Ct. 2934, that .we cen
can bet sure that the ;uxy -haS treated the defendant: a. II
,'unique1y
unique1y i:ndiviclual
[9J' and has made ~ reliable
i~vi~al hwa.an
human bein
bein[gJ'
re1iable detezmiullticn
determination that
death is the appropria~8
at: 319, 109 S.Ct.
appropria~a sent:ence,· --1921 id.,
id •• at
a.ct. 2934
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(QUoein~ woodBon v. Nor~h
North Carolin&, 428 U.S. 290,
290. 304,
304. 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49
L.Ed.2d 9'4
9~4 (1976»."
(1976))."

(my emphasis added)
In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they
will "consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they
can give i t effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for causs.
cause.
Mark J. Ackley
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
mackley~sapd.state.id.us
mackley~sapd.state.id.us

(206) 334-2712
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Shawna Dunn
From:

TOl"Yanski lkim@toryenskl.com]
Kim W. TOlYanski
{kim@toryenskl.com]

Sent:

Wednesday. September 15,20047:09 AM
Wednesday,

To:

Mark Ackley

SUbJect: RE: Penry v. Johnson
Mark, plea negotiations with the prosecutor's office have progressed and we have been told that they would
(arson. 3 ds of attempted murder,
accept a plea to one count of first degree murder, dismiss all other 5 charges (arson,
child endangerment), and no aggravators will be presented at sentencing. Of course, we are going to the mat
wrestling with our client to take the deal. Unbelievably, he's resisting. Day by day, we're putting more pressure
on him to take the deal. He continues to resist. Our attorney client relationship Is being affected because of this.
He has become hostile and angry that we are encouraging a plea. His family seems to support his decision not to
take a plea. That relationship is being affected too.
.
The deal closes the dey we begin to exercise our peremptory challenges in jury
jUry selection. We expect that to
be next Tuesday or Wed. After that, the prosecution goes into overdrive to bury our client
Other issues are erupting. One has to do with his insistence on testifying. He has been told that his attomeys will
not put him on the stand, for ethical reasons. More and more, he is reluctant to follow the advice of counsel.
The dreadful reality of the DP being imposed by this panel of prospective jurors is demonstrated dally. Even the
ones that say they are generally opposed to the DP say they can impose it where children were involved. Many
of ones that generally favor the DP seem very willing to put their beliefs into action and actually impose it if
examinatIon, but the reality is that
allegations are proven in this case. We shop our mitigation in each voir dire examination,
none of it stacks up against the aggravator of leaving 4 kids in a house on fire.
We are consulting with an experienced DP defense lawyer to get ideas about how to work through thIs
this impasse.
He's a grey haired guy with familiarity with the Muslim culture. Will continue to advise you. We're close,
close. but not
antiCipate the worst at trial, based upon the
close enough. If plea negotiations fail, we have told our client to anticipate
verbal statements and nonverbal demeanor of these Jurors during voIr
voir dire.
Kim

Message----Original Message--
From: Mark Acldey [mallto:mackJey@sapd,state.id.us]
[mallto!mackJey@sapd.state.id.us]
Sent: Thursday, September 09,20044:17 PM
kJm@toryanskl.com
To: kJm@toryanskl,com
SubjeGt:
v. Johnson
SubjeG1:: Penry v,
Kim,
KimberlY Simmons, and our mitigation
no~ed yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly
specialist, shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jUry selection.

AS I

Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective
whetner mitigating fac~s
fac~s would Gmatter p to them (as worded by
jurors regarding whecner
the defense) or whether they could simply "conaider
uconaider ft mitigating facts if
inst~cted by the Court (as worded
instnlcted
worcled by the judge). The case of Penry v.
Johnson, 532 O.S. 782, 797 (2001) dealt with jury
jUry instructions on mitigation
at· the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application
for you during jury selection:
~Penzy
~Penzy

mantion of
I did not hold that the mere mention

ft~t~gat~g
ft~t~gat~g

eircumstanees n to a
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Amell&aent. Nor
capital Sen.tencing jury satisfies the Eighth AmeXl&aent.

does it stand
const~tutiona11y 8ufficieDt
aufficieDt to
for the propoaition that it is const~tutiona11y
infor.m
mitigatin~ circumstaDces
circumstances
info%1ft the jury that
that: it may °consider
nconstder n mit!gatin"
app~opriate sentence. Rather, the
in deciding ehe app:c'opriate
~he key UDder
under Penry
:t
that. the jury be able to "consider aJ1d give effect eo [a
J: is eat.
defel1da.ut's m:Ltigat;,ing]
mitigating1 ftvidsl2ce in imposJ.ng
impos;/.ng se.nCaDcoe."
se.nCaDCOft." 49~ u.s.,
defenda.ut's

~exaG, 509 u.s.
at 319, 109 s.ce. 2934 (emphasis addaa,.
addva,. See a180 Johnson v. ~exaG,
350, 381.
381, 113
11.3 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.ld
(O'CONNOR, J., dissenting)
350.
L.Ed.~d 290 (1993) (O'CONNOR.
sentenc~ [must] be allowed
(nrAJ sentenc~
a~10W8d eo give ful1
fu11 consideration and fu11 effect
(empha~i. in original». For it
i t is only wben the
to mitigating circumstances" (empha~i.
mor~ response' to that
jury is given a ·vehicle fo~ expressing its 'reaBoned mor~
evidence in rendering its seneencing decision." Penry ~.
~, &92 U.S.,
U.S •• at
32a, 109
a~ 32B,
S.Ct.
that we can be Sure that the jury ·has
fthas treated the defendant
S. Ct. 2934, that:
defendan~ as a
individua~ 4uman bein[g],
bein[g]' and ba. mada
'uniquely individua~
madv a re~iable determination that
death 1s the appropriate sentence," **1921 id .• at 319, 109 S.ct. 2934
(quotin~ Woo4Ron v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
280. 304, 305, 96 a.Ce. 2978, 49
(quotin~
L.Ed.2d 944 (1976).(1976».

{my emphasis added)

aimpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they
In short. it seems that aimp¥
~consider~ mitigat~on
mitigat~on is not enough. It must be determined whether they
will ~consider~
g~VG it
.f~ect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause.
can g~VG
it: .f~.ct;

Mark J. Ackley
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
mackley@sapd.etate.id.us
(208) 334-2712

8/21/2009
812112009
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Shawna Dunn
From:

Mitch Toryanskl (mitch@toryanskl.com]

Sent:

Thursday, March 10,200512:23 PM

To!
To:

Mark Ackley

Subject:
SubJect: State v. Abullah, Sup. ct.
Ct. No. 31659 I formerly H0201384
Mark:
This is to follow up on Kim's phone call message to you earlier rhls
rhis week.
On March 4, the Judge approved our motion to withdraw as eounsel
eOUDScl from the
I!~e and ~ted
~ted filat
tilat Y0lg Qffice tU~ a written notice of substitution.
Yesterday, we received in the mail a copy of a letter from the clerk of the
Supreme Court advising the clerk of the Ada County Court that Report on
Imposition of Death Penalty has been filed and ordering preparation of 1he
dle
reporter's transcript and clerks record.
Mitch
Mitchell E. Toryanski
This transmission (including anacbments if any) is intended only for the
use of the addrossee and may contain infonnation that is privileged,
confidentia~
confidentia~ and exempt from disclosure under the Electronic Conununication
Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. Sections 2510-2521 and protected by attorney/client
or other privileges. If you are not the intended recipient, or the employee
or agent responsible for delivering
deliVering the message to the intended recipient,
you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of
lhis
tbis comnumicarion is strictly prohibited. Attomey/client or work product
pri vileges are not waived by the transmission
tran&mission of this message. If you have
received this COlJ1IIllmication
commlDlication in ertOJ:, please notify me immediately via
e-mail at info@toryanski.com or by telephone at (208) 841-0655. Thank: you.

'I
I
I
I
I
I
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ShawnaDunn
From:

Mark Ackley [mackley@sapd.state.id.us}

Sent:

Wednesday, May 14,20089:26 AM

To:

Shawna Dunn

Subject: RE: Abdullah v. State: SPOT050030a - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and the

SAPO

Shawna,
Below is an electronic note written by Molly Huskey regarding a call that she received
from Mitch Toryanksi This is the
note that I mJIDlParized in an email to you last week.
thenote
It appears the note was written on the day of the call, November 24,2004. I have not
changed the note in any way, thus the typos. I believe we have now disclosed every
corinnunication, or note referencing a communication, with the Toryanskis prior to our
cOrinnunication,
Abdullah)s counsel. I may very well send you a formal discovery
appointment as Mr. Abdullah's
disclosure attaching each of the conununications that I've already sent to you infonnally
and in piece-meal fashion. If you have any questions, then please let me lmow.

Mark
MJH

11124/04
11/24/04

Mill: Telephone Call from Mitch Toryanski.

Called re: outcome of
trial. wanted to know ifwe
if we filed post trial motions
oftrial.
like motion for new trial. TOld him we didn't do that. Told me that
Azhad was a good person and the good things he had done far outweighed
the aggrsvators.
aggravators. for example, when Azhad was a young man, his father
had been imprisoned. Azhad led his family over the mountains into
Turkey to freedom. He was on the board ofhis church, he was
affectionate with his children.
This new system gives too much power to the prosecutor because there is
no way a jury is going to acquit after hearing all the evidence. He said of
course with a first degree murder)
murder, people will find utter disregard. He said
some of the jurors even wanted to find HAC,
Said Copsey's demeanor made her impssible to work with. She was
demeaning and belittled the attorneys. He really thinks she needs to be
trained in professionalism.
He said client didn't tell him the truth - they still don't know what really
happened. This put them at a huge disadvantage when txying to prepare
the case.
casc. HE says they were much more optimistic re: the possible
outcome earlier in the trial and the longer it went on, the more they knew
the client was telling lies to them.
Hopes
HODes we can get the client some reliet

8121/2009
812112009
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Shawna Dunn
From~
From~

Ackley [mackIEly@sepd.state.id.usJ
[mackley@sepd.state.id.usJ
Mark AcI<ley

Sent:

Friday, May 09, 20083:41 PM

To:

Shawna Dunn

Subject: Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 • disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and the

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

SAPO

Shawna,

Thank you for calling, and sharing your thoughts.
thoughts, I guess I'm not sure what I expected,
but upon further reflection, it was unreasonable-toexpectmy summary of conversations
not to raise a few eyebrows. Hopefully the notes in their entirety will lighten your
concerns if not alleviate them
tliem completely.
Below is the 1124/05
1/24/05 note of my conversation with Kim Toryanski. - Mark
MJA

1124/05

MJA: TIC with Kim Toryanski
MIA:
KT called:

p.m. - purpose solely to discuss
I. Hearing is still scheduled today for 3 p.m.•
PSI and where the source of disagreements may lie
2. Sentencing hearing will be rescheduled, likely 2 weeks out
3. Q whether any amendnlents pending re ICR 32 - I told KT that I was
not aware of any at this time
4. I told KT that we would go to the hearing. but may only stay briefly if
they are going through. 5000 pages of PSI. Our purpose is primarily to
provide support for Azad. KT said that if we leave before the conc1wion
of the hearing then she will pass this on to Azad and also tell him that he is
scheduled for a call with us tomorrow.
5. KT and I talked briefly about challenges to the sentencing procedme. I
mered her to the Stover case for the non-capital charges. I asked her
whether she has considered any constitutional arguments that would
mandate giving the judge sentencing discretion to downwardly depart
from death. She said that she had not but has referred to the jury verdicts
as recommendations which has upset the judge in the past. I mentioned the
possibility of crafting a separation ofpowers
of powers argument, that the legislature
cannot completely divest a district court jUdge
judge of its sentencing
discretion. I told her that such a challenge and others might be further
prior to sentencing.
considered 'Prior

8/2112009
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ShawnaDunn
From:

Mark Ackley [mackley@sapd_state.id.us]
[mackley@sapd.state.id.us]

Sent:

2008 4~36 PM
Friday, May 09. 20084:36

To:

Shawna Dunn

Subject:
between trial counsel and the
SUbJect: Abdullah 'V. State: SPOT050030a • disclosure of correspondence belween
SAPD

Shawna,

The below email was written in response to an interoffice email from Michael Shaw, our investigator.
At the time, I was not assigned to represent Azad. Instead, Azad was being represented by Ron Coulter
Kimber1y Simmons. In the course of his file review, Michael wanted to know, among other things
and Kimberly
[which is why I did not include his initial email inquiry below], whether I had notes from any
conversations with the Toryanskis during their representation. When I prepared the below email, I
referenced my notes contained on a legal pad. I have searched for those notes and my legal pad but I
flle as I had suggested in my
have not located them to date. Michael indicates that he did not take my flIe
email.
am. giving you the email in its entirety,
Because I don't want to adjust the electronic content at all, I am
including a conversation that I had with Joan Fisher from a different date which I had apparently noted
reference~ and just summarizing it, but
somewhere in the same legal pad. I thought about redacting that reference~
on second thought I figured that would only raise more eyebrows. My note also includes references to
visits I had with Azad after our office began representing him. To refresh your memory, I represented
Azad briefly before Ron Coulter was hired. Once he was hired, Molly reassigned cases to adjust for
national workload standards. As a result, I think I was off Azad's case pretty quickly and did not come
back until October 2006.

Although it looks like I might have arguably given some suggestions to cOWlsel. I think you'll agree that
those suggestions are not implicated by Azad's claims, but! suppose that could be a matter of
interpretation. You will notice a reference below to the "El-Contrani (sic)" case; that reference is to
(2005). and pertains to a potential motion to disqualify
State v. Al-Kotrani, 141 Idaho 66, 106 P.3d 392 (2005),
disqua1ification are noted in the opinion, but the following
Judge Copsey. I don't think the grounds for disqualification
Dr. Sanford's conclusions
was written in the Appellant's Brief, "The district court further found that Dr,
"selfwere not credible because Dr. Sanford relied on Mr,
Mr. Al-Kotrani's family's representations and "self
reports." The district court noted that Dr. Sanford did speak with one non-relative, a fonner
serving reports:'
employer. Mr. Abdul Muhammad, who testified that he could only given Mr. Al-Kotrani one instruction
at a time as Mr. Al-Kotrani would get confused. if more than one instruction was given. Further)
Further, Mr,
Mr. Ai
AIKotrani had the tendency to "slack off" ifnot
if not under constant supervision. The district court dismissed.
(Tr.,.• p.39, L.24 - p.40,
Mr. Muhammad's testimony, noting that the "Iraqi community is very close." (Tr
Mr. Al-Kotrani asserts that the district court erred in ruling that
L.24; R, p.79.) . , . Accordingly, Mr,
Dr. Sanford's conclusion that Mr. Al-Kotrani is incompetent to stand trial w~ not credible because it
Dr,
took into consideration information obtained from Mr. Al-Kotrani's family. The district court further
of the same
erred in failing to consider
cOI15ider information obtained from Mr. Muhanunad because he is ofthe
nationality of Mr. Al-Kotrani and its erroneous conclusion that Mr. Muhammad's statements were not
significant." Of course, trial counsel never moved to disqualify the judge, and we have not raised any
claims based on their failure to do so.
I will discuss disclosing Molly's email notes on Tuesday. I anticipate disclosing them unless my
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decision to disclose my own notes to you is questioned.

-Mark
From; Mark Ackley
AckJey

Sent:
sent: Friday, March 17, 2006 10:47 AM
To= Michael Shaw
Swenseni Barbara D. ThOmas; GUadalupe
Guadalupe Ayala
Cc: Kimberly Simmons; Ronaldo A. Coulter; Paula Swensen;
Subject: RE: Abdullah file dean up
Michael, I will go through my emails. I will forward any that are relevant. Perhaps you take my file and
then share or give to Ron or Kimberly. It Includes some notes from IMSI Visits with AA that I am pretty
handWritten notes from
certain were not placed in Prolaw. Below I have summarized most of my handwritten
conversafions -With, or In reference to; trial counsel.
From legal pad
1.

2.

III
1

141 022/023

8121/2009

12117/03 TC with Joan Fisher about the Abdullah case noting that she is concerned about
everything being adequately preserved
9/03/04 TC conversation with Kim T. with Molly (extensive notes on legal pad)

•

Discussion re the Court closing the courtroom; they did not object to closed
proceedings. Judge made them file a motion to contlnue
continue under seal. Should have
amove to unseal the motion, right to public trial1
objected. [It looks like I suggested - "move

•

Discussion about Erica Kline and Detective Whitfield

•

Quotes attributed to Kim T. including. "Now
dNow more than ever.•
ever .• .!
.1 could kick [Copsey]
off: I indicated that we would send the EI-Contrani
EI-Contranl (sic)
(siC) opinion with Copsey's
[racist]
Iracist] remarks. [This is in reference to the Iraqi client case that Eric F. handled (A1
(A1Kotrani) which we then faxed to them [this has been confirmed by Sara]
sara] [It is not
indicated. but I believe I suggested a motion to DQ]

•

My thoughts reflected, "confidence sounds like L,
L. Dunlap· (NOTE: this is a reference
to the Jimmie Thomas case where Lynn Dunlap told Jimmie they would obtain an
acquittal]; quote attributed to Kim T. "we've been seeing things" (bizarre things) since
the beginning of the case

•

Kim thought the State would have trouble proving murder, referring to the State's
case as an attempt to "bootstrap the murder" - IJ asked her why they could not prove
[NOTE: I was quite worried
felony murder and Kim T did not have a good answer INOTE:
about Kim's confidence]

•

Reference to "weekly love letters·
letters" they [I believe "they'
"they" is a reference to trial
counsel] sent to the prosecution to show them how their case sucks

•

Referencing AA. noting that he will plead to what he did, she [Angela) poured the
gasoline, would plead to conspiracy to arson

•

References to problems with the State's lab. They still need an expert to attack the
lab. Many things they are stll/
stili trying to get. [It appears I may have suggested a
motion to continue]

001768
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3,
3.

Undated TC conversation with Mitch Toryanski (date can be approximated post jury verdict
for death sentence, but prior to formal sentencing by judge)

•
•

•
•

•
••

Sentencing scheduled for 1121105
judge said the law was
They (trial counsel?) scratched residual doubt because the jUdge
well-seWed (not mitigation)
Judge limited the scope of AA allocution
They were never told what happened; AA was never straight [NOTE: I believe this
was in response to a question I always ask trial counsel, specifically, -did the client
ever confess to you.'
One area of investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not
sure what this references]
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AM _ _ _ _-.:~·M.___:.._
-.:~·M.____=__
A.M

'-'-

SEP 0 1 2009

MOLL
Y J. HUSKEY
MOLLY
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. # 4843

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
ByE. HOLMES
O!:PUW

MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. # 5888
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN THEDISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,

Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent..

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CV-PC-2005-003080
CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-003080
(fonnerly SPOT0500308)
RESPONSE TO COURT
ORDER INQUIRING INTO
THE PRETRIAL AND TRlAL
INVOLVEMENTOFTHESAPD
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD
WITH TRIAL COUNSEL
(CAPITAL CASE)

Petitioner Azad Haji Abdullah, through his counsel at the Office of the State
Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), hereby provides this response to the Court's August
17, 2009 Order. In the order, this Court directed the parties to address the following
issues: (1) the potential impact of any pretrial and trial involvement the SAPD had with
trial counsel; (2) whether the SAPD's past involvement creates a current a conflict of
interest; (3) the extent of the SAPD's involvement; and (4) whether the SAPD's pretrial
and trial involvement with trial counsel makes members of the SAPD potential witnesses.
Each issue identified by the Court will be evaluated in light of the following summary of
the relevant law governing conflicts of interests.
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
1
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WIlli TRIAL COUNSEL
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I.
RELEVANT LAW
LAW
A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free representation.
See State v. Severson, _

P.3d ------y 2009 WL 1492659 *4 (Idaho Supreme Court May

29, 2009), citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981); State v. Lovelace, 140
Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 285 (2003), citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932); see
also State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 171 P.3d 1282 (Ct. App. 2007). Although Idaho
appellate courts have recognized a statutory right to post-conviction counsel with respect
to non-frivolous claims, our courts have yet to recognize a constitutionally grounded right
to appointed cOWlSel in post-conviction proceedings. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho
789, 793, 102 P.2d 1108, 1112 (2004); Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629,
632 (Ct.App. 2006); see also I.C. § 19-852(b); I.C. §19-4904. In the absence of a
constitutional right to post-conviction counsel, Idaho appellate courts nevertheless
recognize a petitioner's constitutional right to conflict-free representation with respect to
230,233post-conviction counsel. See Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 289-290, 17 P.3d 230,233
234 (2000) ("Because these facts do not identify a conflict other than the one related to
the trial, they also fail to support the claim of ineffectiveness of appellate/post-conviction
counsel as a result of a conflict of interest." (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S 335,347
(1980»).
The salient issue in conflict of interest cases is whether the interests of counsel
conflict with his or her client's interests, thereby compromising counsel's duty ofloyalty.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.s. 688, 692 (1984) (recognizing that counsel laboring
under an actual conflict of interest breaches the duty of loyalty to his or her client, which
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
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conflict: for Sixth
is "perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties."). "An 'actual conflict,'
Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's
performance." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 n.5 (2002).

In Idaho, counsel has a duty to "act with commitment and dedication to the
interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." (Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.3 (commentary).)

Consistent with counsel's duty of

zealous advocacy,counsel has an ethical duty not to represent a elient if that
representation ''will be materially limited by a lawyer's responsibilities to another client,

a fonner client or a third person or by the personal interests of the lawyer...."
lawyer...." LR.P.C.
1.7(a)(2): Trial courts generally rely on defense counsel's good faith and good judgment
to detennine, both professionally and ethically, whether a conflict of interest exists or
will likely develop in the course of trial. Cuyler, 466 U.S. at 347 ("[11rial courts
necessarily rely in large measure upon the good faith and good judgment of defense

counseL").
counsel.").
. Based on established conflict of interest rules and precedent, even if one attorney

in the SAPD office were found to labor under a conflict of interest based on prior contact
with trial counsel, that conflict cannot be imputed to the entire SAPD office. See
Severson, 2009 WL 1492659 at *7-8 (pursuant to Rules of Professional Conduct

governing conflicts of interest, public defender offices are different from private law
firms, and conflict of one public defender cannot be imputed to public defender office).

Rather, whether an individual public defender's conflict should be imputed to an entire
Other potential conflicts of interest not implicated here or by the Court's order include
those outlined in Rule 1.8 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, and generally
I.R.P .C. 1.8.
involve financial, property, or business interests. See I.R.P.C.
1
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public defender office is analyzed on a case-by-case basis, in light of whether the
circumstances demonstrate a potential conflict of interest and a significant likelihood of
prejudice to the client. Id at *7; Only if the facts demonstrate both a potential conflict of
interest and a significant likelihood of prejudice will a conflict be imputed from an
individual public defender to an entire public defender's office. Id. Even if such a
informed. consent. Idat
conflict exists, however, a client can waive the conflict through informed

*6.
In addition to potential and actual conflicts of interest arising from a lawyer's
active representation of competing interests, a conflict may arise where a lawyer must act
as an advocate in a trial in which the lawyer "is [also] likely to be a necessary witness."

See LR.P.C. 3.7 (emphasis added). This Rule generally prohibits a lawyer from acting as
both an advocate and witness in the same proceeding unless: (1) the lawyer's testimony
involves an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony goes to the nature and value of legal
services provided in the case; or (3) disqualification would work substantial hardship on
the client. LR.P.C.3.7(a).

II.
THE SAPD'S MINIMAL PRETRIAL, TRIAL AND POST-TRIAL CONTACT WITH
TORYANSKIS
THE TORY
ANSKIS DOES NOT CREATE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST
There is nothing about the SAPD's unsolicited and minimal pretrial, trial and
post-trial contact with the Toryanskis that would give rise to a potential or actual conflict
of interest between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD. In addition to the infrequency of such
contact, most (if not all) contact was initiated by the Toryanskis. The SAPD's limited
responses included referring trial counsel to well-established case law and directing
counsel to follow existing legal standards. Significantly, the limited advice given to trial
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
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counsel by the SAPD is not the basis of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
raised by Mr. Abdullah.
Most notably, during her deposition, Ms. Toryanski testified about the limited
nature and scope of her discussions with Mr. Ackley during the course of representing
Mr. Abdullah.

[MR. ACKLEY]. Okay. I will go on with the similar questions that I
asked with the other attorneys even though they may seem silly. I'm
help represent yon in
sorry. But did you ever pay me at all to, like, lielp
this case?
TORYANSKI]. No, no, no.
[MS. TORYANSKI].
Q. Okay. Did you ever ask me to talk to Azad?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Did you ever give me any discovery?
A. No.

Q. Okay. Are there any other attorneys that you recall speaking to at all
about this case? We have gone through Chuck· Peterson, Dennis
Benjamin, Teresa Hampton, David Leroy, David Nevin, Joan Fisher, and
myself.

Q. . . , I'm trying to draw a distinction between, like, casual
conversations.
conversations, running into the hall, popping an idea off of someone
st;rategize and give me some advice
versus like, "Let's sit down and really st:rategize
niind. where would you put
how to proceed. II So with those two things in niind,
Dennis Benjamin?
A. Oh, he's at the top.
Q. Okay. And that was primarily li~ited to the death penalty motions?
A. That's correct.
Q. And Chuck Peterson?
A. Chuck. Where on the spectrum?
Q. In terms of someone that you relied upon to assist you in your
representation of Azad.
A. I didn~ rely on Chuck at all.
Q. Okay. That's fine. I'm just trying to go through. Teresa Hampton?
A. She helped in the way that I have already described.
ofjury selection?
Q. SO in the limited fashion ofjury
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A. And talking to a client about a possible plea, about the plea that had
been offered.
Q. David Leroy?
A. Same as Teresa Hampton.
Q. David Nevin?
A. Slightly more. He's slightly before Chuck Peterson on the scale, but
David didn't help.
Q. Okay. Joan Fisher?
A. Where is she on the scale?
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Way at the bottom.
Q. Myself?
A. At the bottom.
Q. I'm not taking it personally. I'm just trying to -- okay.
A. I don't even know ifYOll are really on - I mean, we'd talked
talked,t but I
never really felt that you even were in on the chart.
Q. As far as you're aware, did I know anything about the case other
than what you were conveying to me in your conversation?
A. No.

L.l3 - p.240, L.10 (emphasis
(Addendum A, p.232, Ls.l-12; p.237, Ls.20-24; p.238, L.13
added).) Thus, trial counsels' discussions with the SAPD and its counsel were minimal at
best. To the extent any legal advice was even arguably conveyed, it was necessarily
limited given the SAPD's lack of knowledge and involvement in the case. (Addendum A,
p.232, Ls.7-12 ("Q. Okay. Did you ever ask me to talk to Azad? A. No. Q. Okay. Did

you ever give me any discovery?

A. No."); p.240, Ls.7-10 ("Q. As far as you're aware,

did I know anything about the case other than what you were conveying to me in your
conversation? A. No.").) Further, Ms. Toryanski indicated that she did not rely on any
advice from the SAPD in the course of representing Mr. Abdullah. See generally
Addendum A.

Similarly, Mr. Abdullah has not alleged any claim of ineffective
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assistance of counsel that would be inconsistent with any advice arguably given by the
SAPD or its counsel.2
A. The Minimal Unsolicited Contact Between The SAPD And The Toryanskis Is
Insufficient To Give Rise To A Potential Or Actual Conflict Of Interest
No pretrial, trial or post-trial contact between the SAPD and the Toryanskis gives
rise to a potential or actual con:.t1ict of interest between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD.
Such contacts were minimal, and do not fonn the basis of any claims that Mr. Abdullah
has raised regarding the ineffective assistance of his counsel. The Toryanskis contacted
post-trial
the SAPD office on a handful of occasions during their pretrial, trial, and post~trial
representation of Mr. Abdullah~
Abdullah~ The majority of this contact occurred via email, and was
initiated by the Toryanskis.

(See Emails from Mark Ackley to Shawna Dunn, with

attached documents, containing actual emails exchanged between the Toryanskis and the
SAPD, as well as summaries of other contacts between the Toryanskis and the SAPD,
attached hereto as Addendum B.) Exhibits to Kim Toryanski's deposition include emails
between the SAPD office and Kim Toryanski, and are generally representative of the
limited contact between the SAPD and trial counsel. (See Addendum A.)
1. September 9, 2004 Email- Deposition Exhibit 9
During her deposition, Kim Toryanski acknowledged that Mr. Ackley's email to
her, dated September 9, 2004, was "probably responding to me even though the e-mail

starts with a communication from you, apparently." (Addendum 3, p.227, Ls.2-17 &

if this were the case, which it is not, then it would still not, in and of itself, create a
conflict of interest. Trial counsels' decisions and performance are at issue; in short,
advice or comments from outside lawyers did not and could not relieve trial counsel from
their independent, personal and professional obligations under the Sixth Amendment.
2 Even
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Exhibit 9.)

email.Mr. Ackley infonned Ms. Toryanski that it had come to his
In that email.Mr.

attention that she and her co-counsel, Mitch Toryanski, were asking prospective jurors
questions about mitigating evidence and in doing so, were asking the legally incorrect

question. (Addendum 3, p.227, L.14 - p.228, L.16 & Exhibit 9.) Mr. Ackley directed
Ms. Toryanski to relevant case .law for the governing legal standard in questioning

prospective jurors about mitigating evidence, which Ms. T
oryanski acknowledged she
Toryanski
p.227,
and Mr. Toryanski were applying incorrectly during jury selection. (Addendum 3, p.227.
L.14 - p.228, L.18
L.I8 & Exhibit 9.) During her deposition, Ms. Toryanski did not dispute
the authenticity or authorship of this email. (Addendum 3, p.227, L.2 - p.228,L.18.)

2. September 15, 2004 Email- Deposition Exhibit 10
IS, 2004.
2004, Ms. Toryanski sent an email to Mr. Ackley in which she
On September 15,
discussed the following issues: (1) plea negotiations in Mr. Abdullah's case and her belief

that a plea offer had been made; (2) Mr. Abdullah's insistence on testifying despite being
informed that counsel would not put him on the stand; (3) conflicts between trial counsel
and Mr. Abdullah due to Mr. Abdullah's refusal to plead guilty despite trial counsel

putting tremendous pressure on him to do so; (4) conflicts between trial counsel and
Mr. Abdullah and his increasing unwillingness to follow trial counsels' advice; and (5)

Ms. Toryanski's feelings about the prospective jury panel and their inclination to impose
3. Exhibit 10.)
the death penalty in Mr. Abdullah's case. (Addendum 3,

During her

deposition, Ms. Toryanski did not dispute the authenticity or authorship of this email, and
did not deny that it contained her feelings about Mr. Abdullah and his case at the time it
L.lO -p.231, L.25.)
was written. (Addendum 3, p.230, L.10

RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL
8

001778

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

3. Other Communications
Ms. Toryanski also discussed other emails and telephone conversations that she
and Mr. Toryanski had with the SAPD through Mr. Ackley and Molly Huskey.
(Addendum 3, p.232, L.13- p.237,
p.23?, L.19.) Ms. Toryanski identified the following issues
as having been discussed in those emails and conversations: (1) the affair between the
prosecutor and the lead detective;. (2) whether to move to recuse Judge Copsey;
(3) Ms.

Toryanski~s

inclination to request a conti11t1at1Ce;
contil1tlat1Ce; and (4) issues arising post-

verdict, but prior to judicial sentencing on the non-death eligible offenses. (Addendum 3,
p.232, L.13 - p.237, L.l9.)
L.19.)
Beyond these communications identified by Ms. Toryanski, the Toryanskis also
faxed orders to Molly Huskey and requested advice as to whether permissive appeals
from this Court's adverse rulings would be appropriate, and further faxed motions and
memoranda challenging the constitutionality of the then new death penalty statute, which
trial counsel had filed with this Court. (See Addendum !!.) There were a handful of
additional communications initiated by the Toryanskis with the SAPD, involving
primarily procedural matters post-jury verdict.
The State, through Shawna Dunn and Roger Bourne, was provided with copies of
written communications between the Toryanskis and the SAPD, in addition to summaries
of verbal communications initiated by the Toryanskis with the SAPD.

(See Addendum

B.) This information was provided by the SAPD to Ms. Dunn and Mr. Bourne via email
over a month before depositions of Kim and Mitch Toryanski were conducted. Ms. Dunn
was present for both depositions but declined to question either of the Toryanskis
regarding their contact with the SAPD office. (See Addendum 3, passim; Addendum 9
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQtJlRING
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bas failed to raise any
(Deposition of Mitcb
Mitch Toryanski), passim.) In addition, the State has
concerns about a potential conflict between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah based on these
contacts. To the contrary, it is undersigned counsels' understanding that the State
evaluated this information and decided that no conflict between the SAPD and

Mr. Abdullah existed. 3 This understanding is bolstered by the fact that the State has
bas not
filed a motion regarding a potential conflict of interest, and presumably would have done
so if the communications between the SAPD and trial counsel had raised the specter of a
conflict, potential or actual.
Given the nature of the contact between the SAPD and the Toryanskis, and the
bavenot
fact that the Toryanskis have
not contested the content and nature of the contacts with the
SAPD, it is difficult to see how a conflict of interest between the SAPD and
Mr. Abdullah could arise as a result of these communications and contacts. The SAPD
provided a receptive ear for trial counsels' concerns and frustrations during their
representation of Mr. Abdullah, which involved a minimal amount of interaction. The
SAPD gave limited advice to trial counsel, based both on observations of counsels'
failure to follow established legal standards and on trial counsels' statements to the
SAPD regarding aspects of their representation of Mr. Abdullah. The SAPD remained
The Court ordered simultaneous briefing from the parties. Mr. Abdullah expects the
State to concur with his analysis. However, in the event the State alleges the existence of
a conflict in its briefing to this Court, such an allegation should be reviewed with extreme
cautions. See e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153,163 (1988) ("[T]he
("[T]be Government
may seek to 'manufacture' a conflict in order to prevent a defendant from having a
particularly able defense counsel at his side; [accordingly] trial courts...
courts ... must take it into
consideration along with all of the other factors which inform" a decision involving an
alleged conflict of interest.); Chapman Engineers v. Natural Gas Sales Co., 766 F.Supp.
949,954 (D.Kan. 1991) ("Motions to disqualify should be reviewed with extreme caution
for they can be misused as a technique [] of harassment.") (internal quotations omitted).
Accordingly, Mr. Abdullah reserves the right to respond to the State's briefing if the State
alleges a disqualifying conflict of interest.
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
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cognizant of the potential for a conflict of interest that could possibly arise if the SAPD
were to provide in-depth, frequent and detailed advice to trial counsel throughout their
representation of Mr. Abdullah, and therefore, did not engage in any such involvement in

Mr. Abdullah's case.
There is nothing about the contacts between trial counsel and the SAPD,
particularly when viewed in light of the Final Petition, that gives rise to the inference that
the SAPD's interests, or those of Mr. Ackley or Ms. Huskey, conflict with

Mr. Abdullah's interests, or in any way compromise the SAPD's, Mr. Ackley's and/or
Ms. Huskey's duty of loyalty to Mr. Abdullah. To the contrary, the SAPD's efforts,
through Mr. Ackley and Ms. Huskey, to direct trial counsel to follow existing standards
and to raise relevant legal issues is consistent with Mr. Abdullah's interest in receiving a
fair trial. Moreover, nothing about the contact between the SAPD, through Mr. Ackley
and Ms. Huskey, and trial counsel, implicates the SAPD's commitment and dedication to
the interests of Mr. Abdullah and zealous advocacy on his behalf, or materially limits the
SAPD's representation of Mr. Abdullah. 4
Under these circumstances, given the nature of the limited and primarily
unsolicited contact between the SAPD and trial counsel, there is no inference of a
potential or actual conflict of interest between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah arising from
Tbis is particularly true where trial counsel has not disputed the nature and
such contact. Ibis

4 Notably, the SAPD has previously conducted an internal evaluation of whether a
. potential or actual conflict of interest exists between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah, given
the SAPD's limited pretrial, trial, and post-trial contact with trial counsel. The SAPD's
internal evaluation, conducted in light of prevailing standards of practice and professional
conduct, resulted in the conclusion that no conflict of interest, potential or actual, exists.
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content of their contacts with tbe SAPD, Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey,S and the State
has not alleged any concerns about such contacts. Simply put, the pretrial, trial and post-

trial contact between trial counsel and the SAPD has not, does not, and cannot create
conflicting interests between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD. To the contrary, the nature
and content of contact between trial counsel and the SAPD supports Mr. Abdullah's
claims that trial counsel were ineffective. Thus, there is no conflict of interest between

Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD based on contacts the SAPD had with trial counsel pretrial,
during trial, and post-verdict.

Perhaps the more important question is whether the

SAPD's pretrial, trial and post-trial contact with trial counsel renders Mr. Ackley and/or
Ms. Huskey necessary witnesses at an evidentiary hearing, thereby creating a potential
conflict of interest.
B. The SAPD's PretriaL Trial And Post-Trial Contact With Trial Counsel Does Not
Constitute A Conflict Of Interest Between The SAPD And Mr. Abdullah,
AbdUllah, Even If
That Contact Renders Mr. Ackley And/Or Ms. Huskey Potential Witnesses At An
.
Evidentiary Hearing

The limited pretrial, trial and post-trial contact between the SAPD and trial
counsel does not render Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey likely witnesses at an evidentiary
hearing, and thus does not constitute a conflict of interest or require disqualification of
the SAPD. Even assuming the limited contact between Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey
and trial counsel renders either or both likely necessary witnesses on Mr. Abdullah's
behalf at an evidentiary hearing, such status does not create a conflict of interest between
the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah.
S Indeed, it would be extremely troubling if trial counsel were able to create a conflict of
and/or post-conviction counsel by initiating unsolicited contact
interest with appellate andlor
and/or by disclosing infonnation to such counsel which was otherWise
with counsel andlor
protected by the attorney-client privilege.
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In relevant part, Rule 3.7 of
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct precludes an
ofthe
attorney from acting as an "advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
necessary witness." I.R.P.C. 3.7(a) (Emphasis added.) Despite this prohibition, Rule 3.7
recognizes three exceptions to the advocate-witness rule: (1) the lawyer's testimony
involves an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony goes to the nature and value of legal
seIVices provided in the case; or (3) disqualification would work substantial hardship on
the client. I.R.P.C. 3.7(a). The p'i.111'ose
the advocate-witness rule is to prevent-the trier
pU11'0se of
ofthe
of fact from being "confused or misled by a lawyer serving as both advocate and
witness[,]" and to ensure that opposing counsel will not suffer prejudice resulting from
the lawyer's dual role before the jury. LR.P.C. 3.7, commentary ~~ 2,3.
1. The Advocate-Witness Rule Is Not Implicated In Proceedings Before A
Judge
Where, as here, the testimony of Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey would occur at a
hearing before a judge, rather than a trial before a jury, the possibility of confusion of
roles and prejudice to opposing counsel is non-existent. Moreover, Rule 3.7 explicitly
prohibits a lawyer from assuming a dual-role at trial, but does not prevent a lawyer from

pretrial participation in a case as both an advocate and witness. See, e.g., Roberts v. State,
840 So.2d 962, 970 (Fla.2002) (holding that the purpose of advocate-witness rule, i.e., to
preyent prejudice to opposing counsel and/or avoid a conflict of interest, was not
implicated where the prosecutor was called as a rebuttal witness by the petitioner in a

hearing before a judge); see also State v. Van Dyck, 827 A.2d
post-conviction evidentiary bearing
192, 195 (N.H. 2003) ("Unlike a jury, a judge is unlikely to confuse the roles of advocate
and witness or to deem an attorney credible simply because he
be is an attorney."); cf.

Dimartino v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 66 P.3d 945,946 (Nev. 2003) (adopting the
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majority approach which does not require pretrial disqualification of an attorney who
may be called as a witness at trial). As a result, 1.R.P.C. 3.7 is not implicated where
testimony from attorneys at the SAPD, if offered, would not occur at a jury trial, but
would take place before a judge acting as a fact-finder.
2. Mr. Ackley AndiOr
And/Or Ms. Huskey Are Not Likely To Be Necessary Witnesses
Even assuming I.R.P.C. 3.7 is implicated at a proceeding where a judge is the
-

trier of fact rather than a jury, Rule 3.7 only applies if the lawyer is "likely to be a

necessary witness." I.R.P.C. 3.7(a). At this point, Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are
only implicated as potential witnesses in the event that trial counsel deny making
statements to Mr. Ackley andlor
and/or Ms. Huskey which are relevant to Mr. Abdullah's postconviction claims for relief.
As previously noted, Ms. Toryanski has already acknowledged that she and co
cocounsel had a limited number of communications with the SAPD during the course of
their representation of Mr. Abdullah. With respect to the September 15,2004 email sent
acknOWledged writing the email and
by Ms. Toryanski to Mr. Ackley, Ms. Toryanski acknoWledged
admitted that it contained her feelings and thoughts at that time, both about Mr. Abdullah
L.19 - p.231, 1.25.)
L.25.) If Ms. Toryanski recants her
and his case. (Addendum 3, p.228, 1.19
deposition testimony, such recantation would possibly render Mr. Ackley a necessary
witness if the recantation involves testimony relevant to one of Mr. Abdullah's claims for
post-conviction relief. However, the possibility of a need for the testimony of counsel,
however, is insufficient to meet the necessity or likely to be a "necessary witness"
standard of Rule 3.7. See World Youth Day, Inc. v. Famous Artists, 866 F.Supp. 1297,
1302 (D.Colo. 1994); Fognani ·v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268, 1272 (Colo. 2005) ("[O]pposing
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INfO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
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counsel cannot be disqualified on the basis of speculation or conjecture, and
disqualification can occur only after facts have been alleged that demonstrate a potential
violation ofthe
of the Rule"); Van Dyck, 827 A.2d at 194 (witness is only necessary ifhis or her
testimony is relevant, material and cannot he obtained elsewhere); Bradford v. State, 734
So.2d 364, 369 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) ("The necessity standard requires more than
mere speculation that counsel will be required to testify."). A lawyer is a necessary
witness "ifhis
"ifhls or her testimony is relevant, material and unobtainable elsewhere:'
elsewhere." Warld

Youth Day, 866 F.Supp. at 1302. Where it is not clear whether an advocate's testimony
will be necessary, a court may delay ruling on a motion to disqualify until it can
determine whether another witness can testify. Id
The necessity for Mr. Ackley andlor Ms. Huskey to testify hinges on a sequence
of events unlikely to come to fruition. First, trial counsel must testify contrary to their
written andlor verbal communications with Mr. Ackley andlor Ms. Huskey.6 Second, the
verbal andlor written communications with the SAPD must be relevant. 7

Third,

Mr. Ackley andlor Ms. Huskey must be the only source for the relevant information.
Where, as here, there is a fair amount of evidence, including documents and deposition
testimony, confirming trial counsels' statements, the testimony of Mr. Ackley andlor
Ms. Huskey would likely not be the only source for the relevant infonnation. See

Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268, 1274 (Colo. 2005) (necessity requires consideration of
6 Of course, if trial counsel 'offer testimony consistent with their verbal and written
SAPD. then there would be no need or occasion for Mr. Ackley
communications with the SAPD,
andlor Ms. Huskey to testify.

7 Because the relevance of testimony from Mr. Ackley andlor Ms. Huskey cannot be
.determined until trial counsel testify and until this Court detennines that the testimony
.determined
involves a genuine issue of material fact, the relevance inquiry cannot be adequately
addressed.
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the nature of the testimony, weight of the testimony in resolving the disputed issues, and
the availability of other witnesses or documentary evidence which might establish the
relevant issues); State

'Y.

Schmitt, 102 P.3d 856, 859 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) ("To

demonstrate compelling circumstances [that would justify disqualification], a party must
show that the attorney will provide material evidence unobtainable elsewhere."); Utley v.

City of Dover, 101 S.W.3d 191,202 (Ark. 2003) (declining to disqualify lawyer where
- --

-

moving party failed to demonstrate lawyer's testimony could not be gained from other
sources); Harter

'Y.

Plains Ins. Co., 579 N.W.2d 625, 632 (S.D. 1998) (lawyer not a

necessary witness where documentary evidence on subject of lawyer's intended
testimony admitted into evidence at trial). As a result, Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey
would not be necessary witnesses because the evidence gained from their testimony could
be obtained from other sources.
3. Disqualification Of The SAPD Would Cause Substantial Hardship To
Mr. Abdullah
Finally, assuming that Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey would otherwise be
necessary witnesses, such status would not necessarily disqualify the SAPD from
representing Mr. Abdullah if such "disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial
hardship on the client." I.R.P.C 3.7(a)(3). Even if a lawyer will act as both an advocate
and witness in the same proceeding, and this dual role may prejudice opposing counsel,
"in detennining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must Oe given to
I.R.P.C. 3.7, cmt. ~4.
the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client." 1.R.P.C.

Thus,

substantial hardship involves consideration of inter alia the length of the attorney's
representation of the client, closeness of the trial to the request to disqualify. the amount
and type of legal work already conducted by counsel, the financial burden of retaining
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
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Nat'f Union Fire Ins. Co. v. L.E.
new counsel, and the client's right to choice of counsel. 8 Nat'[

Myers Co. Group, 937 F.Supp. 279, 280-281 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (substantial hardship
where law firm represented client for twelve years, case was a month away from trial,
counsel had done significant amount of substantive' work on case, client would be denied
choice of counsel and client would suffer financial burden); D.J Inv. Group, L.L. C. v.

DAEIWestbrook, L.L.e., 113 P.3d 1022, 1023-1024 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (substantial
DAElWestbrook,
hardship existed where case had been pending for 3 years, parties litigated numeroos
complex legal issues, nearly all witnesses had been disposed, and parties had exchanged
written discovery).
Here, the SAPD has represented Mr. Abdullah since 2005. Specifically,
Mr. Ackley has personally represented Mr. Abdullah since late 2006 and Ms. Huskey has
been the SAPD during the entirety of Mr. Abdullah's post-conviction case. Mr. Ackley is
lead counsel for Mr. Abdullah and is on the Idaho Supreme Court's roster of capital

8 The importance of the attorney-client relationship is sacrosanct in American
jurisprudence. It is fundamental, that once the attorney client relationship is fonned, "a
distinct set of constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attomey
attomeyclient relationship takes effect." Patterson v. Illinois,
IllinOis, 487 U.S. 285,290 n.3 (l988)(citing
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)). The constitutional safeguards include the
Sixth Amendment guarantee that the accused has the right to rely on counsel and
"imposes on the State an affirmative obligation to respect and preserve the accused's
choice to seek [that] assistance." Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171. Once appointed counsel
has established an attorney-client relationship with an indigent defendant, that
relationship is no less inviolate than if counsel bad been retained. See Morris v.
S[appy,
I, 22-23 & n. 5 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in result)
Sfappy, . 461 U.S. 1,
("considerations that may preclude recognition of an indigent defendant's right to choose
his own counsel ... should not preclude recognition of an indigent defendant's interest in
continued representation by an appointed attorney with whom he has developed a
216, 222 (Tex.
relationship of trust and confidence"); Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216.
Cr.App. 1989)("Once counsel has been validly -appointed to represent an indigent
defendant and the parties enter into an attomey-client
attorney-client relationship it is no less inviolate
than if counsel is retained.").
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defense counsel. After extensive litigation and review of an extraordinary number of
documents, Mr. Abdullah's case is finally proceeding to an evidentiary hearing which, in
the world of post-conviction,

~s

the functional" equivalent of a trial. The amount of time

that new counsel would need not only to get up to speed in Mr. Abdullah's case, but also
to establish a meaningful and trusting relationship with Mr. Abdullah, while difficult to
assess is obviously great
Because disqualification of the SAPD and Mr. Ackley specifically, would result
in a substantial hardship to Mr. Abdullah, Rule 3.7 does not require disqualification even
assuming Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are necessary witnesses. If Mr. Ackley and/or
Ms. Huskey are likely, necessary witnesses and the court concludes no substantial
hardship would result from disqualifying the SAPD office, based on established conflict
of interest rules and precedent, even if some attorneys in the SAPD office are found to
labor under a conflict of interest because they are necessary witnesses, that conflict
cannot be imputed to the entire SAPD office. See Severson, 2009 WL 1492659 at *7-8
(pursuant to Rules of Professional Conduct governing conflicts of interest, public
defender offices are different from private law firms, and conflict of one public defender
cannot be imputed to public defender office). Rather, whether an individual public
defender's conflict should be imputed to an entire public defender office is analyzed on a
case-by-case basis, in light of whether the circumstances demonstrate a potential conflict
prejUdice. Id at *7.
of interest and a significant likelihood of prejudice.

Only if the facts

demonstrate both a potential conflict of interest as well as a significant likelihood of
prejudice will a conflict be imputed from one public defender to an entire public
defender's office. Id.
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
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Here, as previously analyzed, there is neither an actual nor a potential conflict of
interest arising from the SAPD's contact with trial counsel. Even assuming a potential
conflict based on that contact, and presunring
presuming Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are
necessary witnesses based on that contact, there is no significant likelihood of prejudice
which would justify imputing the conflict to entire SAPD office. Any testimony that
would be offered by Mr. Acldey
postAckley and/or Ms. Huskey regarding their pretrial, trial or post

cOilIlsel would serve only to support Mr. Abdullah's elaims. The
trial contact with trial cOilnsel
only possible "significant likelihood of prejudice" would be if this Court were
predisposed to disregard the testimony of Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey, simply because
they are attorneys for Mr. Abdullah.

This possibility aside, there is no significant

likelihood ofprejudice that would justify disqualifying the entire SAPD office.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the SAPD's pretrial, trial and post-verdict contact
with trial counsel does not create a conflict of interest and does not render Mr. Ackley
and/or Ms. Huskey necessary Witnesses at Mr. Abdullah's evidentiary hearing. Assuming

arguendo Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are necessary witnesses, disqualification of the
SAPD would result in a substantial hardship to Mr. Abdullah. Finally, even if this Court
were to conclude that no substantial hardship would result from the disqualification of
Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey, there is no significant likelihood of prejudice that would
justify disqualifying the entire SAPD office.

RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITIED this 15t day of September, 2009.

U u\ALD·
tlLLLU'
NICdiE OWENS

Co-counsel for Mr. Abdullah
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
have, on this 1st day of September.
September, 2009.
2009, served a
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have.
true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING
INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL
COUNSEL as indicated below:
SHAWNADUNN
ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT.
FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID
ill 83702

U.S. Mail
- - Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery

AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH
INMATE #76321
IMSI - J BLOCK
PO BOX51
BOISE ID 83707

..L...U.S. Mail
~U.S.Mail
Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

Administrative Assistant
Capital Litigation Unit
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Abdullah v. State of Idaho

Kim W. Toryanski

6/19/2008

n

Page 226 ~

Q.

1

BY MR. ACKLEY:

Beyond Joan Fisher and

2

the other attorneys that you spoke to in varying

3

degrees in this case, did you also contact me on

,~
~

~

I~
~
~

4

i

occasion?

5

A.

Litigating for Life, maybe?

6

conference, I think.

7

And also Dennis Benjamin was referring to you.

8

was just reminded of that in an e-mail that you

9

had shown me as an exhibit here.

II

I mean, Dennis,

~o

he would call you guys M and M, Molly and Mark.

11

You know, "What do Molly and Mark say?"

12

Q.

Okay.

And I am going to show you

13

what's been marked as Petitioner's Exhibit 9 and

14

10?

15

i

Yeah, because you and I had met at a

Sorry about the coloring on that.
A.

That's okay.

These are e-mails.

16

Exhibit 9 is dated -- this is e-mails from me to

17

you.

18

was after the jury selection had commenced.

19

Exhibit 10 is also an e-mail from me to you, and

20

it's dated September 15th, 2004, five days later.

21
22
23
24
25

Exhibit 9 is dated September 10, 2004.

Q.

And the first one, what was the date on

that, again?
A.

This

I'm sorry.

September -- 9 is September.

Exhibit 9

is September 10.
Q.

That was after jury selection?

Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho,
www.etucker.net

(208) 345-3704
106e858f-eb42-42f0..851 e-9SadOO3921
c-9SadOO3921 e8
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Page 227 "f
1
2

A.

Had begun.

Q.

Okay.

~

f

~

And were there questions?

Was

3

there a discussion, then, about jury selection

4

there?

5
6

A.

Let's see.

Maybe this is an e-mail

from you to me in which I respond because of, "As
noted yesterday.
yesterday."II

You're probably responding to

7

I

8

me even though the e-mail starts with a

9

communication from you, apparently.

10

Q.

~

~

i
~

i
~
i

I
j

~

Yeah, there are multiple e-mails

11

actually reflected in that document; is that

12

right?

13

A.

Dh-huh.
Uh-huh.

14

Q.

So just start with the earliest one.

15

A.

Okay.

16
1.6

Q.

Okay.

17

A.

Then you're writing to me.

Which is September 9.
You're

U

telling me that Kimberly Simmons and the

19

mitigation specialist, Shelley Hill observed a

20

portion of yesterday's jury selection.

21

that there was some contention regarding questions

22

to prospective jurors regarding whether mitigating

23

facts would matter to them, as worded by the

24

defense, or whether they could just simply

25

consider mitigating facts if instructed by the

Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho,
www.etucker.net

Kim noted

(208) 345-3704
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·,

Page 228 !}

i
I~

1

court as worded by the judge.

2

versus Johnson dealt with jury instructions on

3

mitigation at close of the case.

4

relevant portion that may have application for you

5

during jury selection.

6

7
8

9

Q.

The case of Penry
There is a

And then you recited -
--

-- some of the language from the Penry

A.

Yes.

helps us a lot.

And then I say, Yes, Mark this
And we've been intending to ask

the mitigation questions using the words weight --

11

give weight and value to mitigation evidence and

12

then give examples of our mitigation facts.

13

as Shelley and Kim have observed, we are forming

14

the questions with the word consider, and we need

15

to fix that.

16

It will be a long day.

18
19

Q.

But

1

~

I·~
~

•

r.
~

*

I

II
l
~

I

~

i

I

We'll work on correcting that today.

Okay.

So those string of e-mails have

to deal with jury selection type questions?
A.

Oh, yes.

And then the September 15th

20

one, just like you've indicated -- oh, it's again

21

responding to that same e-mail about the

22

observations, plea negotiations with the

23

prosecutor's office have progressed and we were

24

told that they would accept them -- Oh, okay.

25

I·

~

-

cases?

10

17

~

Q.

Could you continue reading that?

Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho,
www.etucker.net

(208) 345-3704
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Page 229

A.

1

2

dismiss all other five charges, arson, three

3

counts of attempted murder, child endangerment

4

with no aggravators.

that were presented at sentencing.

6

are going to the mat

8

Q.

10

A.

1S

f
:;

~
f

~

If

Could you slow down for the court

1
~

Oh, okay.

You're here.

I forgot about

i~

•

that.

11
12

Of course, we

reporter?

9

14

And there were aggravators

S

7

13

One count of first degree murder,

~

~

MR. ACKLEY:

Do we need to start over on

that?

THE REPORTER:

Yeah, when you say could

continue reading that.

THE WITNESS:

Dismiss all other five

16

charges, parentheses, arson, three counts of

17

attempted murder, child endangerment.

18

aggravators will be presented at sentencing.

l.9
1-9

course, we are going to the mat wrestling with our

20

client to take the deal.

2l.
21-

resisting.

22

on him to take the deal.

23

Our attorney/client relationship is being affected

24

because of this.

2S

that we are encouraging a plea.

And no
Of

Unbelievably he's

Day by day we're putting more pressure
He continues to resist.

He has become hostile and angry

Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho,
www.etucker.net

His family seems

(208) 345-3704
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Page 230
1

to support his decision not to take a plea.

2

relationship is being affected too.

That

~

~

~

Iit.
~

Want me to read the whole thing?

3
4

Q.

BY MR. ACKLEY:

Yes, please.

5

A.

The deal closes the day we begin to

6

exercise our peremptory challenges in jury

7

selection.

We expect that to be next Tuesday or

8

Wednesday.

After that the prosecution goes into

~

~
~
~

i

;;

9

10

!

overdrive to bury our client.
Q.

~

I

Does that seem to be an accurate

11

reflection of how you were feeling at the time?

I

12

What's the date on that one?

~

13

A.

15th.

14
1.4

Q.

15th.

September 10th?

~

~
E

I

So jury selection began, I

:
!

15
1.5

think, on the 7th, and my notes reflect that the

16

record says that the state's case-in-chief started"

17

on the 27th.

18

all those dates, obviously, were jury selection,

19

but there is a 20-day span there.

20

halfway through at that point?

So basically there is 20 days.

Not

You are about

~1

A.

Yep.

22

Q.

So at that point, at least at that

23

time, you felt like your attorney/client

24

relationship was suffering because of these

25

discussions about the plea bargain?

. Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho,
www.etucker.net

~
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Page 231
~

A.

I am writing that that's how I feel.

2

Q.

Okay.

So is it fair say -- I mean,

3

obviously the passage of time does affect people's

~

4

memory.

f.~

5

earlier today about the relationship in light of

6

your e-mail?

7
8

A.
I

Would you supplement your testimony

Well, II just -- Azad wasn't doing what

thought was in his own best interest.

9
~o

Q.

And he was becoming hostile with you?

A.

II

think he was angry that we kept

11

wanting to -- you know, keep revisiting the same

~2

thing.

~3

14

And -- but ...

Q.

And you were increasing pressure on him

to take the deal?

15

A.

Well, by just continuing to ask him and

have different approaches to it.

17

so strongly that this was in his best interest.

18

And

19

death penalty.

20

Q.

I

.~
~

16

But

I

~

just felt

fretted that that young man would get the
But I am just trying to establish

21

whether that seems to be consistent with how you

22

felt at that time back then.

23

~

A.

Oh, yes.

Oh, yeah.

I mean, he didn't

24

like the fact that, you know, I guess we kept

25

coming back with it.

Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho,
www.etucker.net
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Page 232
~

Okay.

Q.

I will go on with the similar

2

questions that I asked with the other attorneys

3

even though they may seem silly.

4

did you ever pay me at all to, like, help

5

represent you in this case?

6

A.

No , no , no.

7

Q
Q.•

Okay.·
Okay.

A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

8

9
~o

11

I'm sorry.

But

Did you ever ask me to talk to

Azad?
Did you ever give me any

discovery?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

Beyond these two contacts, can you

"~

14

think of any other significant contacts that you

~5

had with me during the course of your entire

~6

representation?

~7

A.

I think we had some e-mails.

I

~

i
~

There was

18

more e-mails.

19

because II -- you and Molly and II talked on the

20

phone about the relationship with "the prosecutor,

21

Erika Klein, had had with Littlefield.

22

really appreciated the time you took to talk with

23

me because you validated my concerns.

24

really wasn't getting that from a lot of defense

25

counsel.

There is a little bit more e-mail

I.
I."

And II
And II

Because II had asked Chuck what he

Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho,
www.etucker.net
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Page 233 ~
1

thought, Chuck Peterson.

2

office and I mentioned it to him.

3

know sort of -- Teresa Hampton, she was aware of

4

it.

5

others that other defense counsel thought it was

6

as big a deal as I

7

Molly saw -- seemed to see something that had a

8

definite impact on the integrity of the case.

9

that was valuable to me in moving forward, how I

10

I

He bounced down to my
And Teresa, you

~i~
~

;:

,

didn't get the perception from talking to
thought it was.

But you and
And

decided to move forward.

11

Q.

Do you recall whether it was a matter,

12

like, saying that there was definitely an impact

13

or something that should be investigated?

14

A.

Something that should be investigated.

15 .

Q.

Do you recall whether you informed us

16

that the judge had given you leave to depose

17

them

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

-- and do the further investigation?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Didn't this, also -- I don't know if

22

this is reflected in the telephone conversation or

23

not, but do you recall the judge ever saying, "I

24

am going to look at personnel files now" -
--

25

~

~

A.

Yes.

Tucker and Associates/Boise, Idaho,

(208) 345-3704

www.etucker.net
106e858f-eb42-42ft)-851c-95ad003921e8
106e858f-eb42-42ft)-851
c·95ad003921e8
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1
I
Kim W. Toryanski
I Abdullah v. State of Idaho
I
I
1
-- "0£ all the police officers"?
Q.
A.
Yes.
I
Q.
And in your memory, do you recall
whether it was reflected on the record or
I
otherwise pretty much implicit that the judge was
going to look at these personnel files of all
I
officers because of this issue with Erika Klein
I
1
and Todd Littlefield had come forward?
A.
Yes.
I
Q.
Did those go kind of hand in hand?
A.
Yes.
I
1
Q.
And you said other e-mails between us,
but then you went directly to that telephone call. i
I
1
So that would have been a telephone conversation
i
I
1
as opposed to e-mail correspondence, the
discussion you just referenced about Todd
I
Littlefield and Erika Klein affair?
A.
Right.
I
1
Q.
Do you recall, has the state or the
prosecution shown any kind of summary of that
I
1
~
all?'
conversation at all?
I
A.
I think I saw an exhibit on that,
maybe.
I think so.
I
1
Q.
But something that kind of outlined the
topics of discussion?
II·
Boise, Idaho, (208) 345-3704
1
I Tucker and Associates,
www.etucker.net
I
1
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11
12

,

,~

13

14

15

16

17

18
J.8

19
J.9

20
21

I

22

23
24

25
25
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Page 235
1

A.

Yeah.

2

Q.

Okay.

All right.

And beyond those

3

three contacts,
contacts l do you recall any other

4

significant contacts during the scope of your

5

representation?

6
7

A.

Well, just,
just l it may be part of those
contacts, or it might be,
bel you know, something

8

additional, additional e-mail.

9

but recusing the judge was an issue that was

10

I

can't remember,

discussed.

i

j

11

Q.

Okay.

12

A.

And I wasn't -- I was not inclined to

13

move to recuse the judge.

14

a discussion of the pros and cons of that.

But there was a

!

just;
ii

And I

I

15

think there was e-mail about that because I think

I

1.6

that I had let you know I was leaning towards

1.7

moving for a continuance.

18

anything yet.

1.9

Q.

But I hadn't prepared

Can you remember whether an e-mail

20

exists or not impacted by the fact that you had

21

apparently seen some sort of summary?

22

A.

g

Yes, it could.

Which is one of the

23

reasons why I have tried not to look at all these

24

affidavits because I don't want to be colored by

25

those kinds of things.
Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho,
www.etucker.net

(208) 345-3704
106e858f-eb42-42fO-851c-95ad003921e8
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1
2

But the state provided you kind of

Q.

~

these e-mails or documents?
A.

3

They are just exhibits that are part of

4

the petition, or something, that I have seen.

5

or two.

6

think there may have been something, I think so,

'7

in just an exhibit to an affidavit that has been

8

prepared.

9

10
11

Q.

Do you have that, what was given to

A.

No, huh-uh.

But I do have what was

attachments in here.

14

affidavits.
Q.

And there are

But mostly it's the

So you saw these exhibits, as yourve
you've

16

described them, as attached to some sort of

17

affidavit?
A.

I can't remember what they were

19

att·ached to or -- it was just -
-- they were

20

numbered.

21

had had a conversation.

23
24
25

One

you?

13

22

~

I can't remember.

these exhibits (indicating).

18

i§

I mean, I have worked with Shawna, and I

12

lS
15

,

~

Q.

I

looked at it, and I recall that we

Okay.

And beyond that, do you recall

any other contact with me?
A.

Not during all this.

We talked at the

end, I think, during the spring before Azad was

Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho,
www.etucker.net

(208) 345-3704
106e858f~b42-4~51~5ad003921e8
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1

sentenced on the other charges.

2

Kimberly had come to the courtroom.

3

may have chatted then.

4

a couple times, I remember that.

5

was a motion -- or excuse me -- an order, a

6

I think you and

fl

You came to the courtroom

__ lengthy order that we had been handed by the

7

judge's courtroom deputy, deputy clerk.

8

lengthy, and was concerning something that had

9

been argued quite a while ago.

It was

And we just had

recently gotten it, and I remember we had thought

11

that that was interesting, the timing of it.

12

that's all I can really remember.

Q.

13

But

SO most of the contact was either

14

during this as reflected here, or later after he's

15

already been sentenced to death?

iI
3

.
Ii

16

A.

Yes, I believe.

17

Q.

But before sentenced on the other

non-capital charges by the judge?

19

A.

Yeah, I think so.

20

Q.

Okay.

Are there any other attorneys

2l.
2J.

that you recall speaking to at all about this

22

case?

23

Benjamin,.Teresa Hampton, David Leroy, David

24

Nevin, Joan Fisher, and myself.

25

i~

I think we

10

18

>

We have gone through Chuck Peterson, Dennis

A.

I

I

Consulting with, you mean? .

Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho,
www.etucker.net

(208) 345-3704
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Mark Ackley

-------From:
. Sent:

To:

Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanskLcom]
Frjday',
Friday., .September 10, 2004 6:45 AM

Mark Ackley

Subject: RE: Penry v. Johnson

Yes, Mark, this helps us a Jot. We have been intending to be asking the mitigation que91IDns
queS1IDns using
us.ing the words,
"give weIght and value" to mitigation evidence, and Ihen give examples of our mitigation facts, but.,
but, as Shelley and
Kim bave
have observed,
obserVed, we are fonnlng
fanning the questions with the word "consider" and we need to "fix that. We'll work on
correctIng that today.
Today will be a long day- we start questioning at 9:00 and will finish at 5;00, but at leasUoday we get lunch.
Copsey even needs to be reminded
r.eminded that we need bathroom breaks.
I'm so glad Shelley and Kim are In
/n the courtroom - will you be able to stop by today?
Kim

---Original Message-Message-
From: Mark Ackley [mailto:mackley@sapd,state.id.us]
Sent: Thursday, september 09,20044:17 PM
To: kim@toryanskl.com
Subject: Penry v. Johnson
Kim,

As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection.
Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective
jurors regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by
the defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if
instructed by the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v.
Johnson.
Johnson, 532 O.S. 782, 797 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application
for you during jury selection:
"Penry I did not hold that the
tb.e mere ment:i.on
mention of "m.i.tigating .ei:rCWl\Stances" to a
cap:i.tB.l
capital senteru:ti.ng jury satisfies the Eigh.th Juuendment. Nor does i t stand

for the proposition that
i t 1.s
~s constitutional1y
suffic~ent to
that; :it
consUtuti.onal1y suffic1.ent
infO%DI.
mi.tiqating circumstances
info%m the
t;he jury that i t may "consider" mi.tiqa1;;ing
in deciding the
'the appropriate sentenoe. Rather, the key uncler Penry
I i.s that the ju:y be $1e to "consider and give e££ec-c
effect to [a
de.fendant's
imposing sentence. rr 492 U.S.,
de.fendan't's mitigating1
mi'tiga-tiDg] evidence in iJIlposing
at 319,109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphaa:i.s
(emphasis added). See also Johnson·v.

~8, 509 U.S.
~8,
350, 361, 113 5_Ct:.
{l993) (O'CONNO~,
(O'CONNOR.• J., dissenting)
5_Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 {1993)
(n (A] sentencP..r
ful.J. effect
sentenCt"'..r rlltUstJ
rlllUstJ be allowed
e.llowad to give
gi.ve £Ull con:sideratioo and fuJ.J.
to m:l.tigatinq c1.roumstancas"
:in .ox:.iginal»). For "i.t
-s..t :is only when the
c1.roumstance.s" {emphasis ;in
ju;y.is <;;ivan
i t s 'reasol;J.Qd
'reasol;lQd r.ora~ ZJesponse'
Zlesponse' to· that
givan a "vehioJ..e for expressing its
evidence in. rendering its sentencing- dec.iEdon," Penry I, -492 U.S.,:at 328,109
5.Ct. '2934, thai: we can be sure that the jury "has treated i:ha
the defendant as a
beinrg)'I and has mad(~
mad(~ a :cel.iabh atlterm:inati.on
atlterm:inat.ion that
·unj.queJ.~· irui:irid-.la.l
irui:irid-.3a.l hUlI!arl
humarl beinrgJ
'unj.queJ."l,'
daat;h 13
:L3 the appropr:i..ate
appropr:i.ate ,santanoe,"
,sentenoe,1< **1921 .id.,
id., at 319, 109 S.·.Ct. 2934

9/2008
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(quoti.ng Woocson
vloocson 'IT.
Carolina l 428 U.£.
U.:S. 280, 304, 305
:~O.5JJ ::96
(quoting
v. North Carolina,
~6 8.Ct. 2978, 49
L.Ed.2d 944 (1976}).u

(my emphasis added)
inqu~r~ng of a prospective juror whether they .
In short, it seems that simpy inqu~r~ng
"consider"H mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they
will "consider
can give it effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause.

Mark J. Ackley
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
mackley@sapd.state.id.us
(208) 334-2712

6/19/.2008
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Mark Ackley
From:

Kim W. Toryanskl [kim@toryanski.com]

Sent:

Wednesday,

To:

Mark Ackley

I
I
I
1I
I,
1I
I
1
I
1I
I
1I
1I
I
I ... ...

~eptembe.r
~eptembe.r

15, 2004 7:09 AM

Subject: RE: Penry v. Johnson

Mark, plea negotiations w1tb the prosecutors
prosecutor's office have progressed and we have been 'tOld thatihey would
accept a plea to one count of first degree murder. dismIss all other 5 charges (arson, :3 .c'ts-of
.c'tso()f attempted murder,
child ,endangerment). and no aggravators will be presented at sentencing. Of course, we are going to the mat
wrestling with our clIent to:take the deal. Unbelievably, he's resisting. Day by day, we're putting more pressure
client relationship is bein,g
bein,9 affected because of this.
on hlm
hIm to take the deal. He continues to resist. Our attorney clIent
He has become hostile and angry that we are encouragirtga ptea.
prea. HfS'famllyssems.tosmpporthisdecision
HfS'famllyssems.iosmpporthisdecision notio
take a plea. That relationship Is being affected too.

selectio.n. We expect that to
The deal closes the day we begin to exercise our peremptory challenges in jury selection.
be next Tuesday or Wed. After that, the prosecution goes Into overdrive to bury our client.

on testifying. He has been toJd
told that his
hiS attorneys Will
Other issues are erupting. One has to do with his insistence ontestlfying.
not put him on the stand, for ethical reasons. More and more, he is reluctant to follow the advice of counsel.

The dreadful reality of the DP being imposed by this panel of prospective jurors is demo.mstrated daily. Even the
ones that say they are generally opposed to the DP say they can impose it where children were Involved.
lnvolved. Many
actually impose it if
of ones that generally favor the DP seem very willing to put theIr beliefs into action and actoally
examination.. but the reality is that
allegations are proven in this case. We shop our mitigation in each yoir dire examination.,
none of it stacks up against the aggravator of leaving 4 kids In a house on fire.

We are consulting with an experienced DP defense lawyer to get 'ideas about how to w.aJk'through this impasse.
He's a grey haired guy with familiarity with the Muslim culture. Will continue to advise you.
we're close. but not
you.. We're
close enough. If plea negotiations fail, we have told our client to anticipate the worst at mal,
mal. based upon the
verbal statements and nonverbal demeanor of th°ese
th'ese jurors during voir dire.

Kim

-Original Message-
Message-From: Mark Ackley [mallto:mackley@sapd.state.ld,us]
[mallto:mackley@sapd.state,ld.us]
5eptember 09, 2004 4:17 PM
Sent: Thursday, September
To: klm@tDryanskl.com
k1m@toryanski.com
Subject: Penry v. Johnson

Kim,
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation

specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's'jury selection.
Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective
jurors regarding Whether
"matt~r" to them (as worded by
whether mitigating facts would "matter"
"consider n mitigating facts if
the defense) or whether they could simply "consider"
'instructed by the Court (as worde~
worde~ by the judge). The case of Penry v.
Johnson, 532 U.s.
U.S. 782, 797 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application
for you during jury selection:

-

ALL-sTATE tJ:GALe

'-

I

o

~~.

;Eo

!lift~

'·Pe.nz:y I did not hold that the mera mention of "mi.tigat:i.ng
Itmi:tigat:i.ng ,ci.iroumstanoes"
ciiroumstanoes" to a

o

1....__•.
1....__
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satisfieas the Eigh.th Amendment. Nor does it
i.t stand
capital sentencing jury satisfiQs
i.t
i.s consti.tutionally sufficient
suffi.cient to
for the proposi.ti.on
proposition that i
t is
i.nfol:tll the jury that i
it
i.nfoJ:tll
t may "oonsider" mitigating circumstances
in deciding the appropriate sentence. Rather, the key under Penry
i.s that the j.ury be able to.
1: is
to . II consider . and give e:f:Eect. t.o fa
de:fendant's mit:igat:ing]
mif:;igaf:;ingJ evidence in :i.zrposing
i..zrposing sentence." 492 O.S. 1
v. 'Texas.1 509 U.S.
at. 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis added). See also Johr.son "V.
350; 381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 {1993)
~_, dissenting)
'.(1993) (O'CONNOR J iI"
f1ll.ustJ be allowed .to give..
give..full considerati.oJa
consicierati.o.13 :and full eft'act
eff'ect
{" CA} senteocer f1l\.ustJ
mitigatil'l.g cirOUlllstances" (emphasis in origimJ.l)}.
origiml-l)}. For .i··t 5..'5
5,.'5 only when the
t.o mitigatil1.g
ja"-'Y is given a "vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned
I reasoned moral .t::eesponse
.t::ecsponse I to that
ja~:-y
evid.ence in rs;oderinq
relliderinq :i.ts
lU'.S. 1 at 328, 109
evidence
its sentencing decision," Penry I, 492 lu.S.
':cks defendant as a
S.Ct. 2934, tha:t
tha:!: WE) can be sure that :the
the juxy "has treated ·:tks
. 'uni~ely
'u:ni~ely ind.i;vidual
ind.:i;vidual hUIllan
hUIIIl:tn beintg}I and has maQQ.
~ a :t:allab1e &ate",,'ination
&ate,...",'ination that
appropl:iate /Sentence," **192l
319 1 109 fl.et.
fl.Ct. '2934
death is the appropJ:iate
**1921 ;i.d.,
i.d., at 319,
(q-ucting
290, 304, 305
30'S,1 95
$/.6 S.Ct. 2978 1 49
(~ucting Woodson v. North Carolina l 428 U.:S.
u.~. 280,
(1'76»."
L.Ed.2d 944 (1'76)."

(my emphasis added)
In short, it seems that simpy inqu1r1nq of a prospective juror whether they
will. "consider II mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they
can give i t effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause.
Mark J. Ackley
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
mackley@sapd.state.id.us
(208) 334-2712
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Mark Ackley
From:
Sent:
To:

Cc:
Subject:
SUbject:
Attachments:

Mark Ackley
Friday, May 09,200812:12 PM
'Shawna Dunn'; Roger Bourne
Boume
Shannon N. Romero
Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and
the SAPD
FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday; Abdullah continuance motion was denied; Penry
v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson; State v. Abullah, Sup. Ct. No.
316591
31659/ formerly H0201384; 66857.pdf; 66858.pdf

Shawna,
This is my response to your request for correspondence between our office and the Toryanskis
at the time of
their representation of Azad Abdullah. I previously agreed to look for this
oftheir
correspondence and disclose it since we both recognized that such correspondence as contained
in the Toryanskis files was incomplete. Thank you for your patience.
I have located and attached the following:

1.

Six emails (some of which overlap) between the Toryanskis (mostly Kim Toryanski)
and our office (Molly Huskey and/or me).
a. NOTE: it appears from some of the emails that there may have been additional
correspondence. I cannot locate any additional correspondence (although I have
located summaries of a few conversations, see below).

2.

Two facsimile cover pages from Kim to Molly.
a. Both faxes, dated 12/11/03 signed by Kim and sent to Molly seem to correspond
with the attached email with the string of communications on 12/17/03 and
apparently pertain to pleadings and rulings regarding challenges to the death
penalty statute.

I have located but have not attached the following:

1.

11/24/04 from Mitch Toryanski to Molly Huskey,
A summary of a telephone calIon 11124104
ofthe
the conversation included:
written by Molly. The topics of
ofthe
a. The outcome of
the trial;
. b. Whether our office files post-trial motions; and
ofthe
c. Mitch's retrospective assessment of
the aggravation and the mitigation evidence,
the new death penalty jury system, Judge Copsey's professionalism or lack thereof,
and Mr. Abdullah's truthfulness or lack thereof; as well as Mitch's description of
1
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their varying degrees of their confidence during the course of the case and his
hopes for Mr. Abdullah in future proceedings.

2.

A summary of a telephone call from Kim to me on 1/24/05,
1124/05, written by me. The topics
of the conversation included:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

3.

Hearing on PSI;
Formal sentencing scheduling;
Amendments to ICR32;
Whether we would attend the hearing; and
Potential challenges to the sentencing procedure.

An email summary of a written summary ofa telephone call on 9/03104 from Kim to
Molly Huskey (for which I was present), written by me on March 17,2006. I have
not yet located my contemporaneous written summary. I think I may have given my
notes to Ron Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not located my notes in the files
that they left behind after they left our office in October 2006. The topics ofthe
of the
conversation apparently included:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

The Court closing the courtroom;
KlinelLittlefield;
Grounds to disqualify Judge Copsey;
My thoughts regarding trial counsels' degree of confidence;
Kim's comments regarding the State's ability to prove murder;
f. Kim's reference to communications sent by them to the prosecution regarding the
prosecution's case;
g. Kim's reference to what Mr. Abdullah agreed he did and for what he would plead
guilty;
h. Referencing to problems with the State's lab
4.

An email summary ofa written summary of an undated telephone conversation
between Mitch and me, written by me on March 17, 2006. I have not yet located my
contemporaneous written summary. I think I may have given my notes to Ron
Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not located my notes in the files that they left
behind after they left our office in October 2006. The topics of the conversation
apparently included:

a.
. b.
c.
d.

1/21/05;
Sentencing scheduled for 1121105;
Residual doubt;
Scope of allocution;
Mitch's comments about statements made to them by Mr. Abdullah reg~ding the
events; and
.

2
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I
e. An unclear reference which my email summary noted as follows: "One area of
I
investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not sure what
this references]"
I
I have multiple concerns about the wisdom of disclosing these documents as they differ from
the emails and the faxes to the extent they are summaries of correspondence, not the
I correspondence
themselves which tend to speak for themselves. I need to further assess
whether we have an obligation to disclose these summaries, and if so, whether they could or
I should
be redacted. I will make a decision on Tuesday after further discussion with my team
and Molly Huskey. I would also be interested in making further inquiry of the Toryanskis;
II perhaps they could check their offices again.
I sincerely invite your thoughts on trusmatter;- indeed, that is Why
why I took the time to describe for I you the contents of these summaries.
I -Mark
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
3
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Shannon N. Romero
From:
Sent:

To:
Subject:

Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanskLcom]
[kim@toryanski.com]
Monday, September 06, 2004 1
:59 PM
1:59
Mark Ackley; Molly J. Huskey
FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday

M&M:

FYI - we're moving for a continuance. The following is a copy of the
"heads up" for the judge. The judge has not responded to Pat Owen's request
that the motion be filed under seal.

----Original Message--Message--
From: Patrick Owen [mailto:PROWENPH@adaweb.net]
Sent: Monday, September 06, 200410:04 AM
To: Judge Cheri Copsey
Cc: kim@toryanski.com
Subject: RE: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday

Judge Copsey:
I request that any such motion be filed under seal and that any proceedings
related to this motion be conducted in chambers.
PatOwen
----Original Message---Message--··
From: Kim W. Toryanski [mailto:kim@toryanskLcom]
fmailto:kim@toryanskLcomJ
Sent: Monday, September 06, 2004 9:59 AM
To: Patrick Owen; Judge Cheri Copsey
Subject: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday

Judge Copsey:
The defense would like to advise you and the State that on Tuesday morning,
we will be filing a motion to continue the trial. The grounds for the
motion are directly related to the State's revelation on Friday morning that
during the course of this case, a sexual relationship existed between one of
the case prosecutors and a key witness in this case, the lead
lead. homicide
detective and case officer.
Full details of the defense necessity for a continuance will be recited in
the written motion. In summary, we assert that the defendant has a
Fourteenth Amendment due process right and a Sixth Amendment right to have a
reasonable opportunity to investigate the temporal duration of the
relationship, whether an actual conflict of interest may have arisen by
virtue of
the relationship, whether the prosecutor's ethical duties were
ofthe
affected and compromised, whether the detective has violated police rules of
conduct, whether evidence or witness testimony may have been tainted or
1
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compromised in connection with the nature of the relationship, and whether
prejudice to the defendant has resulted. While the integrity of the
proceedings and the proper administration of
justice is paramount to all
ofjustice
involved, only Mr. Abdullah stakes his life on the process.
In evaluating the appropriateness of the motion to continue, we have
referenced Guideline 10.7 (duty to investigate) and Guideline 10.8 (duty to
assert legal claims) of the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and
Perfonnance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (Rev. February, 2003).
Without an opportunity to investigate a matter which potentially calls into
question all information about the case, any conviction obtained may be
vulnerable to appellate attack on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated that death cases are
different and deserving of higher due process standards.
Kim Toryanski

2
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Shannon N. Romero
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanskLcom]
[kim@toryanski.com]
Tuesday, September 07,20043:53 PM
Mark Ackley; Molly J. Huskey
Abdullah continuance motion was denied

I
I
I
I

So maybe there is one more appellate
appelJate issue for you two to address if Azad
gets convicted of first degree, the jury finds an aggravator, and that
mitigation does not outweigh the aggravator(s). I think Copsey wants the
"glory" of being the first to try a death case under the new statute.

I
I

The good news is that, in the continuance, I detailed the need to take the
aeposition Of
detective littlefield, the one-that-Erika Klein had the affair
ofdeteetive
with. Thejudge granted that!!! The prosecutor objected, but it feU on
deaf ears. The prosecutor asked for the scope of the depo to be limited,
but the judge said no limitatons on defense inquiry. I'm looking forward to
taking the depo.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

The judge also said she would grant more money to investigate things that
need to be looked into regarding my concerns about the screwups of
the NMS
ofthe
lab. So I'm going to put in for more money to get some additional experts
to advise me, and to testifY. Again, hooray.
All in all, I think I'm going to call it a win. Thanks for wargaming with
me!
Jury selection begins tomorrow morning at 9:00. We're in 507. We'll go
until 1:00 and then adjourn for the day. Same routine through the end of
the week.

Will keep you posted.

Kim

1
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Shannon N. Romero
From:
Sent:

Mark Ackley
Thursday, September 09, 20044:17 PM

To:

kim@toryanskLcom
Penry v. Johnson

Subject:
SUbject:
Kim,

As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation specialist,
Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim noted that there was
some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors regarding whether mitigating
facts would "matter" to them (as worded by the defense) or whether they could simply
"consider" mitigating facts if instructed by the Court (as worded by the judge). The case
of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation
on far you
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my ~ve
~ve applicat;
app~cat;oD
during jury selection:
"Penry I did not hold that the mere mention of "mitigating circumstances" to a capital
sentencing jury satisfies the Eighth Amendment. Nor does it stand for the

proposition that i t is constitutionally sufficient to inform the jury that
i t may "consider"
IIconsider" mitigating circumstances in deciding the appropriate
sentence. Rather, the key under Penry I is that the jury be able to
"consider and give effect to [a defendant's mitigating] evidence in
imposing sentence. " 492 u.s., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis added). See also
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S.
u.s. 350, 381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993) (O'CONNOR,
J., dissenting) {"[AJ
{"fAJ santancer [must] be allowed to give full consideration and full
effect to mitigating circumstances" (emphasis in original». For i t is only when the jury
is given a "vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned m.oral response' to that evidence in
rendering it.s sentencing decision," Penry I, 492 U.S., at 328,109 S.Ct. 2934, that we
can be sure that the jury "has treated the defendant as a 'uniquely
'unique~y individual
individua~ human
bein[g]
sentence,"/I
bein[g]'I and has made a re~iable determination that death is the appropriate sentence,
**1921 id., at 319,109 S.ct. 2934 {quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 426 U.S. 280, 304,
305,96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976})."
(1976»."
(my emphasis added)

In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will
"consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they can give i t
effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause.
Mark J. Ackley
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
mackley@sapd.state.id.us
(208) 334-2712
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Shannon N. Romero
From:

I
I
I
I

Sent:

To:
Subject:
SUbject:

Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanski.com]
Friday, September 10, 20046:45 AM
Mark Ackley
RE: Penry v. Johnson

Yes, Mark, this helps us a lot. We have been intending to be asking the mitigation questions using the words.
words, "give
weight and value" to mitigation evidence, and then give examples of our mitigation facts, but, as Shelley and Kim have
obseNed, we are forming the questions with the word "consider" and we need to fix that. We'll wor!<
work on correcting that
today.
Today will be a long day- we start questioning at 9:00 and will finish at 5:00, but at least today we get lunch. Copsey
even needs to be reminded that we need bathroom breaks.

I'm so glad Shelley aFld Kim are in the courtroom = will you be able to stop

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

by today?

Kim

----Original Message----Message----
From: Mark Ackley [mailto:mackley@sapd.state.id.us]
Sent: Thursday, September 09, 20044:17 PM
To: kim@toryanski.com
Subject: Penry v. Johnson
Kim,
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's
yesterday'S jury selection. Kim
noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors
regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by the
defense> or whether they could simply "consider"
defense}
"consider~ mitigating facts if instructed by
court (as worded by the judge}.
judge). The case of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797
the Court
(2001) dealt with jury
jUry instructions on mitigation at the close of the case. Here is
(2001}
a relevant portion that my have application for you during jury selection:

"Penry I did not hold that the mere menti.on of "mitigating circumstances" to a

Nor does i t stand for
the proposition that i t is constitutionally sufficient to info~
info~ the
mitigating circumstances in deciding the
jury that i t may "consider" mitiqatinq
appropriate sentence. Rather, the key under Penry I .is that the jury
be able to "consider and give effect to {a defendant's
defendant'8 mitigating]
492 U.S., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis
evidence in imposing sentence. " 49.2
capital. sentencing jury satisfies the Eighth Amendment.

U.S. 350, 381,113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d
added). See also Johnson v. Texas, 509 u.s.
("[A} sentencer [must] be a110wed to give
290 (1993) (O'CONNOR, J' T dissenting) ("(AJ
fu11 consideration and full effect to mitigating circumstances" (emphasis in
original». For i t is only when the jury is given a "vebic1e for expressing its
'reasoned
to that evidence in rendering its sentencing decision,"
decision, I,
t :reasoned moral response'
U.S.,I at 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, that we can be sure that the jury "has
Penry I, 492 U.S.
'uni.quely indi.vidua1
individua1 human ];)ein[g]'
treated the defendant as a 'uni.que1y
Qein[g]' and has made a
re1iable determination that death is the appropriate sentence,
It
**1921 id.,
re1iab1e
sentence,"
.i.d., at 319,
109 S.Ct. 2934 (quoting Woodson v. North caro1ina,
CaroB.na, 428 U.s.
U.S. 280,
2.80, 304, 305, 96 S.Ct.
.
2978,49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976»."
emphasis added)
(my empbasis
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In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will
"consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they can give it
effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause.
Mark J. Ackley
Idaho state Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
mackley@sapd.state.id.u5
mackley@sapd.state,id.us
(208) 334-2712

2

001818

I
I

Shannon N. Romero
From:

I
I
I
I
II
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I
I
I
I
I
I

Sent:

To:
Subject:
SUbject:

Kim W. Toryanski {kim@toryanskLcom]
Wednesday, September 15, 2004 7:09 AM
Mark Ackley
RE: Penry v. Johnson

Mark, plea negotiations with the prosecutor's office have progressed and we have been told that they would accept a plea
to one count of first degree murder, dismiss all other 5 charges (arson, 3 cts of attempted murder, child endangerment),
and no aggravators will be presented at sentencing. Of course, we are going to the mat wrestling with our client to take
the deal. Unbelievably, he's resisting. Day by day, we're putting more pressure on him to take the deal. He continues to
resist. Our attorney client relationship is being affected because of this. He has become hostile and angry that we are
encouraging a plea. His family seems to support his decision not to take a plea. That relationship is being affected too.
The deal closes the day we begin to exercise our peremptory challenges in jury selection. We expect that to be next
Tuesday or Wed. After that. the prosec:;uti()!190es
prosec::uti()!1goes into overdrive to bury our client.
Other issues are erupting. One has to do with his insistence on testifying. He has been told that his attorneys will not put
him on the stand, for ethical reasons. More and more, he is reluctant to follow the advice of counsel.
The dreadful reality of the DP being imposed by this panel of prospective jurors is demonstrated daily. Even the ones that
say they are generally opposed to the DP say they can impose it where children were involved. Many of ones that
generally favor the DP seem very willing to put their beliefs into action and actually impose it if allegations are proven in
th is case. We shop our mitigation in each voir dire examination, but the reality is that none of it stacks up against the
. aggravator of leaving 4 kids in a house on fire.
We are consulting with an experienced DP defense lawyer to get ideas about how to work through this impasse. He's a
grey haired guy with familiarity with the Muslim culture. Will continue to advise you. We're close, but not close enough.
If plea negotiations fail, we have told our client to anticipate the worst at trial, based upon the verbal statements and
nonverbal demeanor of these jurors during voir dire.
Kim
Message----
-----Original Message-----

From: Mark Ackley [mailto:mackley@sapd.state.id.us]
september 09, 2004 4: 17 PM
Sent: Thursday, September
To: klm@toryanski.com
Subject: Penry v. Johnson
Kim,
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim
noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors
regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by the
defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if instructed by
the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797
(2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation at the close of the case. Here is
a relevant portion that my have application for you during jury selection:
hold that the mere mention of "m.itigating
",Penry I did not ho1d
"mi.t.igatiug circumstances" to a
capital sentencing jury satisfies the Eighth Amend1l1ent.
Amendment. Nor does it stand for
constitutiona~~y sufficient to infor.m the
the proposition that i t is constitutiona~~y
mi.tigating circumstances in deciding the
jury that i t may "consider" mitigating
appropriate sentence. Rather, the key under Penry I is that the jury
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be able to "consider and give effect to [a
fa defendant's mitigating]
evidence in imposing sentence. " 492 U.S., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis
added). See also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S.
U.s. 350, 381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d
290 (1993) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) ("[A] sentencer [must] be allowed to give
full consideration and full effect to mitigating circumstances" (emphasis in
original». For i t is only when the jury is given a "vehicle for expressing its
'reasoned moral response' to that evidence in renderi.ng its sentencing decision,"
Penry If 492 U.S., at 328, 109 S.ct. 2934, that we can be sure that the jury "has
treated the defendant as a 'uniquely individual human bein[g]' and has made a
reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence," **1921 id., at 319,
109 S.Ct. 2934 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 305, 96 S.Ct.
2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976»."
(my emphasis added)
{my
added}
In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will
"consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they can give it
effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for ~ause,
~ause,
Mark J. Ackley
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
capital Litigation Unit
rnackley@sapd.state.id.us
(208)

334-2712
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Shannon N. Romero
From:
Sent:

To:
Subject:
SUbject:

Mitch Toryanski [mitch@toryanski.com]
Thursday, March 10,200512:23 PM
Mark Ackley
Abullah, Sup. Ct. No. 316591
31659/ formerly H0201384
State v. Abullah.

Mark:
This is to follow up on Kim's phone call message to you earlier this week.
On March 4, the Judge approved our motion to withdraw as counsel from the
case and directed that your office file a written notice of substitution.
Yesterday, we received in the mail a copy ofa Jetter from the clerk of the
Supreme Court advising the clerk of the Ada County Court that Report on
Imposition of Death Penalty has been filed and ordering preparation of the
reporter's transcript and. clerks record.
Mitch
Mitchell E. Toryanski
This transmission (including attachments if any) is intended only for the
use of the addressee and may contain infonnation
information that is privileged,
confidential, and exempt from disclosure under the Electronic Communication
Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. Sections 2510-2521 and protected by attorney/client
or other privileges. If you are not the intended recipient, or the employee
or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient,
you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of
this communication is strictly prohibited. Attomey!client
Attomeylclient or work product
privileges are not waived by the transmission of this message. If you have
received this communication in error, please notify me immediately via
e-mail at info@toryanskLcom or by telephone at (208) 841-0655. Thank you.

1
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Mark Ackley
Mark Ackley
Friday, May 09.20083:41
09,20083:41 PM
'Shawna Dunn'
Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and
the SAPO

From:
Sent:

To:
Subject:

Shawna,
Thank you for calling, and sharing your thoughts. I guess I'm not sure what I expected, but
upon further reflection, it was unreasonable to expect my summary of conversations not to raise
a few eyebrows. Hopefully the notes in their entirety will lighten your concerns if not alleviate
them c o m p l e t e l y . - --- of my conversation with Kim Toryanski. - Mark
Below is the 1124/05
1/24/05 note ofmy
MJA

1124/05

MJA: TIC with Kim Toryanski
KT called:
1. Hearing is still scheduled today for 3 p.m. - purpose solely to discuss
PSI and where the source of disagreements may lie
2. Sentencing hearing will be rescheduled, likely 2 weeks out
3. Q whether any amendments pending re ICR 32 - I told KT that I was
not aware of any at this time
4. I told KT that we would go to the hearing, but may only stay briefly if
ofPS!. Our purpose is primarily to
they are going through 5000 pages ofPSr.
provide support for Azad. KT said that if we leave before the
conclusion of the hearing then she will pass this on to Azad and also tell
him that he is scheduled for a call with us tomorrow.
S.
5. KT and I talked briefly about challenges to the sentencing procedure.
I refered her to the Stover case for the non-capital charges. I asked her
whether she has considered any constitutional arguments that would
mandate giving the judge sentencing discretion to downwardly depart
from death. She said that she had not but has referred to the jury
verdicts as recommendations which has upset the judge in the past I
mentioned the possibility ofcrafting
of crafting a separation ofpowers
of powers argument,
that the legislature cannot completely divest a district court judge of its
sentencing discretion. I told her that such a challenge and others might
be further considered prior to sentencing.
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Mark Ackley

From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

Mark Ackley
Friday, May 09, 2008 4:36 PM
'Shawna Dunn'
Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and
the SAPO

Shawna,

The below email was written in response to an interoffice email from Michael Shaw, our investigator. At the
time, I was not assigned to represent Azad. Instead, Azad was being represented by Ron Coulter and Kimberly
Simmons. In the course of
his file review, Michael wanted to know, among other things [which is why I did not
ofhis
include his initial email inquiry below], whether I had notes from any conversations with the Toryanskis during
their representation. When I prepared the below email, I referenc-ed my notes contained on a legal pad. I have. _
searched for those notes and my legal pad but I have not located them to date. Michael indicates that he did not
take my file as I had suggested in my email.

Because I don't want to adjust the electronic content at all, I am giving you the email in its entirety, including a
conversation that I had with Joan Fisher from a different date which I had apparently noted somewhere in the
same legal pad. I thought about redacting that reference, and just summarizing it, but on second thought I
figured that would only raise more eyebrows. My note also includes references to visits I had with Azad after
our office began representing him. To refresh your memory, I represented Azad briefly before Ron Coulter was
hired. Once he was hired, Molly reassigned cases to adjust for national workload standards. As a result, I think
I was off Azad's case pretty quickly and did not come back until October 2006.

Although it looks like I might have arguably given some suggestions to counsel, I think you'll agree that those
suggestions are not implicated by Azad'sclaims,
Azad'sc1aims, but I suppose that could be a matter of interpretation. You
will notice a reference below to the "EI-Contrani
"El-Contrani (sic)" case; that reference is to State v. AI-Kotrani, 141 Idaho
66, 106 P.3d 392 (2005), and pertains to a potential motion to disqualify Judge Copsey. I don't think the
grounds for disqualification are noted in the opiriion, but the following was written in the Appellant's Brief,
"The district court further fOWld that Dr. Sanford's conclusions were not credible because Dr. Sanford relied on
Al-Kotrani's family's representations and "self-serving reports." The district court noted that Dr. Sanford
did speak with one non-relative, a fonner
former employer, Mr. Abdul Muhammad, who testified that he could only
given
AI-Kotrani one instruction at a time as Mr. AI-Kotrani would get confused ifmore than one
instruction was given. Further, Mr. AI-Kotrani had the tendency to "slack off" if not under constant
supervision. The district court dismissed Mr. Muhammad's testimony, noting that the "Iraqi community is very
close." (Tt., p.39, L.24 - pAO, L.24; R., p.79.) ... Accordingly, Mr. A1-Kotrani asserts that the district court
erred in ruling that Dr. Sanford's conclusion that Mr. AI-Kotrani
Al-Kotrani is incompetent to stand trial was not credible
because it took into consideration information obtained from Mr. A1-Kotrani's family. The district court further
erred in failing to consider information obtained from Mr. Muhammad because he is ofthe
of the same nationality of
Mr. Al-Kotrani and its erroneous conclusion that Mr. Muhammad's statements were not significant." Of
course, trial
triaI counsel never moved to disqualify the judge, and we have not raised any claims based on their
. failure to do so.
I will discuss disclosing Molly's email notes on Tuesday. I anticipate disclosing them unless my decision to
disclose my own notes to you is questioned.
-Mark
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From: Mark Ackley

Sent: Friday, March 17,2006 10:47 AM
To: Michael Shaw
Cc: Kimberly Simmons; Ronaldo A. Coulter; Paula Swensen; Barbara D. Thomas; Guadalupe Ayala
Subject: RE: Abdullah file clean up
Michael, I will go through myemails. I will forward any that are relevant. Perhaps you take my file and then
share or give to Ron or Kimberly. It includes some notes from IMSI visits with M
AA that I am pretty certain were
not placed in Prolaw. Below I have summarized most of my handwritten notes from conversations with, or in
reference to, trial counsel.
From legal pad
1.

2.

3.

12117/03 TC with Joan Fisher about the Abdullah case noting that she is concerned
12/17/03
concemed about
everything being adequately preserved
9/03/04 TC conversation with Kim T. with Molly (extensive notes on legal pad)
•

Discussion re the Court closing the courtroom; they did not object to closed proceedings.
Judge made them file a motion to continue under seal. Should have objected. [It looks like I
suggested -- "move to unseal the motion, right to public trial"1
trial"]

•

Discussion about Erica Kline and Detective Whitfield

•

Quotes attributed to Kim T. including, "Now more than ever...
ever ... 1could
I could kick [Copsey]
[CopseY1 off." I
indicated that we would send the EI-Contrani (sic) opinion with Copsey's [racist1
[racist] remarks.
[This is in reference to the Iraqi client case that Eric F. handled (AI-Kotrani) which we then
faxed to them [this has been confirmed by Sara] [It is not indicated, but I believe I suggested
a motion to DO]

•

'~confidence sounds like L. Dunlap" {NOTE: this is a reference to the
My thoughts reflected, '~confidence
Jimmie Thomas case where Lynn Dunlap told Jimmie they would obtain an acquittal]; quote
things· (bizarre things) since the beginning of the
attributed to Kim T. "we've been seeing things"
case

•

Kim thought the State would have trouble proving murder, referring to the State's case as
an attempt to "bootstrap the murder" - I asked her why they could not prove felony murder
and Kim T did not have a good answer [NOTE: I was quite worried about Kim's confidence}

•

counsel] sent
Reference to "weekly love letters" they [I believe "they" is a reference to trial counsel}
to the prosecution to show them how their case sucks

•

[Angela1 poured the gasoline,
Referencing AA, noting that he will plead to what he did, she [Angela]
would plead to conspiracy to arson

•

References to problems with the State's lab. They still need an expert to attack the lab.
Many things they are still trying to get. [It appears I may have suggested a motion to
continue]
continuel

Undated TC conversation with Mitch Toryanski (date can be approximated post jury verdict for
death sentence, but prior to formal sentencing by judge)
•
•

Sentencing scheduled for 1/21/05
They (trial counsel?) scratched residual doubt because the jUdge
judge said the law was well
wellsettled (not mitigation)
2
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•
•

•

Judge limited the scope of AA allocution
JUdge
They were never told what happened; AA was never straight [NOTE: I believe this was in
response to a question I always ask trial counsel, specifically, "did the client ever confess to
you."]
One area of investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not sure
what this references]
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Mark Ackley
From:
Sent:

To:
Subject:

Mark Ackley
Wednesday, May 14, 2008 9:26 AM
'Shawna Dunn'
RE: Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel
and the SAPO

Shawna,
Below is an electronic note written by Molly Huskey regarding a call that she received from
Mitch Toryanksi. This is the note that I summarized in an email to you last week. It appears
the note was written on the day of the call, November 24,2004. I have not changed the note in
any way, thus the typos. I believe we have now disclosed every communication, or note
referencing a communication, with the Toryanskis prior to our appointment as Mr. Abdullah's
counsel. I may very well send you a formal discovery disclosure attaching each of the
communications that I've already sent to you informally and in piece-meal fashion. If you have
any questions, then please let me know.
Mark
MJH

11124/04
11/24/04 MJH: Telephone Call from Mitch Toryanski.
flied post trial
Called re: outcome of trial. wanted to know if we flIed
motions like motion for new trial. TOld him we didn't do that. Told me
that Azhad was a good person and the good things he had done far
outweighed the aggravators. for example, when Azhad was a young
man, his father had been imprisoned. Azhad led his family over the
mountains into Turkey to freedom. He was on the board of his church,
he was affectionate with his children.
This new system gives too much power to the prosecutor because there
is no way ajury is going to acquit after hearing all the evidence. He
said of course with a fIrst degree murder, people will find utter
the jurors even wanted to find HAC.
disregard. He said some of
ofthe
Said Copsey's demeanor made her impssible to work with. She was
demeaning and belittled the attorneys. He really thinks she needs to be
trained in professionalism.
He said client didn't tell him the truth - they still don't know what really
happened. This put them at a huge disadvantage when trying to prepare
the case. HE says they were much more optimistic re: the possible
OD, the more they
outcome earlier in the trial and the longer it went on,
knew the client was telling lies to them.
Hopes we can get the client some relief.

1

001828

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

APPENDIX 4

001829

III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
I
III
III
III
I
I
I
I
I
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FOURTH DISTRICT COURT

.. PD ST APPELLANT

@001l009

NO. _ _ _ _--=~-'l'"!~,.,~NO·----FlL=!O~~U
FILED
~
A.M
__
A.M _ _ _ _ _
P.M.--+:-1~_-

I tV
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SEP 15 2009
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
J, WEATHERBY
By J.

1

DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

2
3
4

THE STATE OF IDARO~
IDARO~ IN'
IN" AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
AZAD HAJI ABDVLLAH,
ABDl-'LLAH,

5
Petitioner,

6

7
8

CV-PC-200S-00308
CASE NO. CV-PC-200S-00308
VS.
VB.

THE STATE OF ]]),t\HO

CONFUCT COUNSEL
ORDER RE: CONFliCT

9

10

Respondent.

11

In reviewing ,he material filed in support of
the Final Amended Petition, including various
ofthe

12

e-mails attached to the Toryanskis' depositions, it came to the Court's attention that several of the

13

14
15

16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23

24

25

26
27

State Appellate PubEc
POOEc Defender's Office attorneys, including Molly Husky, the State Appellate
Public Defender, M;::rk Ackley, Chief of the Capital Litigation Unit, and Kimberly Simmons,
provided advice to lV[r. Abdullah's privately retained trial counsel before trial began, during jury
voir dire, during trial and post trial.'
trial. I

The record establishes that the State Appellate Public

Defender's Office advised trial counsel on several matters, including advising trial counsel to seek
a continuance of the trial (which they did) and suggesting specific voir dire approaches. Both of
these areas are the subject of Mr. Abdullah's post-conviction claims. The full extent of the State
Appellate Public Defender's Office's involvement and what advice was given was unclear.
Therefore, concerned about the apparent conflict of interest,
interest. the Court ordered counsel to address
the implications and l;lxtent of
tbis involvement.
oftms
Both the

Stat·~
Stat·~

and the State Appellate Public Defender's Office responded and provided

the Court with additional evidence.
Based on the following and having fully considered those responses, the Court finds that
the State Appellate Public Defender's Office has a conflict in its representation of Mr. Abdullah

28
29
30

I The Court notes that M;. Simmons and Mr. Ackley specifically represented to the Court in the original Petition that
they had no involvement: in the trial of this matter. It was on this representation that the Court found good cause to
allow the State Appellate: Public Defender's Office more than three years to finalize the post-conviction petition. This
is why the Court was Wl2 'IlVlIre of the conflict.
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1

in post-conviction proceedings. (This order does not affect the State Appellate Public Defender's

2

Office's representatien of Mr. Abdullah in the appeal of his underlying conviction.) Therefore,

3

the Court shall hold

4

this post-conviction proceeding and in any subsequent proceedings.

~I.
~1.

hearing to determine whether Mr. Abdullah waives this conflict both as to

5

ANALYSIS

6

In examining whether the appropriate procedural safeguards are in place in a case where

7

the d.efen~t_ is ~~ci_llg ~e death penalty, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held

8

that "death is different." In his concurrence, Justice Stevens wrote:

9

12

In the 12 yean since Furman . .. every Member of this Court has written or joined
at least one opinion endorsing the proposition that because of its severity and
irrevocability, the death penalty is qualitatively different from any other
punishment, Hnd hence must be accompanied by unique safeguards to ensure that it
l"~sponse to a given offense.
is a justified l'l~sponse

13

Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,468 (1984). The constitutional reason that "death is different"

14

is the application ohlle Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruelty" to a degree that varies from

15

its application in mClst other criminal cases. Because this is a capital case and Mr. Abdullah is

16

literally fighting for Iris life, this Court must ensure that Mr. Abdullah's rights are protected. As

17

Justice O'Connor Dmed in a concurrence, it would be cruel and unusual punishment to execute a

18

defendant without providing "extraordinary measures to ensure that the prisoner ... is afforded

19

process that will gumantee, as much as .is humanly possible, that the sentence was not imposed

20

out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982).

21

Therefore, this Court's responsibility is heightened.

10
11

22

counsel.2 Wood v. Georgia.
Every defend.mt has the right be represented by conflict-free counseL

23

450 U.S. 261, 271 (l981). In order to ensure a defendant receives conflict-free counsel, a trial

24

court has an affinnative duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever it knows or "reasonably

25

should know that a particular conflict may exist." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980);

26

LO'wdace. 140 Idaho 53,60,90 P.3d 278, 285 (2003). This duty with respect to
see also State v. LQ'wdace.

27

indigent defendants is far more imperative than the judge's duty to investigate the possibility of a

28

29
30

Severson, - P.3d -,2009 WI.. 1492659 (Idaho. 2009). While rehearing
This was recently reaffi.rmed in State v. SeverSOll,
was denied, Severson h,u
ha:~ not yet been released for publication and cannot be cited.

2
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1

conflict that arises

2

u]nless the trial court knows or reasonably should
"[u]nless
true that in a situation of retained counsel, "[

3

know that a

4

535 U.S. 162, 184 (2')02) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980)). When, as was

5

true in Mickens, the: udge is not merely reviewing the permissibility of the defendant's choice of

6

counsel, but is responsible for making the choice herself, and when she knows or should know

7

the· duty to make a thorough inquiry is manifest and
andunquali£ied.
unqualified. lei
that a conflict does exist, the'

8

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court squarely held that when a record discloses the

9

"possibility of a cor.mct" between the interests of the defendant and the interests of the party

10

paying their counsel's fees, the Constitution imposes a duty of inquiry on the state-court judge

11

even when no objection was made. ld at 185 (citing Wood, 450 U.S. at 267, 272). The Court,

12

therefore, has an ongoing obligation to inquire into potential conflicts of interest about which it

13

knows or reasonably should have known. Id This obligation is even more important where the

14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21

22
23

24

25
26
27

28
29
30

particul~lr

criminal defendant

i~

counsel represents either multiple or successive defendants. It is

inquiry." Mickens v. Taylor,
conflict exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry."

facing the death penalty, and Mr. Abdullah is.

In order to satisfy the inquiry requirement, a trial court's examination of the potential
conflict must be the-rough and searching and should be conducted on the record. See State v.
Lopez, 139 Idaho 256? 259, 77 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct.App. 2003); Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314,

1320 (8 th Cir.1991). The Court is entitled to rely on factual representations made by counsel and
may inquire further into the facts, though it "is under no original or continuing obligation to do
States. 375 F.2d 895, 897 (9 th Cir. 1967). The Court ordered counsel to
so." Kaplan v. Unired States,
respond to the Court's questions in writing. Both responded and attached relevant portions of the
record that reflect the evidence. In reaching a decision, the Court relied on the State Appellate

Public Defender's Office's factual representations. However, the determination of whether a
conflict exists is for the Court to decide and not for counsel.

Once a court conducts an inquiry, it must determine whether a conflict actually exists.
a1. 259, 77 P.3d at 127. If the court concludes defense counsel does have a
Lopez, 139 Idaho at
conflict, it must obulin a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver from the defendant or give the

Id
defendant an opportlmity to acquire new counseL ld

It: on the other hand, the court concludes

intc:!rest does not exist, the representation may continue without a waiver. See id.
that a conflict of intc::rest
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1

While the Stlte
Stl.te Appellate Public Defender's Office addresses the conflict created by their

2

role as witnesses in both advising trial counsel and observing the trial, the more significant

3

conflict includes a colorable claim that they refrained from asserting viable ineffective assistance

4

of counsel claims tha.t
that may implicate advice they gave to Mr. Abdullah's retained trial counse1.

5

An actual conflict is defined by its effect on counsel. not by whether there is a "mere
''mere theoretical

6

division of loyalties."
loyalties," Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171, 172 n. 5 (emphasis added). "[T]he evil [of

7

conflict-riddc;:n couru:d] is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, ...

8

[making it] difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney's representation

9

of a clieut."
cIient." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-491 (1978) (emphasis added).

-

-

"--

-

~

3

-

10

In this case, on a successive post-conviction petition or in a federal habeas action, Mr.

11

Abdullah has a "colorable claim" that the State Appellate Public Defender's Office has an actual

12

conflict of interest and, therefore, cannot represent him in this action. That colorable claim exists

13

because attorneys in the State Appellate Public Defender's Office advised Mr. Abdullah's

14
15

16
17
18

retained trial counsel, sat in on the trial and are witness even

post-conviction case. More significantly, should Mr. Abdullah so chose, he could claim the State
Appellate Public Defender's Office post-conviction attorneys may
roay have foregone viable
ineffective assistanc,:: of counsel claims because such claims may implicate advice the attorneys
gave to Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel.

19

20

21
22

if they are not called in the

The Court fhds, therefore, the State Appellate Public Defender attorneys have a conflict
of interest and that if the issue were asserted in later proceedings the court would have to have an
evidentiary proceeding to determine the effect the conflict may have had on their representation. 4

23
24
25
26
27

28

29
30
31
~')

pditioner is represented on post-conviction relief by his trial counsel, the issue of ineffective
By analogy, when a pt!titioner
assistance of counsel may be raised in a 5uooessive petition absent a clear and voluntary waiver. See Commonwealth
v. Via, 316 A.2d 895 (Pa. 1974). Absent a showing that the petitioner was specifically advised of the hazards of
being represented by trial counsel at the post-conviction hearing and that the petitioner consented to such an
alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, is not barred.
arrangement, a successi'r e post-conviction application, aUeging
See Carter v. State, 362 S.E.2d 20, 21 (S.C. 1987). In fact, in South Carolina as a result of this case, coW1S are
instnlcted to advise a I='~titioner
!='~titioner who wishes to waive this conflict that "the dual representation will result in the
instructed
waiver of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel" Id at 22. The petitioner is then required to state on the
record whether he wishe~,
wishe~. to proceed, thereby waiving the issue. ld.
J

mal<...ng any determination regarding the validity of such claim if made by Mr. Abdullah in a
4 The Cc'urt is not malcng
subsequent proceeding. However.
However, clearly Mr. Abdullah could make that claim in subsequent proceedings and if he
were to assert that claim, the court would be required to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the conflict
ORDER RE: CONFLICT COUNSEL
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1

Furthennore, the CO!.u1
CO!.lI1 fmds that this conflict affects the entire office because at least three

2

members of the offil::er, Molly Husky, Mark Ackley and Kimberly Simmons, met with and

3

advised Mr. Abdulla:l's trial counsel pre-trial, during jury selection, during trial and post-trial.

4

Molly Husky is the State Appellate Public Defender and the office supervisor. Mark Ackley

5

heads the
tbe Capital Litigation Unit and supervises that unit. Mr. Abdullah would have a colorable

6

claim that any attorney working for Ms. Husky or being supervised by Mark Ackley would also

7

n..9t pllfSue claims that _may implicate M_s--'
M_s_"--__
have a conflict beCl.!use
because he could claim they did n..Qt
-- _

8

Husky's, Mr. Ackley's or Ms. Simmons' advice. Therefore, the Court finds that the entire State

9

Appellate Public Ddender's Office is conflicted for the purpose of this post-conviction

10

proceeding.

11

While Mr. Abdullah may waive this conflict, only he may waive the conflict and -that

12

waiver must be a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver or the Court must give him an

13

opportunity to acquire new counsel. Lopez, 139 Idaho at 259, 77 P.3d at 127. Mr. Abdullah is

14

15
16

17
18
19

20

21

22
23
24
25

26
27

28

indigent and is entitled to conflict free counsel at public expense.
lawyer, the trial judge's
\Vben
\Vhen an in:ligent defendant is unable to retain his own lawyer.
appointment of coun::el is itself a critical stage of a criminal trial. At that point in the proceeding,
ddendant has no lawyer to protect his interests and must rely entirely on the
by definition, the defendant
judge. Jvfickens,
}vfickens, 53:: U.S. at 184. For that reason it is "the solemn duty of a ... judge before
whom a defendant appears without counsel to make a thorough inquiry and to take all steps
necessary to insure the fullest protection of this constitutional right at every stage of the
(qt.oting Von Maltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 722 (1948»). If the Court had
proceedings." !d. (qJ;.oting
been aware of the c:;mflict, the Court would have ordered the appointment of death qualified
c-cUDsel at pu[;lic expense at the outset of these proceedings.
private c.cUDsel
Therefore, this Court has an obligation to hold a hearing to explain the implications of
waiving these conflicts and how that would not only affect Mr. Abdullah's right to assert claims
post-convictic'[l proceeding but would affect his ability to pursue claims associated with the
in this post-convicticl[l
State Appellate Publ ic Defender's Office's involvement with his private trial counsel in further

29

30

adversely affected his pccrt-conviction counsel's performance. See Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 874 (9'1l
(9'h Cir.
lh
Caldero7l, 283 F.3d 1117. 1126-27 (9 th
2006); Karis v. Calderon,
Cir. 2002).
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11

proceedings, incLudhlg any federal habeas actions or successive post-conviction proceedings. It

2

may even affect his ahility to challenge this Court's actions regarding these conflicts.

3

The Court het'eby schedules a hearing for September 25, 2009, at 10:00 a.m. to detennine

4

whether Mr. Abdulla.il
Abdulla.11 can knowingly.
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive these conflicts, whether

5

the Court should appoint conflict counsel to advise him regarding this waiver, or whether the

6

Court should order the State Appellate Public Defender's Office to provide Mr. Abdullah death

7

qualified private coullSel
COUllSel to represent him in these post-conviction proceedings at public expense.

8

IT IS SO ORDERED.

9

1h
15!h
Dated this 15
day of September 2009.

s

10

~e

11
12

Cheri C. Copsey
District Judge

13

~
~

14
15

16

17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

26

27
28

29
30
31
~')

S A trial \:ourt may appc.int
S
appClint substitute counsel for an indigent defendant upon a showing of good cause. State v. Nath,
137 Idaho 712, 714-15, 52 P.3d 857,859-60 (2002). Whether substitute counsel should be provided is a decision that
of the trial comt and will be reViewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. Id at 7] 5.
lies within the sound di:;~tion ofthe
52 P.3d at 860. The triE.!
triEJ court's decision will only be regarded as an abuse of discretion if it violated the defendant's
right to counsel. Id
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OR
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

AZAD HAJ! ABDULLAH,
Petitioner,· .vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

e. c E \ \} E 0
nns
nn6
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Case No. SP-OT 05-00308
ORDER GRANTING STATE'S
MOTION TO COMPEL
DISCOVERY AND
GRANTING PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER

------------)
--------------------------)

The petitioner has filed an Amended Petition for Post Conviction relief that
includes a wide variety of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Essentially,
the petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for nearly every decision
made by trial counsel in the petitioner's defense. The Court is informed that trial
counsel, Kim and Mitch Toryanski, and the Ada County Public Defenders Office,
who defended the petitioner before the Toryanski's, have both turned their files
over to the State Appellate Public Defender (SAPO). The SAPO has been granted
permission to conduct depositions of the Toryanski's and August Cahill and Amil
Myshin of the public defenders office who represented the petitioner. The State
has moved to compel discovery requiring the SAPO to provide copies of all of
trial counsel's files in preparation for the depositions and so the State can properly
ORDER GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL
COMPEl. DISCOVRRY
DISCOVF.RY
AND GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
(ABDULLAH) PAGE 1
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respond to the petition for post conviction relief. The petitioner has moved for a
protective order for those files to include attorney client privilege materials and
work product.
The State's motion to compel and the petitioner's motion for protective
order came on regularly for hearing on December 18, 2007. After argument, and
the Court being fully informed, the Court orders as follows.
Jight of the number and
1. The State's Motion to compel is granted. In light
variety of the petitioner's claims, trial counsels' files in their entirety are
fairly subject to discovery by the State. Such an order is consistent with
the doctrine of fairness and completeness and with the persuasive
authority of Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9 th Cir. 2003). The
Court has been advised that the State and the petitioner have agreed that
any documents provided to trial counsel by the State need not be
duplicated by the SAPD as part of the discovery process. Other than
those duplicate items, all items in trial counsel's files are subject to
discovery to the State unless the pertinent claim in the petition is
abandoned.
2. Such discovery however is limited pursuant to the petitioner's motion
for protective order which is also granted in part as follows.

The

documents in trial counsel's files as well as any direct attorney client
communications will not be admissible as evidence in the State's case in
ORDER GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
AND GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
(ABDULLAH) PAGE 2
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chief in the event of a retrial or resentencing. However, in the event that
the petitioner testifies, at a retrial or resentencing or other proceeding,
statements the petitioner made to trial counselor their agents may be
used as cross examination or impeachment. Additionally, other material
which was previously the subject of the attorney client privilege or work
product privilege may be used in cross examination of the petiti_oner if
he testifies at retrial, resentencing or other future proceeding, , if made
relevant by the petitioner'S
petitioner's testimony.
If the petitioner testifies in such a way that he opens the door to
impeachment with materials or conversation previously the subject of
one of the privileges and when challenged with the contents of that
impeaching document or statement disclaims it, then and only then will
extrinsic evidence of the previously privilege material be admissible for
impeachment purposes.
3. The petitioner's waiver of both his attorney client privilege and the
work product privilege was made impliedly by his filing of the petition
for post conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.
The petitioner was specifically advised on the record on December 18,
2007 that asserting ineffective assistance of counsel claims would waive
any attorney client privilege or work product privilege. His signature on
this order constitutes his express waiver of those privileges.
ORDER GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
AND GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
(ABDULLAH) PAGE 3
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4. The Courts reasoning and analysis was set out in detail on the record
during the hearing on December 18, 2007 and is hereby incorporated
into this order and adopted by reference.
For the reasons set out above, the State's motion for discovery as modified
by the parties and petitioner's motion for protective order is granted in part as
described above.
It is so ordered.
Ii,

DATED this 1ft-day of

~4&"'1
2008.
~2008.

_~e.~,---_
Cheri C. Copsey
District Judge

-r---a

Mark Ackley/Shannon Romero
State Appellate Public Defender for petitioner

Azad Abdullah
Petitioner

ORDER GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
AND GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
(ABDULLAH) PAGE 4
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY, I.S.B. # 4843
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. #5888
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. #7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise,
Boise. Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

IN TBEDISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTRJUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH,
Petitioner,

v.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)

CASE NO. SPOT0500308

~

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL
AFFIDAVIT OF AZAD HAJJ
ABDULLAH

)
)
)
)
)

(CAPITAL CASE)

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) ss
County of Ada
)
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. All matters set forth are based on my personal knowledge, feelings and beliefs.
2. I am the Petitioner in the above-titled matter.
3. I have been represented by the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD)
since this Court ordered the appointment ofthe
of the SAPD on April 7, 2005.
4. Specifically, I was represented by Kimberly Simmons and Mark Ackley from the start of
my post-conviction case in March or April of 2005 to around January of 2006, when
Ronaldo Coulter replaced Mr. Ackley as my lead counsel. I was represented by Mr.
Coulter and Ms. Simmons until October of 2006, when both Ms. Simmons and Mr.
Coulter left the SAPD office.

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF AZAD HAll ABDULLAH 1
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2006, I have been continuously represented by Mark Ackley.
Ackley, an
5. Since October of 2006.
SAPD, who has served as lead counsel on my case.
attorney with the SAPD.
6. Since April of 2007, I have been continuously represented by Shannon Romero, an
SAPD, who has served as co-counsel on my case.
attorney with the SAPD.
7. Since September of 2007, Nicole Owens, an attorney with the SAPD, has served as
additional counsel on my case.
8. During the nearly 4 ~ years that I have been represented by the SAPD, I have developed
a strong relationship of trust with my attorneys and the staff at the SAPD.
SAPD, including but
not limited to Michael Shaw.
Shaw, the SAPD investigator,
and
Guadalupe
Ayala, the SAPD
investigator.
family, because I speak with them
mitigation specialist. The SAPD"Staff feels to me like family.
and see them more often than my own family. My parents and siblings also have strong
feelings of trust and confidence in the SAPD staff. Attachment 1, incorporated herein by
of my mother with members ofthe
of the SAPD staff.
reference, is a photograph ofmy
9. I am aware of and have received and read a copy of this Court's order directing my
attorneys, and the State.
State, to provide information to this Court about the potential for a
attorneys.
trial, and post-trial contact with my
conflict of interest arising from the SAPD's pretrial, trial.
trial attorneys, Mitch and Kim Toryanski. (See Order RE: SAPD Involvement with Trial
and Pre-Trial, filed 8/17/09.)
10. I am. aware of and have received and read both a copy of the State's Memorandum Re:
2009, and the SAPD's
SAPD involvement with trial and pretrial, filed August 31, 2009.
Response to Court Order Inquiring into the Pretrial and Trial Involvement of the SAPD
1, 2009. I am aware that both the State and my
with Trial Counsel, filed September 1.
counsel at the SAPD have represented to the Court that they do not believe a conflict of
interest exists based on the SAPD's pretrial, trial, and post-trial contact with my trial
counsel.
11. I am aware of and have received and read the Court's Order re: Conflict Counsel, filed
15,2009. My attorneys at the SAPO have reviewed and explained this Order
September 15.2009.
tome.
12. I am very concerned about the Court's order, which as I understand it, concludes that my
attorneys at the SAPO have a conflict of interest with me, based on the pretrial, trial and
post-trial contact the SAPO had with my trial counsel.
13. Because of my prior negative experience with the Toryanskis, which I outlined in detail
in my affidavit and supplemental affidavit, which are attached hereto and incorporated by
reference.
reference, I am extremely concerned about the Court's order. In light of my prior
experience with the Toryanskis, it has taken a long time for me to establish a good and
trusting relationship with my current counsel, Mr. Ackley, Ms. Romero, and Ms. Owens,
and the staff at the SAPO. Up to this point, I have had tremendous faith and confidence
dwfug these post-conviction proceedings and have
in the SAPD's representation of me dwing

SECONDSUPPLEMENTAL
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH 2
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felt that my attorneys
concerned with looking out for my
attomeys and the SAPD staff have been concemed
best interests and well-being throughout their representation of me.
14. This Court's Order re: Conflict Counsel causes me great concern, stress, and terrifies me
at the prospect of losing my attorneys and the staff at the SAPD. If my attorneys at the
SAPD are no longer allowed to represent me, I am.
am also concemed
concerned about how much
longer this will delay my case, how long it will take me to establish a trusting relationship
with new lawyers if the SAPD can no longer represent me, and how allowing new
attorneys
attomeys to represent me at this point will impact my post-conviction claims.

18 daYOf~009.
daYOf~009.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ _ day of
, 2009, a true and correct
copy of
the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
ofthe

MELISSA RICHESON GALLEGOS
Administrative Assistant
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DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

4

AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,

55
Petitioner,

6
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CV-PC-2005-00308
CASE NO. CY-PC-2005-00308
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATUS MEMORANDUM

Res ondent.
In confonnity with the intent ofI.C. § 19-2719 (8); the Court hereby provides the Idaho

Supreme Court with a memorandum describing the status of post-conviction in this case.
(Attached is a copy of the current Register of Actions.) The Court has given this case first priority
but has found repeatedly that the time limitations set forth in I.C. § 19-2719 could not be met and
still accommodate Abdullah's constitutional rights. Therefore, the Court has extended the time
limits set forth in the statute as follows. These extensions have been at Abdullah's requests,
based on sworn testimony, and upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances which would
make it impossible to fairly consider Abdullah's claims in the time provided.
The jury trial against the defendant, Azad Haji Abdullah, commenced on September 10,
2004, with the selection of a jury and ended on November 18, 2004, on an Indictment, filed
November 15, 2002. The underlying case took more than two (2) months to try and several years
of complex litigation. The Court entered judgment on March 4, 2005. AbdulllUl's case involves
complex legal and factual matters.
Abdullah timely filed his original Post-Conviction Petition on April 15, 2005, and under
oath the Petitioner, Azad Abdullah, testified that he needed substantially more time to investigate
his claims and to prepare an Amended Petition. The State answered on May 12, 2005, and the
Court held
heJd a status conference on June 29, 2005.

I

The Court notes that there is no procedure for compliance with this statute.

STATUS MEMORANDUM
CASE NO. CV-PC-200S-00308
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1
2
3

time to properly investigate potential post-conviction claims and both requested the Court to issue

4

responding in September 29,2006. The Court found good cause to grant their requests and issued

5

a scheduling order on June 30, 2005, incorporating those requests.

At that status conference, the parties all agreed that both parties needed substantially more

a scheduling order allowing Abdullah to file an Amended Petition on July 14, 2006 with the State

6

On January 13,2006, Abdullah again moved the Court for an extension of time supporting

7

that request with an Affidavit from Kimberly Simmons, State Appellate Public Defender's
Defender'S Office,

8

stating good cause for another extension. The Court held a hearing on January 20, 2006, found

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

good cause to grant the extension and issued a scheduling order ordering any Amended Petition to

29
30
31
~?

be filed by January 19, 2007, with the State answering within ninety (90) days.
On December 20, 2007, Abdullah again moved the Court for an extension of time
supporting that request with an Affidavit from Mark Ackley, State Appellate Public Defender's
Office, stating good cause for a six (6) month extension. The Court held a hearing on December
21, 2006, found good cause for the extension and granted the request. The Court ordered any
Amended Petition to be filed no later than July 19, 2007, with the State answering within ninety
(90) days.
Abdullah filed his Amended Petition on July 19, 2007. Due to concerns. about juror
privacy the Court allowed Abdullah to withdraw that Amended Petition and to file an Amended
Petition that protected juror privacy. The Court held a number of status conferences subsequent
to this filing.
The State answered the Amended Petition, and moved for summary disposition on April
10,2008.
On August 29, 2008, Abdullah filed his Final Amended Petition and on September 26,
2008, moved to supplement his Final Amended Petition. The State moved to strike portions of
the Final Amended Petition. The State answered the Final Amended Petition and moved for
summary disposition on March 31, 2009. Abdullah moved for an extension of time to allow his
response and supported his motion with an Affidavit from Mark Acldey,
Ackley, State Appellate Public
Defender's Office, stating good cause.

The Court granted his Motion.

On June 15, 2009,

Abdullah responded to the State's Motions and requested an evidentiary hearing. The Court held

STATUS MEMORANDUM
CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-00308
CV-PC-200S-00308
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
~8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

a hearing on June 19, 2009, and ruled that an evidentiary hearing was necessary as to a number of
the claims. The Court requested the parties to get together and try to narrow the subject matter for
the evidentiary hearing because the parties indicated that they might need six (6) weeks. The
Court tentatively scheduled that hearing to begin in October.
The Court held a hearing on August 7, 2009, and based on that hearing moved the
evidentiary hearing to begin February 2010. The Court scheduled an omnibus hearing to address
any final issues on December 4,2009. The Court anticipates the parties may want to brief issues
subsequent to the evidentiary hearing.
Based on the above and the schedule evidentiary hearing, it is anticipated that the Court
will be able to rule on the pending Final Amended Petition no later than June 1, 2010.
Dated this 18th day of August 2009.

ch~of:r~?r--District Judge

26
27
28
29
30
31
~?
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this li day of August 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the

5

within instrument to:

7

GREG H. BOWER
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
ROGER BOURNE
SHAWNADUNN
INTERDEPT. MAIL

10
11

12

13
14

15

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
MARK J. ACKLEY
SHANNON N. ROMERO
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
BOISE, IDAHO 83703

16

.17

IDAHO SUPREME COURT

18

J. DAVID NAVARRO

19

Clerk of the District

20

21

24

--

25

26

27

29

31

~.,
~.,
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Fourth Judicial District Court· Ada County

I)ate:
l)ate: 8/18/2009

ROA Report

lime: 10:04 AM

Case: CV-PC-2005-21802 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey

age 1 of6

I

User: DCCOPSCC

Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Azad Haji Abdullah. Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho,
Idaho. Defendant

late

Code

User

i/15/2005

NEWC

CCCARUHA

New Case Filed

Cheri C. Copsey

CCCARUHA

Petition For Post Conviction Relief

Cheri C. Copsey

CERT

CCCARUHA

Certificate Of Mailing

Cheri C. Copsey

NOTC

CCMONGKJ

Notice Of Filing

Cheri C. Copsey

RSPS

CCMONGKJ

Answ To Petn For Post Convctn Relf(bower/st)

Cheri C. Copsey

HRSC

CCGROSPS

Hearing Scheduled - (06/29/2005) Cheri C.
Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey

ORTR

CCGROSPS

Order To Transport (6/29/05 @ 11 :00)

Cheri C. Copsey

HRHD

CCGROSPS

Hearing Held

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

CCGROSPS

Scheduling Order

Cheri C. Copsey

STIP

CCTHIEBJ

Stipulation For Release Of Jury Questionnair

Cheri C. Copsey

11/21/2005

ORDR

DCANDEML

Order Granting Stip For Release Of Question

Cheri C. Copsey

1/22/2005

MOTN

CCTHIEBJ

Motion For Access To Computer For Reviewing

Cheri C. Copsey

OPPO

CCMARTLG

Motn Permit Access
Qualified Non Opposition Mom

Cheri C. Copsey

CONT

CCMARTLG

Audio/visual
Audiolvisual Equip Review Evidence

Cheri C. Copsey

'2114/2005

MOTN

CCTHIEBJ

Motion For Scheduling Order

Cheri C. Copsey

f21/2005

HRSC

CCMARTLG

Hearing Scheduled - Motn Sched Ordr

Cheri C. Copsey

12/22/2005

ORDR

CCGROSPS

Order Granting In Part Mtn To Permit Access to
AudioNidio Equipment

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCGROSPS

Mtn for Extension of Time to File Amended
Petition for PC Relief

Cheri C. Copsey

NOTC

CCGROSPS

Notice of Hearing (1/20/06 @ 1:00)

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCGROSPS

Motion for Petitioner Access to GJ Transcripts

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

CCGROSPS

Order Granting Motion for Ext. of Time to File
Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief

Cheri C. Copsey

HRHD

CCGROSPS

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
01/20/200601
01/201200601 :00 PM: Hearing Held Motn
Sched Ordr

Cheri C. Copsey

HRSC

CCGROSPS

Hearing Scheduled (Status 05/02/2007 01 :30
PM)

Cheri C. Copsey

122/2005
/1212005

,1712005
11712005

j29/2005
30/2005
11/17/2005

1211/2005

113/2006

120/2006

I
I

1

Judge

(01/20/2006) Cheri C. Copsey

9/2006
1912006
5/2006

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Motion for Preparation of Transcripts

Cheri C. Copsey

OPPO

CCMARTlG

Opposition to Motion to Release Grand Jury
Transcripts

Cheri C. Copsey

114/2006

RSPN

CCTHIEBJ

Response To State's Opposition To Motion To
Release Of Grand Jury Transcripts

Cheri C. Copsey

4/20/2006

NOTH

CCHARRAK

Notice Of Hearing (5/15/06 @ 3:00pm)

Cheri C. Copsey

t1/2006

HRSC

CCHARRAK

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
05/15/200603:00 PM)

Cheri C. Copsey

4/28/2006

ORTR

CCGROSPS

Order To Transport (5/15/06 @ 3:00 p.m.)

Cheri C. Copsey

I
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,ate: 8/18/2009
ime: 10:04 AM

User: DCCOPSCC

ROA Report
Case: CV-PC-2005-21802 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey

Page 2 of6

I

Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

r a d Haji Abdullah, Plainliff vs State Of Idaho.
Idaho, Defendant
Code

User

1/15/2006

HRHD

CCGROSPS

6/9/2006

ORDR

CCGROSPS

Order Granting Petitioner Access to and
Possession of Grand Jury Transcripts with
Limitations

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCGROSPS

Motion for Status Conference

Cheri C. Copsey

10/23/2006
2/22/2006

ORTR

CCGROSPS

Order To Transport (10/25/06 @ 4:30 P.M.)

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

CCGROSPS

Order Granting Motion for Extension of Time to
File An Amended Petition for Post Conviction
Relief

Cheri C. Copsey

1/212007

HRVC

DCANDEML

Hearing result for Status held on 05/02/2007
01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated

Cheri C. Copsey

1/1912007
1/19/2007
130/2007

PETN

DCELLlSJ

Amended Petition for Post-Conviction
Post· Conviction Relief

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order Permitting Withdrawl of Petitioner's
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Cheri C. Copsey

_/6/2007

HRSC

DCANDEML

Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/09/2007 02:30
PM)

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

DCANDEML

Order to Transport (8/9 @ 2:30)

Cheri C. Copsey

PETN

TCWEATJB

Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Cheri C. Copsey

HRHD

TCWEATJB

Hearing result for Status held on 08/09/2007
02:30 PM: Hearing Held

Cheri C. Copsey

1/17/2007
1/1712007

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Motion For Waiver Of Atty/Client Privilege

Cheri C. Copsey

/27/2007
127/2007

NOTC

TCWEATJB

Notice of Conditional Non-Objection to State's
Motion for Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege

Cheri C. Copsey

1/28/2007
/5/2007
15/2007

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order for Waiver of Attorney/Client Privilege

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

DCANDEML

Motion for Discovery

Cheri C. Copsey

MEMO

DCANDEML

Memorandum of Law In Support of Motion for
Discovery

Cheri C. Copsey

1/12/2007

MOTN

CCEARLJD

Motion for Order Requiring Preservation of All
Physical
PhYSical and Documentary Evidence

Cheri C. Copsey

1/19/2007

MEMO

DCANDEML

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Preserve
Evidence

Cheri C. Copsey

NOTH

DCANDEML

Notice Of Hearing (10/11/07 @ 2:30)

Cheri C. Copsey

HRSC

DCANDEML

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
10/11/200702:30 PM)

Cheri C. Copsey

08JT

CCMARTLG

State's Objection To The Motn For Discovery

Cheri C. Copsey

MEMO

CCMARTLG

State's Memorandum In Support of the State's
Objection to The Mom
Motn For Discovery

Cheri C. Copsey

10/10/2007

ORTR

DCANDEML

Order To Transport (10/11/07 @ 2:30)

Cheri C. Copsey

10/1112007

HRHD

TCWEATJB

Hearing result for Discovery Motion held on

Cheri C. Copsey

10/26/2007

MOTN

Date

I

8/10/2006

1/9/2007

I
I

9/26/2007
9/2612007

1

Judge
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on

Cheri C. Copsey

05/15/2006 03:00 PM: Hearing Held

10/11/200702:30 PM: Hearing Held
DCANDEML

(3) Motion Directing Shipment of Evidence to
Petitioner's Expert

Cheri C. Copsey

001852
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Date: 8/18/2009

Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County

lime: 10:04 AM

User: DCCOPSCC

ROA Report

'age 30f6

Case: CV-PC-2005-21802 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey

1

Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
late

Code

User

_012612007

MOTN

DCANDEML

Motion to Permit Release of Evidence to
Petitioner's Expert

Cheri C. Copsey

1/9/2007

NOTC

DCANDEML

Notice of Discovery Status

Cheri C. Copsey

OBJT

CCWRIGRM

States Objection to Motions Directing Shipment of Cheri C. Copsey
Evidence to Petitioner's Expert

~1/1412007

DCANDEML

Judge

Order Permitting Petititoner's Counsel to Depose Cheri C. Copsey
Erika Klein

ORDR

-

.4/2007

MOTN

TCWEATJB

Motion for Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege

Cheri C. Copsey

12/5/2007

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order for Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege

Cheri C. Copsey

12/7/2007

MOTN

DCANDEML

Motion for Preparation of Transcripts

Cheri C. Copsey

NOTC

DCANDEML

Notice of Hearing (12/13)

Cheri C. Copsey

HRSC

DCANDEML

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12113/2007 02:00
PM)

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Motion for Discovery

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Motion To Compel

Cheri C. Copsey

BREF

CCMARTLG

Brief In Support Of Motn To Compel

Cheri C. Copsey

NOTH

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Hearing (12-13-07 @ 2 pm)

Cheri C. Copsey

RSPN

CCTOONAL

Response to Discovery

Cheri C. Copsey

CONT

TCWEATJB

Hearing result for Motion held on 12/13/2007
Cheri C. Copsey
02:00 PM: Continued To Compel And Motn For
Discovery

HRSC

TCWEATJB

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12118/2007 09:00
AM) Motion to Compel/Discovery Issues

Cheri C. Copsey

HRHD

TCWEATJB

Hearing result for Motion held on 12/18/2007
09:00 AM: Hearing Held Motion to
09;00
Compel/Discovery Issues

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order Permitting Petitioner's Counsel to Depose
Tod
Tod Littlefield

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order Directing the Preparation of Transcripts

Cheri C. Copsey

NOFG

TCWEATJB

Notice Of Filing

Cheri C. Copsey

t/31/2007
t/31
12007
1/2/2008

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order re: Juror Contact

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order to Transport (2114/08 at 11 AM)

Cheri C. Copsey

I

HRSC

TCWEATJB

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled

Cheri C. Copsey

1/3/2008

RSPS

CCMARTLG

Response To Order Re Juror Contact

Cheri C. Copsey

18/2008

MEMO

CCDWONCP

Memorandum in Support of Order Limiting Jury
Contact

Cheri C. Copsey

1/22/2008

MOTN

DCTYLENI

Motion to Provide Trial Documents

Cheri C. Copsey

124/2008

MOTN

TCWEATJB

Motion for Partial Summary Disposition &
Memorandum in Support Thereof

Cheri C. Copsey

1/25/2008

RSPS

CCCHILER

Cheri C. Copsey
Response to Motion for Partial Summary
Disposition
DispOSition and Memorandum in Support Thereof

L11/2007

I
,13/2007
~13/2007
/18/2007
118/2007

I
1
1

1/2112007

I
1

-

02/1412008 11 :00 AM) hearing re juror contact
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Case: CV-PC-2005-21B02
CV-PC-2005-21802 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey

I

Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

IAzad Haji
Hajj Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho,
Idaho. Defendant
Date
1/31/2008

Code

User

RSPN

TCWEATJB

MEMO

TCWEATJB

REPL

TCWEATJB

Reply to Response to Motion for Partial- Summary Cheri C. Copsey
Disposition & Memorandum in Support

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order Granting State's Motion to Compel
Discovery and Granting Petitioner's Motion for
Protective Order

Cheri C. Copsey

HRHD

TCWEATJB

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on

Cheri C. Copsey

I

(1312008
114/2008
/14/2008

I

Judge
Ex Parte Supplemental Response to Order Re:
Juror Contact
Document sealed
Memorandum in Response to State's
Memorandum in Support of Order Limiting Juror
Contact

Cheri C. Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey

02114/200B
02/14/2008 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held hearing re

1/1

juror contact

/22 5/2008

MOTN

CCPRICDL

3/27/2008

HRSC

TCWEATJB

Motion to Vacate DepOSitions
Depositions

Cheri C. Copsey

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel

Cheri C. Copsey

04/11/200802:00 PM) Motion to Vacate
Depositions

_/28/2008

NOHG

CCBOYIDR

Notice Of Hearing (4-11-08 @ 2:00pm) Motion to Cheri C. Copsey
Vacate Depositions and Motion to Compel

1/8/2008

ORDR

DCDANSEL

Order to Transport (April 11, 2008 at 2:00 p.m.)

4/10/2008

ANSW

CCAMESLC

Answer to Amended Petition for Post conviction
Cheri C. Copsey
Relief and Motion for Summary Disposition (Dunn
for State of 10)

1/11/2008

HRHD

TCWEATJB

Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on

Cheri C. Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey

04/1.1/2008 02:00 PM: Hearing Held Motion to
Vacate Depositions
PROS

PRPERRRA

Prosecutor assigned Shawna
Shawn a Dunn

Cheri C. Copsey

PROS

PRPERRRA

Prosecutor assigned ROGER BOURNE

Cheri C. Copsey

1/29/2008
1/29/200B

MISC

DCDANSEL

Final Amended Peititon for Post-Conviction
Relief

Cheri C. Copsey

9/26/2008

MOTN

DCDANSEL

Motion for Court to Take Judicial NOtice

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

DCDANSEL
DCOANSEL

Renewed and Supplemental Motion for Discovery Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

DCDANSEL

I

Motion to Supplement Final Amended Petition for Cheri C. Copsey
Post Conviction Relief Addenda With Original
Affidavits

MOTN

DCDANSEL
OCDANSEL

MOtion to Compel Discovery from Trial Counsel
(Kim Toryanski)

Cheri C. Copsey

11/1212008

OBJT

CCWATSCL

State's Objection to the Renewed and
Supplemental Motion for Discovery

Cheri C. Copsey

11/17/2008

OBJT

CCWATSCL

Objection to Motion to Compel Discovery from
Trial Counsel

Cheri C. Copsey

11/25/2008
11/25/200B

OB.IE

MCBIEHKJ

Objection to Motion for Court to Take Judicial
Notice

Cheri C. Copsey

12/15/2008

NOTC

TCWEATJB

Notice of Hearing

Cheri C. Copsey

1/7/2008
117/2008

5/12/2008

I
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ROAReport
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Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

1

Azad Haji Abduliah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
'ate

Code

User

Judge

12115/2008

HRSC

TCWEATJB

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/16/200902:00
PM)

Cheri C. Copsey

1211812008

CONT

TCWEATJB

Hearing Reset (Motion 01/09/200902:00 PM)

Cheri C. Copsey

TCWEATJB

Order to Transport

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

1/6/2009

REPL

TCWEATJB

Reply to State's Objection to Motion to Compel
Discovery from Trial Cou~sel (Kim Toryanski)

1

REPL

TCWEATJB

Reply to State's Objection to Motion for Court to
Take Judicial Notice

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Motion to Strike

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

1nl2009

Cheri C. Copsey

1/9/2009

DCHH

TCWEATJB

I

Hearing result for Motion held on 01/09/2009
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Madsen
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Under 100 Pages

HRSC

TCWEATJB

Hearing Scheduled (Status 06/19/2009 02:00
PM)

Cheri C. Copsey

1/5/2009
127/2009

NOTC

TCWEATJB

Notice of Redactions Made to Prior Findings

Cheri C. Copsey

RESP

CCTOWNRD

Response To Court

Cheri C. Copsey

i/6/2009

NOTC

DCDANSEL

Notice of Clarification of the Record, Limited
Request for Discovery, and Motion for the Court
and the Parties to Rely on the Record

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order Denying Petitioner's Motion to Compel
Discovery from Trial Counsel (Kim Toryanski)

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part
Petitioner's Motion for Court to Take Judicial
Notice

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order Regarding Petitioner's Renewed and
Supplemental Motion for Discovery

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCLYKEAL

Motion for Summary Disposition (Dunn for State
of Idaho)

Cheri C. Copsey

ANSW

CCLYKEAL

Answer to Amended Petition for Post Conviction Cheri C. Copsey
Relief and Brief in support of Motion for Summary
Disposition

MOTN

CCRANDJD

Motion for 14 day Exentsion

Cheri C. Copsey

AFFD

CCRANDJD

Affidavit of Mark JAckley

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order Granting Motion For 14-Day Extension To
File Response To The State's Motion For
Summary Disposition

Cheri C. Copsey

TCWEATJB

Order to Transport

Cheri C. Copsey

3/17/2009
1

1

f31/2009

1/14/2009
1/20/2009

~/1212009
/15/2009
115/2009

MISC

DCDANSEL

Response to the State's Motion for Summary
Disposition

Cheri C. Copsey

1/16/2009

MISC

DCDANSEL

Response to Motion to Strike (Juror's Affidavit
from the Record)

Cheri C. Copsey

~/18/2009

NOTC

TCWEATJB

Notice of Filing Table of Contents and Index of
Addenda to Response to the State's Motion for
Summary Disposition

Cheri C. Copsey
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Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

f a d Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho,
Idaho. Defendant
Date

/18/2009
1/1B/2009

Code

User

NOTC

TCWEATJB

Notice of Supplemental Authority

Cheri C. Copsey

Judge

1
I

NOTC

TCWEATJB

Notice of Filing Original Verfrcation Page

Cheri C. Copsey

6/19/2009

DCHH

TCWEATJB

Hearing result for Status held on 06/19/2009
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Madsen
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated. Under 1-00 Pages -

Cheri C. Copsey

1/2612009
1/26/2009

MOTN

DCDANSEL

Motion for More Time to Contact Witnesses for
Evidentiary Hearing

Cheri C. Copsey

MEMO

DCDANSEl

Memorandum in Support of Motion for More Time Cheri C. Copsey
to Contact Witneses for Evidentiary Hearing

_/6/2009
_/612009

ORDR

DCDANSEl

Order Re: Evidentiary
EVidentiary Hearing

Cheri C. Copsey

./8/2009
1/8/2009
19/2009
./9/2009

srlP

MCBIEHKJ

Stipulation for Extension of Time

Cheri C. Copsey

HRSC

TCWEATJB

Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/07/2009
OBI07/2009 01 :30
PM)

Cheri C. Copsey

./21/2009
,/2112009
128/2009
./28/2009
7/29/2009

TRLD

TCWEAT.IB
TCWEAT./B

Transcript Lodged: 06-19-09

Cheri C. Copsey

TCWEATJB

Order to Transport

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

TCWEATJB

Motion For Preparation Of Transcripts

Cheri C. Copsey

REQU

TCWEATJB

Request For Status Of Pending Motion For Partial Cheri C. Copsey
Summary Disposition And Discovery Motions

STIP

CCHOLMEE

Stipulation Re: Claims

Cheri C. Copsey

./412009
_/4/2009
16/2009
~/6/2009

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order Directing The Preparation Of Transcripts

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

TCWEATJB

Motion For Preparation Of Transcripts

Cheri C. Copsey

fl7l2009
f/7/2009

MISC

TCWEATJB

Miscellaneous: 54 Documents Unsealed

Cheri C. Copsey

MISC

TCWEATJB

Miscellaneous: 65 Documents Unsealed

Cheri C. Copsey

MISC

TCWEATJB

Miscellaneous: 4 Documents Unsealed

Cheri C. Copsey

DCHH

TCWEATJB

Hearing result for Status held on 08/07/2009
01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Madsen
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Under 100 Pages

Cheri C. Copsey

HRSC

TCWEATJB

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled

Cheri C. Copsey

I

7/30/2009

I
I

12/04/2009 01:30 PM) Omnibus Hearing
MISC

TCWEATJB

Proposed Agenda Items For Status Conference

Cheri C. Copsey

_11112009
_/11/2009

ORDR

DCDANSEL

Standing Order Directing the Preparation of
Transcripts of All Post Conviction Hearings

Cheri C. Copsey

1/17/2009

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order Re: SAPO Involvement With Trial And
Pre-Trial

Cheri C. Copsey

I
I
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FOURTH DISTRICT COURT

1410011004

NO.----=~'7'I~':""Ir__NO.----=~'7'I~':'"'lr__FII.£D
3t~~
~P.M~~~__
AM _ _ _ _ _FILED
-rP.M-""'--'='---_

OCT 15 2009
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By J. WEATHERBY

1
2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

3

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

DEPUTY

4

5

AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,

6
7

Petitioner,
NO~CV-PC-200S-0Q308
CASE NO~CV-PC-200S-00308

8

vs.

9

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

10
11
12
13

14

ORDER APPOINTING KEITH ROARK

Respondent.

In reviewing the material filed in support of the Final Amended
AI11ended Petition, including various

e-mails attached to the Toryanskis' depositions, it came to the Court's attention that several of the

15

attorneys, including Molly Husky, the State Appellate
State Appellate Public Defender's Office attomeys,

16

Defender,
Public Defender.

17

began. during jury
provided advice to :Mr. Abdullah's privately retained trial counsel before trial began,

M~iI'k
M~iI"k

Ackley, Chief of the Capital Litigation Unit, and Kimberly Simmons,

18

voir dire, during trial and post triaL]
trial. 1 The record establishes that the State Appellate Public

19

Defender's Office advised trial counsel on several matters, including advising them to seek a

20

continuance of the trial (which they did) and suggesting specific voir dire approaches. Both of

21

these areas are the subject of Mr.

22

Appellate Public Defender's Office's involvement and what advice was given was unclear.

23

Therefore, concerned about the apparent conflict of interest, the Court ordered counsel to address

24

the implications and extent of this involvement.

25

26
27

Abdu11ah~s post-conviction

Both the State and the State Appellate Public

claims. The full extent of the State

Defertder~s Office
Defertder~s

responded and provided

the Court with additional evidence. Based on those responses, the Court found that the State

of interest in its representation of Mr. Abdullah
Appellate Public Defender~s
Defender~s Office had a conflict ofinterest

28

29
30

1 The Court notes that Ms. Simmons and Mr. Ackley specifically represented to the Court in the original Petition that
involvement in the trial of this matter. It was on this repIeSCilta:tion
represCilta:tion that the Court found good cause to
they bad no involveti1ent

31
~?

ORDER APPOINTING KEITH ROARK
CV-PC~lOOS-00308
CASE NO. CV-PC-200S-00308

1
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2082877529

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT

... PD ST APPELLANT

!4J 002/004
14l

1 in post-conviction proceedings as outlined in its September 15,2009, order. The law is clear that
2

once a court concludes defense counsel does have a conflict, it must obtain a knowing, intelligent

3

and voluntary waiver from the defendant or give the defendant an opportunity to acquire new

4

2003)? Mr.
counsel. See State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259, 77 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct.App. 2003).1

5

Abdullah is indigent and is entitled to conflict free counsel at public expense.

6

In order to ensure that Mr. Abdullah knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waives this

7

conflict, the Court hereby appoints R Keith Roark to independently advise Mr. Abdullah about

8 the conflict and its potential effect on this post-conviction case, as well as any future proceedings,
9

including federal habeas or successive post-conviction actions. Mr. Roark is private counsel

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

qualified to represent indigent defendants at trial, in post-conviction and in appellate death penalty

17

cases, having been certified by the Idaho Supreme Court. It does not appear that Mr. Roark has
had any prior involwment in Mr. Abdullah's representation.
As part of this appointment, the Court authorizes Mr. Roark to conduct a thorough and
searching review of the State Appellate Public Defender's pre-trial, trial and pre-sentence
involvement up to its appointment to represent Mr. Abdullah on appeal and on post-conviction. If
he needs to take depositions, he may do so. Furthermore, the Court hereby forwards copies ofthe
of the
relevant materials provided to the Cotut including the following:

18

1) State Appellate Public Defender's Office Motion and Memorandum for
Targeted Inquiry filed 9-25-09;

19

20
21
22
23
24
25
26

2) Order re: Conflict Counsel filed 9-15-09;
3) Response to Court Order Inquiring into the Pretrial and Trial Involvement
of
the SAPD with Trial Counsel filed 9-1-09;
ofthe

4) Memorandum Re: SAPD Involvement with Trial and Pte Trial filed 8-31
8-3109; and
5) Order Re: SAPD Involvement With Trial And Pre-Trial filed 8-17-09.
Following a thorough review of the record and any investigation he deems necessary, he

shall meet with and advise Mr. Abdullah regarding the conflict and any decision to waive the

27

28
29
30
31
':t?

allow the State AppeUate Public Defender's Office more than tbrte years to finalize the post-conviction petition. This
is why the Court was unaware of
the conflict.
ofthe
Z This

was recently reaffirmed in State v. Severson, -

P.3d - , 2009 WL 1492659 (Idaho, 2009). While rehearing

was denied, Severson has not yet been released for publication and cannot be cited.
ORDER APPOINTING KEITH ROARK
CASE NO. CV-PC-1005-00308
CV-PC2005-00308

2
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2082877529

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT

-+

PD ST APPELLANT

@003/004

1

conflict. Once he is satisfied that Mr. Abdullah understands his rights and is capable of making a.

2

knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision, Mr. Roark should schedule a hearing before this

3

Court.

4

IT IS SO ORDERED.

5

Dated this 15th day of October 2009.

6
7
8

Cheri C. Copsey
District Judge

9

CS

10
11

12
13
14

15
16

17
18
19
20

21

22
23

24
25

26
27
28
29
30
31

-:l"

ORDER APPOINTING KEITH ROARK
CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-00308
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I4J 004/004

1

2

CERTlFICATE OF MAILING

3
4
5

6
7
8
9

10

I hereby certify that on this

ti day of October 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the

within instrument to:

GREG H. BOWER
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATIORNEY
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATIORNEY
ROGER BOURNE
SHAWNADUNN
lNTERDEPT. MArr.

11

12
13
14

15
16

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
PUBliC DEFENDER
STATE APPELLATE PUBUC
MARK J. ACKLEY
SHANNON N. ROMERO
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
BOISE, IDAHO 83703

17
18

AZAD ABDULLAH
#76321

19

IMSI-JBWCK

20

P.O. BOX 51
BOISE, IDAHO 83707

21

J. DAVID NAVARRO

22

Clerk of the Dis·
Dis . .ct

23
24

-

25

-.-.

26

.,:"
.':'
"

-'"'

.: ".

27

28

29
30
31
~?
~?

ORDER RE: CONFLICT COUNSEL
CASE NO. CV
CV-PC-200S-00308
-PC-200S-00308

7
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NO.
~'Fi/i:i';-NO.--_
_Fii"i!r;--_ ___
FIlED
A.M
_
_
_
-.IP.M
A.M-_ _-JP.M

----

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843

SEP 252009
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By J. WEATHERBY
DEPUTY

MARK
MARK. J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. #6330
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. #5888
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. #7679
Capital Litigation Unit
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703

CONFORM

t~~lf
~~~11

(20~) ~34-2712

IN THE DISlRICT COURT OF THE FOURTII nmICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,
Petitioner,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-21802
(formerly SPOT0500308)

MOTION FOR A TARGETED
INQUIRY

(Capital Case)

The Petitioner, AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH, by and through his attorneys, Mark Ackley,
Shannon Romero and Nicole Owens of the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender
(SAPD), hereby moves this Honorable Court to conduct a targeted inquiry regarding the SAPD's
alleged conflict of interest at the hearing scheduled for September 25,2009, at 10;00 a.m. This
motion is supported by the Memorandwn in Support of the Motion for a Targeted Inquiry, filed
simultaneously with this Motion.

MOTION FOR A TARGETED INQUIRY

1
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September, 2009.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITIED this 25th day of September.

MOTION FOR A TARGETED INQUIRY
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25 th day of September, a true and correct copy ofthe
of the
foregoing document, MOTION FOR A TARGETED INQUIRY, was delivered to the following:
ROGER BOURNE
SHAWNADUNN
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 WEST FRONT ST., RM. 3191
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
AZAD HAn ABDULLAH
INMATE #76321
IMSI, J BLOCK
PO BOX 51
BOISE In
ID 83707

K

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

u.s. Mail
~ Statehouse Mail
_ _ Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

Administrative Assistant

MOTION FOR A TARGETED INQUIRY
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NO· _ _ _~'imi
~iLm_ _ __
NO.
AM
. - - -___
- FILED
IP.M. _ _ __

MOLL
Y J. HUSKEY
MOLLY
State Appellate Public Defender
State ofIdaho
I.S.B. # 4843

SEP 252009
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By J. WEATHERBY
DEPUTV

MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. #6330
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. #5888
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. #7679
Capital Litigation Unit
-----1647ntlcefHaroorl~fie
7ntlcefHarOOfl~fie
-···-3"64
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334~2712
334~2712

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOUR1H
FOURlH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent

})
})
})
})
})
})
})
})
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-21802
(formerly SPOT0500308)
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR A TARGETED
INQUIRY

(Capital Case)

Comes now the Petitioner, Azad Haji Abdullah, through his counsel, Mark Ackley,
Ackley.
Shannon Romero and Nicole Owens of the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender
(SAPD), hereby submits this Memorandum in Support of Motion For a Targeted Inquiry
(hereinafter "Memorandum") regarding the alleged conflict of interest between the SAPD and

Mr. Abdullah. A hearing is currently scheduled for September 25,2009,
25.2009, at 10:00 a.m.
In this Memorandum, counsel for Mr. Abdullah identify all theoretical conflicts of
interest that may arise from the SAPO's contact with trial counsel in Mr. Abdullah's case, and
identify the reasons why the SAPO believes no conflict exists.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TARGETED INQUIRY
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RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This Court issued an Order directing Mr. Abdullah and the State to submit simultaneous
briefing by September 1,2009, supported by legal authority, regarding the SAPD's pretrial and
trial involvement with Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel. (8117/09 Order re: SAPD Involvement with
Trial and Pre-trial.) The Court's order was specifically directed toward resolving the question of
whether the, SAPD's contact and pretrial and trial involvement with trial counsel constituted a
re~ SAPD
eonflict of interest. On- August -3-1, -2009 the State- submitted its. "Memorandum re:j

Involvement with Trial and Pre-Trial" (hereinafter "State's Memorandum"), in which it asserted
that it did not believe there was a conflict of interest and did not believe any attorneys with the
SAPD office would be necessary witnesses at Mr. Abdullah's evidentiary hearing. (See State's
Memorandum, incorporated here by reference.) The SAPD filed its "Response to Cowt Order
Witl1 Trial Counsel" (hereinafter
Inquiring into the Pretrial and Trial Involvement of the SAPD Wit1:l
"Response") the following day, and asserted that there was no conflict of interest based on the
SAPD'spretrial, trial and post-trial interactions with trial counsel. (See Response, filed 9/1109,
incorporated here by reference.) Both the State and the SAPD attached emails to their respective

filings documenting the interactions between the SAPD and trial counsel, while the SAPD also
attached excerpts from Ms. Toryanski's deposition testimony relating to her communications
- with the SAPD. (See Memorandum (attachments); Response, Addenda A& B.)
Despite the parties' shared belief that no conflict of interest exists, the Court issued an
''the
"Order re: Conflict Counsel" (hereinafter Order) on September 15, 2009, concluding that "the
State Appellate Public Defender's Office has a conflict in its representation of Mr. Abdullah in
poSi--conviction proceedings." (Order, pp.1-2.) Although the Court failed to specifically identify'
poSt-conviction

~OTION FOR TARGETED INQUIRY
. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ~OTION
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any particular conflict, the Court made a number of statements in its Order relating to the
perceived conflict of interest:
This order does not affect the State Appellate Public Defender's Office's
representation of Mr. Abdullah in the appeal of his underlying conviction.

While the State Appellate Public Defender's Office addresses the conflict
created by their role as witnesses in both advising trial counsel and observing the
trial, the more significant conflict includes a colorable claim that they refrained
from asserting viable ineffective assistance of counsel claims that may implicate
advice tbeygave
they gave to Mr.Abdullah1 sretained trial counsel. [Footnote omitted.}- In this case, on a successive post
-conviction petition or in a federal habeas
post-conviction
action, Mr. Abdullah has a "colorable claim" that the State Appellate Public
Defender's Office has an actual conflict of interest and, therefore, cannot
represent him in this action. That colorable claim exists because attorneys in the
State Appellate Public Defender's Office advised Mr. Abdullah's retained trial
counsel, sat in on the trial and are witnesses [sic] even if they are not called in the
post-conviction case. More significantly, should Mr. Abdullah so chose, he could
claim the State Appellate Public Defender's Office post-conviction attorneys may
have foregone viable ineffective assistance of counsel claims because such claims
may implicate advice the attorneys gave to Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel.

Furthermore, the Court finds that this conflict affects the entire office because at
least three members of the officer [sic], Molly Husky [sic], Mark Ackley and
Kimberly Simmons, met with and advised Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel pre-trial,
during jury selection, during trial and post-trial. Molly Husky [sic] is the State
Appellate Public Defender and the office supervisor. Mark Ackley heads the
Capital Litigation Unit and supervises that unit. Mr. Abdullah would have a
colorable claim that any attorney working for Ms. Husky [sic] or being supervised
by Mark Ackley would also have a conflict because he could claim they did not
. pursue claims that may implicate .Ms. Husky's [sic], Mr. Ackley's or Ms.
Simmons' advice. Therefore, the Court finds that the entire State Appellate Public
Defender's Office is conflicted for the purpose of this post-conviction proceeding.
original).)1
(Order, pp.2; 4-5 (emphasis in original).)i
liot address that aspect of this Court's order regarding members ofthe
1 This memorandum doeS Iiot
of the
..SAPD
SAPD who "sat. in on the trial[,)" where two members of the SAPD office, according to the
emailswhicharenowpartoftherecord.werepresentforapartialdayofjuryvoirdire.1bis
..issue
issue is not addressed because no member of the SAPD would or could· ever be called to testify
in contradiction to what the Official Clerk's Record and Official Court Reporter's Transcript
from voir dire reflect occUrred in court and on the record on the day SAPD office members were
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TARGETED INQUIRY
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As a result of having found the existence of a conflict, this Court ordered a hearing be
held on September 25, 2009, at which this Court will "determine whether Mr. Abdullah waives
this conflict both as to this post-conviction proceeding and in any subsequent proceedings."
(Order, p.2.) But see Order, p.6 ("The Court hereby schedules a hearing ... to detennine whether
Mr. Abdullah can knowingly intelligently and volWltarily waive these conflicts, whether the
Court should appoint conflict cOWlSel to advise him regarding this waiver, or whether the Court
should order the State Appellate Public Defender'S Office to provide Mr. Abdullah death
qualified private counsel to represent him in these post-conviction proceedings at public
expense." (footnote omitted».

RELEVANT LEGAL AUTHORITY
In light of this Court's conclusion that the SAPD is currently laboring under a conflict of
interest in its representation of Mr. Abdullah, based on pretrial, trial, and post-trial contacts the
SAPD had with trial counsel, .the SAPD urges this Court to conduct an inquiry at the September
25, 2009 hearing that is both searching and targeted at the conflict issue. See State v. Lopez.
Lopez, 139
256, 259, 77 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct. App. 2003) (stating that once a trial court is aware that a
Idaho 256.
. conflict may exist, it must conduct an inquiry that is both searching and targeted at the conflict
issue). While such an inquiry is usually part of this Court's evaluation of whether a conflict of
interest exists, and this Court has
bas presumably already found a conflict of interest, this Court has
. neither identified the specific nature of the conflict nor the basis for its finding that a conflict of
interest exists.

present for part of the voir dire. Moreover, if mere observation of events which are part of the
public record is sufficient to render an individual a witness, then Ms. Simmons, Shawna Dunn,
the Honorable Patrick Owen, and this Court would all be witnesses in this case.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TARGETED lNQUIRY
lNQUlRY
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Identification of the nature and basis for any conflict of interest is necessary before
Mr. Abdullah can even consider making an intelligent, knowing, and voluntary waiver of any
alleged conflict. Seeld
Pursuant to the Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct (IRPC) 1.7(a)(2), a concurrent
conflict of interest exists where "there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client
or a third person or by the personal interests of the lawyer, including family and -domestic
relationships." Despite the existence of this type of conflict, the rules nevertheless allow a lawyer
to represent a client if: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes thatthe lawyer will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client; (2) the representation is not
prohibited by law; (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before

a . tribunal; and (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. IRPC·
IRPC'
·1.7(b);see
·1.7(b); see also State v. Severson, _

P.3d

..J
--.oJ

2009·WL
2009·
WL 1492659 *6 (Idaho 2009)2 ("To

determine whether an actual conflict of interest exists, Idaho Courts look to the standards set
forth in the Idaho RuIesof
Rules of Professional Conduct''). Because Mr. Abdullah cannot give informed.
SAPO urges this Court to conduct a
consent until the conflicts of interest are identified, the SAPD
targeted inquiry, directed at identifying both the basis for and the nature of any potential conflict.

I. IDENTIFICATION OF ALL BASES FOR THEORETICAL CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST BETWEEN TIlE SAPD AND MR. ABDULLAH BASED ON CONTACT
THE SAPO
SAPD HAD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL
The SAPD identifies herein the theoretical conflicts that could exist based on the
SAPD and trial-counsel. Identification of these theoretical conflicts of
interactions between the SAPO
interest is based on a thorough review of all contacts between the SAPD
SAPO and the Toryanskis,
2

A remittitur has been issued in this case and thus it is final.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TARGETED INQUIRY
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3

previously identified and submitted to this Court as attachments to the SAPD's Response. In
addition to identifying all theoretical conflicts, the SAPD sets forth why it believes no actual
conflict of interest exists with respect to each theoretical conflict identified herein.
A. SAPD "Advice" to Trial Counsel
The first set of
theoretical conflicts is based on the "advice" given by the SAPD. In some
oftheoretical
instances identified below, it is not clear if the SAPD gave advice, and if so, what advice it
provided to trial counsel. For the purpose of this Motion and in light of this Court's .Order re:
Conflict, it will be assumed that the SAPD did in fact provide advice to trial counsel.

1. The SAPD's Possible Suggestion That Trial Counsel Move To Disgualify
This Court
Mark Ackley and Ms. Huskey may have suggested to Kim Toryanski that trial counsel
move to disqualify this Court from presiding over Mr. Abdullah's trial during a September 3,
2004 telephone conversation. (See Response, 3/17/06 Email from Mark Ackley to Michael Shaw
re: Abdullah File Clean up, referencing 9/3104 telephone call with Kim Toryanski and Molly
Huskey.) Assuming the SAPD recommended that trial counsel move to disqualify this Court,

trial counsel made no such motion.
Because the advice offered by the SAPD to trial counsel" was not followed, there is no
basis for presuming the existence of a conflict of interest arising from the SAPD failing to raise a
claim regarding the disqualification motion. The SAPD's advice to counsel was not followed,
and it cannot be said that the SAPD has refrained from claiming trial counsel were ineffective in

An additional contact, discovered only this week during the SAPD investigator's second review
""oftrial
of trial counsels' files in anticipation of an evidentiary hearing, is addressed in this Memorandum.
and attached for this Court's and the State's review. Because this Court ordered the State be
given access to the entirety of trial counsels' files, the" State has been priVy to this coJt.tact. See
2114/08 Order Granting State's Motion to Compel Discovery
Discover}' and Granting Petitioner's Motion
for Protective Order p.2 ("In light of the number and variety of the petitioner's
petitioner9 s claims, trial
9
counsels' files in their entirety are fairly subject to discovery by the State.").
"
counsels
3
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failing to move to disqualify this Court where such failure was not premised on the SAPD's
advice.

2. The SAPD's Possible Advice To Trial Counsel To Object To This Court's
Order Sealing The Proceedings Relating To The Klein/Littlefield
KleinlLittlefield Affair
According to notes from a September 3, 2004 telephone conversation among Mrs.
Toryanski, Mr. Ackley and Ms. Huskey, Mr. Ackley may have suggested to Mrs. Toryanski that
she move to unseal trial counsels' motion to continue that this Court ordered be filed under seal,
based on Mr. Abdullah's right to a public trial. (Response, Addendum B, 3/17/06 Email from
Mark Ackley to Michael Shaw re: Abdullah file clean up, referencing 9/3104 telephone call with
Kim Toryansld
Toryanski and Molly Huskey.) The motion to continue was based on trial counsels' need to
Kle~ and the lead detective, Todd
. investigate the affair between the prosecutor, Erika Kle~

Littlefield, which had just been revealed to trial counseL4
counse1.4
The record demonstrates trial counsel made a motion to unseal the motion to continue
and the transcripts from the in-chambers hearing on the motion
motion.to
to continue. (R., pp.l009-1012.)

L.1S.)
This Court held a hearing and denied that request. (Tr. Vol. IT, p.179, L.3 - p.I90, L.l5.)
Because it appears trial counsel followed

~e

SAPD's advice and moved to unseal the motion

and the transcripts from the hearing relating to the motion to continue, there is no conflict of
·interest that can arise from the SAPD's advice. 1hat
lhat is, it cannot be said the SAPD did· not
·pursue claims that may implicate the SAPD's advice where trial counsel arguably followed the
SAPD's advice
in~ffective in
advice.... There is no argument that could be made that trial counsel were in~ffective

.. Errors in the spelling of the prosecutor's and detective's names demonstrate the SAPD's lack
"Errors
of knowledge. (Response, Addendum B, 3/17/06 Email from Mark Ackley to Michael Shaw re:
Abdullah File Clean Up, referencing 9/3104
9/3/04 telephone call with Kim Toryanski and Molly
Huskey, identifying "Erica Kline and Detective Whitfield.'1
Whitfield.")
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moving to unseal the motion to continue and the related hearing where this Court denied the
motion. S
SAPD' s Possible Advice to Trial Counsel to Move to Continue the Trial
3. The SAPD's
Based on Mrs. Toryanski's Representation that the Defense Had No Expert to
Attack the State's Laboratory Results and the Revelation of the Affair
between the Lead Detective and the Assistant Prosecutor (9/3/04 TC with KD
Based on Mrs. Toryanski's assertion that the defense had no expert to attack the State's
Laboratory Results, in conjunction with the revelation that the .lead
lead detective and assistant
prosecuting attorney were having an affair, Mr. Ackley may have advised Mrs. Toryanski to
move to continue the trial.

(Response, Addendum B, 3/17/06 Email from Mark Ackley to

Michael Shaw re: Abdullah file clean up, referencing 9/3/04 telephone call with Kim Toryanski
and Molly Huskey.) In fact, Ms. Toryanski did move to continue the trial, and did reference the
toxicology results, and the State's choice of testing labs, as decisions that may have been
impacted by the affair between the Detective Littlefield and prosecutor Erika Klein, and areas of
inquiry that trial counsel would explore in a deposition of Detective Littlefield.

(9/7/04

Defendant's Motion to Continue Trial Filed Under Seal,pp.4-10.)
Given that trial counsel did move to continue the trial, consistent with possible advice
given by Mr. Ackley, and the SAPD has raised a claim that trial counsel were ineffective in
failing to assert and honor Mr. Abdullah's right to a speedy trial by requesting multiple
CQntinuances, it cannot be said that the SAPD has a conflict and is refraining from raising claims
on Mr. Abdullah's behalf that may implicate their advice to move to continue the trial. (See .

Final Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Claim FF, Trial Counsel Rendered

I
I
I
I
-

6 Notably, it could be argued that there coUld be a a potential conflict had trial counsel failed to
move to unseal the motion and hearing based on the advice ofthe
of the SAPD, and the SAPD had not
raised a ~laim of ineffective assistance resulting from trial counsels' failure.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TARGETED INQUIRY

8

001873

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
.1
I
I
I

Ineffective Assistance By Failing to Assert And Honor Mr. Abdullah's Demands to Exercise His
Right to a Speedy Trial.)
4. Mr. Ackley Advising Mrs. Torvanski That Trial Counsels' Voir Dire
Questioning Of Prospective Jurors Was Erroneous And Directing Trial
Counsel To Review Relevant Portions Of Penry v. Johnson (919/04 Email
From Mr. Ackley To Kim Toryanski)
Kimberly Simmons, fonner co-counsel for Mr. Abdullah, and Shelley Hill, observed a
portion ofjury
of jury selection in Mr. Abdullah's
Abdullah'S case on one day, September 8, 2004. (See R~
Addendum B, 919/04 Email from Mr. Ackley to Mrs. Toryanski.) Based on their observations,
they reported back to Mr. Ackley that both trial counsel and this Court were incorrectly inquiring
of prospective jurors' ability to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence. Mr. Ackley
advised Mrs. Toryanski of Supreme Court precedent suggesting that asking jurors if they could
simply consider mitigating evidence is not enough. Mr. Ackley advised Mrs. Toryanski that
.prospective jurors needed to be questioned to detennine whether they could give effect to
.prospective
mitigating evidence, and if they could not, trial counsel needed to move to exclude those jurors
for cause. ld
The SAPD has challenged all aspects of trial counsels' perfonnance during jury selection,
Relief,
including but not limited to voir dire. (See Final Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
Claim EE., Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Stipulating To Strike Pro-Life
AIl Adequate Voir
Jurors Based Solely On Their Jury Questionnaires, By Failing To Conduct AD.

Dire, By Failing To Move To Strike Jurors For Cause, And By Failing To Utilize Preemptory
Challenge To Strike Biased Jurors.") The SAPO's claim that trial .counsel
counsel wereinetTective
throughout all aspects of jury selection is consistent with the advice Mr. Ackley provided to trial
.

.

re~g the inadequacy of their voir dire of prospective jurors. Thus, it cannot be said
counsel re~g
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that the SAPD has a conflict of interest which is causing SAPD attorneys to refrain from raising
claims on Mr. Abdullah's behalf that may implicate their advice to trial counsel regarding voir
dire.
5. Mr. Ackley's "Advice" To Mrs. Toryanski About Possibly Crafting A
Separation Of Powers Argument Challenging The Sentencing Procedures .
Utilized In Mr. Abdullah's Case
In a post-verdict, pre-judicial sentencing phone conversation initiated .by Mrs. Toryanski
to Mr. Ackley on January 24, 2005, Mr. Ackley mentioned the possibility of challenging the
post-verdict sentencing procedure in Mr. Abdullah's case and indicated that such a challenge, as

1124/05 Mr.
. well as others, might be considered prior to sentencing. (Response, Addendum B, 1/24/05
Ackley note of telephone conversation with Kim Toryanski.) Trial counsel did not me any
motions challenging the sentencing procedure in Mr. Abdullah's case, and did not ask the Court
to impose a sentence other than death.
death, despite the jury's sentencing verdict.
Because the suggestion made by Mr. Ackley to Mrs. Toryanski was not followed, there is
.. no· basis for presuming the existence of a conflict of interest arising from the SAPD failing to
raise a claim regarding trial counsels' failure to challenge the sentencing procedures. The
SAPD's advice to counsel was not followed, and thus, it cannot be said that the SAPD has

II
II
II

ilil

I

II)1
II
II

refrained from claiming trial counsel were ineffective in failing to move to disqualify this Court
SAPD'ss advice.
where such failure was not premised on the SAPD'

6. Trial Counsels' Request For Molly Huskey To Review This Court's Adverse
Rulings Arid Infonn Counsel Whether An Interlocutory Appeal Would Be
Advisable
. On December 4, 2003, this Court issued its
.

"~ision
"~ision

Regarding State Death Penalty

Statute
PenaIty[,]" denying trial counsels' objection to the
statute and Notice of Intent to Seek the Death PenaIty[,r
State's notice to seek the death penalty, denying the motion to strike the notice seeking the death
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penalty, and denying the motion to declare the death penalty statute inapplicable to Mr.
Abdullah's case. (R., pp.576-592.) On December 9, 2003, this Court issued its "Decision
Regarding Constitutionality of the Statutory Aggravating Factors[,]" denying Mr. Abdullah's
request to deem the statutory aggravating circumstances contained in Idaho Code § 19-2515
unconstitutional. (R., pp. 598-606.)
On December 11,2003, trial counsel preswnably faxed these orders to Molly Huskey,6
rufmgs and assist in "evaluating whether it is advisable to fIle
asking Ms. Huskey to review the rofmgs
file

an interlocutory appeal- on one or the other or both." (9/1109 Response, Attachment B, 12111103
fax cover sheet.)

The nature of the advice provided by Molly Huskey, if any, is not evident

counsel.7 A review of
from any subsequent email communications between the SAPD and trial counseL
the clerk's record demonstrates that trial counsel did not seek pennission to appeal these orders,
and no interlocutory appeal was ever initiated.
any; in order to
Regardless of the nature of Ms. Huskey's advice to trial counsel, if any..
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsels' failure to seek permission to
appeal these orders in 2003, current counsel must

demo~te
demo~te

that the Idaho Supreme Court

would have granted permission for the int~r1ocutory
int~rlocutory appeal, a completely discretionary decision,
and further, convince this Court that the Idaho Supreme'Court would have reversed this Court's
rulings on both orders. See Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 154, 177 P.3d 362,368 (2008) ("In

1214 & I know that Under
In the fax cover sheet, Kim Toryanski states "[t]he orders were filed 12/4
the Idaho Appellate Rules we have 14 days to file notice of appeal withe trial ct. The clock is
R~sponse, Attachment B,I2111103
B,12111103 fax cover sheet.)
sheet)
ticking. Thank you so muchl" (911109 R~sponse,
th
th
4 , the other order was not filed until December 9 • As a
While one order was filed December 4th,
result, it is not clear that the December 9th Order, as opposed to some other ruling by this Court,
was faxed by trial counsel to Molly Huskey for review.
6

7 See Response, passim & Addenda (identifying and citing to emails, telephone snmmaries,
summaries, and
Toryanski for the limited, involvement of the SAPD in Mr.
deposition testimony of Mrs. Toryanski.
Abdullah's case and the limited nature of the SAPD's advice).
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a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to pursue a motion in the
underlying action, the court properly may consider the probability of success of the motion in
question

in

determining

whether

the

attorney's

inactivity

constituted

incompetent

perfonnance."); LA.R.l2(a) ("Pennission may be granted by the Supreme Court to appeal from
an interlocutory order or degree of a district court in a civil or criminal action ....").
....").
To prevail on this claim, current counsel would have to convince this Court that the Idaho
Supreme Court WGUld have granted relief; in.short, current counsel would have to convince this
Court that its ruling on these motions were wrong. Even if current counsel could demonstrate
that trial counsels' interlocutory appeal would have been granted and this Court's orders
reversed, current counsel would still need to demonstrate that Mr. Abdullah was prejudiced as a
result of
counsels' deficient omission. Prejudice would be demonstrated based on the passage of
ofcounsels'
time between the theoretical date that interlocutory relief would have been granted and a future
unknown date when Mr. Abdullah obtains relief from the Idaho Supreme Court on direct appeal
through reversal of this Court's orders. Significantly, prejudice would not be based on the denial
of the right to appeal since this Court's rulings have been preserved for challenge on direct
appeal..· If this Court's rulings were in fact erroneous, Mr. Abdullah will receive relief from the
appeal,,·
Idaho· Supreme Court on direct appeal and there will be no opportunity for a successive petition
or federal habeas review on this possible claim, and the type of "colorable claim" i.dentified by
the Court would never arise.

Because the SAPD cannot demonstrate deficient performance of trial counsel, where it
cannot prove that the Idaho Supreme Court would have granted an appeal from this Court's
interlocutory orders, and it cannot prove that the Idaho Supreme Court would reverse this
Court's rulings, a challenge to trial counsels' failure to seek permission to appeal the
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interlocutory orders from December of 2003 would be futile. This is particularly true where the
error, if any, will be remedied on direct appeal. See Gilpfn-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57
P.3d 787, 792 (2002) ("A post-conviction action is not a substitute for and does not supplant a
direct appeal from the conviction or sentence."). Further, finding a conflict of interest on this
ground would suggest that post-conviction counsel should raise a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel for every preserved error for which permission to appeal has not been sought. Thus,
the absence of a c1aiin- ffi.aCtrfaf
tliaCtrfaf counsels"·
counsels"- failure

to seek permission

to appeal this Court~s-

interlocutory order was ineffective, irrespective of whether or how the SAPD advised trial
counsel to proceed with the interlocutory appeal, does not result from the SAPD refraining from
raising ineffective assistance of
counsel claims where no prejudice can ever be shown.
ofcounsel
In conclusion.
conclusion, in each area where the SAPD allegedly provided advice to trial counsel, it
cannot be shown that such advice led to a conflict of interest. Moreover, it is worth nothing that
neither the State nor the Court has ever suggested that the "advice" rendered was deficient in
light of the circumstances of
the case as relayed by trail counseL
ofthe
B
B.... SAPD AS POSSIBLE WITNESSES TO STATEMENTS MADE BY TRIAL
COUNSEL
I.
t. Kim Toryanski's Statements To Mr. Ackley And Ms. Huskey Which Left Mr.
Ackley With The Impression That Mrs. Toryanski Was Over-Confident In
Tiia} Counsels' Ability To Obtain An Acquittal
Mrs; Toryanski is the primary witness to both the content and tone of her conversations with

Mr. Ackley and Ms. Huskey. (Response, Addendum B,
B. summary of 9/3/04 telephone
conversation among Ms. Huskey, Mr. Ackley and Mrs. Toryanski.) In addition, Sherry Rogers,

Mr. Abdullah, Dr. Craig Beaver.
Beaver, and Ms. Rosanne Dapsauski can each testify regarding MIs.
Toryanski's over confidence in obtaining an acquittal. (See Final Amended Petition (or Post4) & Attachments; Claim T(l) & Attachments; Claim II &
Conviction Relief, Claim C(
C(4)
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Attachments.) Notably, this conversation arose in the context of Mrs. Toryanski's beliefs
regarding the flawed State Laboratory testing through NMS, and the impact of the
KleinfLittlefield affair. In addition, Mrs. Toryanski herself admitted that her confidence in Mr.
KleinJLittlefield
Abdullah's case decreased substantially based on this Court's rulings excluding particular
evidence immediately before the State presented its case-in-chief. (See Final Amended Petition,
Addendwn 3, p.226, L.12 -p.231, L.25; Addendum 6, pp.6-7 & Addendum 17.) Indeed, trial

counsel ultimately did-not object to the State's motion in-limine
iIl--limine Ie: National Me.dical
MeAical Services,
Services,pp.l036-39.)
filed September 14, 2004. (Trial Tr. Vol. ill, p.829, L.25 - p.830, L.6; R., Vol. VI, pp.1036-39.)
Similarly, after this conversation, the Court denied trial counsels' motion to continue.
2. Mrs. Torvanski's Statement To Mr. Ackley And Ms. Huskey That Mr.
Abdullah Would Plead To What He Did, i.e.,
Le., Conspiracy To Commit Arson.
And Indicating Mrs. Abdullah Poured Gasoline At The Crime Scene
Mrs. Toryanski would be a witness to these statements and the content of the statements.
Mrs.
(Response, Addendum a,
B, 9/3/04 Telephone conversation between Mr. Ackley and Mrs.

Toryanski.) Similarly, the content of this email is established by Mrs. Toryanski's proffers to the
State and by statements attributed to Mr. within those proffers. Mr. Abdullah would also·provide
testimony he gave the Toryanski's various factual accOunts, including one like this, based on trial
counsels' representations that if he pled guilty to something, he would be released from jail.
(Final Amended Petition, Addendum 3, p~212,
p~2I2, L.8-I5; 211, L.l6-25 & Exhibits 49,50,51,52,

and 53; Final Amended Petition, Addendum 6, p,18.)
p.18.)

3. Mr. Toryanski's Statements To Mr. Ackley
Acldey That Trial Counsel Did Not
Pursue Residual Doubt Because This Court Indicated The Law Was Well
WellSettled And Residual Doubt Was Not Mitigation

After- the jury reached its penalty phase verdict but prior to judicial. sentencing, Mr.
After'
Toryanski contacted Mr. Ackley
Acldey and mentioned the fact that trial counsel did not pursue residual
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doubt based on this Court's indication that the law was well-settled and residual doubt was not
mitigating evidence. (Response, Addendum B, Mr. Ackley's Summary of post-verdict, prejudicial sentencing conversation between Mr. Toryanski and Mr. Ackley). The residual doubt
issue has been raised in Mr. Abdullah's Final Amended Petition and there is no indication that
the SAPD offered any advice on the residual doubt issue to trial counsel. See Final Amended
Petition, Claims E-F & Addenda. Mr. Toryanski is a witness to this statement and its content,
while the most than;W'rbe"said
that"c~atlbe'said of Mr. Acldey is that-heisa-witness to the statement having been
made, not to its content.
4. Mr. Toryanski's Statement To Mr. Ackley That Trial Counsel Were Never
Told What Happened And Mr. Abdullah Was ''never straight"
These statements by Mr. Toryanski to Mr. Ackley were made after the jury reached its
penalty phase verdict but prior to judicial sentencing. (Response, Addendum B, Mr. Ackley's
Sununary of post-verdict, pre-judge sentencing conversation between Mr. Toryanski and Mr.
Ackley.) Mr. Toryanski is a witness both to these statements and to their content, and Mr.
Toryanski acknowledged making such statements and harboring such beliefs during his sworn
deposition testimony. (See Final Amended Petition, Addendum 9, p.614, L.22 - p.616 L.ll.)
These statements are similar to those addressed below at 6, and that analysis is incorporated here
by reference.
5. Mr. Toiyanski's Statements That Judge Copsey's Demeanor Made Her
Impossible To Work With. That She Was Demeaning And Belittled The
Attorneys And Was Unprofessional
These statements made by Mr. Toryanski are not tied to and do not implicate any claim
'Final Amended Petition. Moreover, Mr. Toryanski's statements were
raised in Mr. Abdullah's ·Final

made after the jury reached its guilt phase and penalty phase verdicts in Mr. Abdullah's case.
The SAPD did not witness Judge Copsey's demeanor during the underlying proceeding to any
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appreciable degree. (See Response, Addendum B,
B. 9/9/04 Email from Mr. Ackley to Mrs.
Toryanski acknowledging that Ms. Simmons and the SAPD mitigation specialist observed a
portion of jury selection the day before.) The SAPD has since reviewed the underlying record
and does not believe any of this Court's comments could provide the basis for a motion to
disqualify for cause. Irrespective, there is no conflict that would have precluded the SAPD from
raising this claim. Both Mr. and Mrs. Toryanski are witnesses to these statements and their
content. Ms. Huskey-could only testify-that such a statement was made, but could not attest to the
truth of its content.

6. Mr. Toryanski's Statement To Ms. Huskey That Mr. Abdullah Did Not Tell
Trial Counsel The Truth And They Still Did Not Know What Really
Happened. Which Put Them At A Huge Disadvantage

Mr. Toryanski has consistently maintained that neither he nor Mrs. Toryanski ever knew
what the truth was regarding the events of October 4-5, 2002, and the fact that trial counsel did
not know what really happened put them at a huge disadvantage. (Response, Addendum B,

11124/04 telephone call from Mr. Toryanski to Ms. Huskey.) Mr. Toryanski is a witness to these
statements, and has never denied .making
making these statements or expressing these feelings about Mr.
statements.

"truth." (Final Amended Petition, Addendum 9, p. 577, L.12 - p.580,
p.S80, L.23;
Abdullah and the ''truth.''

p.600, L.25 .;.. p.602, L.11.) Moreover, Mr. Toryanski's statements were made after the jury had
reached both a guilt and penalty phase verdict. In any event, there is no indication that Ms.
Huskey provided any advice in this telephone call.

7. Mrs. Toryanski's Email Statement Regarding The Existence Of An Offer Of
One Count Of First Degree Murder, Dismiss All Other Charges, And The
Agw;ment That No Aggmvators Will Be Presented At Sentencing
Mrs. Toryanski has admitted that she wrote this email and has not disavowed the contents
of the email or disputed its accuracy. (Final Amended Petition, Addendum 3, p.228, L. 17 -
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p.23l, LIS & Exhibit 10.) Thus, the printed copy of the email is the most accurate recitation of
Mrs. Toryanski'
Toryanski'ss statement. Mrs. Toryanski is a witness to the content of this statement, as are
'Shawna Dunn and the Honorable Patrick Owen. Mr. Ackley can only testify that he received
this email from an address assigned to Mrs. Toryanski and that it contained the statements Mrs.
Toryanski has already admitted she made. Mr. Ackley provided no advice in this email.
8. Mrs. Toryanski's Email Statement To Mr. Ackley That She And Mr.
Toryanski Were Wrestling Mr. Abdullah To The Mat to Take A Deal, But
- Mi~ Abdullah
Abdullah Was Resisting So Trial-Counsel Were Putting More Pressure
On Him, Which Was Affecting The Attorney-Client Relationship

'I
I
I
I
I
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I

Mrs. Toryanski has admitted that she wrote this email and has not disavowed the contents
of the email or disputed its accuracy. (Final Amended Petition, Attaclunent 3, p.228, L. 17
17p.231, LIS & Exhibit.lO.) Thus, the printed copy of the email is the most accurate recitation of
Mrs. Toryanski's statement. Mrs. Toryanski is a witness to this statement and its content, as are
Toryanski and Mr. Abdullah. (Final Amended Petition, Addenda 6 & 9.). Mr. Ackley can
Mr. Toryansld
only testify that he received this email from an address assigned to Mrs. Toryanski and that it
contained the statements Mrs. Toryanski has already admitted she made. Mr. Ackley provided no
advice in this email.
9. Mrs. Toryanski's Email Statement To Mr. Ackley That Mr. Abdullah Was
AngrylHostile About The Plea Offer And Mr. Abdullah's Family SupPOrted
Angry/Hostile
The Rejection Of A Plea Offer, Which Was Affecting Trial Counsels'
Relationship With Mr. Abdullah's Family
Toryanski bas
has admitted that she wrote this email and has
Mrs. Toryansld
bas not disavowed the contents
of the email or disputed its accuracy. (Final Amended Petition, Attachment 3, p.228, L. 17 Thus, the printed copy of the email is the most accurate, recitation of
p.231, LIS & Exhibit 10.) Thus~
Mrs. Toryanski's statement. Mrs. Torjanski is a witness to this statement and its content, as are
Mr~

Abdullah, Zuheir Abdullah and Sherry Rogers. (Final Amended Petition, Addenda 4,6 &
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12.) Mr. Ackley can only testify that he received this email from an address assigned to Mrs.
Toryanski and that it contained the statements Mrs. Toryanski has already admitted she made.
Mr. Ackley provided no advice in this email.
10. Mrs. Toryanski's Email Statement To Mr. Ackley That The Plea Offer Would
Close When Trial Counsel Begin To Exercise Peremptory Challenges
Mrs. Toryanski has admitted that she wrote this email and has not disavowed the contents
of the email or disputed its accuracy. (Final Amended Petition, Addendum 3, p.228, L. 17 p.231, LIS & Exhibit 10.) Thus, the printed copy of the email is the most accurate recitation of

Mrs. Toryanski's statement. Mrs. Toryanski is a witness to this statement and its content, as are
Shawna Dunn and the Honorable Patrick Owen. Mr. Ackley can only testify that he received
this email from an address assigned to Mrs. Toryanski and that it contained the statements Mrs.
Toryanski has already admitted she made. Mr. Ackley provided no advice in this email.
11. Mrs. Toryanski's Email Statement To Mr. Ackley That An Issue Was
Erupting Regarding Mr. Abdullah's Insistence Of. testifying, Despite Trial
. Counsel Infonning Him That They Would Not Put .Him On The Stand For
Ethical Reasons
Mrs. Toryanski has admitted that she wrote. this email and has not disavowed the
p.228, L.
contents of the email or disputed its accuracy. (Final Amended Petition, Addendum 3, p.22S,

17 - p.2ll, LIS & Exhibit 10.) Thus, the printed copy 'of the email is the most accurate
recitation of Mrs. Toryanski's statement. Mrs. Toryanski is a witness to this statement, and Mr.
Toryanski and Mr. Abdullah are witnesses to the content ofthe
of the statement, the content ofwhich
of which is
already part of the underlying record. (Final Amended Petition, Claims E-Ft' Addenda 6 & 9.)

Mr. Ackley can only testify that he received this email from an address assigned to Mrs.
Toryanski and that it contained the statements Mrs. Toryanski has already admitted she made.

. Mr. Ackley provided no advice in this email.
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12. Mrs. Toryanski's Email Statement To Mr. Ackley That Mr. Abdullah Is More
And More Reluctant To Follow The Advice Of Trial COWlSel
Mrs. Toryanski has admitted that she wrote this email and has not disavowed the contents
p.228. L. 17 of the email or disputed its accuracy. (Final Amended Petition, Addendum 3, p.228,
p.231,
p.23I, LIS & Exhibit 10.) Thus, the printed copy of the email is the most accurate recitation of
Mrs. Toryanski's statement. Mrs. Toryanski is a witness to this statement, and Mr. Toryanski is a
witness to the content of the statement. Mr. Ackley can only testify that he received this email
-

-

Toryansld and that it contained the"statements
the· statements Mrs. Toryanski
from an address assigned to Mrs. Toryanski
has already admitted she made.

Toryanski's Email Statement To Mr. Ackley That The Panel Of
13. Mrs. Torvanski's
Prospective Jurors Would Impose Death, Even Those Generally Opposed To
The Death Penalty, When Children Are Involved
Mrs. Toryanski has admitted that she wrote this email and has not disavowed the contents
of the email or disputed its accuracy. (Final Amended Petition, Addendum 3, p.228, L. 17 -
p.23 1, LIS & Exhibit 10.) Thus, the printed copy of the email is the most accurate recitation of
Toryansld is also a witness to this statement, as are David
Mrs. Toryanski's st8.tement. Mrs. Toryanski
1-8.).."Mr.
Mr. Ackley can only
Leroy and Chuck Peterson. (Final Amended Petition, Addenda 1-8.).

testify that he received this email from an address assigned to Mrs. Toryanski and that it

contained the statements Mrs. Toryanski has already admitted she made.
14. Mrs. Toryanski's Email Statement To Mr. Ackley That None Of The
Defense's Mitigation "stacks up against the aggravator of leaving 4 kids in a
house on fire"

."Mrs.
Mrs. Toryanski has admitted that she wrote this email and has not disavowed the contents
Addendum 3, p.228, L. 17 -
of the email or disputed its accuracy. (Final Amended Petition, Addendum.
ToryansId to Mr.
p.231, LIS & Exhibit 10; Response, Addendum 2,9/15/04 Email from Mrs. Toryanski
Ackley).) Thus, the printed copy of the email is the most accurate recitation of Mrs. Toryanski's
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statement. Mrs. Toryanski is also a witness to this statement. Mr. Ackley can only testify that he
received this email from an address assigned to Mrs. Toryanski and that it contained the
statements Mrs. Toryanski has already admitted she made.
15. Mr. Ackley's Telephone Call To Mr. Toryanski Identifying Steven Kingsley
As Having Information Regarding Steven Bankhead And Wanting to Help
In an undated notation in trial counsels' files, Mr. Toryanski documents a phone call from
Mr. Ackley. (See Addendum I, Mr. Toryanski's note regarding telephone from Mr. Ackley,
Bates Stamp 11358, attached hereto.) The notation reads as follows, verbatim:

TIC from Mark Ackley;
Steven Kingsley, Orofino inmate # 15065
was wI Bankhead
Bankhead's wife@houseall the time Nov 00
B. buying & selling dope thru month
Kingsley would like to help
Will I be in Orofino for a while.
while .
. (Addendum 1.) There does not appear to be any further information in trial counsels' file
regarding this contact. Mr. Kingsley did, however, testify at Mr. Abdullah's judicial sentencing
hearing in March of2005. (Trial Tr. Vol. VID, p.607, L.l-p.613, L.3.)
Mr. Kingsley testified that he had read about Mr. Bankhead's involvement in Mr.
Abdullah's case in the newspaper. (Trial Tr. Vol. VIII, p. 607. L20 - p.608, L.2l.) When he
learned of Mr. Bankhead's involvement, Mr. Kingsley testified that he immediately "called [his]
[bis]
appellate attorney's office to let him' know that I knew where Bankhead was through the month
of November 2000 and he wasn't in Lewiston." (Trial Tr. Vol. VIII,p. 611, Ls. 23-25.) Mr.
Kingsley further testified that his motivation in testifying on Mr. Abdullah's behalf was that he
didn't "believe anybody should be judged on something that Mr. Bankhead has said. In all the
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time that I have known Mr. Bankhead, he's never been truthful in anything that he's done either
himself. his wife or his family." (Trial Tr. Vol. VIII, p.612, Ls. 7-11.)
to himself,

Mr. Ackley would be a witness to the fact that Mr. Kingsley contacted the SAPD office
and expressed a desire to assist in Mr. Abdullah's case.

Mr. Ackley conveyed that very

information to Mr. Toryanski. (Addendum 1.) Apparently, as a result of that communication,
trial counsel called Mr. Kingsley to testify on Mr. Abdullah's behalf at the judge sentencing

hearing in March of 2005. It is unclear how the information Mr. Ackley conveyed to Mr.
Toryanski could possibly render Mr. Ackley a witness to any claim where Mr. Kingsley actually
testified.
CONCLUSION
forms the basis of any possible conflict of
No advice given by the SAPO to trial counsel fonns

interest between the SAPO and Mr. Abdullah. COWlSel for Mr. Abdullah have identified every
possible conflict that could arise from advice the SAPD gave to trial counsel and explained why

the SAPO believes, in each instance,
instance. there is no conflict of interest. In addition, counsel have
identified every possible instance where SAPO attorneys could arguably be called as witnesses
to statements by trial counsel, and have explained.
explained why SAPD attorneys are not witnesses to the

content of the statements, and how most of the statements are proven by extrinsic evidence or by
the testimony ofthe
of the Toryanskis themselves.
Current counsel urges this Court to engage in a
a similar searching and targeted inquiry, on
the recor~ in determining (or confirming) whether an actual conflict of interest exists, and if so,
to identify the conflict on the record.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMIITED this 25 th day of September, 2009.

~~r::t:
~~r::t:

Lead Counsel for Mr. A Clullah
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2009, a true and correct copy
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25 th day of September, 2009.
of the foregoing document, IvIEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TARGETED
INQUIRY, was delivered to the following:
ROGER BOURNE
SHAWNADUNN
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
ST., RM. 3191
200 WEST FRONT ST.•
BOISE, IDAHO 83702

AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH
INMATE #76321
IMSI, J BLOCK
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

I

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

U.S. Mail
--}c--}c.- Statehouse Mail
_ _ Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

MELISSA RICHESON 1\LLEGOS
Administrative Assistant
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Shannon N. Romero
John Weatherby [jweatherby@adaweb.net]
Tuesday, September 29, 2009 11 :31 AM
Shannon N. Romero
RE: Potential Hearing Dates in Azad Abdullah's Case SPOT0500308

From:
Sent:

To:
Subject:
SUbject:

Please notice the motion for disqualification hearing for Thursday 10/15 at 3:00.

,-.,..,._._,_. . .

-"--,,,,,-~,

_~-_

. .__."._ _.. _-_. "_"_" __"-'---_""--'-'_'--'-'------.

-'~--_._----'-'

From: Shannon N. Romero [mailto:sromero@sapd.state.id.us]
Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2009 10:55 AM
To: John Weatherby
Cc: Shawna Dunn; Mark Ackley; mark ackley; Melissa Richeson Gallegos; Michael Shaw; Guadalupe Ayala; Nicole Owens
Subject: Potential Hearing Dates in Azad Abdullah's Case SPOT0500308

Good Morning John:
We need to notice some recent motions (motion for disqualification, motion for permissive appeal and others)
for a hearing and oral argument. Mark Ackley spoke with Shawna Dunn and the State would like at least 14
days to respond. We believe that is fair and consistent with the civil rules as well. Could you please indicate
the Court's availability during the below range of dates? We will then finalize a date and notice the motions for
hearing.
October 14-16
October 27-29
Thank you,

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Shannon Romero
Capital Litigation Unit
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703
Tel: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208)-334-2985
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE:
The information contained in this electronic mail message is privileged and confidential information intended
for the use of the addressee listed above. If you are neither the intended recipient nor the employee or agent
responsible for delivering this message to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure,
copying, distribution or the taking of action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.
If you have received this electronic mail message in error, please immediately notify the sender by telephone.

1

001892

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

- - --

-

--

APPENDIX 11

001893

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Page 1 of6

Idaho Repository - Case History Page

Case History
Ada

1 Cases Found.
V._
V.'

"'_.v.'''''__ __
·"".v.''''''__

'

',""

'v",,

".,..","":,;,:,~-,x-~",,,,--;,,,,~,
""".<M»:,~-'x-~·",,,,--·;':v~e,.<·'.·:···:"··:·:·.·:/:":·:."",

__

-___
-_.__

,_,_,_,_,_~,',",
,_,_,_,_,_~.,""'

_, :.",.:.".:.".""
" '"
____"
""".v:,.:.:

,, .. ___,_·c,",""'>:
.<_,,_.,_,,*;:

",'«,...,,>,'.,,. ','«, ,>,.:." .., "_.,
,_".,

, __ , ,
,__

Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
CV-PC-2005
CV·PC·2005·
Post
21802
District Filed: 04/15/2005Subtype: Conviction
Case:Old Case:
Relief
sp-Or-05
SP·OT·05·
00308*0
Subjects:Abdullah, Azad Haji
Other Parties:State of Idaho
Ph en~ing Daterrime Judge
eanngs:
1

02/01/2010

9:00 AM

Status: Pending

Type of Hearing

12/04/2009 Cher' C ,... pse

1:30 PM

Judge' Cheri C.
. Copsey

......
0
......0

Y
Y

.
Chen C. Copsey

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled

Register Date
of
actions:
04/15/2005 New Case Filed
04/15/2005 Petition For Post Conviction Relief
04/15/2005 Certificate Of Mailing
04/22/2005 Notice Of Filing
05/12/2005 Answ To Petn For Post Convctn Relf(bower/st)
Relf(bowerlst)
06/17/2005 Hearing Scheduled
Scheduled·- (06/29/2005) Cheri C. Copsey
06/17/2005 Order To Transport (6/29/05 @ 11 :00)
06/29/2005 Hearing Held
06/2912005
06/30/2005 Scheduling Order
11/17/2005 Stipulation For Release Of Jury Questionnair
11/21/2005 Order Granting Stip For Release Of Question
11/22/2005 Motion For Access To Computer For Reviewing
1210112005 Qualified Non Opposition Motn Permit Access
12101/2005
12101/2005 Audiolvisual Equip Review Evidence
12/14/2005 Motion For Scheduling Order
12/21/2005 Hear~ng Scheduled
Scheduled·- Motn Sched Ordr (01120/2006)

Chen C. Copsey

G.r~nting I.n Part Mtn To Permit Access to
1212212005 Ord~r G.r~nting
Equipment
AudloN,dlo EqUipment
01/13/2006 Mtn for. Extension of Time to File Amended Petition for

PC Relief
01/13/2006 Notice of Hearing (1/20106
1:00)
(1/20/06 @ 1:00)
01/20/2006 Motion for Petitioner Access to GJ Transcripts
01/20/2006 Order Granting Motion for Ext. of Time to File Amended

Petition for Post Conviction Relief
01/20/2006 Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
01/20/2006 01 :00 PM: Hearing Held Motn Sched Ordr
01/20/2006 Hearing Scheduled (Status 05/0212007 01 :30 PM)
03/09/2006 Motion for Preparation of Transcripts
04/05/2006 Opposit!on to Motion to Release Grand Jury

Transcnpts
04/14/2006 Response To State's ,?pposition To Motion To Release
Of Grand Jury Transcnpts
04/20/2006 Notice Of Hearing (5115/06
(5/15/06 @ 3:00pm)
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04/21/2006 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 05/15/2006
03:00 PM)
04/2812006
04/28/2006 Order To Transport (5/15/06 @ 3:00 p.m.)
05/15/2006 Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
05/15/200603:00 PM: Hearing Held
06/09/2006 Order Granting Peti~ioner.Ac~s.s
Peti~ioner.Ac~s.s t~ and Possession of
Grand Jury Transcripts with Limitations
LimItations
08/10/2006 Motion for Status Conference
10/23/2006 Order To Transport (10/25/06 @ 4:30 P.M.)
12/2212006
12/22/2006 Order Granting Motion for Extension of Time to File An
Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief
05/02/2007 Hear~ng
Hear~ng result for Status held on 05/02/200701 :30 PM:
Hearing Vacated
0711912007
07119/2007 Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
07/30/2007 Or~~r
Or~~r Permitting With~r~wl
With~r~wl of ~etitioner's
~etitioner's Amended
-PetitIOn
-Petitton for POSt-ConVlCtion Relief
.
08/06/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/09/2007 02:30 PM)
08/06/2007 Order to Transport (8/9 @ 2:30)
08/09/2007 Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
08/09/2007 Hear~ng
Hear~ng result for Status held on 08/09/200702:30 PM:
Hearing Held
0811712007
08117/2007 Motion For Waiver Of AttylClient
Atty/Client Privilege
08127/2007
08/27/2007 Notice of Conditional Non-Objection to State's Motion
for Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
08/28/2007 Order for Waiver of AttorneylClient
Attorney/Client Privilege
09/0512007
09/05/2007 Motion for Discovery
09/05/2007 M.emorandum of Law In Support of Motion for
DIscovery
Discovery
09/12/2007 Motion for Order Req.uiring Preservation of All Physical
and Documentary EVidence
09/19/2007 M~morandum
M~morandum in Support of Motion to Preserve
EVIdence
EVidence
09/19/2007 Notice Of Hearing (10/11/07 @ 2:30)
09119/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 10/11/2007
02:30 PM)
09/26/2007 State's Objection To The Motn For Discovery
09/26/2007 State's Memorandum In Support of the State's
Objection to The Motn For Discovery
10/10/2007 Order To Transport (10111/07 @ 2:30)
10/11/2007 Hearing result for Discovery Motion held on 10/11/2007
02:30 PM: Hearing Held
10/26/2007 (3) ~otion Directing Shipment of Evidence to
Petitioner's Expert
10/26/2007 Motion to Permit Release of Evidence to Petitioner's
Expert
11/09/2007 Notice of Discovery Status
11/09/2007 St~tes
St~tes Objectio~
Objectio~ .to Motions Directing Shipment of
EVidence to Petitioner's Expert
11/14/2007 Or~er
Or~er Permitting Petititoner's Counsel to Depose Erika
Klein
12/04/2007 Motion for Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
12/05/2007 Order for Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
12/07/2007 Motion for Preparation of Transcripts
12/07/2007 Notice of Hearing (12/13)
12107/2007
12/07/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/13/200702:00 PM)

001895
https:/
/www.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.do ?roaDetail=yes&schema=AD A&count...
https://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.do?roaDetail=yes&schema=ADA&count...

10/20/2009

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Idaho Repository - Case History Page

Page 3 of6

12/11/2007 Motion for Discovery
12/11/2007 Motion To Compel
12/11/2007 Brief In Support Of Motn To Compel
12/11/2007 Notice Of Hearing (12-13-07 @ 2 pm)
12/13/2007 Response to Discovery
12/18/2007 Hearing result for Motion held on 12/13/200702:00
PM: Continued To Compel And Motn For Discovery
12/18/2007 Hea.ring Scheduled ~Motion 12/18/200709:00 AM)
CompellDlscovery Issues
Motion to Compel/Discovery
12/1812007
12/18/2007 Hearing result for Motion held on 12/18/200709:00
CompellDiscovery Issues
AM: Hearing Held Motion to Compel/Discovery
12/1812007
12/18/2007 ~rder Permitting Petitioner's Counsel to Depose Tod
littlefield
12/21/2007 Order Directing the Preparation of Transcripts
1~j21/2QQ7
1~j21/2QQ7 NQtic~

Of Filing

12/31/2007 Order re: Juror Contact
01/02/2008 Order to Transport (2/14/08 at 11 AM)
01/02/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 02114/2008
0211412008
11 :00 AM) hearing re juror contact
01/03/2008 Response To Order Re Juror Contact
01/08/2008 Memorandum in Support of Order Limiting Jury Contact
01/22/2008 Motion to Provide Trial Documents
01/24/2008 Motion for Part.ial Summary Disposition &
Memorandum In Support Thereof
01/25/2008 Response to Motio~ for Partial Summary Disposition
and Memorandum In Support Thereof
01/31/2008 Ex Parte Supplemental Response to Order Re: Juror
Contact
01/31/2008 Memorandum in Response to State's Memorandum in
Support of Order Limiting Juror Contact
02/13/2008 R~ply t? Response to Motio~ for Partial Summary
DIspOSItion
DIsposItion & Memorandum In Support
02/14/2008 Order Granting State's Motion to Compel Discovery
and Granting Petitioners Motion for Protective Order

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
02/14/2008 02/14/2008 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held hearing re juror
contact
03/25/2008 Motion to Vacate Depositions
03/27/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel 04/11/2008
02:00 PM) Motion to Vacate Depositions
03/28/2008 Notice Of Hea~i.ng
Hea~i.ng (4-11-08 ~ 2:00pm) Motion to
Depositions and Motion to Compel
Vacate DepOSitions
04/08/2008 Order to Transport (April 11, 2008 at 2:00 p.m.)

Answer to Amended Petition for Post conviction Relief
04/10/2008 and Motion for Summary Disposition (Dunn for State of
ID)
Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on
04/11/2008 04/11/200802:00 PM: Hearing Held Motion to Vacate
Depositions
05/07/2008 Prosecutor assigned Shawna Dunn
05/12/2008 Prosecutor assigned ROGER BOURNE
08/29/2008 Final Amended Peititon for Post-Conviction Relief
09/26/2008 Motion for Court to Take Judicial NOtice
09/26/2008 Renewed and Supplemental Motion for Discovery
09/26/2008 Motion to Supplement Final Amended Petition for Post
Conviction Relief Addenda With Original Affidavits
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09/26/2008 MOtion t~ Compel Discovery from Trial Counsel (Kim
Toryanskl)
11/12/2008 Stat.e's Obje?lion
Obje~ion to the Renewed and Supplemental
Motion for Discovery
11/17/2008 Objection to Motion to Compel Discovery from Trial
Counsel
11/25/2008 Objection to Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice
12/15/2008 Notice of Hearing
12/15/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0111612009 02:00 PM)
12/18/2008 Hearing Reset (Motion 01/09/2009 02:00 PM)
12/18/2008 Order to Transport
01/06/2009 Reply to State's Objection to Motion to Compel
Discovery from Trial Counsel (Kim Toryanski)
01/06/2009 Re~l~ to St~te's Objection to Motion for Court to Take
Judicial Notice
01/0712009 Motion to Strike

Hearing result for Motion held on 01/09/2009 02:00
01/09/2009 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Kim
Madsen Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Under 100 Pages
01/09/2009 Hearing Scheduled (Status 06/19/2009 02:00 PM)
0210512009 Notice of Redactions Made to Prior Findings
02/27/2009 Response To Court
Notice of Clarification of the Record, Limited Request
03/06/2009 for Discovery, and Motion for the Court and the Parties
to Rely on the Record
03/17/2009 Order Denying Petitioner's Motion to Compel Discovery
from Trial Counsel (Kim Toryanski)
03/17/2009 Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Petitioner's
Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice
03/17/2009 Order Regarding ~etitione~'s Renewed and
Supplemental Motion for Discovery
03/31/2009 Motion for Summary Disposition (Dunn for State of
Idaho)
03/31/2009 Answer to Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief
and Brief in support of Motion for Summary Disposition
05/14/2009 Motion for 14 day Exentsion
05/14/2009 Affidavit of Mark JAckley

Order Granting Motion For 14-Day Extension To File
05/20/2009 Response To The State's Motion For Summary
Disposition
06/12/2009 Order to Transport
06/15/2009 R~spo~~e
R~spo~~e to the State's Motion for Summary
DIsposition
DISposition
0611612009 Response to Motion to Strike (Juror's Affidavit from the
Record)

Notice of Filing Table of Contents and Index of
06/18/2009 Addenda to Response to the State's Motion for
Summary Disposition
06/18/2009 Notice of Supplemental Authority
06/18/2009 Notice of Filing Original Verfication Page

Hearing result for Status held on 06/1912009
0611912009 02:00 PM:
06/19/2009 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Kim
Madsen Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Under 100 Pages
06/26/2009 M~tion
M~tion ~or More ~ime to Contact Witnesses for
EVidentiary Hearing
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Suppo~ of N!0tion for .More
06/26/2009 Memorandum in Suppo~
,More Time to
Contact Witneses for EVidentiary Hearing

07106/2009 Order Re: Evidentiary Hearing
07108/2009 Stipulation for Extension of Time

SCheduled (Status 08/07/2009 01 :30 PM)
07109/2009 Hearing Scheduled
07/21/2009 Transcript Lodged: 06-19-09
07/28/2009 Order to Transport
07/29/2009 Motion For Preparation Of Transcripts
07/29/2009 Request Fo~ Stat~~ Of Pend!ng Motion F?r Partial
DIsposition And Discovery MotIons
Motions
Summary DISposition
07/30/2009 Stipulation Re: Claims
08/04/2009 Order Directing The Preparation Of Transcripts
08/06/2009 Motion For Preparation Of Transcripts
08/07/2009 Miscellaneous: 54 Documents Unsealed
08/07/2009 Miscellaneous: 65 Documents Unsealed
08/07/2009 Miscellaneous: 4 Documents Unsealed

Hearing result for Status held on 08/07/2009 01 :30 PM:
08/07/2009 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Kim
Madsen Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Under 100 Pages
08/07/2009 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 12/04/2009
01 :30 PM) Omnibus Hearing
08/07/2009 Proposed Agenda Items For Status Conference
08/07/2009 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 02101/2010
09:00 AM) Evidentiary
~i~ecting t~e Preparation of Transcripts
08/11/2009 Standing Order ~i~ecting
of All Post Conviction Hearings

08/17/2009 Order Re: SAPO Involvement With Trial And Pre-Trial
08/18/2009 Status Memorandum
08/18/2009 Reporter's Transcript Filed (Hearings on February 14,
2008 & April 11, 2008 and August 7, 2009
08/18/2009 Reporter's Transcript Filed (Hearings on August 7,
2009)
08/31/2009 M morandum Re: SAPO Involvment with Trial and Pre
Trial
Tnal

7

09/01/2009 Response to Court Order Inquiring into the Pretrial and
Trial Involvement of the SAPO with Trial Counsel
09/14/2009 Motion to Strike Addenda to the Petition
0911412009 Renewed Motion to Reconsider Discovery Request
09/14/2009 Motion to Allow Mr. Abdullah to Submit Surrebuttal
09/14/2009 Motion and Renewed Motion for Judicial Notice
0911512009 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 09/25/2009
10:00 AM)
09/15/2009 Order to Transport
09/15/2009 Order Re: Conflict Counsel

Stipulated Motion To Remove Addendum 22 From
09/18/2009 Petitioner's Final Amended Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief
09/2412009 Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Disqualify
09/2412009 A!fidavi~ Of Mark J. Ackley In Support Of Motion To
Disqualify
09/24/2009 Motion To Disqualify
09/2412009 Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
09/25/2009 10:00AM: Hearing Vacated
09/24/2009 Order To Rescind Transport Order
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09/24/2009 Motion for Attachment of Deposition Transcript
09/24/2009 Motion for Permission to Appeal
09/25/2009 Me~orandum In Support Of Motion For A Targeted
Inquiry
InqUiry
09/25/2009 Motion For A Targeted Inquiry
09/30/2009 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 10/15/2009
03:00 PM) Motion to Disqualify
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY, I.S.B. # 4843
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho

DEC 202006

J.c.gtifQaM,erk

MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330
Lead Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit
ERIK R. LEHTINEN, I.S.B. # 6247
Co-Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

By l. AMES
DEFUTl'

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO,INAND Ji'QR THE COUNTY OF ADA
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,
Petitioner,

v.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. SPOT 05-00308
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK J. ACKLEY
AFFIDAVIT
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME FOR FILING
AN AMENDED PETITION FOR
POST CONVICTION RELIEF
: (CAPITAL CASE)

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) ss
of ADA.
County ofADA.
)
Mark I. Ackley, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

1.

I am lead counsel representing Azad Abdullah inhis post-conviction proceedings.

2.

It is my professional opinion based on my experience and training, and based on the
standards governing perfonnance of defense counsel in capital post-conviction
proceedings, that despite the exercise of due diligence, extraordinary circumstances have
arisen in Mr. Abdullah's case which necessitate an extension of six months for the filing
of an amended petition for post-conviction relief. Specifically, as noted herein, the recent
departure of Mr. Abdullah's prior post-conviction coUnsel requires an extension of time
for newly assigned counsel to adequately represent Mr. Abdullah in these proceedings.

Qualifications

3.'

I am setting forth a summary ofmy
of my relevant qualifications as a capital appellate and post
postconviction attorney for the purpose of establishing that the requested six-month extension

AFFIDAVIT OF MARK I. ACKLEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR FILING AN AMENDED PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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is both a necessary and a reasonable extension of time in light of all circumstances
surrounding this case.
4.

In May 1996, I graduated from Indiana University School of Law, in Bloomington,
Indiana. After passing both the Indiana and Kentucky bar exams, I began my legal career
in January 1997, at the Jefferson County Public Defender, in Louisville, Kentucky. Over
the next three years, I tried numerous felony jUlY
jwy trials either as sole or lead counsel.
Because Kentucky has jUlY
jwy sentencing, I gained experience and training in matters
involving jUlY
jwy sentencing. During my emplOYment
employment at the Jefferson County Public
Defender, I managed an average caseload of 150-200 cases.

S.
s.

"SAPD',), as
In October 2000, Ijoined the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender, (herein "SAPD''),
second-chair counsel in the capital litigation mrit, (herein UCLlY). I officially began
representing Idaho death row inmates after admission to the Idaho State Bar in April
employment at the SAPD is
2001. With the exception of a few non-capital appeals, my emplOYment
employment at the SAPD, I'
limited exclusively to capital representation. During my emplOYment
have managed a caseload between three and six cases at any given time. lhave provided
either capital post-conviction or appellate representation, and in some cases, both, for the
following nine clients: Timothy Dunlap; Donald Fetterly; Faron Lovelace; Jimmie
Thomas; Michael Jauhola; Darrell Payne; Dale Shackelford; Erick Hall; and
Mr. Abdullah.

6.

I have received over a hundred hours of continuing education focused on capital defense
litigation. I have attended numerous seminars hosted by organizations recommended by
the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases (rev. ed. 2003)(herein "ABA Guidelines''), Commentary to Guideline 8.1.
See http://www.abanet.org/deathpenalty/resources/docs/2003Guidelines.pdf
http://www.abanet.org/deathpenaltylresources/docs/2003Guidelines.pdf

7~

I have consulted with, and received instruction from, attorneys recogniiedas experts and
leaders in the capital defense community. For instance, I consulted with; and obtained an
affidavit from, Eric Freedman in the Payne case regarding the obligations. of post
post. conviction counsel under the ABA Guidelines. Mr. Freedman is a Professor of Law at
..the
the Hofstra University School of Law, an active capital litigator, and served as Reporter
for the ABA Guidelines. I have also consulted with, and obtained a written declaration
from, David Lane in the Hall case regarding the standards for conducting an adequate
of jury sentencing in capital cases. Mr. Lane has frequently lectured in
. voir dire in light ofjury
matters of capital defense to attorneys throughout the country. In addition, I have
received individualized instruction and feedback from Anthony Amsterdam.
Mr. Amsterdam heads the faculty at an annual capital post-conviction skills seminar. He
"is also mown
known for his representation of William Funnan in the landmark case of Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S~ 238 (1972).
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8.

In September 2002, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized me as qualified to handle
capital appellate and post-conviction cases, and included my name on the Court's "Idaho
Capital Defense Counsel Roster" created in compliance with Idaho Criminal Rule 44.3.
http://www.isc.idaho.gov/appcnsl.htm.
See http://www.isc.idaho.gov/appcns1.htm.

9.

My qualifications have been recognized by my peers. Specifically, the Federal Defenders
Idaho,-capital habeas unit, have requested that I instruct'
Idaho
of Eastern Washington and Idaho,·capital
instrucfldaho
attorneys in aspects of trial and appellate-level capital representation at their sponsored
conferences. Most recently, I discussed the unique hurdles associated with capital jury
sentencing and discussed means of addressing those hurdles as well ~ potential
constitutional infirmities in Idaho's new death penalty statue.

The CLU: Attorneys-and Workload
10.

I am setting forth a description of the attorneys in the CLUand their relevant caseloads
extension is both a necessary
for the purpose of establishing that the requested six-month extensionis
and a reasonable extension of time in light of all circumstances surrounding this case.

11.

I am lead counsel with seniority and supervising responsibilities in the CLU. With the
recent departures of Ron Coulter and Kimberly Simmons, there are currently just,
just. two
attorneys assigned full-time to the CLU. The second attorney, Paula M. Swensen, was
recently promoted from second-chair counsel to lead co1.insel A third attorney, Erik
Lehtinen, is assigned a limited role in the CLU, serving only as second-chair counsel in
Mr. Abdullah's case. Mr. Lehtinen maintains a non-capital appellate workload.

12.

Over the next two months, Mr. Lehtinen must file between one and four appellant's
briefs, at least four or five reply briefs, and has two oral arguments scheduled before the
Idaho Court ofAppeals.
of Appeals. In addition, Mr. Lehtinen has numerous cases pending decisions
for which petitions for review may be necessary. Finally, Mr. Lehtinen has numerous
cases with petitions for review pending, for which further briefing before the Idaho
Supreme Court will be necessary if the petitions are granted, and petitions for certiorari
may be necessary if denied.

13.

In addition to my representation of Mr. Abdullah, I am lead counsel on the following
three capital cases: Erick Hall V.
v. State, Ada Cmmty case no. SPOT0500155 (post
(postconviction); State v. Dale Shackelford. Supreme Court case nos. 27966/31928
(consolidated appeal); and State v. Michael lauhola,
Jauhola, Supreme Court case nos.
.27490/31435 (consolidated appeal).

a.

Due to the departure of Ms. Simmons, I am the only attorney wjth significant
knowledge of the facts and law relevant to the Shackelford case~ and I am
currently the only attorney formally assigned to the case. The Shackelford case is -
extraordinarily complicated and lengthy, even for a capital case. The relevant
transcripts in the Shackelford consolidated appeal exceed ten thousand (10,000)
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pages. The clerk's record is thirty-five (35) volumes. In short, the departure of
Ms. Simmons has nearly doubled my responsibilities on the Shackelford case.
14.

Due to the departures of Mr. Coulter and Ms. Simmons, I am not only lead counsel for
Mr. Abdullah and sole counsel for Mr. Shackelford, I am also supervising counsel on the
following two capital cases: Timothy Dunlap v. State, Caribou County case no. CV2006CV2006
111, and State v. Darrell Payne, Supreme Court case nos. 28589/32389 (consolidated
appeal).

15.

While my role as supervising counsel is theoretically limited to providing guidance to
lead and second-chair counsel, in practice, due to my experience in, and knowledge of,
capital litigation as well as my knowledge of the specifics of the cases currently handled
by the SAPD, my role as supervising cmmsel can require a substantial amount of time
depending on the phase of the case. For example, I played a substantial role as
supervising counsel in the Payne case in the final phases of the preparation of the
appellant's brief filed in the Idaho Supreme Court on December 13, 2006. Specifically,
between November 14, 2006, and December 10, 2006, I spent approximately one
hundred fifty-six (156) hours supervising revisions to the brief. During that period of
time, there were eight weekend days; I worked four of those days on the Payne case, for a
total of nearly thirty-eight (38) hours. The brief was 208 pages in length.

Abdullah
The Amount of Investigation and Time Necessary to Adequately Represent Mr. AbduHah
16.

Adequate post-conviction representation requires a reinvestigation of the underlying
criminal case for all arguably meritorious guilt and sentencing-phase claims inside and
outside the record. See ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.15.1.
Two parallel tracks of post-conviction investigation are required. One
involves reinvestigating the capital case; the other focuses on the client.
Reinvestigating.· the case means examining the facts underlying the
conviction and sentence, as well as such items· as trial counsel's
perfonnance, judicial bias or prosecutorial misconduct. Reinvestigating
the client means assembling a more-thorough biography of the client than
was known at the time of trial, not only to discover mitigation that was not
presented previously, but also .to
.to identify mental-health claims which
potentially. reach beyond sentencing issues to fundamental questions of
competency and mental-state defenses.

ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.15.1.
17~

There are numerous potential sources of factual infortnation
infOrination relevant to the identification
and development of post-conviction claims. Most sourceS of information are outside the
record, and include, but are riot limited to the following: the client, members of the
. client's family, trial team members, the client's acquaintances, relevant law enforcement
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personnel, the trial witnesses, the media, and files in possession of the trial team and law
enforcement. See Hertz & Liebman,
Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure §
Liebman,Federal
11.2b (5th ed. 2005). In addition to sources outside the record, an adequate postpost
conviction investigation requires a review of the record. See Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d
523, 535 (9th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
"requires review of the trial transcript and the entire record to determine the nature,
frequency, and effect of counsel's errors.") As part of the record review, post-conViction
counsel must review all motions and objections made during the underlying criminal
proceedings to ensure that all possible federal constitutional grounds have been properly
preserved for federal review.
18.

Post-conviction investigation must be diligent and exhaustive, aimed at including all
.. possible grounds for relief since the failure to raise. all PQssible
possible claims may result in a
procedural bar. See e.g., Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 903 P.2d 58 (1995). Such an
investigation is obviously time intensive. A 1998 survey of the time and expenses
required in Florida capital post-conviction cases concluded that:
[T]he most experienced and qualified lawyers at Florida's post-conviction
defender office, the Office of Capital Collateral Representation[,] have
estimated that, on average, over 3,300 lawyer hours are required to take a
post-conviction death penalty case from the denial of certiorari by the
United States Supreme Court following direct appeal to the denial of
certiorari [from state post-conviction proceedings.]
J

ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 6.1 (citing "The Spangenberg Group,
Amended Time & Expense Analysis Of 'Post-Conviction Capital Cases In Florida 16
(1998).")
Status of the Post-conviction Reinvestigation
19.

For the majority of the period between January and October 2006, Mr. Abdullah was
represented in these post-conviction proceedings by Ron Coulter (lead counsel), and
Kimberly Simmons (second-chair counsel).
However, in October 2006, both
Ms. Simmons, and Mr. Coulter, due to unrelated circumstances, ..tendered·
tendered· their
resignations. Ms. Simmons' last day ofemployment
of employment at the SAPD was October 6, 2006.
Mr. Coulter's last day was October 16, 2006.

20.

The departure of Mr. Coulter and Ms. Simmons does notmean that the post-conviction
investigation conducted to date has been for naught. Indeed, the CLUinvestigative team, .
comprised of Michael J. Shaw (guilt-phase investigator), and Guadalupe Ayala
. (mitigation specialist), have made substantial progress in their investigation which has.
included gathering records, interviewing potential witnesses, and obtaining affidavits.
However, based on my discussions with the investigators, there are numerous sources of
. information yet to be investigated, and several witnesses already contacted who require
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follow-up interviews. Moreover, it is absolutely vital that the investigative team receive
adequate guidance and direction from post-conviction counsel. Thus, in order for the
investigation to be completed, post-conviction counsel must have an adequate
opportunity to become familiar with the case. At a bare minimum, post-conviction
counsel must thoroughly review the record, transcript, and trial counsels~ files.
Time Estimates Cor
for Current Counsel to Adequately Review the Record. Transcript, and
"Trial Counsels' Files

21.

Current counsel estimates it will take approximately twelve work weeks of uninterrupted
review to complete a review ofthe record, transcript, and trial counsels' files.

a.

There are appIOximately-seven-thousand
applOximately-seven-thousand (7,000) pages of relevant Reporter's
Transcript to be reviewed. Estimating a review of four hundred pages per day
(fifty pages per hour), it will take seventeen and one half (17Yz)
(17~) days to read the
transcripts. This requires approximately four work weeks of uninterrupted
review.

There are approximately 1600 pages of Clerk's Record to be analyzed and
b.There
b.
reviewed.
Estimating a review and analysis of 320 pages per day (40 pages
per hour), it will take forty (40) hours to read the record. This requires
approximately one work week of uninterrupted review.

c.

There are approximately thirty-six thousand (36,000) pages of documentation in
trial counsels' files. This documentation includes discovery provided by the
prosecution, documentation obtained through the trial team's independent
investigation, and notes generated by trial team members. Estimating a review
and analysis of 1000 pages per day (125 pages per hour), it will take thirty-six
"(36) days to read the record. This requires approximately seven work weeks of
"
unintemipted review.

for Current Counsel Taking Into Consideration Other Aspects of"
Time" Estimates Cor
Mr. Abdullah's Case, Time Commitments to Other Clients.
CHents, and Unanticipated
Developments

22.

Current counsel anticipates that it will take qne work week to prepare a motion for
discovery. Unless otherwise ordered, the motion for discovery will be filed with the
amended petition for post-conviction relief for the pwpose of linking the discovery
requests to relevant claims in the petition. Although current counsel will attempt to
"resolve discovery disputes without this Court's involvement, based on counsel's
experience in other cases, unless the prosecution agrees to "open file" discovery, a formal
motion is almost always necessary. "In addition, there may be some discovery that cannot
be accessed without an order from the Court.

""AFFIDAVIT
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK J. ACKLEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR FILING AN AMENDED PETITION
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23.

Current counsel anticipates that over the next four months, a mmllnum of nine
uninterrupted weeks must be allotted to other clients.
a.

Based on notice received from the Idaho Supreme Court, oral argument in the
Jauhola case will occur either in late January or early February 2007. The actual
date for argument has yet to be finalized. Counsel anticipates that it will take
approximately forty (40) hours to prepare for oral argument. This requires
approximately one work week ofuninterrupted
of uninterrupted preparation.

b.

The appellant's brief in the Shackelford case will likely be due to the Idaho
Supreme Court sometime in March 2007. Counsel anticipates that it will take
approximately two hundred (200) hours to complete the brief by that deadline.
This. requires apPr9.ximately fjve
Dve w9rk. we.eks of~ninterrupted
of~ninterrupted preparation.

c.

It is difficult to assess the amOunt of time that must be allotted to the Hall case.

Currently, a full-day discovery hearing is scheduled for January 4,2007. Prior to
that time, counsel must draft a supplemental discovery justification memorandum
based in part on the recent conclusion of the court-ordered depositions of both
trial counsel. Following the hearing and receipt of any court-ordered discovery,
counsel will file a final petition for post-conviction relief on Mr. Hall's behalf.
Counsel will then likely respond to an anticipated motion for summary dismissal
from opposing counsel. Counsel anticipates that all of this could occur within the
next four months. Counsel anticipates that it will take approximately three works
to complete this phase of the Hall case. Additional time commitments to
Mr. Hall's case are dependent q.pon whether the district court grants an
evidentiary hearing.
24.

case-related·matters
There are many other case-related
matters for which it is difficult to designate a specific
amount of time but which require time commitments. For instance, current counsel must
maintain communication with his clients. In addition, there are administrative matters
unrelated to client representation which current counsel must attend. For instance,
current counsel has management responsibilities for CLU team members and on occasion
must assist the SAPD on capital legislation and rule-making issues.

Time Estimates: Summary
25.

Based on enumerated paragraphs 19 and 21, current counsel estimates that an extension
of twenty-one (21) weeks is necessary for competent post-conviction investigation and
reasonable in light of counsels' obligations to other capital clients. An additional five
weeks is necessary to account for routine and unanticipated case-related and·
administrative matters. Counsel belieyes that this time frame will obviate the need for
. any additional extensions of time.

AFFIDAVIT OF MARK J. ACKLEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR FILING AN AMENDED PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF •

7
001907

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Conclusion
26.

Extraordinary circumstances exist in this case requiring a reasonable extension of time
for adequate post-conviction representation.
Specifically, with the departure of
Mr. Coulter and Ms. Simmons from the SAPO, current counsel has been forced to
assume responsibilities for additional cases, including the representation of Mr. Abdullah.
Counsel takes seriously his obligations to Mr. Abdullah and this Court. Counsel assures
this Court that any prioritization of work to date or otherwise reflected in this affidavit
has not been based on preferences to individual clients or individual courts, but instead
based on preexisting timelines that could reasonably be met.

27.

case;-- Current counsel assures this
-This Court hM-already shown
-great patience in- this C8Se;shown-great
Court that a long-tenn plan for consistent representation for Mr. Abdullah has been put in
place by the SAPD. Thus, regardless of the employment of attorneys to fill any of the
vacancies left by Mr. Coulter and Ms. Simmons, currentcounsel
current counsel and Mr. Lehtinen intend
to represent Mr. Abdullah through the conclusion of his state post-conviction
proceedings.

28.

Based on the amount of time designated herein in addition to consideration of the amount
of time that will be dedicated to other foreseeable and unforeseeable events, current
counsel is of the professional opinion that an extension of six months is both a necessary
and reasonable extension of time for the filing of an amended petition for post-conviction
relief.
DATED this 20th day of December, 2006.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 20th day of December, 2006.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR TIffi COUNTY OF ADA

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)

Plain~esponden~
Plaintiff7R.espondent,
VS.
V5.

OS~21802
Case No. CV PC OS~21802

)

AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH,

)
)
)

04-06-77
DefendantlPetitioner.

ORDER TO RESClND
TRANSPORT ORDER

------------------')
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Transport Order filed on September 15,2009. directing
the above named defendant be brought before this Court on September 25, 2009 be, and hereby is,

RESCINDED. The hearing has been vacated.
Dated this

,_;1_,,\_
,_;1_"\_ day of September 2009.

CHERI C. COPSEY
District Judge

II-I.

I
III

ORDER TO REscn~D
RESCD'~D TRANSPORT ORDER - PAGE-l

001910

III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
I
III
I
III
I
III
III
III
III
III
III

09/ \/2009 16:42 FAX

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT

2082877529

~

PD ST APPELLANT

~

0021002

',-,,'
',--,,'

\...-.-'

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
certiry that on this
I hereby certify

J1

day of September, 2009, I mailed (served) a true and

correct copy ofthe
of the 'within instrument to:

Ada County Prosecutor - Faxed
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Clerk of the District Court
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MAR 0 , 2010
J. DAVID NAVARRO. Clerk
By J. WEATHERBY

1

DEPUTY

2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

3

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

4

AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,

5
Petitioner,

6
7
8
9

10

CV-PC-2005-00308
CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-00308
vs.
ORDERRE: WANER HEARING

THE STATE OF IDAHO
Res ondent.

11

R. Keith Roark has now advised the Court that Mr. Abdullah is ready to tell the Court

12

whether he wants to continue to be represented by the State Appellate Public Defender's Office in

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

this post-conviction case and whether he is prepared to waive any conflict.

The Court has

scheduled a hearing for Apri123, 2010, at 1:00 p.m. While both the State and the State Appellate
Public Defender's Office may attend, neither will address the Court regarding the conflict or Mr.
Abdullah's decision to either waive the conflict or request new cOWlsel.
The Court has already ruled that the State Appellate Public Defender's Office has a
conflict. Without invading potential attorney-client confidences, the Court could not fully explore
the extent of any conflict. Therefore, the Court ordered Mr. Roark to fully explore the extent of
the conflict. Once Mr. Roark felt he had a complete understanding about the extent of the conflict
and any ramifications, meet with Mr. Abdullah and explain the ramifications of waiving that
conflict on future proceedings, including any successive post-conviction proceedings or federal
habeas actions.
At the April hearing, Mr. Roark should place on the record what materials he has reviewed
and what depositions he took but not reveal the substance of any of those materials. Any written
documentation, not already in the record, should be filed under seal with the Court as previously
ordered. As indicated in the Court's January 27 order, these materials will remain sealed, even
from the Court, unless there is a :further
further order.

30
31
~?

W AlVER BEARING
ORDER RE= WAlVER
CASE NO. CV-PC-200S-00308

1
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3

Mr. Roark should make a record at the hearing that he has fully informed Mr. Abdullah
about his findings but not reveal any advice that he may have given Mr. Abdullah.
The Court then will ask Mr. Abdullah whether he understands the implications of waiving
the conflict on any future proceedings and then whether he actually waives the conflict. The

5

Court will explain to him that only he can decide whether to waive the conflict after the advice of

6

counsel.

7

9

If he does not waive the conflict, the Court will order the State Appellate Public
Defender's Office provide conflict counsel, certified by the Idaho Supreme Court, to represent Mr.
Abdullah in this post-conviction case. Such conflict counsel, or conflict counsel's law firm,
cannot have had any involvement in the underlying case or in this post-conviction case. If Mr.

11

Abdullah requests new counsel, the Court will order Mr. Roark to meet with that counsel to insure

12

that new counsel has complete access to any material Mr. Roark fOWld.

13

15
16

If Mr. Abdullah waives any conflict, then the State Appellate Public Defender's Office will
continue to represent him in this post-conviction case and both the State and State Appellate
Public Defender's Office should be prepared to immediately schedule an evidentiary hearing.
Dated this 1st day of March 2010.
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J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk

PUBliC' OFFENDER
By J. WEATHERBY
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICf~Y
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH,
Petitioner,
CV -PC-2005-21802
CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-21802
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

ORDER RE: APPOINTMENT OF
CONFLICT COUNSEL

Respondent.

11

On October 15, 2009, having previously found the State Appellate Public Defender's
Office had an office wide conflict, the Court appointed Keith Roark to thoroughly review the
record and make any investigation he deemed necessary to fully evaluate the State Appellate
Public Defender's Office's conflict of interest in representing Mr. Abdullah in this
post-conviction proceeding, including the full extent of its involvement with Mr. Abdullah's trial
counsel. After completing his review and analysis, the Court ordered Mr.
Mr, Roark to meet with and
advise Mr. Abdullah regarding the conflict and any options regarding that conflict. The Court
further ordered that once he was satisfied that Mr. Abdullah understood his rights and was capable
of making a knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision, Mr. Roark should schedule a hearing
before this Court.
Mr. Roark contacted the Clerk and scheduled a hearing for April 23, 2010, indicating that
in his opinion Mr. Abdullah had been fully infonned regarding the conflict and all of Mr. Roark's
findings.

At the hearing, Mr. Roark set forth what actions he took and what materials he

reviewed. Mr. Roark told the Court he believed that Mr. Abdullah would be able to make an
intelligent, knowing and voluntary decision regarding the conflict and that he had been fully
informed about the potential impact any decision would have on future litigation including any
infonned
successive post-conviction proceedings or any federal habeas actions. Mr. Roark also indicated
that he had informed Mr. Abdullah that any decision would have pennanent
permanent impacts on future
litigation. The Court gave Mr. Abdullah a last opportunity to meet privately with Mr. Roark.

31
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meeting. the Court advised Mr. Abdullah that it was his decision with the advice of
After that meeting,
counsel. Mr. Abdullah refused to waive the conflict and asked the Court to order the appointment
of conflict counsel. I.C.R. 44.2(1) provides in relevant part as follows:
(1) Immediately following the imposition of the death penalty, the district judge
who sentenced the defendant shall appoint at least one attorney to represent the
defendant for the purpose of seeking any post-conviction remedy referred to in I.C.
§ 19-2719(4) that the defendant may choose to seek. This appointment shall be
made in compliance with the standards set forth in Idaho Criminal Rule 44.3, and
represenJed the
the a1.UJrney appointed shall be someone other than cDUJZ£e.l who represemed
of the death penalty. This new counsel shall not
defendant prior fa the imposition ofthe
be considered to be co-counsel with any other attorney who represents the
defendant, but may also be appointed to pursue the direct appeal for the defendant.
Therefore, in order to fulfill its responsibilities, the Court orders the Trial Court
Administrator to contact in writing the death qualified attorneys identified in the list attached to
this order. The Trial Court Administrator shall request they provide the Court with their resumes,
identify any conflicts that might exist and indicate whether their workload 1 would allow them to
devote sufficient time to Mr. Abdullah's post-conviction proceeding.

Once the Trial Court

Administrator has those responses, the Court will schedule a hearing with Mr. Abdullah and Mr.
Roark present to interview proposed counsel.

After that hearing, the Court will forward the

names of those qualified attorneys who are acceptable to the Court to the State Appellate Public
Defender's Office to allow it to negotiate the compensation.
Public Defender's Office to
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-871 2 the Court orders the State Appellate PUblic
arrange for conflict counsel to be compensated out of the budget of the State Appellate Public
Defender's Office.
Furthermore, as ordered in open court, in order to preserve the record for appeal, the Court
hereby further orders Mr. Roark to file those depositions and any other material he thinks
appropriate with the Court under seal to substantiate what Mr. Abdullah has been told regarding

J.C.R. 44.3(4). "Appointments pursuant to this Order should provide each client with quality representation in
I I.C.R.
nol make an appointment
accordance with constitutional and professional standards. The appointing authority shall not
work/aCId." (Emphasis added.)
llthe appointment on the attorney's workload."
without assessing the impact {lthe

I.e.
I.e. § 19-871: "Should the state appellate public defender be unable to carry out the duties required in this act
conllict of interest or any other reason, the slale
state appellate public defender shall Clrl'angefor
arrange for counsel jar
because of a contliet
defendallts to be
he compensated 0111
of the budget
hudget a/the state appel/ute
appellCile public defender." (Emphasis added.)
indigelll defendants
alit ofthe
2
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any conflict. The Court finds that sealing these documents, even from the Court, is necessary to

2

protect Mr. Abdullah's attorney client privilege and right to a fair post-conviction proceeding.

3

Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i)(5). Neither the Court nor the State shall have access to

4

that material during this post-conviction case, except by further order of the Court. Copies of

5

those documents, however, shall be made available to the new conflict counsel to determine

6

whether new post-conviction claims may be made.

7

IT IS SO ORDERED.

8

Dated this 30 th day of April 2010.

9
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11

~~

Cheri C. Copsey
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

1
2
3

20 I 0, I served a true and correct copy of the
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of April 2010,

4

within instrument to:

5

GREG H. BOWER
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
TIORNEY
DEPUTY PROSECUTING A
ATIORNEY
ROGER BOURNE
SHAWNADUNN
FAX: 208·287-7709
208-287-7709

6

7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
STA
TE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
STATE
MARK J. ACKLEY
SHANNON N. ROMERO
FAX: 208·334-2985
208-334-2985
AZAD ABDULLAH
#76321
IMSI-J BLOCK
P.O. BOX 51
BOISE, IDAHO 83707
R. KEITH ROARK
THE ROARK LAW FIRM
409 N. MAIN STREET
HAILEY, ID 83333
FAX: 208-788-3918

24

LAMONT ANDERSON
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHIEF, CAPITAL LITIGATION UNIT
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

25

FAX: 208-854-8074

26

TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR
LARRY REINER

23

27
28

J. DAVIDNAVARR
Clerk of the Dis ri
ourt
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LIST OF DEATH PENALTY QUALIFIED ATTORNEYS FOR
POST-CONVICTION
POST·CONVICTION
Virginia Bond - 463-0681
Bond Law, Cbted.
P.O. Box 1725
Nampa, ID 83653
FAX: 442-0017

Robert R. Chastain - 345-3110
Attorney at Law
PO Box 756
1487 W. Hays
Boise, Idabo 83701-0756

E-mail: vabond@fmtc.com

345-1836
FAX: 345·1836
E-mail: rrcbast@gwest.net

324-7200
Marilyn B. Paul- 324·7200
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 623
Shosbone, Idaho 83352-0623
FAX: 324-7200

Scott E. Fouser- 454-2264
Attorney at Law
PO Box 606
Caldwell ID 83606-0606
FAX: (208) 454-0313
E-mail: wiebefouserattor@gwest.net

Terry S. Ratliff - 587-0900
Attorney at Law
290 South 2 E
Mountain Home ID 83647
FAX: (208) 587-6940

E.R. Frachiseur - 587-4462
400 W 7th S
Mountain Home ID 83647
FAX: (208) S87-2094

John M. Adams - 446-1700
Attorney at Law
POBox 9000
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-9000
FAX: (208) 446-1701
E-mail: ladams@kcgov.us

James Arcblbald - 524-4002
Swafford Law Office, Chartered
525 9th St
Idaho Falls ID 83404
FAX: 208-524-4131

David Martinez
Chief Bannock County Public Defender
P.O. Box 4147
Pocatello, ID 83205

Robert J. Van Idour-743-6100
Fitzgerald & Van Idour
Towne Square Ste 480
504 Maio St
Lewiston 10 83501
FAX: (208) 746-5571
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LIST OF DEATH PENALTY QUALIFIED ATTORNEYS FOR
POST-CONVICTION

Lynn Nelson - 446-1700

Randall D. Schulthies - 236-7040

Office of Public Defender - Kootenai County

Bannock County Courthouse

PO Box 9000

Chief Public Defender

Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-9000
FAX: (208) 446-1701
E-mail: Inelson@kcgov.us

PO Box 4147
Pocatello ID 83205
236~ 7048
FAX: (208) 236-7048
randalls@bannociccoonty.Ds
E-mail: randalls@bannockcoonty.os

J. Bradford Chapman - 446-1700
Attorney at Law
POBox 9000
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-9000
FAX: (208) 446-1701
E-mail: bcchapman@kcgov.U8

Van G. Bishop - 465-5411
Attorney at Law
203 12th Ave Ste B
Nampa ID 83686
FAX: (208) 465-5881
E-mail: van@villadelpescador.com
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH,
Petitioner,

6
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
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CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-00308
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

ORDER FINDING ABDULLAH
KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY
WAIVED THE CONFLICT

Res ondent.

11

On October 15, 2009, having previously found the State Appellate Public Defender's

12

Office had an office-wide conflict, the Court appointed Keith Roark to thoroughly review the

13
13

record and make any investigation he deemed necessary to fully evaluate the State Appellate

14

16

17

18

19
19

21

23
24

25
26

27

28

29

30

Public
PUblic Defender's Office's conflict of interest in representing Mr. Abdullah in this
post-conviction proceeding, including the full extent of its involvement with Mr. Abdullah's trial
counsel. After completing his review and analysis, the Court ordered Mr. Roark to meet with and
advise Mr. Abdullah regarding the conflict and any options regarding that conflict. The Court
further ordered that once he was satisfied that Mr. Abdullah understood his rights and was capable
of making a knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision, Mr. Roark should schedule a heating
before this Court.
Mr. Roark contacted the Clerk and scheduled a hearing for April 23, 2010, indicating that

inforned regarding the conflict and all of Mr. Roark's
in his opinion Mr. Abdullah had been fully informed
findings.

At the hearing, Mr. Roark set f0l1h
f011h what actions he took and what materials he

reviewed. Mr. Roark told the Court he believed that Mr. Abdullah would be able to make an
intelligent, knowing and voluntary decision regarding the conflict and that he had been fully
infonned about the potential impact any decision would have on future litigation including any
successive post-conviction proceedings or any federal habeas actions. Mr. Roark also indicated
that he had infonned Mr. Abdullah that any decision would pennanently impact future litigation.
The Court gave Mr. Abdullah a last opportunity to meet privately with Mr. Roark. After that

31
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1

meeting, the Court advised Mr. Abdullah that it was his decision with the advice of counsel. Mr.

2

Abdullah refused to waive the conflict and asked the Court to order the appointment of conflict

3

counsel.

4

Subsequent to that hearing the Court entered an Order requiring the Trial Court

5

Administrator to solicit conflict counsel to represent Mr. Abdullah. On April 30, 2010, the Court

6

received another letter from Mr. Abdullah indicating he wanted to change his mind and waive the

7

conflict. On May 3, 2010, Mr. Roark noticed the issue for hearing on May 7,2010.

8

At the hearing, the Court informed Mr. Abdullah that any decision would be permanent!

9

and that it would affect his ability to raise the conflict issue in subsequent proceedings. The Court

10

gave Mr. Abdullah the opportunity to again meet with Mr. Roark. After a recess of about fifteen

11

(15) minutes, Mr. Abdullah indicated he was ready to proceed and after inquiry into whether this

12

was his decision and only his decision, Mr. Abdullah waived the conflict. Mr. Roark placed on

13

the record that he had met with Mr. Abdullah two additional times after the April 28, 2010,

14
15
16
17
18

hearing and that he was satisfied that Mr. Abdullah was mentally stable, intelligent, and capable
of making this decision himself. He also indicated that Mr. Abdullah had been carefully informed
about his findings and that the decision would be permanent. Mr. Roark stated that he believed
that the decision was knowing and voluntary and that Mr. Abdullah had all the information
necessary to make the decision.

19
20

Therefore, the Court finds that Mr. Abdullah has knowingly and voluntarily waived any
conflict the State Appellate Public Defender's Office has.

Based on that waiver,2 the Court

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

1 The Court indicated that it would not allow Mr. Abdullah to change his mind again absent some extraordinary
circumstance.
2

I.C.R. 44.2(1) provides in relevant part as follows:
(1) Immediately following the imposition of the death penalty. the district judge who sentenced the
defendant shall appoint at least one attorney to represent the defendant for the purpose of seeking
any post-conviction remedy referred to in I.C. § 19-2719(4) that the defendant may choose to seek.
This appointment shall be made in compliance with the standards set forth in Idaho Criminal Rule
44.3,
44.3. and the attorney appointed shall be someone other than counsel who represented the
defendant prior to the imposition of the death penalty. This new counsel shall not be considered to
be co-counsel with any other attorney who represents the defendant, but may also be appointed to
pursue the direct appeal for the defendant.

31
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therefore reappoints the State Appellate Public Defender's Office to represent Mr. Abdullah in the

2

post-conviction proceeding.

3
4

anticipates scheduling the evidentiary hearing to begin August 30,2010. The parties should come

5

prepared to address that. The Court will also set argument on the Motion to Strike at the status

6

conference.

The Court hereby sets a status conference for May 12, 2010, at 3:30 p.m. The Court also

7

IT IS SO ORDERED.

8

Dated this i

h

day of May 2010.

9

10
11

Cheri C. Copsey
District Judge
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1

I hereby certify that on this

--.::L day of May 2010, I served a true and correct copy of the

3

within instrument to:

4

GREG H. BOWER
TIORNEY
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING A
ATTORNEY
ATIORNEY
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATIORNEY
ROGER BOURNE
SHAWNADUNN
INTERDEPT. MAIL

5
6
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
SHANNON N. ROMERO
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
BOISE, IDAHO 83703
AZAD ABDULLAH
#76321
IMSI-J BLOCK
P.O. BOX 51
BOISE, IDAHO 83707
R. KEITH ROARK
THE ROARK LAW FIRM
409 N. MAIN STREET
HAILEY, ID 83333
FAX: 208-788-3918
LAMONT ANDERSON
DEPUTY ATIORNEY
A TIORNEY GENERAL
CHIEF, CAPITAL LITIGATION UNIT
OFFICE OF THE ATIORNEY
ATIORNEY GENERAL
FAX; 208-854-8074
TRIAL COURT ADMlNISTRATOR
LARRY REINER
INTERDEPT. MAIL
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GREG H. BOWER

Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Roger Boume

RECE\VEO

Idaho State Bar No. 2127

AUG 19
19 20\0
20'0
STA1"E APPELLA1"E

Jan M! )Jennetts
Idaho State Bar No. 4606
Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax:

p\J8\JC OEFENOE~
p\J8L\C

287-7709

IN TIlE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
TIIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 1HE COUNTY OF ADA

DARRELL EDWARD PAYNE,
Petitioner,
vs.

mE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV PC 2010 11137
STATE'S MOTION FOR
INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE
CONFLIer WITH THE
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER

-------------)
-------------------------)
COMES NOW, Roger Bourne and Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting

Attorneys, in and for the County of Ada, State of Idaho, and requests that this Court hold
a hearing and to inquire into whether or not the State Appellate Public Defender
(hereinafter "SAPO") has a conflict in representing the Petitioner in these post-conviction
proceedings.
STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSmLE CONFLICT WITH THE
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER (pAYNE) Page 1
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The State prefers to address this issue now rather than later. The State hopes to
avoid additional delays that would be caused were we to discover later that there is indeed
a conflict. In addition, it is appropriate that a record be made at the district court level on
this issue rather than attempting to address it at a later time during appellate proceedings.
During the re-sentencing proceedings in the present case, the State and defense
trial counsel reviewed the prison call list. In reviewing the prison call list, the State
discovered that Petitioner Payne was communicating over the phone with someone at the
SAPD's Office because the call list shows that there were telephone calls made from the
Petitioner to the SAPD's telephone number. Although the State did not receive or have
access to the actual recordings of these telephone calls and does not know the content of
any of these calls to the SAPD, it is clear from the call list itself that Petitioner Payne was
communicating with someone at the SAPD's Office because there were completed calls
to the telephone number at the SAPD's Office. The length of these calls to the SAPD
ranged from three minutes to forty-five minutes and occurred approximately once a
month from February 4, 2009, to December 2, 2009. Rob Chastain and Deborah Kristal
filed a notice of appearance in the re-sentencing proceedings on February 2, 2009. The
call list the State has includes telephone calls from February 1,2009, to January 11,2010.
During the re-sentencing proceedings, this Court made a record that this Court
observed members of the SAPD Office in the courtroom. The State similarly put on the
record that one of the SAPD attorneys was observed speaking with Petitioner Payne
during one of the breaks. Again, the content of the conversation is unknown. However,
in an abundance of caution and in an effort to avoid unnecessary delays in these post
postconviction proceedings, the State requests that this Court inquire of post-conviction
counsel to ensure that there is no conflict.
The State further requests that the SAPD disclose any notes, documents and
conversations members of the SAPD staff had with Darrell Payne and/or trial counsel for
Darrell Payne prior to the SAPD post-conviction appointment on April 30, 2010.

STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE CONFLICT WITH THE
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER (pAYNE)
(PAYNE) Page 2
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The State contends that any of these conversations or notes that related specifically
to the Payne case would not be protected by the Attorney-Client Privilege because the
SAPO did not represent the Petitioner during those time frames. Should the Court
conclude otherwise, the State requests that the Court inquire of the SAPO outside the
State's presence on the record and review these documents en camera to determine
whether these communications demonstrate that a conflict exists.

In addition, it is

entirely possible that this information would be relevant in responding to and addressing
the Petitioner's post-conviction claims.
of August 2010.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this L.l::..- day ofAugust
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Roger Boume
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

~,#~
J M. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

~daY of August 2010, a true and correct

copy of the foregoing State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible Conflict With the State
AppeIIate
Appellate Public Defender was served on Shannon Romero and Nicole Owens, Deputy
State Appellate Public Defenders, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho 83703 in the
manner noted below:

\f.... By depositing copies Qf _the S8l1le
S8l11e in the United States Mail, postage prepa!d, first
class.
of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
o By depositing copies ofthe

o By infonning the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for
of the Ada County Prosecutor.
pickup at the Office ofthe
of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile nwnber: _ _ __
o By faxing copies ofthe

STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSmLE CONFLICT WITH mE
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER (pAYNE)
(PAYNE) Page 4
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843

NO.=:--~~~_
NO.=:--~~~_
FIlED

A.L
A.Af-

~

----lp.M-!f29 :
----lp.M-*29

JAN f f 2011

IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
By JANET ElUs • Clerk
DEPury
DI!PuTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV PC 080 3085

AMENDMENT TO MOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL

(CAPITAL CASE)

ORiSINAl
ORiGINAL

------------_~)
--------------------------~)

COMES NOW Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his attorneys at the office of the
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), and hereby amends his Motion for Permission to
Appeal filed on January 10, 2011.

This amendment is made pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(a).

(

AMENDMENT TO MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL

0019341

Specifically, the Petitioner substitutes the attached page eleven (11), Appendix A, for the
submitted page eleven (11) of the same document.
Respectfully submitted this 11th
11 th day of January, 2011.

IAN H. THOMSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

\Juvlc

0

Q
NICOLE OWENS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 11th
11 th day of January, 2011, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AMENDMENT TO MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL, as
indicated below:

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI - J BLOCK
BOISE ID 83707

--

u.S. Mail

-y....1
- Statehouse Mail
- - Facsimile

_ _ Hand Delivery

JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

- - U.S.

Mail
Statehouse Mail
-Facsimile
Hand Delivery

----v:-

~'----~
MITIGATION SPECIALIST
MITIGAnON

IHT/ga
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Appendix A

·,

1.

This Court's Order That A Further Inquiry Be Conducted Where Mr. Benjamin Has
Advised The Court A Conflict Does Not Exist, Where The State Has Not Presented
Any Evidence Of A Conflict, And Where The Court Does Not Have The Facts
Necessary To Support Further Inquiry Involves A Controlling Question Of Law

This Court in its Memorandum Decision and Order finds that it is "lacking enough facts to
make [the] determination [of whether a conflict exists.]" (Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 8,
Ls. 18-19.) This Court also finds that it is "presently lacking the factual background necessary to
reach any conclusion." (Memorandum Decision and Order, p.7, Ls. 25-26.) Additionally, the only
factual assertion contained in the record is that of Mr. Benjamin indicating a conflict of interest
does not exist. Moreover, the State has not presented any factual basis warranting further inquiry
into whether a conflict exists. The controlling question of law is whether a district court in a capital
post-conviction proceeding can validly appoint a separate court appointed expert attorney to
independently review the record and conduct investigation, where there are no facts indicating
further inquiry is warranted and where the only facts before the Court indicate a conflict does not
exist. This is a legal question of first impression and is a substantial legal issue of great public
interest. See Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2, 3-4, 665 P.2d 701, 702-03 (1983).
2.

There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion Involving This Court's
Order That A Further Inquiry Be Conducted By A Court-Appointed Attorney Where
Mr. Benjamin Has Advised The Court A Conflict Does Not Exist, Where The State
Has Not Presented Any Evidence Of A Conflict, And Where The Court Does Not
Have The Facts Necessary To Support Further Inquiry

Substantial grounds for difference of opinion regarding this controlling question of law stem
from case law cited in the SAPD's filings regarding this issue including the Ex Parte Notice of
Possible Conflict of Interest, the Response to State's Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD

MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL

00193811

t

'

•

•

•

NO.----FR.ECl~~--Al-M
_
____---'P.M _______

NO·---IFR.ECl~~

~_M--

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

_

~P.M

JAN 25 2011
RICH, Clerk
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH.
ByJANETEWS

Jan M. Bennetts
Idaho State Bar No. 4606
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

DEPUTY
DePUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-PC-2008-03085

STATE'S RESPONSE TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
JUDICIAL NOTICE

-------------)
------------------------------)

COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County
of Ada, State of Idaho, and makes the following response to the Petitioner's Motion for
Judicial Notice.
The State objects to this Court taking judicial notice of portions of the State v.
Abdullah (hereinafter Abdullah) record as requested by the Petitioner. First, the State fails to

see the relevance or need for this Court to take judicial notice of a partial record in an
unrelated case. Although Judge Copsey's handling of the conflict issue in Abdullah, may

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
(HALL ll), Page 1
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provide some guidance for this Court, it is not necessary or appropriate for this Court to take
judicial notice of a partial record in the Abdullah case without relevance having been
established.
Second, the Petitioner is requesting that this Court take judicial notice of only a
portion of the Abdullah record regarding the conflict issue. It would not be appropriate for
only certain items to be judicially noticed and not others. If this Court does take judicial
notice of these items, then it would be appropriate for the Court to take judicial notice of the
entirety of the record related to the conflict issue in Abdullah. The remainder of the record
ought to be considered contemporaneously with the portions requested as a matter of fairness.
See I.R.E. 106. Again, the State objects to this Court taking judicial notice of documents in

an unrelated case, but if it does so, the State believes it should only be done in its entirety as
to the conflict issue.
Because the Petitioner has failed to establish relevance for this Court taking judicial
notice of a partial record in an unrelated case, the State requests that this Court deny the
Motion for Judicial Notice.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this a'¢day of January 2011.

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor

By: an M. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
(HALL 11), Page 2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Response

to Petitioner's Motion for Judicial Notice was delivered to the State Appellate Public
Defender's Office, 3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100, Boise, Idaho 83703 through the
United States Mail, this

J-~ day of January 2011.

-----.::::'M-'
Legal Assistant

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
(HALL ll), Page 3
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...._
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GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

JAN 25 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. Clerk

Jan M. Bennetts
Idaho State Bar No. 4606
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

ByJANETEWS
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-PC-2008-03085

STATE'S RESPONSE TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

------------)
--------------------------)

COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and makes the following response to the Petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration regarding this Court's Order appointing Keith Roark.
Prior to this Court's Memorandum and Order and Appointment of Keith Roark,
this Court considered all of the information and arguments provided by the Petitioner, the

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
(HALL II), Page 1
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State and Mr. Benjamin. This Court made a reasoned and considered decision based
upon the entirety of the record before it.
The State will not restate its earlier arguments and hereby incorporates by
reference its previous filings on this subject. Nonetheless, it is important to consider
several points.
First, the State's interest in having this issue addressed now is not to delay
proceedings or have this Court or anyone else go on a fishing expedition. The State
hopes to prevent this conflict issue from becoming the basis for a possible reversal in
subsequent proceedings. At a minimum, there must be a record that an appellate court
can review. At this point, there is no clear record upon which an appellate court could
make a review of this issue. There have been vague statements and broad conclusions,
none of which provide a basis upon which an appellate court can make a meaningful
review. Absent a clear and meaningful record, it creates the potential for an appellate
court to remand this case requiring that a meaningful record be made.
Second, the Petitioner discusses in the Motion for Reconsideration the information
sharing that occurred between the SAPD in Hall I and trial counsel in Hall II. It seems to
the State that there is a difference between merely information sharing and providing
advice; having discussions that informed trial counsel's decisions; obtaining advice or
having discussions about strategy or trial options; and/or taking other actions that create a
conflict in post-conviction.

In fact, if information sharing of test results and other

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
(HALL ll), Page 2
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information that related to, or could have had impact on trial counsel's work in Hall II,
did not occur, the SAPD would now be claiming in this post-conviction proceeding that
trial counsel was ineffective for not participating in information sharing.

Because

information sharing did occur, trial counsel was better prepared for Hall II. It does not
contlict; nor did the State
seem to the State that information sharing alone would create a conflict;
contlict. Rather, as the
intend to conveyor imply that information sharing alone creates a conflict.
State pointed out in its previous filings that will not be restated here, there are various
contlicts could arise if more than information sharing took place.
ways conflicts
Third, the Petitioner cites to the State v. Abdullah (hereinafter Abdullah) case and
indicates that the SAPD represented to the Court in Abdullah that no contlict existed.
(Motion to Reconsider, at 7.) In Abdullah, Judge Copsey determined that a conflict
existed and thereafter appointed Keith Roark to conduct an independent review. In the
present case, the SAPD filed an Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest on June
29,2010. The Notice filed went beyond documenting merely information sharing ("The
SAPD cooperated with trial counsel in Hall II by sharing testing and expert information
Hall I.") and indicated that the SAPD attorneys "may have had contact with
obtained in HallL")
trial counsel and that contact may present a conflict of interest in the SAPD's continued
representation of Mr. Hall." However, unlike the Abdullah case in which Judge Copsey
had details upon which to make a determination, there have been no specifics or details
presented to the Court that would give this Court a basis upon which to determine

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
(HALL 11), Page 3
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whether a conflict exists.

•
It is also important to note that in its Notice, the SAPD

appeared to recognize the distinction between merely information sharing and other
contact that could present a conflict of interest.
In any event, the SAPD has indicated that there is certainly the potential that a
conflict exists. In its Notice, the SAPD states several times that the contact with trial
counsel may present a conflict: the SAPD attorney "became concerned about a conflict
of interest"; "[a]fter an internal review, it was determined that independent counsel

should be hired to independently evaluate the conflict."; the SAPD contacted Mr.
Benjamin who "agreed to evaluate the conflict and advise Mr. Hall whether or not the
conflict should be waived."; and, "In the event Mr. Hall is inclined to waive the conflict, it

is anticipated that independent counsel will schedule a waiver hearing with this Court.','
(Notice, at 3 (emphases added).). Even though the SAPD did not indicate conclusively
whether or not there was a conflict, the language of this Notice certainly suggests that
there is a conflict and that, at a minimum, an inquiry is required. That alone is sufficient
to warrant an inquiry.
Fourth, the SAPD seems to argue that the State should determine whether there is
a conflict by reviewing trial counsel's materials and/or having discussions with trial
counsel. However, it is not the State that is required to make this determination. It is not
the SAPD that must make the determination. It is not Mr. Benjamin that must make the
determination. It is the Court and only the Court that must make the final determination

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
(HALL ll), Page 4
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as to whether a conflict exists. Certainly, this Court may consider the entirety of the
information provided to it, but it is this Court's duty to make the final determination. In
Abdullah, it was the Court and only the Court that ultimately determined there was a

contlict.
In this case, the State sought guidance from this Court as to whether or not it was
free to discuss with trial counsel conversations trial counsel had with the SAPD when the
Petitioner was present and/or when the Petitioner was not present. The State made such a
request because the State certainly does not want to misstep. The State sought and
received clear direction from this Court that it is not free to have such discussions with
Hall II trial counsel at this time and the State will abide by that Order until such a time as
this Court directs otherwise. Further, until this issue is resolved and the State receives
clear direction that it may obtain trial counsel's materials in discovery from the SAPD,
the State will not do so. The materials from trial counsel may well contain information
about the conversations that this Court has instructed that the State not be privy to.
Unless the State misunderstands, the SAPD also appears to argue on the one hand
that there is an attorney-client privilege related to communications with trial counsel
and/or Petitioner about Hall II matters because the SAPD represented the Petitioner in
Hall I; and, on the other hand, that the State is free to discuss these communications with
trial counsel. The State cannot easily reconcile those two concepts, which is why the
State will await permission and an Order from this Court before proceeding forward to

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
(HALL ll), Page 5
001946

•

•

review any discovery or discuss communications with trial counsel.

If there

IS

an

attorney-client privilege that prevents the SAPD from disclosing to the State
communications it had with Hall II trial counsel and/or the Petitioner about Hall II
matters, then how is appropriate for the State to communicate with Hall II trial counsel
about those same privileged communications? If there is an attorney-client privilege
about Hall II matters, then the State cannot circumvent that privilege by going to Hall II
trial counsel to do so. To be clear, it is the State's position, as the State has argued in
prior filings, that the Petitioner has waived the attorney-client privilege related to any Hall
II communications, correspondence, emails, documents, and so on, by filing this postconviction Petition, l but until the conflict issue is resolved and this Court issues an Order
outlining what the State is entitled to obtain, the State will abide by this Court's Order of
December 27, 2010.
Fifth, the SAPD indicates that this Court did not hear from Mr. Benjamin at the
October 19, 2010, hearing. (Motion to Reconsider, at 17.) Although the State does not
have a transcript of that hearing, the State recalls that this Court did in fact hear from Mr.
Benjamin.
Finally, it is important to note that the present case is distinguishable from the

Abdullah case in that in the Abdullah case, Judge Copsey had the relevant information to
make the necessary findings. In the present case, this Court does not. Again, if merely

I The State recognizes that the attorney-client privilege between the SAPD and the Petitioner related to Hall I post
postconviction matters would not be waived.

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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information sharing occurred, that is different than advice, strategy and conversations or
communications of that nature, but the conflict issue must nonetheless be resolved.
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests that this Court deny the Motion for
Reconsideration.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this clt/l'-day
cll/l'-day of January 2011.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor

~M~

By: an M. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's

Response to Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was delivered to the State Appellate
Public Defender's Office, 3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100, Boise, Idaho 83703
through the United States Mail, this

~ay of January 2011.
Legal Assistant

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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JAN 25 2011

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

O. RICH. Clerk
CHRISTOPHER D.
By JANET ELLIS
DEPUTY

Jan M. Bennetts
Idaho State Bar No. 4606
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-PC-2008-03085

STATE'S RESPONSE TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL

------------)
---------------------------------------------------------------)

COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and makes the following response to the Petitioner's
Motion for Permission to Appeal.
The Petitioner seeks permission to file an interlocutory appeal of this Court's
December 27, 2010, Order should this Court decline to grant the SAPD's Motion for

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO
APPEAL (HALL 11), Page 1
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Reconsideration.

The SAPD indicates that "[n]ow it seems the State will be

automatically filing motions raising the issue of a conflict, whether or not there are facts
to support such a motion, in every capital post-conviction case the SAPD represents" and
cites a case for the proposition that the State may manufacture a conflict in order to
prevent a defendant from having able counsel. (See Motion for Permission to Appeal, at
n.l.)
2, including n.!.)

The State takes great issue with the implication that the State is

somehow manufacturing a conflict in order to have the SAPD removed from a capital
case or cases. As the State has indicated repeatedly, the State's only interest is in not
having cases remanded and/or reversed on the basis of a conflict issue. Nor is the State
making up conflicts out of whole cloth.
First, in State v. Abdullah (hereinafter Abdullah), the Court concluded that there
was in fact a conflict even though the SAPD represented that it did not believe there was

a conflict. (SAPD Motion to Reconsider, at 7.) In State v. Payne (hereinafter Payne),
there were numerous and lengthy phone calls between the SAPD counsel and Payne
during a time when Payne was represented by trial counsel who were preparing for re
resentencing proceedings.

These calls certainly gave rise to conflict concerns and the

State's concerns were well-founded as is evidenced by the fact that this Court granted the
State's Motion for Inquiry. The Court did in fact conduct such an inquiry.
In the present case, as in Payne, the State filed its Motion for Inquiry in an
abundance of caution to avoid the very issues that arose in Abdullah. The State would
certainly have been remiss in its obligations if it had not brought this issue to the Court's
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO
APPEAL (HALL 11), Page 2
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attention, particularly in light of these other cases; the fact that this issue goes to the very
integrity of post-conviction representation; and that this issue certainly has the potential
for a reversal or remand upon subsequent appeals. Apparently, the State's Motion for
Conflict Inquiry was not misplaced in the present case in light of the fact that the SAPD
had similar concerns as it outlined in its Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest
filed on June 29, 2010, and further in light of Mr. Benjamin's Affidavit in which he
concluded that there was an instance where the SAPD gave advice to trial counsel. (See
Motion to Reconsider, at 14 n.2.)
The State is troubled by the SAPD's allegation that the State's concern regarding
whether a conflict of interest exists has any motivation other than protecting the integrity
of its capital cases.
As the Petitioner points out in its Motion for Permission to Appeal in the present
case, the Idaho Supreme Court declined to grant its motion for interlocutory appeal in the
Abdullah matter when it sought to appeal Judge Copsey's appointment of Keith Roark to

examine the conflict issue in the Abdullah case. (Motion for Permission to Appeal, at 3.)
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the SAPD has standing to bring this
Motion given that this Court has appointed independent counsel, the State objects to this
Court granting the Motion for Permission to Appeal. The Petitioner has failed to meet the
standards for an interlocutory appeal.
Idaho Appellate Rule 12(a) permits an appeal from an interlocutory order in a
criminal action if the appeal "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO
APPEAL (HALL 11), Page 3
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substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal from the
order or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." I.A.R.
12(a). Idaho's appellate courts have given little guidance regarding the interpretation of
I.A.R. 12(a).

In Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2, 4 (1983), the Idaho Supreme Court

explained, "[i]t was the intent of I.A.R. 12 to provide an immediate appeal from an
interlocutory order if substantial legal issues of great public interest or legal questions of
first impression are involved." The Court further explained that a number of factors,
none of which is controlling, are considered in determining whether such an appeal
should be granted, including "the impact of an immediate appeal upon the parties, the
effect of the delay of the proceedings in the district court pending the appeal, the
likelihood or possibility of a second appeal after judgment is finally entered by the district
court, and the case workload of the appellate courts." Id. Finally, the Court cautioned
that I.A.R. 12 is to be used only in "the exceptional case" and should not be used to
"broaden the appeals which may be taken as a matter of right under I.A.R. 11."
II." Id.
The Petitioner argues that this Court's Order involves a controlling issue of law as
to which there are substantial grounds for differences of opinion. (See Motion, at 4-12.)
The Petitioner's Motion for Permission to Appeal is repetitive. Accordingly, the State
will attempt to organize the arguments. The Petitioner's arguments seeking to persuade
this Court to grant permission to appeal can be summarized as follows: (1) Whether Mr.
Benjamin's review was sufficient; (2) Whether the Court's appointment of Keith Roark

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO
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interferes with the Petitioner's right to choice of counsel; and, (3) Whether requiring the
SAPD to pay for Keith Roark's justifies an interlocutory appeal.
1. Dennis Benjamin's Review
The Petitioner overlooks several very important points when he argues that this
Court should grant permission to appeal based upon Mr. Benjamin's review.

First,

regardless of whether or not the State had filed its Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD
Conflict, this Court would face the exact same issues it currently faces and this case
would be in the exact same position. That is true because in its Ex Parte Notice of
Possible Conflict of Interest filed on June 29, 2010, the SAPD stated several times that
the SAPD contact with trial counsel may present a conflict: the SAPD attorney "became

concerned about a conflict o/interest"; "[a]fter an internal review, it was determined that
independent counsel should be hired to independently evaluate the conflict."; the SAPD
contacted Mr. Benjamin who "agreed to evaluate the conflict and advise Mr. Hall
whether or not the conflict should be waived."; and, "In the event Mr. Hall is inclined to

waive the conflict, it is anticipated that independent counsel will schedule a waiver
hearing with this Court." (Notice, at 3 (emphases added).). Accordingly, this is not some
imagined conflict that this Court or the State pulled out of thin air. There is a basis for
inquiry and careful review. Even though the SAPD did not indicate conclusively whether
or not there was a conflict in its Notice, the language of its Notice certainly suggests that
there is a conflict. That alone is sufficient to warrant an inquiry.

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO
APPEAL (HALL 11), Page 5
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Second, the Petitioner seems to overlook the fact that it is the Court who has the
duty to detennine whether a contlict
conflict exists. Neither the State's opinion; nor the SAPD's
opinion; nor Mr. Benjamin's opinion is controlling. As the State has previously argued,
this Court must independently make that detennination.
Third, the Petitioner argues that this Court's failure to accept Mr. Benjamin's
conclusion requires this Court to certify this issue for appeal. At this point, this Court
does not have a sufficient record upon which it can rely to make an independent decision
about whether or not a contlict
conflict exists. There is no substance to the conclusory statements
this Court currently has before it. There must be more than conclusory statements upon
which this Court can base a ruling. It should be noted that in Abdullah, Keith Roark
provided Judge Copsey with a thorough written report that was provided under seal and is
subject to appellate review. (See Petitioner's Motion to Reconsider, Appendix 7.)
Furthennore, in the present case, there is an insufficient record for an appellate
court to later review when this case is appealed. The State is certain that this conflict
contlict issue
will be the basis for a subsequent appeal. As it currently stands, there is not enough
infonnation for an appellate court to conduct a meaningful review. See State v. Severson,
147 Idaho 694, 704 (2009), rehearing denied (2009) ("In order to satisfy the inquiry
contlict must be thorough and
requirement, a trial court's examination of the potential conflict
searching and should be conducted on the record." (emphasis added». Additionally, if
there is not a sufficient record for this Court to base its decision, the State fails to see how
the Idaho Supreme Court will be in any better position to hear an appeal and issue a ruling

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO
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regarding a potential conflict without a sufficient record upon which to conduct a
meaningful review.
2. Right to Counsel of Choice
Petitioner argues that by appointing Keith Roark, this Court is interfering with his
right to choice of counsel. The State disagrees. The Petitioner is entitled to counsel free
of conflict. Should this inquiry result in a finding that the Petitioner has conflict free
counsel, the SAPD will resume their representation.

Should this inquiry result in a

finding that a conflict exists, the Petitioner will have a choice. He may either choose to
waive the conflict and the SAPD will resume representation or he may choose not to
waive the conflict. Regardless of the Petitioner's decision, it will not interfere with his
right to counsel.
It should also be noted that the final outcome of this inquiry has yet to be decided,

which makes a current appeal premature. The SAPD has not been disqualified from
representation for all future proceedings; rather, this Court is attempting to conduct the
required inquiry before such a decision can be made.

Only after such inquiry is

completed, will there be a final outcome. If this Court were to ignore its obligation to
make this independent determination, it would certainly give rise to an appellate issue.
Furthermore, if this Court ignored its obligation and the SAPD continued its
representation based upon the current record, it follows that the SAPD would not raise
this issue on appeal given that the SAPD believes the current status is acceptable. The
failure to raise this issue on appeal will be the basis for a subsequent appeal at which time
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the Petitioner would argue that the SAPO had a conflict and continued to represent him
when he had a right to conflict free counsel. He would then argue that not only did the
SAPO have a conflict, which infected the entire post-conviction proceeding, but he would
argue, as another appellate, claim that the SAPO failed to raise the conflict issue on
appeal.
Further, the right to counsel of one's choice is not absolute.

The Sixth

Amendment provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. One element of this basic
guarantee is the right to counsel of choice." United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1074
(3rd Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1047 (1996) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). However, "[t]he right to counsel of one's choice encompassed within the Sixth
Amendment is not absolute." United States v. Carrera, 259 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir.
2001); see also State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920,930-31 (Ct. App. 1997) (right to counsel

not absolute and does not necessarily include right to counsel of one's own choosing; it
does entitle criminal defendant to reasonably competent counsel). As explained in Caplin
& Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989) (quoting Wheat v.

United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)), "those who do not have the means to hire their

own lawyers have no cognizable complaint so long as they are adequately represented by
attorneys appointed by the courts. '[A] defendant may not insist on representation by an
attorney he cannot afford. '" See also Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025-26 (9th Cir.

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO
APPEAL (HALL D), Page 8
001956

· .
2000) (citing cases establishing that right to choice of counsel is not absolute, but limited
to those who are financially able to retain counsel).
3. SAPD Required to Pay for Keith Roark
The Petitioner argues that this Court is in error for requiring the SAPD to pay for
Keith Roark to conduct this inquiry. The Petitioner contends that this Court's reliance on
I.C. § 19-871 is erroneous. Idaho Code § 19-871 is clear and unambiguous: "Should the
state appellate public defender be unable to carry out the duties required in this act

because of a conflict of interest or any other reason, the state appellate public defender
shall arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to be compensated out of the budget of
the state appellate public defender." (emphasis added.) This statute clearly applies and
§ 19-870( 1)(d) states in relevant part that
this Court did not err in its ruling. Further, I.C. §19-870(1)(d)
the SAPD shall provide representation for indigent defendants in "[plost-conviction
"[plost-conviction relief
proceedings in district court in capital cases where the appellant was sentenced on or after
.... ,,)
September 1, 1998
1998....,,\
The Petitioner cites to I.C. "§19-871(d)", but the State cannot locate a subsection
(d). Idaho Code 19-871 has no subsections; and thus, the State is uncertain as to what the
Petitioner is citing. (See Motion, at 17.)
The Petitioner's reliance on I.C. §§19-4904
19-4904 and §19-860
§ 19-860 is misplaced. Idaho Code
§§19-870(1)(d)
19-870(1)(d) and §§19-871
19-871 are the controlling statutes. Pursuant to I.C. §19-870(1)(d),
§ 19-870(1)(d), it
is the SAPD's responsibility to represent the Petitioner in these post-convictions

I

The Petitioner was sentenced to death in this case in 2007.
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proceedings and pursuant to I.C. §I9-87I, it is the responsibility of the SAPD to pay Mr.
Roark for his services under these circumstances where the SAPD is unable to carry out
its duties at this time. Inability to pay does not relieve the SAPD of its statutory duties.
An interlocutory appeal based upon this Court's ruling is inappropriate.

impact of an interlocutory appeal on the parties is significant.

The

Not only would an

interlocutory appeal delay the conflict inquiry, but it would delay the post-conviction
proceedings. An interlocutory appeal should not be used to "broaden the appeals which
may be taken as a matter of right under I.A.R. 11." See Rudell, 105 Idaho at 4. Nor does
an immediate appeal from this Court's Order materially advance the orderly resolution of
the litigation in this case. Based upon the foregoing, the State requests that this Court
deny the Motion for Permission to Appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this Pl'1Aday of January 2011.

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor

~/I{~

By:
M. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's

Response to Petitioner's Motion for Pennission to Appeal was delivered to the State
Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100, Boise, Idaho
83703 through the United States Mail, this

~J.ay of January 2011.

Legal Assistant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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Case No. CV PC 08-03085
REPLY TO STATE'S
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR JUDICIAL
NOTICE
(CAPITAL CASE)

------------- )
-----------------------------)
Counsel for Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his counsel at the State
Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), submits the following reply to the State's Response to

Petitioner's Motion for Judicial Notice (hereinafter State's Response). The State lodges two
objections, namely:

(1) the relevance of the documents, and (2) the selective nature of the

materials submitted.
The relevance of the material referenced in the Motion for Judicial Notice is two-fold:
first, it helps to explain the reasons why the State Appellate Public Defender chose to file a
notice to the court and undertake a review of the conflict through an independent attorney,
REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR JUDICIAL
NOTICE -1

001960

instead of merely making a representation to the Court and then waiting for the Court to appoint
an attorney; and second, it replaces the allusions and opaque references to State v. Abdullah that
have been made in arguments, pleadings and the Court's own order, with specific facts.
Mr. Hall accompanied his Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order
(hereinafter Motion to Reconsider) with several appendices and a Motion/or Judicial Notice. He
made reference to those documents throughout his Motion to Reconsider, in order to shed
additional light on the issue and to provide the Court with information Mr. Hall believed to be
necessary to reconsider its decision.

Any party making a motion for reconsideration under

I.R.C.P. 11(1)(2)(B) is permitted to present new evidence. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468,
472 (Ct. App. 2006). When considering a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order
pursuant to I.R.C.P. II(a)(2)(B), the trial court should take into account any new facts presented
by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the interlocutory order. Coeur d'Alene

Mining Co. v. First Nat 'I Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 823 (1990). The burden is obviously on the
moving party to bring to the attention of the court any new facts. Id.
With regard to the conflict inquiry, what occurred in State v. Abdullah is relevant if the
... any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
evidence has ""...
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." I.R.E. 401. Here, the Court appears to have used the Abdullah case as a general
template for how to proceed. The Court has appointed the same attorney used by Judge Copsey
in the Abdullah case, and has effectively given him the same charge. Accordingly, Mr. Hall
believes that a fuller understanding of the proceedings in State v. Abdullah would provide the
Court with information that clearly distinguishes the two cases, and also provides important
context as to why the SAPD originally chose to proceed in the manner it did.
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Mr. Hall argues in his Motion to Reconsider that there are several reasons the Court
should have part of the record in Abdullah in order to more clearly understand those proceedings.
First, the SAPD attorneys who filed the Ex Parte Notice had only recently finished the lengthy
and laborious conflict inquiry in the case of Mr. Abdullah. The relevance is that their experience
in Abdullah may have affected the choices they made in order to address any possible conflict
issues. Second, one could interpret the SAPD's choice to contract with an outside attorney (prior
to the finding of an actual conflict) in order to evaluate the conflict and advise Mr. Hall as an
attempt by the SAPD to avoid making a representation as to whether a conflict existed, only to
be later contradicted by the Court, as happened in Abdullah. The record in Abdullah lends
credibility to the argument that the SAPD faced a dilemma when determining how to proceed in
this case. The SAPD had just experienced a situation where attorneys had represented to their
client that there was no conflict, only for the Judge to tum around and find such a conflict did
exist and that the advice of his own attorneys was therefore compromised. Third, the Decision
Memorandum and Order has at least suggested that the SAPD's refusal to be more forthcoming

with the Court may be an attempt to hide information from the Court. The Abdullah record
provides a context in which the actions by the SAPD can be interpreted as being overly cautious
and an attempt to avoid the same scenario. Fourth, the Abdullah case also demonstrates how
Judge Copsey had received specific information in the ordinary course of litigation that led her to
make the finding that a conflict of interest actually existed.

Mr. Hall believes that that

procedural history is critical in distinguishing the two cases and in explaining why the conflict
inquiry in the two cases should be treated differently.
With regard to the selective nature of the Motion for Judicial Notice, the SAPD does not
object to the Court taking judicial notice of additional material in that case if it would be helpful
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to the Court. Obviously, the entirety of a capital post-conviction record is voluminous; however,
the Motion for Judicial Notice was simply an attempt to identify those portions of the record
which were directly relevant to the conflict inquiry. The SAPD has no objection to the Court
taking judicial notice of the entire public record in State v. Abdullah, as long as Mr. Hall would
be able to refer to those proceedings with specificity in any future pleading or hearing.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we ask this Court to take judicial notice of the items
outlined in the Motion for Judicial Notice, and in so doing recognize their relevance to Mr.
Hall's Motion to Reconsider.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of February, 2011.

Ian H. Thomson
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

UllUivD.

Nicole Owens
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

12

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
13

14

On December 27, 2010, this Court filed its Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith

15

Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel in this case. Petitioner Erick Virgil Hall was convicted of the

16

rape and first-degree murder of Cheryl Hanlon on October 22, 2004 (Hall II). In the period of time

17

during which the trial took place, the Petitioner was represented by the State Appellate Public Defender

18

("SAPD") on the matter of his post-conviction and appeal of his conviction for the kidnapping, rape, and

19

first-degree murder of Lynn Henneman (Hall I). In his amended post-conviction petition, filed in this
20

case on April 7,2009, the Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel in the Hall II case provided ineffective
21
22
23

assistance of counsel.
On June 29,2010, the SAPD filed its Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest in this case,

24

and on July 30,2010, the State filed its Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict (Hall II). The

25

Court heard oral argument on the State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict (Hall II) on

26
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August 26, 2010 and granted the motion at that hearing. After hearing oral argument and reviewing the
1

2

extensive briefing filed by both parties on the issues of the scope and structure of the Court's inquiry into

3

the possible conflict of interest, the Court filed its Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith

4

Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel on December 27,2010. The SAPD filed its Motion to

5

Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order on January 10, 2011.

6
7

DISCUSSION
8

"In order to ensure that a defendant receives conflict-free counsel, a trial court has an affirmative
9

10

duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever it knows or 'reasonably should know that a particular

11

conflict may exist.'" State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703, 215 P.3d 414, 423 (2009)(quoting State v.

12

Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278,285 (2003)). In its Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of

13

Interest, the SAPD informed the Court that contact between former SAPD attorneys and Petitioner's trial

14

counsel "may present a conflict of interest in the SAPD's continued representation of Mr. Hall." At that

15

point, the Court had reason to know that a particular conflict may exist, even before the State filed its
16

Motion for Inquiry. The SAPD now portrays its Ex Parte Notice as evidence of concern about the
17
18

"appearance of a possible conflict of interest." Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order

19

at 8 (emphasis added). However, the Ex Parte Notice did not disclose the appearance of a possible

20

conflict; rather, it disclosed a possible conflict. The Ex Parte Notice disclosed the following: (1)

21

counsel from the SAPD's office "may have had contact with trial counsel and that contact may present a

22

conflict of interest in the SAPD's continued representation of Mr. Hall;" (2) after discovering that

23

contact, an attorney in the office "became concerned about a conflict of interest;" (3) the SAPD hired
24

independent counsel "to independently evaluate the conflict;" and (4) independent counsel hired by the
25
26

SAPD "agreed to evaluate the conflict and advise Mr. Hall whether the conflict should be waived."
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Accordingly, this Court found that it was under an affinnative duty to inquire into the potential
1

2

conflict when it granted the State's Motion for Inquiry on August 26,2010. The time to request

3

reconsideration of that motion has passed. As described in the Memorandum Decision and Order filed

4

December 27,2010, the SAPD has declined to share infonnation requested by the Court in furtherance

5

of the Court's inquiry into whether the Petitioner is receiving conflict-free counsel. Nevertheless, the

6

inquiry has so far revealed at least one instance where the SAPD gave advice to trial counsel in Hall II,

7

although no disclosure regarding the substance of that advice has been made to the Court.
8

In the Petitioner's Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order, the SAPD asks the
9

10

Court to reconsider its holdings with regard to the following issues: (1) whether the SAPD has been

11

candid and forthcoming with the Court while investigating any possible conflict; (2) whether the SAPD

12

has been willing to share infonnation concerning contacts between the SAPD and Hall II trial counsel

13

when no attorney-client privilege prevents that release; (3) whether appointing Mr. Roark to act as

14

conflict counsel for the Petitioner is any different than the work already perfonned by Mr. Benjamin; (4)

15

whether any further conflict inquiry is justified in light of the infonnation now before the Court; and (5)

16

whether the State should be pennitted to contact and inquire of Hall II trial counsel about their
17

communications with the SAPD. A decision whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration
18
19

made pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2)(B) is left to the sound discretion of the trial

20

court. Van v. PortneufMedical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 560,212 P.3d 982,990 (2009).

21

The Candor of the SAPD and the Attorney-Client Privilege

22

Having granted the State's Motion for Inquiry, this Court is required and has an affinnative duty
23

to detennine whether the Petitioner is receiving conflict-free counsel. The purpose of the Court's
24

inquiry is to protect an important and fundamental right of this capital Petitioner to conflict-free counsel.
25
26
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1

The Court has no interest in "interfering with the attorney-client relationship that already exists" as

2

alleged by the SAPD. However, the very nature of an inquiry requires that questions be asked.

3

The SAPD was candid and forthcoming when it brought the possible conflict to the Court's

4

attention by filing the Ex Parte Notice, and the Court has expressed that opinion on several occasions.

5

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the SAPD's level or degree of disclosure after the Motion for Inquiry

6

was granted (including but not limited to the Amended Notice and the Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin)

7

has not been sufficient to provide the Court with the factual background necessary to determine whether

8

the contacts between the SAPD and trial counsel, during which at least some advice was given,

9

constitutes a conflict of interest.

10

The Court appreciates the SAPD's acknowledgment that "as the issue is framed by the Court, the

11

SAPD's actions since its filing of the Ex Parte Notice could be seen as evasive." As counsel is likely

12

aware, failing to provide requested information is commonly perceived as potentially evasive. Although

13

the Court has cautioned that candor is essential to the inquiry, the Court has not made any specific

14

findings of untruthfulness or imposed any sanctions against the SAPD and therefore, does not find it

15

necessary or appropriate to reconsider this issue.

16

The SAPD claims that its lack of disclosure arises' in large part from the attorney-client privilege

17

between the SAPD and the Petitioner during the time of the communications in question due to the

18

Hall!.
!.R.P.C.
1. In support ofthis notion, the SAPD points to 1.R.P.C.
SAPD's representation of the Petitioner in Hall

19

1.6(a) which provides that:

20
21

22

A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client gives
informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation 0
the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).
The SAPD goes so far as to claim that:

23

24
25

Because the SAPD would not release attorney-client files to anyone without a release from Mr.
Hall, no guarantee can be made that Mr. Roark will have access to the same information or that
Mr. Hall will cooperate with Mr. Roark. The SAPD could envision a scenario in which Mr.
Roark would be left to review the exact same information now available to the State and the

26
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1

2

Court-the files of Mr. Chastain and Ms. Kristal, along with the public record, and the
statements of anyone willing to speak with Mr. Roark regarding the possible conflict.
The facts presently before the Court indicate that the SAPD represented the Petitioner in Hall I at

3

a time when attorneys in the SAPD's office had contact with and gave advice to trial counsel in Hall II.
4

The Petitioner has now filed in this case a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief alleging that those same
5
6

Hall II trial attorneys (receiving advice from the SAPD) provided ineffective assistance of counsel. If

7

the SAPD is correct that its representation of the Petitioner in Hall I and the Idaho Rules of Professional

8

Conduct or Idaho law work together to preclude the Court from completing its inquiry and reaching a

9

reliable conclusion whether a conflict exists, it seems to follow that the protection of the Petitioner's

10

right to conflict-free counsel would require that counsel other than the SAPD be appointed to represent

11

the Petitioner, absent a waiver of the conflict.
12

However, the Court need not decide whether counsel other than the SAPD is required because
13

LR.P.C. 1.6(b)(6) provides that a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client
14
15

if such disclosure is necessary "to comply with other law or a court order." This Court is conducting a

16

lawful judicial inquiry in order to determine whether the Petitioner is receiving conflict-free counsel.

17

Further, this Court has entered an order appointing Keith Roark as independent conflict counsel

18

representing the Petitioner and who therefore is bound by attorney-client privilege. That order

19

specifically authorized Mr. Roark "to conduct a thorough and searching review of the SAPD's pre-trial,

20

trial and pre-sentence involvement in the trial of Hall II up to its appointment to represent the Petitioner
21

in this Hall II post-conviction and appeal case."
22
23

Nevertheless, in order to resolve any ambiguity regarding this issue, the Court hereby

24

supplements its Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent Conflict

25

Counsel to clarify that: (1) Mr. Roark is authorized to view the files of the SAPD; and (2) anyone

26
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employed by or affiliated with the SAPD's office who is questioned or deposed by Mr. Roark during his
1

2

investigation is acting pursuant to a lawful judicial inquiry and subject to a court order as contemplated

3

by LR.P.C. 1.6(b)(6). In view of the foregoing, the Court denies the Motion to Reconsider as it relates to

4

the attorney-client privilege issue.

5

Whether Further Conflict Inquiry is "Justified" and the Role and Compensation of Mr. Roark

6

The Petitioner asks this Court to reconsider whether any further conflict inquiry is justified.
7

Black's Law Dictionary defines 'justification" as "[a] lawful or sufficient reason for one's acts or
8

omissions; any fact that prevents an act from being wrongful." Black's Law Dictionary 882 (8th ed.
9

2004). The SAPD provides no support for the proposition that the judicial inquiry is unlawful or
10

wrongful. Rather, the SAPD, after acknowledging that its actions may be seen as evasive and claiming
11

that attorney-client privilege has prevented it from providing the Court with requested infonnation,
information, now
12

information to continue the conflict inquiry at the present
argues that "the Court does not have sufficient infonnation
13

time." It appears that the SAPD is arguing that it may disclose a possible conflict; decline for whatever
14

reason to provide requested infonnation
information to the Court during a judicial inquiry into the possible conflict;
15

and then claim that a lack of information
infonnation provided to the Court by the SAPD requires the Court to cut
16

information provided to the
short its inquiry. This position is not supported by law. Rather, the lack of
ofinfonnation
17

Court necessitates the continuation of the inquiry until such time as the Court can determine
detennine whether the
18

Petitioner is receiving conflict-free counsel.
19

Idaho law requires that an adequate inquiry must be "thorough and searching" and should be
20

conducted on the record. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 704, 215 P.3d 414,424 (2009). At the
21

conclusion of an adequate inquiry, a court must determine
detennine whether a conflict actually exists. !d. As
22

stated in this Court's Memorandum Decision and Order filed December 27,2010, this Court is presently
23

lacking the factual background necessary to make such a determination.
detennination. The SAPD argues extensively
24

that Mr. Benjamin has provided the Court with his conclusion that the advice did not constitute a
25

conflict of interest. That is true. It is also true that Mr. Benjamin failed to provide the Court with the
26
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1

factual bases for his conclusion. The Court may rely on the representations of counsel, but is not obliged

2

to do so. Id. The adequacy of a judicial inquiry is for the Court to decide and not for counsel, and the

3

Court declines to reconsider whether any further conflict inquiry is 'justified."

4

Related to this issue is the SAPD's contention that appointing Mr. Roark to act as independent

5

conflict counsel for the Petitioner is no different than the work already performed by Mr. Benjamin. The

6

SAPD argues that "[t]he appointment of Keith Roark is unnecessary, duplicative, and will not

7

accomplish anything that cannot be provided by Mr. Benjamin." Although Mr. Benjamin did not file

8

this motion to reconsider on behalf of the Petitioner, it has been represented to the Court that Mr.

9

Benjamin is the SAPD's choice of conflict counsel, taking the place ofthe SAPD as to the conflict issue

10

alone. This Court, at this stage of the inquiry, has thus far elected not to rely on the representations of

11

Mr. Benjamin. The fact that the SAPD chose to hire Mr. Benjamin in no way constrains this Court's

12

discretion regarding how it may conduct its inquiry. This Court took great care when deciding the

13

structure of the inquiry, after considering many factors including the attorney-client privilege issues

14

involved in this case. For the foregoing reasons, and having previously explained the reasons why

15

independent conflict counsel was appointed and the differences in the roles ofMr. Roark and Mr.

16

Benjamin in its Memorandum Decision and Order filed December 27,2010, the Court declines to

17

reconsider the appointment of Keith Roark as independent conflict counsel.

18

Further, the Court declines to reconsider its order that the SAPD pay for independent counsel. In

19

its Motion to Reconsider, the SAPD argues that pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-860(b), Ada County and

20

not the SAPD is responsible for the cost. However, Idaho Code § 19-860(b) applies to county public

21

defenders and indigent criminal defendants facing a formal charge, and the SAPD's reliance on I.e. §

22

19-860(b) is misplaced. Here, the Petitioner has already been convicted. A petition for post-conviction

23

relief is a special proceeding which is civil in nature; it is a proceeding entirely new and independent

24

from the criminal action which led to the conviction. Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 808 P.2d 373

25

(1991); Matthews v. State, 130 Idaho 39, 936 P.2d 682 (Ct. App. 1997).

26
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1

In the Petitioner's Motion for Pennission to Appeal, the SAPD further argues that Idaho Code §

2

19-4904 provides that a county bear the cost of the representation in post-conviction cases. That is true

3

in almost all post-conviction cases. However, one exception to that rule is where, as here, the post-

4

conviction relief proceeding is in a capital case where the Petitioner was sentenced on or after September

5

1, 1998. Idaho Code § 19-870(1)(d)
19-870(l)(d) requires that the SAPD provide for representation in those cases so

6

long as the county participates in the capital crimes defense fund. Further, Idaho Code § 19-871

7

provides that when the SAPD is unable to carry out such duties because of a conflict of interest or any

8

other reason, other counsel shall be "compensated out of the budget of the state appellate public

9

defender."

10

The Court is aware of the current budget constraints facing nearly all state governmental

11

agencies, including the SAPD. However, the level of funding appropriated by the legislature is not a

12

matter for this Court to detennine; further, any funding shortfall is a matter ofless significance than

13

Petitioner's basic, fundamental right to conflict-free counsel. For the foregoing reasons, the Court

14

declines to reconsider its order that Mr. Roark be compensated from the budget of the SAPD.

15

The State's Contacts with Trial Counsel

16

Finally, the SAPD requests the Court to reconsider whether the State should be pennitted to

17

contact and inquire of Hall IT trial counsel about their communications with the SAPD. The Court has

18

not held that the State will never be pennitted to contact and inquire of trial counsel. Rather, the Court

19

has ordered that the State wait until further instructions are given by this Court before proceeding. The

20

State was not a party to any of the conversations that are at issue in this case, and in light of the potential

21

attorney-client privilege issues in this case, the Court prefers to hear from Mr. Roark before allowing the

22

State to proceed. Therefore, the Court declines to reconsider the issue.

23
24

25

26
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CONCLUSION

1

2

In a careful exercise of its discretion, this Court DENIES the Motion to Reconsider

3

Memorandum Decision and Order for the foregoing reasons. Additionally, the Court hereby

4

supplements its Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent Conflict

5

Counsel to clarify that: (1) Mr. Roark is authorized to view the files ofthe SAPD; and (2) anyone

6

employed by or affiliated with the SAPD's office who is questioned or deposed by Mr. Roark during his

7

investigation is acting pursuant to a lawful judicial inquiry and subject to a court order as contemplated

8

by I.R.P.C. 1.6(b)(6). AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

9

10

Dated this

23~aYOf~, 2011.

11

12

Thomas F. Neville
District Judge

13

14
15
16

17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24

25
26
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1
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2
3
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5
6
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8
9

10
11

12
13
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24
25
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, C ark

4

By JANET ELLIS

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,

DEPUTY

5

6
7

Petitioner,

CV -PC-2008-03085
Case No. CV-PC-2008-03085

vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
DENYING THE MOTION FOR PERMISSION
TO APPEAL

8
9

10

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

11
12

13
14

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner Erick Virgil Hall was convicted of the rape and first-degree murder of Cheryl Hanlon
on October 22,2004 (Hall IT). In the period of time during which the trial took place, the Petitioner was

15

represented by the State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD") on the matter of his post-conviction and
16

appeal of his conviction for the kidnapping, rape, and first-degree murder ofLynn Henneman (Hall
17

18

n.

It

has now been established that during that time period, attorneys at the SAPD gave advice to Hall IT trial

19

counsel in at least one instance. Following the Petitioner's conviction in Hall II, the SAPD was

20

appointed to represent him in this post conviction and appeal case. In the Petitioner's amended post-

21

conviction petition filed in this case on April 7, 2009, the Petitioner alleged that his Hall II trial attorneys

22

provided ineffective assistance of counsel.

23

On June 29, 2010, the SAPD filed its Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest in this case,
24

and on July 30,2010, the State filed its Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict (Hall II). In the
25
26

Ex Parte Notice, the SAPD disclosed the following: (1) counsel from the SAPD's office "may have had
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contact with trial counsel and that contact may present a conflict of interest in the SAPD's continued
1

2

representation of Mr. Hall;" (2) after discovering that contact, an attorney in the office "became

3

concerned about a conflict of interest;" (3) the SAPD hired independent counsel "to independently

4

evaluate the conflict;" and (4) independent counsel hired by the SAPD "agreed to evaluate the conflict

5

and advise Mr. Hall whether the conflict should be waived."

6

The Court heard oral argument on the State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict

7

(Hall II) on August 26, 2010 and granted the motion at that hearing. After hearing oral argument and
8

carefully reviewing the extensive briefing filed by both parties on the issues of the scope and structure of
9

10
11

the Court's inquiry into the possible conflict of interest, the Court filed its Memorandum Decision and
Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel on December 27, 2010.

12

As described in earlier decisions of this Court, the SAPD has declined to share information

13

requested by the Court in furtherance of the Court's inquiry into whether the Petitioner is receiving

14

counsel. Il Even so, the inquiry has thus far revealed at least one instance where the SAPD
conflict-free counse1.

15

gave advice to trial counsel in Hall II, although no disclosure regarding the substance of that advice has

16

been made to the Court.
17

On January 10, 2011, the SAPD filed two motions on behalf of the Petitioner. The first was a
18
19

Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order, and the second was this Motion for Permission

20

to Appeal.
Appea1. To date, neither motion has been noticed for hearing. On February 11, 2011, the SAPD filed

21

a Motion for Permission to Appeal in the Idaho Supreme Court. This Court first learned of that filing

22

only through a notice it received from the Idaho Supreme Court. On February 23,2011, this Court was

23
24
25

26

1 The SAPO's representation that "counsel at the SAPO [has] determined that no conflict of interest actually exists" was made
on the record for the first time in this Motion for Permission to Appeal. Prior to this Motion, the SAPO has declined to render
an opinion whether a conflict of interest exists.
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ultimately provided a copy of the motion filed in the Idaho Supreme Court by an SAPD attorney. This
1

2
3

Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to Reconsider and Supplementing the
Original Decision and Order was filed on February 23,2011.
DISCUSSION

4
5

6

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that it is the SAPD which filed both the Motion to
Reconsider and the Motion for Permission to Appeal on behalf of the Petitioner, and not Dennis

7

Benjamin. On August 30, 2010, Mr. Benjamin filed a Limited Notice of Appearance, declaring that he
8

"enters a limited appearance as attorney for petitioner as to the conflict of interest only." When asked
9

direct questions about the possible conflict, the SAPD declined to answer and directed all questions to
10
11

Mr. Benjamin. The SAPD has repeatedly referred to Mr. Benjamin as "conflict counsel" with regard to

12

the issue of whether the Petitioner is receiving conflict-free counsel (as is his right). Yet, the SAPD has

13

now filed two motions on behalf of the Petitioner regarding the conflict issue. Even though the SAPD

14

has informed the Court that it does not represent the Petitioner on the conflict issue, the Court believes

15

that a complete record is important in this case, and will therefore consider the Motion for Permission to

16

Appeal on the merits.
17

Idaho Appellate Rule 12(a) provides that:
18

19
20
21

Permission may be granted by the Supreme Court to appeal from an interlocutory order or
judgment of a district court in a civil or criminal action, or from an interlocutory order of an
administrative agency, which is not otherwise appealable under these rules, but which involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and
in which an immediate appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly
resolution of the litigation.

22
23

24
25

Idaho Appellate Rule 12(b) describes the process by which a party must seek permission to appeal an
interlocutory order:
A motion for permission to appeal from an interlocutory order or judgment, upon the grounds set
forth in subdivision (a) of this rule, shall be filed with the district court or administrative agency

26
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1

2
3

within fourteen (14) days from date of entry of the order or judgment. The motion shall be filed,
served, noticed for hearing and processed in the same manner as any other motion, and
hearing of the motion shall be expedited. In criminal actions a motion filed by the defendant
shall be served upon the prosecuting attorney of the county. The court or agency shall, within
fourteen (14) days after the hearing, enter an order setting forth its reasoning for approving or
disapproving the motion.

4

5
6

(emphasis added). The Court notes that the Petitioner never noticed his Motion for Permission to
Appeal for hearing as set forth in Idaho Appellate Rule 12(b). Additionally, the Petitioner filed his

7

Motion to Reconsider on the same day that he filed his Motion for Permission to Appeal. This Court
8

regarded the Motion to Reconsider to be the threshold motion and considered it first because, had the
9

10
11

Court granted the Motion to Reconsider, the Motion for Permission to Appeal would have been moot.
Perhaps more importantly, it appears that the Petitioner has failed to present one of the issues on

12

which he now seeks appeal in the Idaho Supreme Court to this Court in his Motion for Permission to

13

Appeal filed January 10, 2011. The issues raised by the Petitioner in his Motion for Permission to

14

Appeal filed in this Court are as follows: (1) whether this Court may appoint an attorney where an

15

attorney hired by the SAPD has "already performed the very same inquiry" (See Motion for Permission
16

to Appeal, p. 4); (2) whether this Court may continue its inquiry to determine whether the Petitioner is
17
18

receiving conflict-free counsel on the record that presently exists (See Motion for Permission to Appeal,

19

p. 10); and (3) this Court's order requiring the SAPD to pay for independent conflict counsel appointed

20

by the Court (See Motion for Permission to Appeal, p.12).

21
22
23

In his Motion for Permission to Appeal filed in the Supreme Court on February 11, 2011, the

Petitioner presented the following issues to the Idaho Supreme Court in a section entitled "Issues for
Appeal":

24
25
26

Mr. Hall seeks an appeal on the following questions: (1) whether a district court is justified in
ordering a conflict inquiry where an evaluation of a possible conflict has already been conducted
by an independent attorney and the defendant does not raise a conflict; (2) whether an attorneyMEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 4
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,

1

2
3

.

client privilege exists during the representation of a client, when communications or file
information pertains to a pending case on which the client is being represented by other
attorneys; and (3) whether the district court violates the separation of powers by forcing the
SAPD to pay for services already provided under the statute designating the authority to provide
conflict counsel specifically to the SAPD.

4

The first and the third of the issues presented to the Idaho Supreme Court are issued raised by the
5
6

Petitioner in the Motion for Permission to Appeal filed in this Court. However, the issue regarding

7

attorney-client privilege was not raised in the Motion for Permission to Appeal filed in this Court on

8

January 10,2011.

9

10

Although the Court is aware of the different issues presented in the respective Motions for
Permission to Appeal, this Court is not tasked with deciding whether the Petitioner has violated the

11

Idaho Appellate Rules, and may only address the issues properly before this Court. Therefore, this Court
12

will limit its analysis to the issues presented in the Motion for Permission to Appeal filed in this Court
13

January 10,2011.
14
15

SAPD's Motivation for Filing
In a section entitled "Motivation for Filing," the SAPD states that "[n]ow it seems the State

16
17

will be automatically filing motions raising the issue of a conflict, whether or not there are facts to

18

support such a motion, in every capital post-conviction case the SAPD represents." In an apparent

19

attempt to support this speculative statement, the SAPD quotes select portions of the following sentence

20

from the Unites States Supreme Court's decision in Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988), in
21

which the Court held that district courts have substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflict of
22
23

24
25

interest:
Petitioner of course rightly points out that the Government may seek to 'manufacture' a conflict
in order to prevent a defendant from having a particularly able defense counsel at his side; but
trial courts are undoubtedly aware of this possibility, and must take it into consideration along
with all of the other factors which inform this sort of a decision.

26
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1

/d. This Court is aware of that possibility as a general matter, but the facts in the Ada County cases
!d.

2

where the conflict issue has arisen do not support a conclusion that the State is "manufacturing" a
3

possible conflict in this case and do not provide any basis for speculation that the State will attempt to
4

5
6

manufacture a possible conflict in the future.
In Abdullah v. State, the State never filed a motion for inquiry into a possible conflict of interest.

7

In fact, the conflict issue was raised by the Court based upon the record in that case. In Payne v. State,

8

the factual basis for the State's Motion for Inquiry was telephone records showing that the petitioner in

9

that case was placing regular and lengthy telephone calls to the SAPD's office during the time of his re
re-

10

sentencing proceedings when Payne was represented by trial counsel and was not being represented by
11

the SAPD.2
SAPD. 2 In this case, the SAPD itself alerted the Court to the possibility of a conflict and the inquiry
12
13

to date has shown that the SAPD gave advice to Hall II trial counsel. Thus, if the three cases listed

14

above support the SAPD's claim that the conflict issue is "now routinely being raised in all capital post-

15

conviction cases," it is only because the facts of those cases called the issue into question.

16
17

In two of the three cases in which the conflict issue has arisen, the facts show that attorneys from
the SAPD's office gave advice to trial counsel in a capital case where the SAPD knew or should have

18

known that it would be appointed to represent the defendant in the appellate and post-conviction
19

proceedings. The Court found an actual conflict of interest in the Abdullah case. In this case (and now
20
21
22
23

the subject of this decision), the inquiry into whether a conflict of interest exists has not been completed.
As the Court has noted on several occasions, the SAPD was correct in filing the Ex Parte Notice of
Possible Conflict of Interest. Additionally, the SAPD has admitted that there is an appearance of a

24
25
26

2 The SAPD provided the information requested by the Court in furtherance of its inquiry in that case. That inquiry has
concluded and the Court has detennined that the SAPD is not conflicted in its representation of Mr. Payne in that case.
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possible conflict of interest in this case. The facts before this Court simply do not support any inference
1

2

that the State is seeking to "manufacture" a conflict now or that they will do so in the future. Although

3

the SAPD's motivation for filing the Motion for Permission to Appeal is based upon speculation

4

concerning actions not yet taken by the State, this Court will analyze each of the three issues raised in

5

the Motion for Permission to Appeal.

6
7

I.

Whether this Court may Appoint an Attorney Where an Attorney Hired by the SAPD

8

has "Already Performed the Very Same Inquiry This Court Ordered"
9

10
11

The premise for this statement is that Dennis Benjamin, an attorney hired by the SAPD prior to
notifying the Court of a possible conflict of interest, has "already performed the very same inquiry this

12

Court ordered" Keith Roark to undertake. That statement is factually incorrect for several reasons

13

outlined in previous decisions and incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein, including the fact

14

that Mr. Benjamin did not have the power to depose. Likewise, the SAPD's argument that this Court's

15

shopping," comparing it to a "litigant's efforts to find a
appointment of Mr. Roark amounts to "attorney shopping,"

16

particularly sympathetic forum and manipulate the system in their favor," has no basis in fact because
17

such an argument assumes that the Court is seeking a particular outcome. This Court is conducting its
18
19
20
21
22
23

inquiry for no reason other than to determine whether this capital Petitioner is receiving the benefit of his
constitutional right to conflict-free counsel.
It appears that the SAPD is arguing that if it discloses a possible conflict of interest but hires
other counsel who represents to the Court that the possible conflict is actually no conflict at all (even
without providing the factual bases for that conclusion), then the Court must rely on the representations

24

of counsel and may either: (1) inquire no further; or (2) may inquire further but may not appoint
25

independent conflict counsel other than that already chosen by potentially conflicted counsel.
26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 7

001981

"In order to ensure that a defendant receives conflict-free counsel, a trial court has an affil1llative
1

2

duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever it knows or 'reasonably should know that a particular

3

conflict may exist.'"
exist.'" State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703, 215 P.3d 414, 423 (2009)(quoting State v.

4

Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278, 285 (2003)). A Court engaged in an inquiry into whether a

5

conflict of interest exists is not required to rely on the representations of counsel and "may inquire

6

further into the facts ...
..."" Id. at 704, 215 P.3d at 424. The SAPD has cited no legal authority that stands

7

for the proposition that a Court undertaking a judicial inquiry into whether a Petitioner is receiving
8

conflict-free counsel is limited in how it may structure that inquiry by any action taken by potentially
9

10

conflicted counsel. Idaho law is clear that a court is not required to rely on the representations of

11

counsel. Thus, there is no controlling question of law or substantial grounds for difference of opinion

12

regarding whether this Court may appoint independent conflict counsel during the course of a judicial

13

inquiry into a possible conflict of interest.

14
15

Additionally, there is no controlling question of law or substantial grounds for difference of
opinion regarding whether this Court's order appointing Mr. Roark as independent conflict counsel

16

interferes with the Petitioner's right to choice of counsel. In the event that this Court eventually
17

detel1llines that a conflict exists, the Petitioner may under certain circumstances make an intelligent,
18
19
20

knowing and voluntary waiver of the conflict.
In support of the proposition that the appointment of Mr. Roark constitutes an impel1llissible

21

intrusion into an established attorney-client relationship, the Petitioner cites to an Alaska Court of

22

Appeals case where that Court noted that such an intrusion is justified "only upon a substantial showing

23

of necessity." Knix v. State, 922 P.2d 913, 919 n.7 (Alaska Ct.App. 1996). However, that Court goes on

24

to list "a potential conflict between [the defendants] and their attorneys" as one of the circumstances
25

"warranting interference with [the defendants'] established attorney-client relationships." Id. The
26
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SAPD opines that only "an actual conflict, or serious potential for a conflict" warrants the appointment
1

2

of independent counsel. (emphasis in the original). However, the SAPD cites no law in support of that

3

statement. Moreover, this Court takes very seriously any potential conflict of interest in a capital

4

proceeding where a Petitioner's very life is at stake.

5
6

II.

Whether this Court may Continue its Inquiry to Determine Whether the Petitioner is

7

Receiving Conflict-free Counsel on the Record that Presently Exists
8

After disclosing the possible conflict of interest in its Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict, the
9

SAPD has declined to share information requested by the Court in furtherance of the Court's inquiry into
10
11

whether the Petitioner is receiving conflict-free counsel. Now, having failed to provide a level of

12

disclosure adequate for this Court to determine whether the SAPD's contact with and advice given to

13

Hall II trial counsel constitutes an actual conflict of interest, the SAPD argues that "this Court cannot

14

point to any factual basis that would result in a requirement that the Court conduct further inquiry into a

15

conflict of interest." As this Court has explained previously, the inquiry to date has revealed that

16

attorneys at the SAPD's office gave advice to Hall IT trial counsel. Mr. Benjamin has stated his
17

conclusion that the advice did not constitute a conflict of interest; however, he did not disclose the
18
19

factual bases for that conclusion. In addition, the SAPD's earlier failure to disclose the factual bases for

20

its decision to file the Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict leaves this Court with no information

21

regarding whether one contact may represent a potential conflict of interest or if more than one of the

22

contacts between the SAPD and Hall IT trial counsel may represent a potential conflict of interest.

23

Therefore, there are facts in the present record which warrant further inquiry.

24

Idaho law requires that an adequate inquiry must be "thorough and searching" and conducted on
25

the record. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 704, 215 P.3d 414, 424 (2009). At the conclusion of an
26
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adequate inquiry, a court must determine whether a conflict actually exists. !d. For the foregoing
1

2

reasons, this Court finds that the issue of whether the Court may continue its inquiry on the present

3

record does not present a controlling question of law for which there is substantial grounds for difference

4

of opinion.

5

6

III.

Whether this Court's Order Requiring the SAPD to pay for Independent Conflict

7

Counsel Appointed by the Court is Permissible
8

The SAPD argues that "[
d]espite being informed by the SAPD it had no budgetary resources to
"[d]espite
9

10
11

pay for Court appointed conflict counsel, this Court disregarded the information and nevertheless
ordered the SAPD to pay for conflict counsel to represent Mr. Hall. In so doing, this Court has

12

effectively defeated the legislature's intent in creating the SAPD and the capital crimes defense fund,

13

and has exceeded its jurisdiction." This Court is aware of the current budget constraints facing nearly

14

all state governmental agencies, including the SAPD. However, this capital Petitioner has the

15

constitutional right to conflict-free counsel even during a recession.

16

The SAPD argues that this Court's order "is an attempt to defeat the legislative intent in creating
17

both the SAPD office and the capital crimes defense fund." The legislature's statement of intent in
18
19
20
21
22

23

creating the SAPD office is found at Idaho Code § 19-868 and reads as follows:
The legislature recognizes that the cost of legal representation of indigent defendants upon the
appeal of their criminal convictions, particularly convictions for first-degree murder, is an
extraordinary burden on the counties of this state. In order to reduce this burden, provide
competent counsel but avoid paying high hourly rates to independent counsel to represent
indigent defendants in appellate proceedings, the legislature hereby creates the office of the state
appellate public defender.

24

The SAPD's argument that the fact that this Court assigned the cost of independent counsel in this case
25

involving an indigent Petitioner convicted of first-degree murder to it rather than to Ada County amounts
26
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to "an attempt to defeat the legislative intent" is curious considering that the express intent of the Idaho
1

2
3
4

5
6

legislature in creating the office of the SAPD was to relieve the "extraordinary burden on the counties of
this state." I.e. § 19-868.
In addition, the SAPD argues that pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-860(b), Ada County and not the

SAPD is responsible for the cost. However, the SAPD's reliance on I.C. § 19-860(b) is misplaced
because Idaho Code § 19-860(b) applies to county public defenders and indigent criminal defendants

7

facing a formal charge. Here, the Petitioner has already been convicted. A petition for post-conviction
8

relief is a special proceeding that is civil in nature; it is a proceeding entirely new and independent from
9

the criminal action which led to the conviction. Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 808 P.2d 373 (1991);
10
11

Matthews v. State, 130 Idaho 39, 936 P.2d 682 (Ct. App. 1997).

12

The SAPD argues further that Idaho Code § 19-4904 provides that a county bear the cost of the

13

representation in post-conviction cases. That is true in almost all post-conviction cases. However, one

14

exception to that rule is where, as here, the post-conviction relief proceeding is in a capital case in which

15

the Petitioner was sentenced on or after September 1, 1998. Idaho Code § 19-870(1)(d) requires that the

16

SAPD provide for representation in those cases so long as the county participates in the capital crimes
17

defense fund. Further, Idaho Code § 19-871 provides that when the SAPD is unable to carry out such
18
19
20

duties, other counsel shall be "compensated out of the budget of the state appellate public defender."
The SAPD argues that this Court's reliance on I.C. § 19-871 is misplaced because "no

21

determination was made by the SAPD that it was unable to carry out the duties required in the act."

22

First, the statute does not require that the SAPD make a determination that it is unable to carry out the

23

duties required in the act; it simply requires that the SAPD "be unable to carry out the duties required in

24

this act." I.C. § 19-871 (emphasis added). Second, the SAPD has failed to provide requested
25

information during the course of this Court's judicial inquiry and has in fact stated that it is unable to
26
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answer questions posed by the Court because it does not represent the Petitioner on the conflict issue.
1

2

The SAPD's failure to provide requested information, even after this Court's order commencing a

3

judicial inquiry, combined with Mr. Benjamin's failure to provide the Court with the factual bases for

4

his conclusions have left the SAPD and its choice of conflict counsel unable to render sufficient

5

assistance to this Court in light of its duty to determine whether the Petitioner is receiving conflict-free

6

counsel-a determination which must be made before this case may proceed.

7

Therefore, this Court finds that for the purposes of the judicial inquiry to determine whether the
8

Petitioner is receiving conflict-free counsel, the SAPD has shown itself to be unable to carry out its
9

10

duties as contemplated by I.e. § 19-871. Ada County contributes to the capital crimes defense fund, and

11

the SAPD was appointed to this case pursuant to I.e. § 19-870(1)(d). Idaho Code Section § 19-871

12

provides that provides that when the SAPD is unable to carry out such duties because of a conflict of

13

interest or any other reason, other counsel shall be "compensated out of the budget of the state appellate

14

public defender." For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that its order that the SAPD pay for Mr.

15

Roark's services as independent conflict counsel does not present a controlling question of law for which

16

there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion.
17

CONCLUSION
18
19

In each of the Ada County cases cited by the SAPD, the factual bases for judicial inquiry into

20

conflict of interest involved actions taken by the SAPD and not by the State. Therefore, the SAPD's

21

stated motivation for filing its Motion for Permission to Appeal (that "the State will be automatically

22

filing motions raising the issue of a conflict, whether or not there are facts to support such a motion") is

23

based on speCUlation
speculation and is not grounded in fact. After carefully considering each of the grounds

24

presented to this Court for requesting permission to appeal, the Court concludes that none of the issues
25

cited present controlling questions of law for which there are substantial grounds for difference of
26
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opinion. Moreover, granting the Motion for Permission to Appeal would not materially advance the
1

2
3

orderly resolution of the ligitation; rather, it would cause needless delay. Accordingly, this Court
DENIES the Motion for Permission to Appeal. AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

4

5

Dated this ffiay of
6

7

8

~

,2011.

Thomas F. Neville
District Judge
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
Capital Litigation Unit
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,

v.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV PC 080 3085

MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO
APPEAL SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER

(CAPITAL CASE)

ORrSINAL

COMES NOW Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his attorneys at the office of the
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), and hereby moves this Honorable Court for
permission to appeal, pursuant to the Idaho Appellate Rules, Rule 12, from this Court's

Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to Reconsider; and Supplementing the
Original Decision and Order (hereinafter, Supplemental Order) filed February 23, 2011.

I.

RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 27,2010, the Court filed its Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith

Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel (hereinafter, Memorandum Decision). Mr. Hall timely
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filed a Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order (hereinafter, Motion to Reconsider)
on January 10,2011. Contemporaneously with the Motion to Reconsider, Mr. Hall filed a Motion
for Permission to Appeal with the court, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12, which required
Mr. Hall to seek permission to appeal from the district court within fourteen (14) days from the date

of entry of the order at issue. Once the district court failed to rule on the motion within the twentyone (21) days from the date of the filing of the motion, Mr. Hall was allowed to file a motion with
the Supreme Court without any order of the district court]. Mr. Hall filed a Motion for Permission
38528to Appeal with the Supreme Court on February 11, 2011 (Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 38528
2011 ).
On February 23, 2011, the Court issued its Supplemental Order denying Mr. Hall's Motion
to Reconsider and clarifying certain aspects of its original order.

The Supplemental Order

authorizes Mr. Roark to view the files of the SAPD even in the absence of a waiver from Mr. Hall.
Supplemental Order, p.5, Ls.18-25. In addition, the court ordered that all employees and attorneys

at the SAPD are ordered to cooperate with Mr. Roark during the course of his investigation,
regardless of any attorney-client privilege that may exist, because I.R.P.C. 1.6(b)(6) permits the
breaching of any privilege in order to comply with a court order. Supplemental Order, p.5, L.25 p.6, L.3.
II. JURISDICTION

[d]
In his original Motion for Permission to Appeal filed with the court, Mr. Hall "reserve
"reserve[d]
the right to amend this motion for permissive appeal to include any further findings of this Court."
Motion for Permission to Appeal, p.2, Ls.7-8. However, because Mr. Hall had already filed a
Motion for Permission to Appeal with the Supreme Court when the court issued its most recent

] The court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion for Permission to
Appeal on March 4, 2011.
MOTION FOR PERNIISSION TO APPEAL SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
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Supplemental Order, Mr. Hall is not permitted under the Idaho Rules of Appellate Procedure to
simply amend his prior Motion Jor
for Permission to Appeal at this point in time. See I.A.R. 12. In
order to establish proper jurisdiction, the rules clearly state that any motion to the Supreme Court
must be preceded by "a motion for permission to appeal from an interlocutory order or judgment"
l2(b). Because Mr. Hall did not have the opportunity to request the
to the District Court. I.A.R. 12(b).
court's permission to appeal the clarification of its orders as laid forth in its Supplemental Order
when he filed his original Motion Jor
for Permission to Appeal, Mr. Hall believes he must now file the
instant motion prior to asking the Supreme Court to consider the court's denial of his Motion to

Reconsider.
III. ARGUMENT
In the absence of any controlling Idaho case law on the relevant question of law, Mr. Hall
requests the court grant him permission to appeal the Supplemental Order to the Idaho Supreme
Court. In accordance with Idaho Appellate Rule 12, the order presents a controlling question of
law where there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion, and presents a situation where an
immediate appeal would protect Mr. Hall's significant and substantial rights, and materially
advance the resolution of these post-conviction proceedings.
A. This Court's Order Presents A Controlling Question Of Law
The specific controlling question of law is whether attorneys and other employees of the
SAPD should release the contents of its files and cooperate with the investigation of Mr. Roark,
where: (1) such a release and cooperation would breach and violate the existing attorney-client
privilege with Mr. Hall; (2) Mr. Hall has not granted a waiver of his attorney-client privilege with
the SAPD; (3) the court has indicated that the breach of attorney-client privilege is in compliance
with the exceptions provided in I.R.P.C. 1.6(b)(6), specifically in compliance with a court order;
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(4) the court's order is pursuant to its affinnative "duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever
it knows or 'reasonably should know that a particular conflict may exist. '" State v. Severson, 147
Idaho 694, 703 (2009) (internal citation omitted); (5) after a thorough and independent review,
Mr. Benjamin has represented to the Court that no conflict exists between Mr. Hall and the SAPD,
and neither Mr. Hall nor his conflict-attorney, Mr. Benjamin, have requested further inquiry into
the possibility of any conflict; and, (6) the basis for the court's further inquiry is rooted in the
contents of the Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest filed on June 29, 2010, and the

Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin filed on August 30, 2010. The foregoing facts present an issue of
first-impression for the Idaho courts.
1.

Existence Of An Attorney-Client Privilege
As Mr. Hall has argued in previous submissions to the Court, the SAPD has had a

continuous, uninterrupted attorney-client relationship with Mr. Hall since its appointment as postpost
conviction counsel in Hall I on January 25, 2005. That attorney-client relationship certainly exists
for the current staff at the SAPD, but also extends to those attorneys no longer working for the
SAPD. See I.R.P.C. 1.6, Comment 19 ("The duty of confidentiality continues after the client
clientlawyer relationship has tenninated."); I.R.P.C. 1.9, Comment 1 ("After tennination of a client
clientlawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and
conflicts of interest".)
According to the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, "a lawyer shall not reveal
infonnation relating to representation of a client unless the client gives infonned consent." I.R.P.C.
1.6(a). Elsewhere, the rules state that "a lawyer should keep in confidence infonnation relating to
representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required or pennitted." I.R.P.C. Preamble
,-r4. To release the SAPD's entire files to anyone, even where that person is another attorney
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selected by the Court, would be a clear breach of the attorney-client privilege. The court's order
does not limit Mr. Roark's authorization to view the SAPD files in any way. Supplemental Order,
p.5, L.25. Those files would include all client communications, notes, communications with others
involved in the case, work-product, memoranda, and investigation materials. The court also orders
the SAPD cooperate if questioned by Mr. Roark, "subject to a court order." Supplemental Order,
p.6, Ls.l-2.
2. Absence Of A Waiver From Mr. Hall
Mr. Hall has not granted informed consent to the SAPD to share his files with anyone other
than Mr. Benjamin for the purpose of conducting an investigation into a possible conflict. See
Appendix 9 to Motion to Reconsider (Authorization for Release of Information to Dennis
Benjamin). The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct make it clear that in the absence of the
client's informed consent, a lawyer is only permitted to reveal information relating to
representation in very limited circumstances. The applicable exception in this case, as the court has
noted in its Supplemental Order, is "to comply with other law or a court order." I.R.P.C. 1.6(b)(6).
3. Compliance With A Court Order Under I.R.P.C. 1.6(b)(6)
Mr. Hall acknowledges that his attorneys are permitted to breach attorney-client privilege in

releasing information pursuant to a court order to do so. "A lawyer may be ordered to reveal
information relating to the representation of a client by a court ... to compel the disclosure."
I.R.P.C. 1.6 Comment 13. However, the Rules of Professional Conduct do not permit immediate
capitulation, but instead require that "absent informed consent of the client to do otherwise, the
lawyer should assert on behalf of the client all nonfrivolous claims that the order is not authorized
by other law or that the information sought is protected against disclosure by the attorney-client
privilege or other applicable law."

Id.

Mr. Hall's litigation surrounding the court's order
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appointing Mr. Roark represents such an effort. "In the event of an adverse ruling, the lawyer must
consult with the client about the possibility of appeal to the extent required by Rule 1.4." Id. The
court's Supplemental Order constitutes the adverse ruling contemplated in the Commentary to Rule
1.6, and this instant motion is Mr. Hall's effort to pursue an appeal of that order.
4. The Court's Independent Duty To Inquire Into A Potential Conflict
Mr. Hall agrees that the "trial court has an affinnative duty to inquire into a potential
conflict whenever it knows or 'reasonably should know that a particular conflict may exist.
exist.'"'" State
v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703 (2009) (quoting State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60 (2003))
(emphasis added). The "substantial grounds for a difference of opinion" as contemplated in Idaho
Appellate Rule 12(a) surround the interpretation of what constitutes a reasonable basis for the Court
to conclude that a particular conflict may exist.
The court has found that the SAPD's filings disclosed that (1) SAPD attorneys may have
had contact with trial counsel in Hall II that may present a conflict of interest; (2) SAPD attorneys
were concerned about a conflict of interest; (3) the SAPD hired Mr. Benjamin to independently
evaluate the conflict; and, (4) Mr. Benjamin was hired to evaluate the conflict and advise Mr. Hall
as to any waiver. Supplemental Order, p.2, Ls.20-25. In addition, the Court has found that the
inquiry has "revealed at least one instance where the SAPD gave advice to trial counsel in Hall II."
Id. p.3, L.6.

5. Mr. Benjamin Represented That No Conflict Exists And Mr. Hall Does Not Request Further
Inquiry
Mr. Benjamin explained in his affidavit that although there was contact between SAPD
lawyers and Hall II trial counsel, those contacts do not constitute a conflict under Idaho case law.

See Affidavit oj Dennis Benjamin,

~1O.

Mr. Benjamin recognizes that in one instance SAPD

lawyers did offer advice to Mr. Hall's attorneys, but the advice given presented no conflict for the
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SAPD. Id. at ~12. After his review and evaluation, Mr. Benjamin met with Mr. Hall and consulted
with him. Id. at ~5. Mr. Hall has never directly, or indirectly through Mr. Benjamin, expressed any
concern to the court that he had a potential conflict with the SAPD.
6. Basis For The Court's Further Inquiry
The Rules of Professional Responsibility require lawyers identify conflicts of interest. See

generally I.R.P.C. 1.7 and 1.8. In addition, "[t]o determine whether a conflict of interest exists, a
lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice,
to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the person and issues involved." I.R.P.C.
1.7, Comment 3. Here, the SAPD adopted a reasonable procedure in notifying the court of its
intent to contract Mr. Benjamin to represent Mr. Hall in order to evaluate whether a conflict exists,
and to advise Mr. Hall on any waiver of that conflict. The result of that evaluation is represented
by the findings in Mr. Benjamin's affidavit to the court. The court indicates in its Supplemental

Order that these procedures undertaken by the SAPD provide the very grounds that require a
judicial inquiry. See Supplemental Order, p.6, Ls.13-16.
B. As To The Controlling Question Of Law There Are Grounds For A Substantial Difference
Of Opinion

There are no Idaho appellate decisions which indisputably cover the facts presented in the
case before the Court.

During the recent course of litigation, several Idaho cases concerning

conflict have been cited as relevant to the court's obligation.

However, each of those cases

consider facts very different from those presented here.
The case of State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694 (2009), presents an extensive discussion ofthe
court's obligation to conduct a "thorough and searching" examination. Id. at 704. However, in that
case Mr. Severson had been appointed counsel "despite Severson's objection that he had a conflict
of interest" and had argued that "the appointment of [counsel] violated his right to be represented
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by conflict-free counsel." ld. at 701. The Supreme Court made clear that "because Severson
objected to the conflict of interest at trial, the court had an affirmative duty to inquire into the
potential conflict." ld. at 704. In light of that crucial fact, the Supreme Court indicates that the trial
court "'must make the kind of inquiry that might ease the defendant's dissatisfaction, distrust, or
concern. '"

F .2d 1314, 1320 (8 th Cir. 1991)).
ld. (quoting Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d

Here, the

defendant has not made an objection, requested different counsel, or shown any dissatisfaction,
distrust, or concern about his representation by the SAPD?
In Severson, the Supreme Court also relies on the legal precedent established by State v.
Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53 (2003). In Lovelace, the prosecution first moved that defense counsel be

disqualified because of a conflict with his ongoing campaign to seek the position of county
prosecutor. ld. at 59. Lovelace later filed a motion to dismiss his trial counsel "due to a possible
future conflict of interest" and requested he be allowed to proceed pro se. ld. Although the court
refused to appoint new counsel at· that time, a new lawyer was appointed once his original attorney
was sworn in as county prosecutor. ld. In that case, the Supreme Court noted that "whenever a
trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict may exist, the trial court has a
duty of inquiry.") ld. at 60. Once again, Mr. Hall has never made a request for new counsel, and
the court does not have in its possession any specific facts that a conflict exists, stating that "this
Court is presently lacking the factual background necessary to make such a determination."
Supplemental Order, p.6, Ls.22-23.

It should be noted that the Supreme Court refused to find that a conflict existed even where
another public defender that worked in the same office as Mr. Severson's trial counsel had
represented the mother of the victim in a civil suit directly relating to Mr. Severson's criminal case.
ld. at 701.
) The Supreme Court found that "Lovelace provided no facts to suggest that counsel allowed
anything adversely to affect his representation" ld. at 61, and that "the district court's denial of
relief on the conflict of interest claim was proper." ld. at 62.
2
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Finally, in State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256 (Ct. App. 2003), the Court of Appeals considered
whether the defendant deserved a new trial after the trial court had undertaken appointed conflict
counsel to advise the defendant about the effects of an actual conflict known by the court, and the
defendant had subsequently waived any conflict. The Court of Appeals found that the record
reflected the "district court had before it statements from defense counsel that there was a possible
conflict and that Lopez had agreed to continued representation." Id. at 259. The statements made
[ ... ] in a
by defense counsel included information that his "same firm had represented the victim [...
criminal matter eleven years earlier." Id. at 257. The trial court appointed a public defender to
counsel and advise the defendant of his rights, and a hearing was held to inquire further into the
issue. Id. at 259. The trial court subsequently granted a new trial after the jury found Lopez guilty,
"based on the court's conclusion that it had not adequately inquired into the conflict and had
improperly determined the conflict to be waivable." Id. at 257. The Court of Appeals found that
"the inquiry into the potential conflict was adequate" and reversed the trial court's decision

4

•

Id. at

259. In the instant case, Mr. Hall has been afforded the advice of an independent conflict attorney
and has decided not to raise any conflict issues.
None of the Idaho cases mentioned provide clear guidance as to whether the SAPD should
release privileged information in the absence of a waiver, where the Court orders a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege in order to inquire into a conflict where Mr. Hall has chosen not to raise

4 The Court of Appeals noted in making its decision that "[c]onflicts can be divided into those
which implicate the attorneys own self-interest and those which implicate the attorneys ethical
obligation to someone other than the defendant, and the former are often more serious than the
latter." Id. at 260. The court should note that any potential conflict which would implicate the
attorneys "own self-interest" would not apply to the present case since neither Mark Ackley nor
Paula Swensen represent Mr. Hall, and any conflict with those attorneys would not be imputed to
other attorneys at the SAPD under State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784 (Ct. App. 2007) and State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694 (2009).
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the issue or make an objection to the SAPD's continued representation. Although these cases more
clearly speak to the nature of a court's inquiry, they do not adequately address the SAPD's
obligation to cooperate under court order where such cooperation conflicts with the duties imposed
by the attorney-client privilege.
C. A Permissive Appeal Would Materially Advance The Resolution Of The Proceedings
Once the attorney-client privilege is waived by forcing the SAPD to release its files to
another party, the privilege is waived forever and the protection cannot be restored. It is a classic
case of never being able to unring a bell. If Mr. Roark is granted access to the SAPD's protected
files, or if SAPD attorneys are ordered to answer his questions during his investigation or at a
deposition, and Mr. Roark subsequently reports his findings to the Court, the attorney-client
privilege is forever vanquished. A permissive appeal is the only manner by which Mr. Hall can
protect his ongoing attorney-client privilege with either the SAPD or Mr. Benjamin.
IV. CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Because the court's most recent Supplemental Order presents a controlling question of law
as to which there remains grounds for a substantial difference of opinion, and where an immediate
appeal would materially advance the resolution of these proceedings while still protecting
Mr. Hall's rights, the court should grant the opportunity to file a permissive appeal with the Idaho
Supreme Court. Consequently, Mr. Hall respectfully requests this Court grant permission to appeal
from this Court's post-conviction Supplemental Order issued on February 23, 2011, and then stay
these post-conviction proceedings pending resolution of the appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court.
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Respectfully submitted this

i h day of March, 2011.

u~

IAN H. THOMSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

l)JJJh
D.
lJillh
N1C6LEOWENS
N1C6iEOWENS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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Jan M. Bennetts
Idaho State Bar No. 4606
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,

vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-PC-2008-03085
STATE'S RESPONSE TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL
SUPPLEMENT ORDER

------------)
--------------------------)

COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and responds to the Petitioner's Motion for Permission to
Appeal Supplement Order filed on March 7, 2011. The State objects to the Petitioner's
Motion for Permission to Appeal Supplemental Order.
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It appears that the Petitioner's Motion reiterates, in large part, what has already
been presented to this Court in previous State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) filings
regarding this issue. This Court has already denied the Motion for Pennission to Appeal
regarding the three issues presented to it:

(l) appointment of Keith Roark; (2) this

Court's continued conflict inquiry; and, (3) this Court requiring the SAPD to pay for the
appointment of Keith Roark. (See Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion
for Pennission to Appeal, March 4, 2011.)

In denying the Petitioner's Motion for

Pennission to Appeal, this Court concluded that none of these three issues presented a
controlling question of law for which there is substantial grounds for difference of
opinion.
There do not appear to be any new arguments or infonnation that would require this
Court to change its ruling denying the Motion for Pennission to Appeal. It is also worth
noting that the SAPD argues that "Mr. Hall has never directly, or indirectly through Mr.
Benjamin, expressed any concern to the court that he had a potential conflict with the
SAPD." This Court should reject that argument. First, it is the Court's duty, and the
Court's duty alone, to detennine if there is a conflict regardless of whether the Petitioner
has expressed a concern because there is an independent basis from which this Court has
detennined that it does have a duty to inquire. Second, as the SAPD well know, this will be
an issue that is appealed long after the SAPD no longer represents the Petitioner. If this
Court fails to conduct an inquiry or bases its decision on the lack of record currently before
it, there will be no way for a future appellate court to detennine whether the inquiry was

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO
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sufficient. Further, the Petitioner will then claim in a future appeal that there was a conflict;
contlict;
that it was not sufficiently developed on the record; that he failed to understand the nature
of the conflict; and/or that he would not have waived it. At this time, there is nothing in the
record to suggest that the Petitioner could even make a knowing, intelligent and voluntary
waiver of a conflict should one exist.
In addition to the above, the SAPD is also now arguing to this Court that the
Petitioner should be permitted to appeal regarding the attorney-client privilege issue.
This Court stated as follows in its Memorandum and Decision Denying the Motion to
Reconsider filed on February 23, 2011 at page 5:

However, the Court need not decide whether counsel other than the SAPD
is required because I.R.P.C. 1.6(b)(6) provides that a lawyer may reveal
information relating to the representation of a client if such disclosure is
necessary "to comply with other law or a court order." This Court is
conducting a lawful judicial inquiry in order to determine whether the
Petitioner is receiving conflict-free counsel. Further, this Court has entered
an order appointing Keith Roark as independent conflict counsel
representing the Petitioner and who therefore is bound by attorney-client
privilege.
The State is not persuaded by the SAPD arguments regarding the attorney-client
privilege that an immediate appeal is appropriate. Courts are often engaged in making
inquiries that require disclosure of attorney-client privileges to a Judge, outside the presence
of the State, under certain circumstances where the Court has a duty to inquire. For
example, when a defendant requests a different public defender or claims that there is an
issue with his or her defense attorney that needs to be addressed, the Court will clear the
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courtroom, require the State to leave the courtroom and will conduct an inquiry outside the
presence of everyone except the court reporter so that the Court can inquire. The Court will
then inquire of both defense counsel and the defendant, outside the presence of the State,
about the nature of the issue. This inquiry requires the defense attorney and/or defendant to
reveal privileged information for the limited purpose of the Court determining what action
to take, if any.
The Petitioner has failed to establish that there is a controlling question of law for
which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion. He has further failed to
establish that an immediate appeal would materially advance the orderly resolution of this
litigation. If anything, an interlocutory appeal will cause unnecessary delay.
For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons the State has set forth in its previous
filings surrounding this conflict issue, which are incorporated herein, the State requests
that this Court deny the Motion for Permission to Appeal Supplemental Order.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this!l!!:... day of March 2011.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor

~1Itn4
By. an M. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing STATE'S

RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL
SUPPLEMENT ORDER was delivered to the State Appellate Public Defender's Office,
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100, Boise, Idaho 83703 through the United States
Mail, this

£.

day of March 2011.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTMcT OF

15 2011
MAR 15

2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CHRISTOPHER D. RIC , Clerk

3

By JANET ELLIS
DEPUTY

4

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
5
6
7

Petitioner,

CV -PC-2008-03085
Case No. CV-PC-2008-03085

vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
DENYING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO
APPEAL SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER

8

9

10

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

11

12
13

14

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

As discussed in previous decisions issued by this Court in this case, which are hereby
incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein, this Court has a duty to detennine whether the

15

SAPD is providing capital Petitioner Erick Virgil Hall with conflict-free counsel in light of the fact that
16

the SAPD had contact with Petitioner's trial counsel; that contact included at least one instance where
17
18

19

advice was given; and the SAPD has now filed claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
of counsel on behalf of the Petitioner.

20

On December 27,2010, this Court filed its Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith

21

Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel. On January 10, 2011, the SAPD filed three motions on behalf

22

of Petitioner. The two motions relevant to this decision are the Motion for Pennission to Appeal and the

23

Motion to Reconsider. In its Motion to Reconsider, the SAPD argued that independent counsel should
24

not be appointed by this Court for various reasons, including possible attorney-client privilege issues.
25
26

~
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Even so, the SAPD chose not to request pennission to appeal that issue in its Motion for Pennission to
1

2
3

Appeal filed with this Court on the same day.
In its Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion for Pennission to Appeal filed

4

March 4,2011, this Court noted that the SAPD requested pennission to appeal the attorney-client

5

privilege issue in its Motion for Pennission to Appeal filed in the Idaho Supreme Court, but that the

6

SAPD failed to request pennission to appeal that issue in this Court as required by Idaho Appellate Rule

7

12(b). Three days later, on March 7, 2011, the SAPD filed its Motion for Pennission to Appeal
8

Supplemental Order.
9

10

DISCUSSION

11

The issues argued by the SAPD in the Motion for Pennission to Appeal Supplemental Order are

12

a repeat of arguments made by the SAPD in previous motions, including the Motion to Reconsider filed

13

the same day as the first Motion for Pennission to Appeal. The Motion to Reconsider contained an

14

entire section entitled "The SAPD Has Been Willing to Share Infonnation with the Court Whenever

15

There is No Attorney-Client Privilege," yet the SAPD chose not to raise that issue in the first Motion for
16

Pennission to Appeal. This Court's supplement to its original decision in the order denying the Motion
17
18

to Reconsider filed February 23,2011 was simply a restatement of its order filed December 27,2010 and

19

did not change the order filed December 27,2010. The restatement was issued because it was clear from

20

the briefs filed by the SAPD in this case that it had become necessary to plainly restate the obvious-that

21

Keith Roark had been appointed independent conflict counsel pursuant to this Court's Memorandum

22

preDecision and Order filed December 27,2010; that "a thorough and searching review of the SAPD's pre

23

trial, trial and pre-sentence involvement in the trial of Hall II" might include a review of SAPD files; and

24

that those questioned or deposed by Mr. Roark during his investigation were acting pursuant to a lawful
25

judicial inquiry and were subject to a court order.
26
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In its Motion for Permission to Appeal Supplemental Order, the SAPD admits that it has
1

2

argued the attorney-client issue "in previous submissions to the Court." Indeed, the arguments that the

3

SAPD makes in the Motion for Permission to Appeal Supplemental Order are no different than the

4

arguments that the SAPD made in prior filings. Nevertheless, permission to appeal was not timely

5

requested in this Court with regard to the attorney-client privilege issue even though the SAPD made the

6

same arguments in the Motion to Reconsider filed on the same day as the first Motion for Permission to

7

Appeal, and even though the SAPD later requested appeal on that issue in the Idaho Supreme Court.
8

Following this Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as
9

10

Independent Conflict Counsel filed December 27,2010, the SAPD failed to file a motion for permission

11

to appeal the attorney-client privilege issue within fourteen (14) days from date of entry of the order or

12

LA.R. 12(b). The fact that it was necessary for this Court (in the Order Denying
judgment as required by I.A.R.

13

the Motion to Reconsider) to remind counsel that the order of December 27, 2010 was indeed a court

14

order does not reset the clock.

15

CONCLUSION

16
17
18
19
20
21

The Petitioner's present Motion for Permission to Appeal addresses no issue which could not
have been raised within fourteen days following this Court's Memorandum Decision Appointing Keith
Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel filed December 27,2010. Therefore, the present motion is not
timely pursuant to I.A.R.
LA.R. 12(b). Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Petitioner's Motion for Permission
to Appeal. AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

22

Dated this
23
24

t5~ay ot(\A~A~

,2011.

ar~o.~
ar~o.~
Thomas F. Neville
District Judge

25
26
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1

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

2
3

I hereby certify that on this ,{,
,;- day of

~ 2011, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of

the within instrument to:
4
5

6
7

8

Ian H. Thomson
Nicole Owens
IDAHO STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
3647 Lake Harbor Ln
Boise, ID 83703
Tel: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985

9

10
11

12
13
14

15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23

Jan M. Bennetts
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W Front St, Rm 3191
Boise, ID 83702
Tel: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
Dennis A. Benjamin
NEVIN BENJAMIN MCKAY & BARTLETT, LLP
303 W Bannock St
PO Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
Tel: (208) 343-1000
Fax: (208) 345-8274
R. Keith Roark
ROARK LAW FIRM
409 NMain St
Hailey, ID 83333
Tel: (208) 788-2427
Fax: (208) 788-3918
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

24

25
26

Deputy Clerk
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MAR 13 2011
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS~MRlaTQ~HER
DIS~~Q~HER D. R'CH, 'lerk
'lark

1

"y JANET EWS
D&PUTY

2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

3
4

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,

5

Petitioner,

6

Case No. CV-PC-2008-03085
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER DENYING
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
JUDICIAL NOTICE
WITHOUT PREJUDICE

vs.

7
8
9
10

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

11

12
13
14

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Petitioner's Motion for Judicial Notice is the last of three motions filed by the Petitioner on
January 10, 2011 to be considered by this Court. The procedural history of these post-conviction

15

proceedings are set forth in this Court's previously filed Memorandum Decision and Orders, filed on
16

February 23,2011 and March 4,2011, which are hereby incorporated by reference as if fully set forth
17
18
19
20
21
22

herein. The Petitioner's Motion for Judicial Notice is accompanied by two bound collections of
documents, measuring approximately two inches thick.
The Petitioner requests that this Court take judicial notice of fifteen items, including eleven
documents. Each of the eleven documents (some with voluminous attachments) for which the Petitioner
requests judicial notice are documents filed in connection with judicial inquiries to determine whether a

23

conflict of interest existed in one of two capital post-conviction cases unrelated to this case. However,
24

the documents for which the Petitioner requests judicial notice are selected and do not encompass the
25
26

J

entirety of the record pertaining to the judicial inquiries in either of the two unrelated cases.
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On January 25,2011, the State filed the State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Judicial
1

2

of the selective
Notice, objecting to this Court taking judicial notice ofthe requested documents because ofthe

3

nature of the documents and because the relevance ofthe
of the documents to the instant case has not been

4

established. On February 1,2011, the Petitioner filed his Reply to State's Response to Petitioner's

5

Motion for Judicial Notice, arguing that the selected materials are relevant for two reasons: (1) they help

6

to explain the actions of the SAPD; and (2) they replace "allusions and opaque references" to State v.

7

Abdullah with specific facts.
8

DISCUSSION
9

10
11

Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 is entitled "Judicial Notice of Adjudicative
AdjUdicative Facts" and provides in
pertinent part:

12

(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts.

13

(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned.

14

15
16
17
18
19

20

(d) When mandatory. When a party makes an oral or written request that a
court take judicial notice of records, exhibits or transcripts from the
court file in the same or a separate case, the party shall identify the
specific documents or items for which the judicial notice is requested
or shall proffer to the court and serve on all parties copies of such
documents or items. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a
party and supplied with the necessary information.

21
22

23

The Petitioner has requested that the Court take judicial notice of each of fifteen items pursuant

24

to I.R.E. 201(d). However, items numbered one through four are the Petitioner's recitations of which
25

26

attorneys from the SAPD's office served as counsel for two different Petitioners (for himself and another
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.

capital petitioner) at different times. Items one through four as presently requested do not comply with
1

2

LR.E. 201 (d) because the Petitioner has not identified the specific documents or otherwise provided the

3

information necessary for the Court to identify the specific record, exhibit or transcript in the court file

4

from which the information may be verified.

5
6

Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 applies only to judicial notice of adjudicative facts. An
"[ a] controlling or operative fact, rather than a background fact; a fact that
"adjudicative fact" is "[a]

7

concerns the parties to a judicial or administrative proceeding and that helps the court or agency
8

determine how the law applies to those parties. For example, adjudicative facts include those that the
9

10

jury weighs." Black's Law Dictionary 669 (9th ed. 2009). Items five through fourteen are a list of

11

documents from the court file in Abdullah v. State, post-conviction Case Number SPOT 0500308. Item

12

fifteen is a document from the court file of Payne v. State, post-conviction Case Number CV-PC-20I0
CV-PC-2010-

13

11137. These documents are related to judicial inquiries into conflict of interest issues in those cases,

14

but are selected and do not encompass the entire histories of the judicial inquiries in those cases. In

15

response to the State's questioning of the relevance of the documents to the instant case, the Petitioner

16

replied:
17
18
19
20

The relevance of the material referenced in the Motion for Judicial Notice is two-fold: first, it
helps to explain the reasons why the State Appellate Public Defender chose to file a notice to the
court and undertake a review of the conflict through an independent attorney, instead of merely
making a representation to the Court and then waiting for the Court to appoint an attorney; and
second, it replaces the allusions and opaque references to State v. Abdullah that have been made
in arguments, pleadings and the Court's own order, with specific facts.

21

The Petitioner further opines that "a fuller understanding of the proceedings in State v. Abdullah
22
23

.... " However, the
would provide the Court with information that clearly distinguishes the two cases
cases...."

24

Petitioner's argument specifically identifies only one fact to distinguish the two cases: the fact that

25

"Judge Copsey had received specific information in the ordinary course of litigation that led her to make

26
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the finding that a conflict of interest actually existed." This Court is aware of that fact. However, the
1

2

fact that Judge Copsey mayor may not have structured her inquiry differently than this Court, and the

3

fact that the judicial inquiry in Abdullah was spurred by an apparent conflict that was identifiable from

4

filings in that case are not controlling facts in this case; rather, they are merely background facts from an

5

unrelated case.

6

The remainder of the Petitioner's argument focuses on the reaction of the SAPD to the rulings in

7

the Abdullah case such as how that case "affected the choices they made;" how the Abdullah Court's
8

finding of a conflict of interest "compromised" the advice of the SAPD to Mr. Abdullah; and how the
9

10

SAPD "faced a dilemma when determining how to proceed in this case" because of the Abdullah Court's

11

rulings. The reaction of counsel to rulings in an unrelated case is not an adjudicative fact, and the

12

arguments and orders based on the different facts of that unrelated case are not controlling or operative

13

facts in this case. Further, no explanation at all has been given why item number fifteen from the Payne

14

case was included in the Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice.

15

CONCLUSION

16

Requested items one through four do not comply with I.R.E. 201(d) as presently requested, and
17

the Petitioner has failed to connect items five through fifteen to any adjudicative fact in this case.
18
19
20

Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Petitioner's Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice without
prejudice. AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

21
22

Dated this

23~yof~ ,2011.

23

24

Thomas F. Neville
District Judge

25

26
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1

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

2
3

I hereby certify that on this

12. day of ~20
~20 11, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of

the within instrument to:
4

5
6
7

8

Ian H. Thomson
Nicole Owens
IDAHO STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
3647 Lake Harbor Ln
Boise, ID 83703
Tel: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985

9

10
11

12
13

14

15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22

Jan M. Bennetts
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W Front St, Rm 3191
Boise, ID 83702
Tel: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
Dennis A. Benjamin
NEVIN BENJAMIN MCKAY & BARTLETT, LLP
303 W Bannock St
PO Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
Tel: (208) 343-1000
Fax: (208) 345-8274
R. Keith Roark
ROARK LAW FIRM
409 N Main St
Hailey, ID 83333
Tel: (208) 788-2427
Fax: (208) 788-3918

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

23
24

25

~.-Jlt)~
~.-JL61~
Deputy Clerk
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NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B.
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Deputy Appellate Public Defenders
Capital Litigation Unit
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OEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,

)
)
)

Appellant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

v.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Case No.CV PC 080 3085
Supreme Court Case No. 38528

NOTICE OF APPEAL
(Capital Case)

ORiGINAL

TO: THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND ITS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, THE ADA
COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, appeals against the above-named Respondent to
the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing
Keith Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel, entered by the District Court of the
Fourth Judicial District, by the Honorable Thomas F. Neville, on December 27,
2010; and from the Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to
Reconsider and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order, entered by the
same District Court on February 23, 2011, during the capital post-conviction
proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
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2.

•

Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, has been granted permission to appeal the above
orders to the Idaho Supreme Court, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12(c), by the
Idaho Supreme Court's "Order Granting Motion For Permission To Appeal,"
dated March 23, 2011, Supreme Court Docket No. 38528, a copy of which is
attached hereto.

3.

Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, intends to raise the following issues (among
others which may later be identified):
a.

The protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege and rule of
confidentiality are determined by the existence of the attorney-client
relationship and not by the content of the communication between the
attorney and client;

b.

The district court was not justified in ordering a conflict inquiry where an
independent attorney had evaluated the possible conflict and determined
none existed, Mr. Hall had never raised the issue, and neither the State nor
the district court were able to provide the specific facts necessary to justify
a further inquiry;

c.

The district court cannot order the disclosure of attorney-client privilege
communications and work product of current post-conviction counsel in
an effort to investigate a possible conflict where Mr. Hall has never raised
the issue, and neither the State nor the district court were able to provide
the specific facts necessary to justify a further inquiry; and,

d.

The district court violated the separation of powers by forcing the Idaho
State Appellate Public Defender (hereinafter SAPD) to pay for services

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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•

already provided under the statute designating the authority to provide
conflict counsel specifically to the SAPD.
4.

No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. Although certain
documents were originally filed under seal, all such documents have since been
unsealed by order of the district court.

5.

Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, requests that the Reporter's Transcripts of all
hearings of every nature and description conducted in Ada County Case No. CV
PC 0803085 be prepared pursuant to I.A.R. 25(d). Mr. Hall requests the transcript
be provided both in electronic and hard copy format, and include at least the
following hearings:
a.

06/09/2008, Scheduling Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript

pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;
b.

0711412008, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages

for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;
c.

02/0312009, Scheduling Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript

pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;
d.

07/24/2009, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages

for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;
e.

0812812009, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages

for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;
f.

10/3012009, Discovery Hearing, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript

pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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g.

•

04/22/2010, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages
04122/2010,
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;

h.

0611112010, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages
06/11/2010,
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;

1.

08/06/2010, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;

J.

08/26/2010, Motion Hearing, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;

k.

09/0112010, Hearing, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages for this
09/01/2010,
hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; and,

1.

1011912010, Hearing, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages for this
10/19/2010,
hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;

6.

Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, requests a to-date Clerk's Record of Ada County
Case No. CV PC 080 3085 be prepared including all documents in the trial court
file of every nature, kind, and description, including briefs or memoranda filed or
lodged. Mr. Hall requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's
record in addition to those automatically included under I.A.R. 28(b)(2)(0):
28(b)(2)(0):
a.

03111/2008, Motion for Order Waiving the Attorney-Client Privilege;
03/11/2008,

b.

10/09/2009, Response to Respondent's Motion for Discovery and
Petitioner's Request for a Protective Order;

c.

10/2012009, State's Specific Response to Petitioner's Discovery Requests
10/20/2009,
and Reply to Petitioner's Response to State's Motion for Discovery and
State's Reply to Motion for Protection Order (Hall II);

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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•

d.

0411511 0, Notice of Change in Status of Counsel;
04/15/1

e.

04/30/2010, Order RE: Respondent's Motions for Discovery and for

Waiver of Attorney Client Privilege;
f.

06/29/2010, Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest (filed under

seal);
g.

07/28/2010, Ex Parte Motion (filed under seal);

h.

07/30/2010, Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict;

1.

08/06/2010, Response to State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD

Conflict (Hall II);
J.

08/1312010, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Inquiry into Possible

SAPD Conflict;
k.

08/20/2010, Reply to Memorandum in Support of State's Motion for

Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict (Hall II);
1.

08/30/2010, Amended Notice of Possible Conflict oflnterest;
ofInterest;

m.

08/30/2010, Notice of Limited Appearance of Dennis Benjamin;

n.

08/30/2010, Notice of Filing Under Seal;

o.

08/30/2010, Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin;

p.

10/04/2010, Notice of Filing Under Seal;

q.

10/04/2010, State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Possible

Conflict and Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin;
r.

10/12/2010, SAPD Letter to Judge Thomas F. Neville, with enclosed

transcript;
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s.

•

•

12127/2010,
12/27/2010, Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as

Independent Conflict Counsel;
t.
1.

0111012011,
01/10/2011, Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order;

u.

0111 0120
01/1
0/20 11, Motion for Permission to Appeal;

v.

01/10/2011, Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice;
0111012011,

w.

0111112011, Amendment to Motion for Permission to Appeal;
01/11/2011,

x.

01125/2011,
01/25/2011, State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Judicial Notice;

y.

01125/2011,
01/25/2011, State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration;

z.

01125/2011,
01/25/2011, State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Permission to

Appeal;
aa.

02/0112011,
02/01/2011, Reply to State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Judicial

Notice;
bb.

02/23/2011, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to

Reconsider, and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order;
cc.

03/04/2011, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion for
03/0412011,
Permission to Appeal;

dd.

03/07/2011, Motion for Permission to Appeal Supplemental Order;

ee.

03/10/2011, Response to Petitioners Motion for Permission to Appeal
0311012011,
Supplemental Order;

ff.

03/15/2011, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion for
03115/2011,
Permission to Appeal Supplemental Order; and

gg.

03/23/2011, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Petitioner's
03/2312011,
Motion for Judicial Notice Without Prejudice.
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.,.
7.

Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, requests that any offered or admitted exhibits be
copied and sent to the Supreme Court.

8.

I certify:
a.

A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Reporter;

b.

Petitioner-Appellant Erick Hall is an indigent prisoner and represented by
the SAPD, a state agency and public defender office, and is therefore
exempt from paying for transcripts, which should be provided at the
expense of the county pursuant to I.C. § 31-3212(4), I.C. § 1-1105(2), and
I.C. § 67-2301;

c.

Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, is an indigent prisoner and represented
by the SAPD, a state agency and public defender office, and is therefore
exempt from paying for the preparation of the clerk's record pursuant to
I.C. § 31-3212(4), I.C. § 1-1105(2), and I.C. § 67-2301;
I.e.

d.

Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, is an indigent prisoner and represented
by the SAPD, a state agency and public defender office, and is therefore
exempt from paying for the appellate filing fee under I.A.R. 23(a), and
pursuant to I.C. § 31-3212(2) and I.C.
I.e. § 67-2301;

e.

Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
ofldaho pursuant to I.C.
I.e. § 67-1401(1)).
Rule 20 (and the attorney general ofIdaho

RESPECTFULLY
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this 13 th day of April, 2011.

L<~
IANH.~MSON
IAN H. #OMS ON
pep ty Appellate Public

V

I~JjJ~

efender

.

NICOLE OWENS
Deputy Appellate Public Defender
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.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

•

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 13 th day of April, 2011, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL, as indicated below:

---v- U.S. Mail

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI - J BLOCK
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

----A- Statehouse Mail
---A-

===

Facsimile
Hand Delivery

L LAMONT ANDERSON
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
POST OFFICE BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
- - Facsimile
Hand Delivery

JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
-if-if-- Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery

HON. THOMAS F. NEVILLE
DISTRICT JUDGE
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
200 W. FRONT STREET
BOISE ID 83702

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
-V- Facsimile
-A- Hand Delivery

X

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
- - Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
DISTRICT COURT CLERK
200 W. FRONT STREET
BOISE ID 83702
SUE WOLF
COURT REPORTER
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
200 W FRONT STREET
BOISE ID 83702

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
- - . Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery

IHT/jf
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

RECEIVED
NAR 2 ~ 2011
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,

STATE APPElLPJE
PUBLIC DEFENIER ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

Petitioner,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PERMISSION TO APPEAL
Supreme Court Docket No. 38528-2011
Ada County Docket No. 2008-3085
Ref. No. 11-124

I. A MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL with attachments, was filed by counsel for
1.
Petitioner on February 11,2011, requesting permission to appeal, pursuant to the Idaho
Appellate Rules, Rule 12, from the district court's written Memorandum Decision and
Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel issued on December 27,
2010.
2. A RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL with
attachments, was filed by counsel for Respondent on February 25, 20 II. A NOTICE OF
IMPACTING
SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRICT COURT ORDER IMP
ACTING PENDING
2011.
II.
PERMISSIVE APPEAL was filed by counsel for Appellant on February 25, 20
3. A NOTICE OF DISTRICT COURT DECISION with attachment, was filed by counsel
for Respondent on March 8, 2011.
A NOTICE OF DISTRICT COURT
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL with attachment, was filed by counsel for Petitioner on
March 8, 2011.
The Court is fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Petitioner's MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL be,
and hereby is, GRANTED and Petitioner is granted leave to appeal by permission
pennission under I.A.R. 12
from the district court's Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent
Conflict Counsel, filed December 27, 2010.
IT FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for Petitioner shall file a Notice of Appeal with the
Clerk of the District Court within twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order, which appeal
shall proceed as iffrom
if from a final judgment or order entered by the District Court.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL - Docket No. 38528-2011
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•
DATED this '),

•
3

day of March 2011.
By Order of the Supreme Court

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Judge Thomas F. Neville

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL - Docket No. 38528-2011
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MOLLY 1. HUSKEY, I.S.B. # 4843
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
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IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679
Deputy Appellate Public Defenders
Capital Litigation Unit
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, 10 83703
(208) 334-2712

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, ·Clerk
By BRADLEY J. THIES
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Appellant,

)
)
)

)
)
v.
)
ST ATE OF IDAHO,
STATE
)
)
)
Respondent.
)
---------~))

Case No.CV PC 080 3085
Supreme Court Case Nos.
38528/38704
NOTICE OF APPEAL

(CAPITAL
(CAPIT AL CASE)

ORiGINAL
ORiG1NAl

TO: THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND ITS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, THE ADA
COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, appeals against the above-named Respondent to
the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing
Keith Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel, entered by the District Court of the
Fourth Judicial District, by the Honorable Thomas F. Neville, on December 27,
2010; and from the Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to
Reconsider and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order, entered by the
same District Court on February 23, 2011, during the capital post-conviction
proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
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2.

•

Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, has been granted pennission to appeal the above
12(c), by the
orders to the Idaho Supreme Court, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12(c),
Idaho Supreme Court's "Order Granting Motion For Pennission To Appeal,"
dated March 23, 2011, Supreme Court Docket No. 38528; and by the Idaho
Supreme Court's "Order Granting Motion For Pennission to Appeal and
Consolidation," dated April 20, 2011, Supreme Court Docket No. 38704, a copy
of which is attached hereto as Addendum A. This Notice of Appeal is timely filed
pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court's "Order Granting Motion to Reissue
Order," dated June 13, 2011, Supreme Court Docket No. 38704, a copy of which
is attached hereto as Addendum B.

3.

Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, intends to raise the following issues (among
others which may later be identified):
a.

The protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege and rule of
confidentiality are determined by the existence of the attorney-client
relationship and not by the content of the communication between the
attorney and client;

b.

The district court was not justified in ordering a conflict inquiry where an
independent attorney had evaluated the possible conflict and detennined
none existed, Mr. Hall had never raised the issue, and neither the State nor
the district court were able to provide the specific facts necessary to justify
a further inquiry;

c.

The district court cannot order the disclosure of attorney-client privilege
communications and work product of current post-conviction counsel in

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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•

an effort to investigate a possible conflict where Mr. Hall has never raised
the issue, and neither the State nor the district court were able to provide
the specific facts necessary to justify a further inquiry; and,
d.

The district court violated the separation of powers by forcing the Idaho
State Appellate Public Defender (hereinafter SAPD) to pay for services
already provided under the statute designating the authority to provide
conflict counsel specifically to the SAPD.

4.

No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. Although certain
documents were originally filed under seal, all such documents have since been
unsealed by order of the district court.

5.

Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, requests that the Reporter's Transcripts of all
hearings of every nature and description conducted in Ada County Case No. CV
25(d).
PC 0803085 be prepared pursuant to I.A.R. 25(
d). Mr. Hall requests the transcript
be provided both in electronic and hard copy format, and include at least the
following hearings:
a.

06/09/2008, Scheduling Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript
06109/2008,
pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;

b.

07/14/2008, Status Conference, Court Reponer Sue Wolf, transcript pages
07114/2008,
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;

c.

02/03/2009, Scheduling Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript
pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;

d.

07/24/2009, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;
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08/28/2009, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages

for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;

f.

10/3012009, Discovery Hearing, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript

pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;
g.

04/22/2010, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages

for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;
h.

06111/2010,
06/11/2010, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages

for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;
1.

08/06/2010, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages

for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;
J.

08/26/2010, Motion Hearing, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages

for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;

k.

0910112010,
09/01/2010, Hearing, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages for this

hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; and,

1.

10/19/2010, Hearing, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages for this

hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;
6.

Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, requests a to-date Clerk's Record of Ada County
Case No. CV PC 080 3085 be prepared including all documents in the trial court
file of every nature, kind, and description, including briefs or memoranda filed or
lodged. Mr. Hall requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's
record in addition to those automatically included under I.A.R. 28(b)(2)(O):
a.

03/11/2008,
0311112008, Motion for Order Waiving the Attorney-Client Privilege;
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b.

10109/2009,
10/09/2009, Response to Respondent's Motion for Discovery and

Petitioner's Request for a Protective Order;
c.

10/20/2009, State's Specific Response to Petitioner's Discovery Requests

and Reply to Petitioner's Response to State's Motion for Discovery and
State's Reply to Motion for Protection Order (Hall II);
d.

04115/10,
04/15/10, Notice of Change in Status of Counsel;

e.

04/30/2010, Order RE: Respondent's Motions for Discovery and for

Waiver of Attorney Client Privilege;
f.

06/29/2010, Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest (filed under

seal);
g.

0712812010,
07/28/2010, Ex Parte Motion (filed under seal);

h.

07/30/201 0, Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict;

1.

08/06/2010, Response to State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD
08/0612010,
Conflict (Hall II);

J.

08/13/2010, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Inquiry into Possible
08113/2010,
SAPD Conflict;

k.

08/20/2010, Reply to Memorandum in Support of State's Motion for

Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict (Hall II);

1.l.

08/30/2010, Amended Notice of Possible Conflict ofInterest;
oflnterest;

m.

08/30/2010, Notice of Limited Appearance of Dennis Benjamin;

n.

08/30/2010, Notice of Filing Under Seal;

o.

08/30/2010, Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin;

p.

10/04/2010, Notice of Filing Under Seal;
10104/2010,
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10/04/2010, State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Possible

Conflict and Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin;
r.

1011212010,
10112/2010, SAPD Letter to Judge Thomas F. Neville, with enclosed

transcript;
s.

12/27/2010, Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as

Independent Conflict Counsel;
t.
1.

0111012011, Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order;
01110/2011,

u.

01110/2011, Motion for Permission to Appeal;

v.

01110/2011, Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice;

w.

01111/2011, Amendment to Motion for Permission to Appeal;

x.

01125/2011,
01/25/2011, State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Judicial Notice;

y.

01125/2011,
01/25/2011, State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration;

z.

01/25/2011, State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Permission to

Appeal;
aa.

02/01/2011, Reply to State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Judicial

Notice;
bb.

02/23/2011, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to

Reconsider, and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order;
cc.

03/04/2011, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion for

Permission to Appeal;
dd.

03/07/2011, Motion for Permission to Appeal Supplemental Order;

ee.

0311 0/2011, Response to Petitioners Motion for Permission to Appeal

Supplemental Order;
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ff.

0311512011,
03/15/2011, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion for

Permission to Appeal Supplemental Order; and
gg.

03/23/2011, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Petitioner's

Motion for Judicial Notice Without Prejudice.
7.

Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, requests that any offered or admitted exhibits be
copied and sent to the Supreme Court.

8.

I certify:
a.

A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Reporter;

b.

Petitioner-Appellant Erick Hall is an indigent prisoner and represented by
the SAPD, a state agency and public defender office, and is therefore
exempt from paying for transcripts, which should be provided at the
expense of the county pursuant to I.C. § 31-3212(4), I.C. § 1-1105(2), and
I.C. § 67-2301;

c.

Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, is an indigent prisoner and represented
by the SAPD, a state agency and public defender office, and is therefore
exempt from paying for the preparation of the clerk's record pursuant to
I.C. § 31-3212(4), I.C. § 1-1105(2), and I.C. § 67-2301;

d.

Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, is an indigent prisoner and represented
by the SAPD, a state agency and public defender office, and is therefore
exempt from paying for the appellate filing fee under I.A.R. 23(a), and
pursuant to I.C. § 31-3212(2) and I.C. § 67-2301;

e.

Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20 (and the attorney general ofIdaho pursuant to I.C. § 67-1401(1)).
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14
14th
day of June, 2011.

lLtt-~
lL-tt-~
IAN H. THOMSON
Deputy Appellate Public Defender

NICOLE OWENS
Deputy Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

•

th
14th
day of June, 2011, served a true and
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 14
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL, as indicated below:

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI - J BLOCK
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

X

==

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

L LAMONT ANDERSON
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
POST OFFICE BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010

=:s::

JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
_'__ Facsimile
_'__
-'.--'.--- Hand Delivery

HON. THOMAS F. NEVILLE
DISTRICT JUDGE
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
200 W. FRONT STREET
BOISE ID 83702
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
DISTRICT COURT CLERK
200 W. FRONT STREET
BOISE ID 83702
SUE WOLF
COURT REPORTER
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
200 W FRONT STREET
BOISE ID 83702

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

===

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

yY

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
- - Facsimile
Hand Delivery

-----r:-

Jody Fa'fr
.
AdrlHnistrative Assistant, CLU
IHT/jf
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

-.......,RECEIVED
~RECEIVED
APR 2 1 2011
IN THE MATIER OF THE MOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND
CONSOLIDATION.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE APPELLATE
PUBLIC DEFENDER
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND
CONSOLIDATION
Supreme Court Docket No. 38704-2011
Ada County Docket No. 2008-3085
Ref. No. 11-192

A MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND CONSOLIDATION with attachments,
was filed by counsel for Petitioner on March 29,2011, requesting permission to appeal, pursuant to
I.A.R. 12, from the district court's written Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to
Reconsider; and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order issued February 23, 2011 in Ada
County case no. CV PC 2008-03085. Petitioner requests that the Court consolidate this case with
the original Motion for Permission to Appeal in Supreme Court Docket No. 38528.

The Court is

fully advised; therefore, after due consideration,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Petitioner's MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL
AND CONSOLIDATION be, and hereby is, GRANTED and Petitioner is granted leave to appeal by
permission under I.A.R. 12 from the district court's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the
Motion to Reconsider; and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order, filed February 23,2011.
Petitioner shall file a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the District Court within twenty-one (21)
days from the date of this Order, which appeal shall proceed as if from a final judgment or order
entered by the district court.
IT FURTHER ORDERED that appeal no. 38528 and 38704 shall be CONSOLIDATED FOR
ALL PURPOSES under 38528, but all documents filed shall bear both docket numbers.
FURlHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare a LIMTED
IT FUR1HER
CLERK'S RECORD, in Docket No. 38704 which shall include the documents requested in the
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND CONSOLIDATION Docket No. 38704-2011
002035

•

•

Notice of
Appeal (to be filed by counsel for Petitioner), together with a copy ofthis
of this Order which shall
ofAppeal
be due on July 22, 2011.

DATED this

). 0 day of
April, 2011.
ofApril,

By Order ofthe
of the Supreme Court

81ee~ ~~

Stephen W. Kenyon, ~
k

cc:

_

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Judge Thomas F. Neville

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND CONSOLIDAnON
CONSOLIDATION Docket No. 38704-2011
38704·2011
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AddendumB
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•
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

_ _ RECEIVED
1 3 2011
JUN 13
IN THE MATIER
MATIER OF TIlE MOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND
CONSOLIDATION.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,

)
)

)

)

)

STATE APPELLATE
PUBLIC DEFENDER
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
REISSUE ORDER

)

Petitioner,

)

)

v.

)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Supreme Court Docket No. 38704-2011
Ada County Docket No. 2008-3085
Ref. No. 11-283

On April 20, 2011, this Court entered an ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND CONSOLIDATION allowing Petitioner leave to appeal by
pennission under I.A.R. 12 from the district court's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the
Motion to Reconsider; and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order, filed February 23, 2011.
A Notice ofAppeal
of Appeal was not filed with the Clerk ofthe
of the District Court by Petitioner within twenty-one
days ofthe
of the date ofthat
of that Order. Thereafter, a MOTION FOR COURT TO REISSUE APRIL 20, 2011
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND CONSOLIDATION AND
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT THEREOF was filed by counsel for Petitioner on May 17, 2011,
requesting this Court to reissue the April 20, 2011 Order so that Petitioner may file a Notice of
Appeal with the district court.

A RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR COURT TO

REISSUE ORDER was filed by counsel for the Respondent on June 2, 2011. The Court is fully
advised; therefore, after due consideration,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Petitioner's MOTION FOR COURT TO REISSUE APRIL
20, 2011

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND

CONSOLIDATION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT THEREOF be, and hereby is, GRANTED
and Petitioner is granted leave to appeal by pennission under I.A.R. 12 from the district court's
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to Reconsider; and Supplementing the

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REISSUE ORDER - Docket No. 38704-2011
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Original Decision and Order, filed February 23, 2011. Petitioner shall file a Notice of Appeal with
of this Order, which appeal
the Clerk of the District Court within twenty-one (21) days from the date ofthis
shall proceed as if from a fmaJ
tinaJ judgment or order entered by the district court.
IT FURTHER ORDERED that appeal nos. 38528 and 38704 shall be CONSOLIDATED
FOR ALL PURPOSES under 38528, but all documents filed shall bear both docket numbers.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the due date for the filing of the Clerk's Record and
Reporter's Transcripts in these consolidated appeals shall remain as previously set for July 22, 2011,
in Supreme Court Docket No. 38528-2011.

DATED this

/.1"";,.y
/3"";,.y

20 II.
of JUDe, 20II.
By Order of

cc:

Supreme Court

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
Court Reporter Susan Wolf
District Judge Thomas F. Neville

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REISSUE ORDER - Docket No. 38704-2011
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•

MOLL Y J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843

FII.E~P},J)
NO.Fll.E~P},J)
--.J-.~
__--.J-.~

-

-

A.M.A.M.

SEP \ 6 20\\

IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327
JORDAN E. TAYLOR, I.S.B. # 8212
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

o RICH,
RICH. Clerk
CHRISTOP~;:ET eu-IS
eHRISTOP~;:ET
By oEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

-------------)
---------------------------)

Case No. CV PC 0803085
NOTICE OF CHANGE IN
STATUS OF COUNSEL

OR 1Gl NAL
(CAPITAL CASE)

Petitioner ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorneys at the State Appellate
Public Defender (hereinafter "SAPD"), hereby provides notice of change in the status of his
counsel. On August 17, 2011, Ms. Nicole Owens left the office of the SAPO and therefore will
no longer be representing Mr. Hall as co-counsel. As of this writing, Mr. Hall is represented by
Mr. Thomson and Mr. Jordan E. Taylor in these post-conviction proceedings.
DATED this 16 th day of September, 2011.

~.~
IAN H. THOMSON
Deputy State ApR

JORDAN . AYLOR
Deputy ate Appellate Public Defender
NOTICE OF CHANGE IN STATUS OF COUNSEL - I
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•

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

•

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of September, 2011, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document, NOTICE OF CHANGE IN STATUS OF COUNSEL,
as follows:
JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
~and Delivery

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

~ Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

Jody
CLU

NOTICE OF CHANGE IN STATUS OF COUNSEL - 2
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I'ILED
A...IIIyi.-._ _ _..-JP.M
A...IIIy'"-

TO:

CLERK OF THE COURT
IDAHO SUPREME COURT
451 WEST STATE STREET
BOISE, IDAHO
83702
FAX 334-2616

4'• OD
Of:>

SEP 30 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. Clerk
By BRADLEY J. l'HIES
DEPUTY

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,

Docket No.

38528-2011
38704-2011

Petitioner/Appellant,
Case No.

CVPC-2008-0003985

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPTS LODGED
Notice is hereby given that on September 29,
lodged twelve

(12)

listed below,

for the above-referenced appeal,

2011,

transcripts of 379 pages in length,

District Court Clerk of Ada County,

with the

Fourth Judicial

District.

s~~--------s~~--------Official Court Reporter

TRANSCRIPTS:
06-09-08
07-14-08
02-03-09
07-24-09
08-28-09
10-30-09
04-22-10
06-11-10
08-06-10
08-25-10
09-01-10
10-19-10

Scheduling Conference
Status Conference
Scheduling Conference
Status Conference
Status Conference
Discovery Hearing
Status Conference
Status Conference
Status Conference
Motion Hearing
Hearing
Hearing
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner-Appellant,

Supreme Court Case No. 38528
38704

vs.
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State ofIdaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the followingUnsealed documents (see Order Unsealing
Documents, filed January 11,2012) will be submitted as EXHIBITS to the Record:

1. Ex Parte Notice Of Possible Conflict Of Interest (Filed under seal), filed June 29,2010.
2. Ex Parte Motion To Vacate And Reschedule Hearing (Filed under seal), filed
July 28, 2010.
3. Affidavit Of Dennis Benjamin (Filed under seal), filed August 30, 2010.

4. State's Response To SAPD Amended Notice Of Possible Conflict And Affidavit Of
Dennis Benjamin (Filed under seal), filed October 4,2010.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 6th day of February, 2012.

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

BY~
Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner-Appellant,

Supreme Court Case No. 38528
38704

vs.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

LAWRENCEG. WASDEN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

OCT 04 lOll

Date of Service: - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner-Appellant,

Supreme Court Case No. 38528
38704

vs.
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
13th day of April, 2011.

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
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MOLL Y J. HUSKEY
MOLLY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843

NO.

__

NO.----i:ii'"aii~~r_r_~=~

F-I'l~~
A.M., _ _ _ _F-l'l~~

3)$9
3)$LC

OCT 25 2011

IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327
JORDAN E. TAYLOR, I.S.B. # 8212
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JANET ELLIS
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV PC 08-03085

MOTION TO UNSEAL DOCUMENTS

(CAPITAL CASE)

aRIG' NAL
AL

COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his attorneys at the
Office of the State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) and moves this Honorable C0U11 to unseal
the following documents in the clerk's record, which had originally been filed under seal:
1. Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest, originally filed under seal on June
29,2010;
2. Ex Parte Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing, filed under seal on July 28,
2010;
3. Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on August 30,2010; and
4. State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Possible Conflict and Affidavit of
Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on October 4.2010.
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Mr. Hall brings this motion in accordance with Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i),
which states that "any interested person or the court on its own motion may move to disclose,
redact, seal or unseal a part or all of the records in any judicial proceeding."
Although copies of the two ex parte notices (items 1 and 2) were subsequently provided
to the attorneys for the State, they were never technically unsealed by the Court.

(See

38528/38704 Tr., p.247, L.24 - p.248, L.18; p.254, Ls.12-16.)
In settling the record for an interlocutory appeal, counsel for Mr. Hall has reviewed the
four sealed documents and determined the entire contents of those documents have already been
extensively litigated and argued before the District Court. Mr. Hall no longer has any privacy
interest in the contents of those filings.

Consequently, none of the information contained in

those documents is now privileged or sensitive. Without concerns of privilege, there is no longer
any purpose served in maintaining those documents as sealed in the District Court or on appeal.
In addition, unsealing the documents will make argument and filings before the Supreme Court
more expeditious and convenient for all parties.
Counsel for Mr. Hall has spoken with Mr. Hall, Mr. Dennis Benjamin, and Jan Bennetts,
on behalf of the Ada County Prosecutor, and none of those parties have objections to the
unsealing of these documents.
DATED this 25 th day of October, 2011.

IAN H. THOMSON
Deputy State Ap llate Public Defender

JORD
. AYLOR
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25 th day of October, 2011, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document, MOTION TO UNSEAL DOCUMENTS, as follows:
JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W FRONT ST SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702
ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI - J BLOCK
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
. Facsimile
Hand Delivery

=:.x;
=:.&:;
-X--X-

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

L LaMONT ANDERSON
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
POST OFFICE BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
~.Hand Delivery (Supreme Ct. Box)

JUDGE THOMAS F. NEVILLE
ADA COU1\rTY DISTRICT COURT
200 W FRONT STREET
BOISE ID 83702-7200

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
;acsimile
~Hand
~Hand Delivery

DENNIS BENJAMIN
NEVIN BENJAMIN & McKAY
303 W BANNOCK
PO BOX 2772
BOISE ID 83701

-----v

Statehouse Mail
XU.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
ofldaho
State ofIdaho
I.S.B. # 4843
IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327
JORDAN E. TAYLOR, I.S.B. # 8212
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
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OCT 25 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JANET ELLIS
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,

)
)
Petitioner-Appellant, )
)
v.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
Respondent.
)

-------------)
----------------------------)

TO:

CASE NO. CV PC 08-03085
SUPREME COURT NOS. 38528/38704

OBJECTION TO THE RECORD

(CAPITAL CASE)

OR1G\NAL

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND L. LaMONT
ANDERSON, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that appellant in the above-entitled proceeding hereby

(LA.R.)
objects to the record on appeal served October 4,2011, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule (I.A.R.)
29. This objection is based upon the fact the appellant is requesting the items listed below.
Accordingly, the appellant requests, pursuant to I.A.R. 29(a), that the following be added to the
record:
1. Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest, originally filed under seal on June

29,2010;

OBJECTION TO THE RECORD - Page 1
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2. Ex Parte Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing, filed under seal on July 28,

2010;
3. Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on August 30, 2010; and
4. State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Possible Conflict and Affidavit of

Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on October 4,2010.
Idaho case law currently indicates that any missing portions of the record are presumed to
support the trial court's ruling. State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 390, 582 P.2d 728, 736 (1978);
State v. Williams, 126 Idaho 39, 45, 878 P.2d 213,219 (Ct. App. 1994). The requested items are

currently missing from the record. Unless made part of the record on appeal, the events and
testimony of this hearing will be presumed to support the district court's rulings, decisions, and
orders, which are now on appeal. In order to overcome this legal presumption and to have his
case considered on its facts and merits, Mr. Hall requests that the above-mentioned items be
made part of the record on appeal and filed with the Idaho Supreme Court.
Although copies of the ex parte documents were subsequently provided to the attorneys

for the State, they were never technically unsealed by the Court. (See 38528/38704 Tr., p.247,
L.24 - p.248, L.18; p.254, Ls.12-16.) Mr. Hall files contemporaneously with the Court a Motion
to Unseal Documents requesting these documents be unsealed, and that they be included in part
of the record as such.

DATED this 25 th day of October, 2011.

~H~#ol~
~H~~~
JORDJl(1\f~
JORDJl(l\f~

Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25 th day of October, 2011, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document, OBJECTION TO THE RECORD, as follows:
JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W FRONT ST SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702
ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMA
TE # 33835
INMATE
IMSI - J BLOCK
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

X
-4---4- Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
___ Hand Delivery

L LaMONT ANDERSON
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
POST OFFICE BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery (Supreme Ct. Box)

JUDGE THOMAS F. NEVILLE
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
200 W FRONT STREET
BOISE ID 83702-7200

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B.
LS.B. # 4843

01 2011
NOV 01
i.::2A D. RICH, Clerk
CHRISTOPi i'::A

IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B.
LS.B. # 8327
JORDAN E. TAYLOR, I.S.B.
LS.B. # 8212
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
Capital Litigation Unit
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

By KATHY BIEHL
Deputy

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,

)
)

Petitioner-Appellant, )

CASE NO. CV PC 08-03085
SUPREME COURT NOS. 38528/38704

)

v.

)
)

STA TE OF IDAHO,
STATE

)

STIPULATED OBJECTION TO THE
RECORD

)

Respondent.

)
)

(CAPITAL CASE)

OR1GrNAL

--------------)
-----------------------------)

COMES NOW the Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his attorney, .
Ian Thomson, at the State Appellate Public Defender's Office (SAPD), and Respondent, State of
Idaho, by and through its attorney, L. LaMont Anderson, at the Idaho State Attorney General's
Office, and hereby submit this stipulation regarding the settlement of the record pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rule (LA.R.) 29(a).

Mr. Hall previously filed an Objection to the Record on

October 25,2011, covering the same material. Accordingly, both parties agree that the following
documents be added to the record:
interest, originally filed under seal on
1. Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of [nterest,
June 29,2010;

STIPULATED OBJECTION TO THE RECORD
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2. Ex Parte Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing, filed under seal on July 28,
2010;
3. Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on August 30, 20 10; and
4. State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Possible Conflict and Affidavit of
20lO.
Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on October 4,
4,2010.
Based on the foregoing, the parties ask this Honorable Court to grant an order including the
named documents in the Clerk's Record, as reflected in the proposed Order to Settle the Record
filed herewith.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1sl day of November, 2011.

\~~
\~~

i'liTHOMSON
IliTHOMSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

STIPULATED OBJECTION TO THE RECORD
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•

,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of November, 2011, I served aa true and correct
copy of the foregoing document, STIPULATED OBJECTION TO THE RECORD, as follows:
JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W FRONT ST SUITE 3191
BOISE JD
ID 83702
ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI - J BLOCK
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

Statehouse Mail
U.S,
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery

-X-X-- Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

L LaMONT ANDERSON
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
POST OFFICE BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
~ Hand DeliveT)7 (Supreme Ct. Box)

JUDGE THOMAS F. NEVILLE
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
200 W FRONT STREET
BOISE ID 83702-7200

Statehouse Mail
U.S,
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery

F 'r
ministrative Assistant

STIPULA
TED OBJECTION TO THE RECORD
STIPULATED
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F~LED

if :

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843

NO.
AM

IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327
JORDAN E. TAYLOR, I.S.B. # 8212
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
Capital Litigation Unit
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

CHNITOPHER D. RICH.
RICH, Clertt

P.M.--f-J----P.M.--f-J----

NOV 02

zon

It KATHY BIEHL
DIIIIIlJ
IlIIIlIlJ

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

-------------)
----------------------------)

CASE NO. CV PC 08-03085

STIPULATION TO UNSEAL
DOCUMENTS

(CAPITAL
(CAPIT
AL CASE)

ORIG1NAL

COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his attorneys, Ian
Thomson and Jordan Taylor, at the State Appellate Public Defender's Office (SAPD),
and Respondent, State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, by and through its
attorney, Jan Bennetts, at the Ada County Prosecutor's Office, and hereby submit this
stipulation regarding the unsealing of documents in the above-captioned case.
Petitioner and Respondent agree that the following documents should be
unsealed, and that they be made public for the purposes of future post-conviction
litigation and on appeal:
1. Ex Parte Notice of Possible Confhct of Interest, originally filed under seal on
June 29, 2010;
20 10;

STlPULATlON
STIPULA
TION TO UNSEAL DOCUMENTS - I
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2. Ex Parte Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing, filed under seal on July
28,2010;
3. Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on August 30, 2010; and
4. State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Possible Conflict and Affidavit
of Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on October 4,2010.
This stipulation is made in accordance with Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i), which
states that "any interested person or the court on its own motion may move to disclose,
redact, seal or unseal a part or all of the records in any judicial proceeding." The parties
also stipulate that the interest in public disclosure predominates any remaining privacy
interest.
Based on the foregoing, the parties ask this Honorable Court to grant an order
unsealing the documents, as reflected in the proposed Order to Unseal Documents filed
herewith.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of November, 2011.

~Al.~

IAN H. THOMSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

~N~
JA BENNETTS
Deputy Ada County Prosecutor
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

•

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of November, 2011, I served a true
STIPULA nON TO UNSEAL
and correct copy of the foregoing document, STIPULAnON
DOCUMENTS, as follows:
JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W FRONT ST SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
,"" Hand Delivery

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI - J BLOCK
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

~

L LaMONT ANDERSON
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
POST OFFICE BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery (Supreme Ct. Box)

JUDGE THOMAS F. NEVILLE
ADA COU1\fTY DISTRICT COURT
200 W FRONT STREET
BOISE ID 83702-7200

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery

DENNIS BENJAMIN
NEVIN BENJAMIN & McKAY
303 W BANNOCK
PO BOX 2772
BOISE ID 83701

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

y..

Jod){ Fa
CLU' aministrative Assistant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV PC 08-03085

)

ORDER UNSEALING DOCUMENTS

)
)
)
)

(CAPITAL CASE)

-------------~)
--------------------------~)
The Court having before it a Stipulation of the parties, and good cause appeanng
therefore; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following documents contained in the Clerk's
Record be unsealed and disclosed:
1. Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest, originally filed under seal on June
29,2010;
2. Ex Parte Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing, filed under seal on July 28,
2010;

3. Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on August 30, 2010; and
4. State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Possible Conflict and Affidavit of
Dennis Be~amin, filed under seal on October 4,2010.
In so ordering, the Court finds that the interest of public disclosure predominates over
any remaining privacy interest in accordance with Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i).
DATED this ____
_ _ day of November, 2011.

Honorable Thomas F. Neville
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

•

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ _ day of
, 2011, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER UNSEALING DOCUMENTS by method
indicated below to:

IAN THOMSON
JORDAN TAYLOR
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
3050 LAKE HARBOR LANE, SUITE 100
BOISE ID 83703

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W FRONT ST SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI - J BLOCK
PO BOX 51
ID 83707
BOISE 10

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

L. LaMONT ANDERSON
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
POST OFFICE BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

DENNIS BENJAMIN
NEVIN BENJAMIN & McKAY
303 W BANNOCK
PO BOX 2772
BOISE ID 83701

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

Deputy Clerk

ORDER Ul'JSEALING DOCUMENTS

2

002059

.

.

•

~

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL

DISTR«;1;T~O~¥,---:~:-;;,;-_ _ __
DISTR«;1;T~O~¥,---:~:-;;,;-

C/'
..... jifi
I,..,
A.M.
~' L~
A
M <:/'.

__
P.M _ _ _
_

FILED

"
~
~
M

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JAN 11 2012
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
v.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

CASE NO. CV PC 08-03085

By JANET ELLIS
OEPUTY

ORDER UNSEALING DOCUMENTS

(CAPITAL CASE)

The Court having before it a Stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing
therefore; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following documents contained in the Clerk's
Record be unsealed:
1. Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest, originally filed under seal on June
29,2010;
2. Ex Parte Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing, filed under seal on July 28,
2010;
3. Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on August 30, 2010; and
4. State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Possible Conflict and Affidavit of
Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on October 4, 2010.
In so ordering, the Court finds that the interest of public disclosure predominates over
any remaining privacy interest in accordance with Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i).

~2ct2.....
~
2012....

ofJilt~.
DATED this ~ day of.fSl~.

Honorable Thomas F. Neville
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this -.U~ day of O1J~
~ , 201L.
20 I J... I served a true
UNSEAEGD6cUMENTS by method
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER UNSEA--eiNGDbcUMENTS
indicated below to:

.. -- ,

IAN THOMSON
JORDAN TAYLOR
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
3050 LAKE HARBOR LANE, SUITE 100
BOISE ID 83703

U.S. Mail
_ _ Statehouse ~ail 0
fi"Efcslmne ~
_ _ Hand Delivery

--L
-L

JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W FRONT ST SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

Statehouse Mail
_ _ U.S. Mail.
Mail _

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI - J BLOCK
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

L. LaMONT ANDERSON
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
POST OFFICE BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010

Statehouse Mail
_ _ U.S. Mail ~
VFacsimile
VFacsiII1ile
_ _ Hand Delivery

DENNIS BENJAMIN
NEVIN BENJAMIN & McKAY
303 W BANNOCK
PO BOX 2772
BOISE ID 83701

Statehouse Mail
_ _ U.S.Mail ~

()

=:2~ile"~
=:2'~ile"~

_ _ Hand Delivery
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~FacslmI1e
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\.

MOLL Y J. HUSKEY
MOLLY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843

NO. ~

A.M.'.N

FILED

P.M. _ _ __

JAN 11 2012

IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327
JORDAN E. TAYLOR, I.S.B. # 8212
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
Capital Litigation Unit
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JANET ELLIS
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,

)
)

Petitioner-Appellant, )

CASE NO. CV PC 08-03085
SUPREME COURT NOS. 38528/38704

)

)

~

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

ORDER ON OBJECTION TO THE RECORD

)
)

Respondent.

)

(CAPITAL CASE)

------------)
---------------------------)

The Court having before it a Stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing
therefore; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following documents be added to the Clerk's
Record:

1. Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest, originally filed under seal on
June 29,2010;
2. Ex Parte Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing,
Hearing. filed under seal on July 28,
2010;
3. Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on August 30, 2010; and
4. State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Possible Conflict and Affidavit of
Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on October 4,2010.
U'A_

~

2..D(2,

DATEDthis~:..:...clayof~OlL
DATEDthis~:..:...c1ayof~OlL

~
~
~~
HonoraIeThOlllaSi.
eville...
Hono~hOlllaSi ~~eville'"
District Judge
..
..

ORDER ON OBJECTION TO THE RECORD
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•

•
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1l.f\A
~

~

201,1 I served a true and
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of
2011
correct copy of the foregoing document ORDER ON OBJECTION TO THE RECORD as
follows:
IAN THOMSON
JORDAN TAYLOR
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
3050 LAKE HARBOR LANE, SUITE 100
BOISE ID 83703

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
------;;r- Facsimile ~
_ _ Hand Delivery

JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W FRONT ST SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

Statehouse Mail
_ _ U.S. Mail ~

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI - J BLOCK
POBOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

L. LaMONT ANDERSON
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
POST OFFICE BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010
DENNIS BENJAMIN
NEVIN BENJAMIN & McKAY
303 W BANNOCK
PO BOX 2772
BOISE ID 83701

ORDER ON OBJECTION TO THE RECORD

~

Wlesimile

_ _ Hand Delivery
Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

v

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail

Paesimile -e---f)
~

_ _ Hand Delivery
Statehouse Mail
U.S.Mail ~

,/Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery
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